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This thesis aims to add empirical evidence to the corporate finance literature by looking at 
two main financing issues, namely firms’ payout policies and capital structure decisions, in 
the context of emerging markets.  The thesis consists of seven chapters, including five main 
standalone research papers.  After an introductory chapter, the first research paper reviews 
the existing literature on the dividend policy controversy with an emphasis on recent 
empirical work.   The following two chapters consist of two research papers which look 
separately at the dividend and capital structure decisions of firms in India and in Mauritius.  
In the second research paper an agency model of dividend policy is estimated and tested on a 
sample of Indian firms using Weighted Least Squares methodology.  The third research paper 
applies panel data procedures to estimate and test a model of the determinants of leverage, 
using the entire population of non-financial quoted firms in Mauritius.  The last two 
empirical papers investigate how affiliation with an Indian Business House impacts on the 
dividend and capital structure decisions of firms.   The impact of group-affiliation on the 
payout decision is tested by Maximum Likelihood qualitative and limited dependent variable 
techniques.  The analysis of the impact of group-affiliation on the capital structure decision is 
conducted using Ordinary Least Squares methods and incorporates group-level 
characteristics as explanatory variables.  While the main findings of these papers are on the 
whole consistent with the theory, there are new major insights that represent the special case 
of emerging markets.  These main insights, as well as the main conclusions of the study, are 
summarised in Chapter 7, including some promising ideas for future research.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  The background and motivation of the study 
Firms can use internal or external sources to finance their investments.  Internal sources 
include retained earnings and depreciation, while external sources basically refer to new 
borrowings or the issue of stock.  Thus the financing decision involves the appraisal of 
two choices.  The first is the dividend choice – the fraction of retained earnings to be 
ploughed back and the fraction to be paid out as dividends.  The second is the capital 
structure choice – the fraction of external finance to be borrowed and the fraction to be 
raised in the form of new equity.   
On the face of it neither the dividend decision nor the capital structure decision 
should impact on the value of the firm.  This is because both these decisions can be 
related to either the type of security, form of distribution, or make up of the ownership 
structure, but not to the investment decision.   Thus the financing decision will determine 
the mix of debt and equity, the relative numbers of shareholders and debtholders, and the 
distribution of investment proceeds between interest, dividends and capital gains.  
However, how investment is financed or how and to whom the proceeds are distributed 
should not have an impact on the investment decision itself, and thus on firm value.  In 
short, financing and investment decisions are independent of each other and the value of 
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the firm is determined by the latter.  Thus, as financing decisions have no affect on value, 
they are irrelevant and should be the residue of the more important investment decisions.   
In practice, however, firms, managers, and investors, devote much time and 
resources to making and analysing financing decisions about dividends and capital 
structure.  Moreover, when market imperfections such as taxation, transaction costs, 
asymmetric information and agency conflicts, are introduced, devoting time and 
resources to financing decisions no longer appears a futile pursuit.  Subsequently, much 
theoretical and empirical research has aspired to clarify how the two principle financing 
decisions, the dividend and capital structure choices, impact on the value of firms that 
operate in imperfect markets.  To date no consensus has been reached.      
 
1.2  The contribution of the study 
This study aims to contribute to the corporate finance literature, by looking at both the 
dividend and the capital structure choices.  However, an attempt is made to make a 
valuable contribution by innovating on the rich existing literature in three major ways.  
First, in order to provide a more comprehensive view on the subject, both theoretical and 
empirical approaches are undertaken.  Particularly, the second chapter is devoted to a 
review of existing theoretical and empirical literature on the dividend decision 
controversy, with emphasis on current thinking.  The remaining chapters are equally 
divided between the dividend and capital structure decisions and are empirically oriented.   
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The second way by which this study attempts to innovate on existing academic 
work is by concentrating on emerging, as opposed to developed, markets.  As noted in the 
literature review in the second chapter, most of the theoretical and empirical studies that 
deal with financing decisions are US based.  However, many emerging markets are, as 
implied by the name, in the middle of a process of change, growth and liberalisation, 
which provide an interesting testing ground for Western-based corporate theory. Thus 
Chapter 3, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 investigate dividend and capital structure decisions of 
Indian firms, while in order to achieve balance, Chapter 4 is African based.     
The third way by which innovation is sought in this study is by synthesising 
corporate financing theory with business groups theory.  In particular, Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 investigate the impact of group affiliation on the dividend and capital structure 
decisions respectively.  Thus the second and third innovations are related to each other 
because business groups are typical of emerging markets, and theories to explain their 
evolution are often related to market distortions that characterise many of these markets.   
Furthermore, India is a suitable representative of both an emerging market and an 
environment where business groups have flourished.    
  
1.3 The methodology of the study 
The methodology of the study is illustrated in Figure 1.1, and consists of five major steps 
namely: review of the literature; construction of hypothesis or theory or model; data 
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collection; estimation and testing; and interpretation of findings to generate conclusions 
and relate them to the literature and theory.  
All the five steps are well explained in Section 1.4, regarding the structure and 
contents of the study.  However, it is useful to explain, as part of the methodology, the 
testing ground chosen for the empirical chapters, i.e. mainly India.  
 













Estimation and testing 
Data collection 










True to type, the Indian emerging market has been undergoing economic reforms 
since 1991, prior to which it was characterised by high controls and extensive public 
ownership.  Prior to reforms a licensing system required firms to obtain clearances for 
many routine operations.  Clearances were typically determined not on economic or 
social basis but by the relative lobbying power of firms and business groups. Other 
industry controls, such as monopoly controls and small-scale incentives, limited firms’ 
growth.  Indeed, this may explain the large size of the Indian market in terms of number 
of listed firms while at the same time majority of Indian companies are relatively small 
(see Green, Murinde and Suppakitjarak, 2001). Similarly, the foreign trade regime prior 
to reforms was characterised by high protectionism from import competition and 
restrictions on foreign ownership of Indian companies.  Likewise the government was 
heavily involved with the workings of the financial systems. High reserve requirements 
were stipulated, interest rates were imposed, and credit was directed to priority sectors 
giving rise to manipulation and inefficiencies.  Furthermore, supervision and financial 
discipline were slack, and equity markets suffered from lack of transparency and poor 
investor protection, while the large public sector was similarly inefficient.   
In 1991 India suffered a financial crisis which was followed by the initiation of 
economic reforms.  Financial reforms of the banking sector included reduction in the 
reserve requirements on banks, liberalisation of interest rates, and opening up the banking 
sector to entry by new private banks.  Reforms were also introduced in the non-bank 
financial sector.  For example, capital market reforms included the establishment of the 
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Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1988, which was given statutory 
powers in 1992.  SEBI was charged with improving disclosure rules in the primary 
market for equity as well as the transparency of trading practices in the secondary market.  
Similarly the office of the Controller of Capital Issues, which controlled the issue and 
pricing of new equity, was abolished in 1992, encouraging firms to sell shares.  Other 
reforms were also launched including relaxing restrictions on foreign ownership, 
lowering import controls and tariffs, restructuring of the domestic tax system, and 
phasing out of government subsidies.   It is thus in this new and changing environment 
that Indian firms have been making their financing decisions since the middle of the 
1990s, and it is these decisions that are analysed in the third, fifth and sixth chapters of 
this study.  
The population of Indian firms from which the samples were drawn for Chapter 3, 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, is the 4800 or so listed companies on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange out of a universe of over 6500 listed and unlisted Indian firms.  But the size of 
this population is not typical of developing countries, and thus in order to achieve a more 
balanced view, the 40 or so listed companies on the Mauritius Stock Exchange form the 
population from which the sample for Chapter 4 is drawn.  The Mauritius economy can 
be differentiated from the Indian economy in other ways too, although there are also 
some similarities.  In essence, the ownership structure in Mauritius, like in India, is 
predominantly family oriented with an emphasis being placed on preventing dilution of 
control.  The Mauritius Stock Exchange is much more recent than the Bombay Stock 
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Exchange, being established in 1988 by the Stock Exchange Act1.  In the early 1990s it 
was opened to foreign investors, in spite of which it is still characterised by poor 
liquidity, low standards of corporate disclosures, and high domination by a few large 
companies.  It is this environment, which provides the backdrop for the capital structure 
decisions of Mauritian firms in the 1990s as is analysed in Chapter 6.  
 
1.4  The structure and scope of the study 
Before turning to the analysis of how Mauritian or Indian firms take financing decisions 
in the environments described above, Chapter 2 takes stock of current thinking and 
evidence on the dividend puzzle.   The starting point for the debate on how dividend 
affects firm value, which is often referred to as the dividend puzzle, is typically marked 
by Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) irrelevancy theory.   Thus the second chapter begins 
by describing the irrelevancy theory, and then outlines some of the leading theories that 
have evolved once the assumptions underlying the irrelevancy theory are relaxed.  These 
include the transaction costs theory, the tax hypothesis, the bird in the hand argument, 
and the signalling and agency theories.  The transaction cost theory of dividends is based 
on transaction costs, control and other considerations that are associated with paying 
dividends and then resorting to external finance to fund investments.  The tax hypothesis 
proposes that government distortions by way of taxes have important implications for 
                                                          
1 The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) was established in 1875 as ‘The Native Share and Stockbrokers 
Association’.  
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dividend policy and firm value.   The bird in the hand argument is based on the idea that 
dividends reduce risk, while the signalling theory is based on the information content of 
dividends.   Finally the agency theory of dividends deals with the role of dividends in 
resolving agency conflicts.  After reviewing some of the relevant empirical 
methodologies and evidence, Chapter 2 concludes that no agreement has yet been 
reached on the dividend policy question.  
As in Chapter 2, the subject of Chapter 3 is also the dividend policy puzzle, only 
here an empirical approach is undertaken and an extended agency theoretic rationale for 
the dividend decision is investigated.  The extended theory considers conflicts and 
associated costs that broaden beyond the pure owner-manager relations.  To this end, a 
variant of the cost minimisation model is utilised, relaxing the assumption of linearity and 
using data on Indian firms.  As previously hinted, management of the Indian economy 
has traditionally been based on socialist ideology and a high degree of state-intervention. 
Chapter 3 suggests that this imply more severe agency conflicts including conflicts that 
arise between the pursuit of socio-political goals and the goal of shareholder wealth 
maximisation.  The hypothesis is, therefore, that an agency rationale for the dividend 
puzzle fits especially well in the Indian context.  The empirical method is the general to 
specific approach, starting with an unrestricted model that includes non-linear terms, and 
carrying out a simplification process based on Wald and t-tests.   Chapter 3 presents 
empirical results that are consistent with the hypothesis put forward.  In particular, the 
degree of government holdings appears to be significant in explaining the target payout 
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ratios of firms in the Private Sector in India.    
Chapter 4 turns attention to the second financing decision, namely the capital 
structure choice.   In particular the chapter investigates the power of competing theories 
in explaining the capital structure decisions of non-financial, quoted companies in 
Mauritius.  For this purpose a measure of leverage is regressed on firm characteristics 
that have been identified by previous research as important determinants of capital 
structure.  The idea is to distinguish among the various theories by studying the nature of 
the relationship between leverage and other firm’s characteristics.  The empirical 
approach includes both a cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares analysis and a panel 
data procedure.  The findings support the notion that the trade off, pecking order, and 
agency theories, as well as control considerations have an important role in explaining the 
capital structure decision.  The strongest and clearest evidence is in support of control 
considerations, and is obtained from the highly significant and positive impact of size and 
growth on the firm’s leverage decision.  These findings sit well with the family oriented 
ownership structure that dominates the Mauritian business environment as noted in 
Section 1.3 above.  The recording of highly significant and negative impact of asset 
structure on leverage is puzzling.  It could be interpreted as validation of an agency-based 
explanation, or it could be due to measurement problems.  In the latter case, it is plausible 
that the asset structure variable is a proxy for non-debt tax shields rather than for asset 
tangibility.  In this sense the strong and negative relationship between asset structure and 
leverage is a further reinforcement of the trade off theory of capital structure. 
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Chapter 5 introduces the business group phenomenon and investigates the impact 
of group affiliation on the firm’s dividend policy.  More specifically, the chapter links the 
transaction cost theory of dividend with the market failure and political economy theories 
of business groups in emerging markets.  As reviewed in the second and third chapters, 
the transaction cost theory or dividend asserts that due to the gap between external and 
internal finance, dividend policy is negatively related to dependency on the former.  
Furthermore, as this gap is expected to be notably wide in emerging markets, the 
transaction cost theory of dividend should fit particularly well to data from such markets.  
However, the market failure and political economy theories of business groups in 
emerging markets imply that group-affiliation reduces the firm’s dependency on external 
finance.  Instead dividend policies of group-affiliated firms are determined by group 
considerations.  To test whether the dividend policies of group-affiliated firms are 
substantially different to that of independent firms, a number of techniques are applied to 
data on Indian firms.  The empirical procedure begins with a comparative analysis, 
followed by multivariate analysis that utilises qualitative and limited dependent variable 
methodologies.   Results support the notion that the decision of whether to pay dividend 
is sensitive to transaction cost considerations regardless of group-affiliation. Results 
further show that the payout level of group-affiliated firms is less sensitive to transaction 
cost considerations compared with the case of independent firms.  However, one finding 
which is left unexplained is that once group diversification passes a certain threshold, the 
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transaction cost model appears to once again offer a good fit to the dividend behaviour of 
firms. 
Chapter 6 continues with the theme on business groups but as related to the 
capital structure decision.  In the spirit of the previous chapter, the idea is to synthesize 
two strands of the corporate finance literature.   The synthesis is then used to generate 
two plausible models that explain the capital structure decisions of group-affiliated and 
non-group firms. The first model is estimated and tested on a sample of 1472 Indian 
firms, of which 912 are independent firms and 560 are group-affiliated.  The second 
model expands on the first and is tested on a sample of 1384 firms of which 912 are 
independent and 472 are group-affiliated.  In general, the results confirm that group-
affiliated firms approach the capital structure decision in a manner, which is significantly 
different from their independent counterparts.  For example, the results of the comparison 
analysis show that the mean as well as median leverage of group-affiliated firms is higher 
than the counterpart measures for non-affiliated firms.   Moreover, the multivariate 
analysis concludes that the capital structure decision of group-affiliated firms is more 
sensitive to firm’s liquidity, assets’ intangibility, and profitability compared with 
independent firms.  In contrast the capital structure decision of independent firms display 
greater sensitivity to firm size and growth compared with group-affiliated firms.  Thus of 
the firm characteristics only age and stock illiquidity prove to have similar impact on the 
capital structure decision of group and non-group firms.  When group-level 
characteristics are added, only group liquidity appears unimportant while group 
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profitability shows to have strong and negative impact on the leverage decisions of 
group-affiliated firms.  The latter result may be due to profitable groups creating internal 
capital markets, to avoid having to resort to expensive external finance.  Likewise group 
debt and group size are shown to have significant and negative impact on the leverage 
decision of group-affiliated firms.  This may indicate that groups co-ordinate their 
policies, and share (in particular) intangible assets, such as reputation.  Similar to 
previous work there is also some evidence of the importance of group diversity to the 
operations of group-affiliated firms.   
In addition to undertaking the above mentioned empirical procedures, each of the 
second to sixth chapters ends with a list of some promising future research ideas, some of 
which are subsequently attempted.  Finally, Chapter 7 concludes by summarising the key 
conclusions of the study and by presenting the main future research ideas.  
 
1.5  Limitations of the study 
Before proceeding to the main chapters, it is worth noting three main limitations of this 
thesis.  First, the thesis relies on empirical procedures as in the corporate finance 
literature and as illustrated by Figure 1.1, rather than construction of theoretical proofs on 
dividend policy and capital structure of firms in emerging markets.  Thus the first main 
limitation of this thesis is that theoretical modelling of these issues as contained in the 
financial economics literature is not addressed here.  
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Second, it was purposely intended to produce standalone empirical papers in 
Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.  To maintain their standalone status, it was found necessary to 
include brief reference to the relevant background literature, thereby inevitably leading to 
some limited amount of duplication between each of the standalone chapters and the 
literature survey in Chapter 2.  However, we maintain that the repetition has bee kept to 
the strictest minimum.  
Third, the empirical findings and conclusions contained in this thesis may be used 
by financial managers to inform policy decisions.  However, it is not the intention of this 
thesis to generate policy-oriented findings for operation purposes.  Thus the third main 
limitation of this work is that focus is not directed at the practical applicability of the 
findings.  Recognising these limitations the thesis proceeds to the main standalone 
research papers, commencing with Chapter 2, which surveys the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the dividend policy controversy.   
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CHAPTER 2: DIVIDEND POLICY – WHAT DO WE KNOW? 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Firms are generally free to select the level of dividend they wish to pay to holders of 
ordinary shares, although factors such as legal requirements, debt covenants and the 
availability of cash resources impose some limitations on this decision.  It is thus not 
surprising that the empirical literature has recorded systematic variations in dividend 
behaviour across firms, countries, time and type of dividend.    
Variations amongst firms are noted, for example, in Fama and French (2001). 
They bring evidence to show that US dividend paying firms tend to be large and 
profitable, while non-payers are typically small, less profitable but with high investment 
opportunities.  Variations across countries include La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (2000) who study the dividend policies of over 4000 firms from 33 countries 
around the world.  It is found that dividend policies vary across legal regimes in a way 
that is consistent with the idea that dividend payment is the outcome of effective pressure 
by minority shareholders to limit agency behaviour.   Thus firms in common law 
countries with good legal protection of investors tend to have higher payout ratios 
compared with firms in countries with weaker legal protection.  This is consistent with 
Allen and Michaely (1995), who note that firms in the US, had payout ratios of around 60 
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percent during the 1980s and early 1990s.   However during the same period, Glen, 
Karmokolias, Miller and Shah (1995) observe a payout ratio of only about 40 percent, for 
a composite of emerging markets’ firms.  Time trends in dividend behaviour is 
investigated by Fama and French (2001), who find that the percentage of US firms that 
pay dividends fell from 66.5 in 1978 to 20.8 percent in 1999.  The study also describes a 
declining trend in the propensity to pay dividend by US corporations in the time period 
from the late 1970s to the late 1990s.  Likewise DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2000) 
look at time trends in the type of dividends paid by US firms.  They find that special 
dividends have gradually disappeared in the period from the 1940s to the 1990s although 
incidences of very large special dividends have increased.     
In light of the freedom over dividend policy and the observed variations across 
firms, countries, time and type of dividends, the question of how dividend policy is 
determined has been the subject of many studies.   This question is often referred to as the 
dividend puzzle, and the debate is generally believed to have been initiated by Miller and 
Modigliani’s (1961) irrelevancy theory.  Miller & Modilgiani (1961) show that in a 
perfect capital market with rational behaviour and perfect certainty and with investment 
and borrowing decisions given, dividend policy has no effect on the value of the firm1.  
                                                          
1 Miller & Modilgiani (1961) specify what they mean by perfect capital market, rational behaviour and 
perfect certainty.  In a perfect capital market all buyers and sellers have equal access to information, and 
none receives preferential treatment. Thus all traders are price-takers and none can affect the market price.  
Further, trading does not entail any transaction costs and there are no tax differentials associated with 
paying dividends either for firms or for individuals.  Rational behaviour implies that more wealth is 
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The value of the firm at the beginning of the period can be expressed as the dividends to 
be received during the period plus the firm’s value at the end of the period, less the 
amount of external finance raised during the period, all expressed in present value terms.  
In turn, the amount of external finance is the amount of funds required to finance planned 
investments, less the firm’s earnings after deducting the amount of dividends paid.  As 
the dividends for the period appear twice on the RHS of the equation with opposite signs, 
they sum to zero and hence eliminated.  
Vt = PV [Dt+ Vt+1 – (It – (Xt - Dt))]                                                                                (2.1) 
Where Vt is the value of the firm at time t; PV stands for present value; Dt is the total 
dividends paid during period t; It is investment; and Xt is the firm’s net profit for period t.   
The firm’s value at the end of the period can similarly be defined as the dividend 
paid during that period plus the value at that period end less external finance raised 
during the period, and so forth for all future periods.  The current value of the firm can 
therefore be expressed as the infinite sum of the present values of future earnings less 
investment expenditures. Since profits, investment and the discount rate are all 
independent of dividend either by their nature or by assumption, the conclusion is that the 
dividend decision has no effect on value.    
When the assumptions underling the irrelevancy theory are relaxed the question is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
preferred to less, and investors are indifferent to whether wealth comes in the form of dividend or capital 
gains. Perfect certainty means that all investors are certain about the future investment and profits of all 
firms, thus there is no need to distinguish between debt and equity and an all-equity firm is assumed.  
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whether it is still reasonable to conclude that dividends will have no effect on expected 
earnings, investment or on the firm’s risk and hence the discount rate.   For example, 
future earnings of a firm that pays dividends may be lower relative to a similar firm that 
does not pay dividends if paying dividends involves incurring transaction costs or extra 
taxes.   Indeed, much of the dividend literature has focused on the implications of 
relaxing the Miller & Modilgiani (1961) irrelevancy theory assumptions and of 
introducing market imperfections.  
 The literature that deals with dividend policy in the presence of market 
imperfections may be categorised under two basic views: for and against.  On the 
‘against’ camp are theories including the transaction cost theory of dividend and the tax 
hypothesis that suggest that dividend payments reduce shareholder wealth.  On the ‘for’ 
camp are theories that suggest that dividend payments increase shareholder wealth, 
including the bird in the hand argument, the signalling theory and the agency theory of 
dividend.  All these theories have been extensively discussed and tested but to date there 
is no consensus on how firms determine their dividend policies. 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the leading theoretical themes that have 
evolved to explain the dividend puzzle.  It is also intended to review the main empirical 
methodologies that have been developed to test these theories and to present some of the 
evidence that have been collected.  The structure of this chapter is as follows.  Leading 
dividend theories are outlined in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 selected empirical studies 
testing the various dividend theories are reviewed.  Section 2.4 concludes.  
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2.2   Dividend theories 
2.2.1  The transaction cost theory  
Firms may incur costs in distributing dividends while investors may incur costs in 
collecting and reinvesting these payments.  Moreover, both firms and investors may incur 
costs when, due to paying dividends, the firm has to raise external finance in order to 
meet investment needs.  Indeed, the transaction costs incurred in having to resort to 
external financing, is the cost of dividend in Bhattacharya’s (1979) model.  In contrast, 
however, it may be argued that dividend are beneficial as they save the transaction costs 
associated with selling stocks for consumption purposes2.   Either way, if there are 
additional transaction costs that are associated with paying or not paying dividends, then 
dividend policy should impact earnings expectations and hence share price and firm 
value.   
Alternatively dividends may influence value if dividend policy has an impact on 
management’s investment decisions.  For example, managers may decide to forgo 
positive net present value investments because dividend payments exhausted internal 
finance and raising external funds involves transaction or other costs.  Indeed in Miller 
and Rock’s (1985) model the cost of dividends arise from cutting or distorting the 
                                                          
2 Having to sell stock for consumption purposes is the assumption in John and Williams (1985).  Indeed, 
Fama and French (2001) note that one possible explanation for the decline over time in the benefits of 
dividends may be the increased tendency to hold stocks via mutual funds.  Holding via these funds reduces 
the transaction costs associated with selling stock to meet liquidity needs. 
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investment decision.  However, more typically, the transaction cost theory of dividend 
retains the assumption of a given level of investment, and focuses on the costs of raising 
external funds when the firm increases its dividend payment.  Transaction costs include 
flotation costs to the firm of raising additional external finance such as underwriter fees, 
administration costs, management time, and legal expenses.  Further, when the firm pays 
dividend and then has to raise additional external finance, existing shareholders suffer 
dilution of control.  Thus to maintain control or for other reasons, existing shareholders 
may subscribe to the new issue, incurring trading costs such as stamp duty and 
stockbrokers’ commissions.  Ultimately all these transaction costs are reflected in the 
share price and firm value.    
In addition to explicit transaction costs there are also less obvious costs that are 
associated with paying dividend and resorting to external finance, and which are due to 
information asymmetries and pecking order considerations.  Particularly, raising new 
equity can be costly if it comes at a time when the shares are temporarily under-valued or 
due to the signals this action sends to the market regarding the value of the firm.  
Similarly, debt issues are also problematic because the announcement of the issue may be 
associated with increased probability of default and with managers trying to issue debt 
before such bad news are revealed.  Like explicit transaction costs, these less obvious 
costs should also impact earnings expectations and be reflected in the firm’s share price 
and value.    
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Subsequently, due to the costs associated with raising external finance, the 
transaction cost theory of dividend suggests that firms should utilise retained earnings to 
the extent possible.  Dividend should only be paid when this does not result in shortage of 
internal funds that are required for investment.  Thus Rozeff (1982) suggests that firms 
that have greater dependency on external finance would maximise shareholder wealth by 
adopting lower payout policies.  Leverage, growth potential and volatility are all factors 
that can increase dependency on costly external funds.  High levels of leverage imply 
high fixed costs that the firm has to ensure it can meet.  Growth potential means the firm 
is faced with good investment opportunities for which it requires funds. Similarly 
earnings volatility suggests that dependency on external finance is higher because there is 
less certainty regarding earnings to be generated.   This implies that highly leveraged, 
risky or growth firms should be associated with conservative payout policies.  
Another important factor that has implications for control consideration and for 
the transaction costs of raising external finance and thus for firms’ dividend policies, is 
size.   Particularly, the ownership structure of small companies is likely to be less 
dispersed than that of larger firms.  The more dispersed is ownership the less control is 
exercised by each shareholder and hence the problem of loosing control is more critical 
for smaller firms.  Further, the cost of external finance is likely to be higher for smaller 
firms compared with larger, well-established firms with easier access to the capital 
markets.  Add to this the observation that growth firms are usually smaller and the 
conclusion is that small firms are likely to find the payment of dividends more costly 
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compared with larger firms.  This conclusion may explain the positive correlation often 
observed between firm size and the likelihood that the firm is a dividend payer. (Redding, 
1997, and Fama and French, 2001).   
 
2.2.2  Tax theories 
Another cost associated with dividend payments is taxes.  The tax hypothesis proposes 
that corporate tax on distributions and taxes on dividends in the hand of investors are 
important costs to be considered when deciding on a dividend policy.  More specifically, 
the difference between tax on dividends and on capital gains should be considered as well 
as the difference between corporate tax on distributed and on retained earnings. For 
example, if corporate tax on distributions is higher than that on retained earnings, this 
may reduce expected earnings of a firm that pays dividends relative to a firm that does 
not.  Similarly, if dividends in the hands of shareholders are taxed higher than capital 
gains, investors should evaluate expected returns on an after tax basis and share prices 
will vary inversely with the firm’s payout level.  Indeed, the basic tax hypothesis 
proposes that additional taxes on dividends make capital gains a less costly way of 
returning wealth to shareholders.  Thus, the basic tax hypothesis supports a conservative 
dividend policy, and proposes that if the firm wants to return cash to shareholders then 
this should be done through share repurchases.  It is thus puzzling to find that although 
repurchases have increased since the 1980s (Allen and Michaely, 1995, Jagannathan, 
Stephens and Weisbach, 2000, and Fama and French, 2001), they have not substituted for 
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dividends (Fama and French, 2001, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 2000).   
However Miller and Scholes (1978) show that under two provisions of the US 
Internal Revenue Code, taxable investors may still be indifferent to dividends even when 
the tax regime favours capital gains3.   Furthermore, Miller and Modigliani (1961) argue 
that despite the presence of taxes, tax-induced clientele effect greatly reduces the tax 
costs of dividends.  The idea is that there may be clienteles for both high and low 
dividend yields depending on tax positions.  Institutions, which are often tax-exempt and 
individuals at low tax brackets may prefer companies with high payout policies.  Other 
investors at high tax brackets for whom the relative tax cost of dividends is substantial 
will prefer firms with low payout policies.  Shareholders select firms whose policies suit 
their preferences.  As there are enough firms to satisfy all, no firm can increase its value 
by changing its dividend policy.  Moreover, by changing its dividend policy, a firm may 
trigger a change in clientele and this could be costly due to trading costs.  Thus the 
clientele effect hypothesis supports the dividend irrelevancy conclusions.  
 
                                                          
3 The first provision used to illustrate the irrelevancy of taxes in Miller and Scholes (1978) is the ability to 
deduct interest payments from investment income received, in calculating tax liability.   The second 
provision is that insurance companies pay no taxes on investment income.  Thus if the firm increases its 
dividend, a taxable investor can avoid the additional tax liability by increasing his interest liability to the 
point where it matches the increased level of dividends.  To maintain the same level of risk, the investor 
can use the proceeds from the additional borrowings to buy insurance policy.  This increases the investor’s 
level of assets so that his debt ratio is unchanged.  
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2.2.3  The bird in the hand argument 
The traditional argument in favour of dividend is the idea that dividends reduce risk 
because they bring shareholders’ cash inflows forward.   Although shareholders can 
create their own dividends by selling part of their holdings, this entails trading costs, 
which are saved when the firm pays dividends.  The risk reduction or bird in the hand 
argument is associated with Graham and Dodd (1951) and with Gordon (1959) and it is 
often defended as follows.  By paying dividends the firm brings forward cash inflows to 
shareholders, thereby reducing the uncertainty associated with future cash flows.  In 
terms of the discounted dividend equation of firm value, the idea is that the required rate 
of return demanded by investors (the discount rate) increases with the plough-back ratio.  
Although the increased earnings retention brings about higher expected future dividend, 
this additional dividend stream is more than offset by the increase in the discount rate.   
This argument overlooks the fact that the risk of the firm is determined by its 
investment decisions and not by how these are financed. The required rate of return is 
influenced by the risk of the investments and should not change if these are financed 
from retained earnings rather than from the proceeds of new equity issues.  As noted by 
Easterbrook (1984), in spite of paying dividends the firm does not withdraw from risky 
investments, thus the risk is merely transferred to new investors.  
 
2.2.4  The signalling theory 
A more convincing argument in favour of dividends is the signalling hypothesis, which is 
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associated with propositions put forward in Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), 
John and Williams (1985), and others.  It is based on the idea of information asymmetries 
between the different participants in the market and in particular between managers and 
investors.  Under such conditions, the costly payment of dividend is used by managers, to 
signal information about the firm’s prospects to the market.  For example, in John and 
Williams’ (1985) model the firm may be temporarily under-valued when investors have 
to meet their liquidity needs.  If investors sell their holdings when the firm is 
undervalued, then there is a wealth transfer from old to new shareholders.  However, the 
firm can save losses to existing shareholders by paying dividends.  Although investors 
pay taxes on the dividends, the benefits from holding on to the undervalued firm more 
than offset these extra tax costs.  A poor quality firm would not mimic the dividend 
behaviour of an undervalued firm because holding-on to over-valued shares does not 
increase wealth.   
The signalling hypothesis can explain the preference for dividends over stock 
repurchases in spite of the tax advantage of the latter4. Particularly, as suggested in 
Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000), Guay and Harford (2000) and DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Skinner (2000) among others, the regular dividend signal an ongoing 
commitment to pay out cash.   This signal is consistent with Lintner (1956) observation 
that managers are typically reluctant to decrease dividend levels.  However, unlike 
regular dividends, repurchases and special dividends can be used to signal prospects 
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without long-term commitment to higher payouts.  Therefore announcements of increases 
in regular dividends signal permanent improvements in performance, and should be 
interpreted as confidence in the firm on behalf of managers thus triggering a price rise.  
Conversely, announcements of dividend decreases should be interpreted as signalling 
poor performance and lack of managerial confidence and should therefore trigger drops 
in prices.   
If changes in the levels of dividend release information to the market, then firms 
can reduce price volatility and influence share prices by paying dividends.  However, it is 
only unexpected changes which have an informative value and which can thus impact 
prices.  Therefore, the value of the signal depends on the level of information 
asymmetries in the market.  For example, in developing countries where capital markets 
are typically less efficient and where information is not as reliable as in more 
sophisticated markets, the signalling function of dividend may be more important.  
Moreover, it can be argued that information will eventually be revealed whether or not 
the dividend signal is sent, hence the dividend impact on prices is only temporary.  
 
2.2.5  The agency theory of dividend 
Another argument in favour of generous dividend payments is that this shifts the 
reinvestment decision back to the owners.  The underlying assumption is that managers 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 Refer to the discussion in Section 2.2.2, on the tax hypothesis. 
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may not necessarily always act as to maximise shareholders’ wealth.   The problem here 
is the separation of ownership and control which gives rise to agency conflicts as defined 
in Jensen and Meckling (1976).  Accordingly when the levels of retained earnings are 
high managers are expected to channel funds into bad projects either in order to advance 
their own interests or due to incompetency.   Hence generous dividend policy enhances 
the firm’s value because it can be used to reduce the amount of free cash flows in the 
discretion of management and thus controls the over investment problem (Jensen, 1986).   
Another agency theory based explanation of how dividends increase value is 
described in Easterbrook (1984).   While the transaction cost theory of dividend proposes 
that dividend payments reduce value because they lead to the raising of costly external 
finance, Easterbrook (1984) argues that it is this process which reduces agency problems. 
The idea is that the payment of dividends is one possible solution to the problem of 
collective action that tends to lead to under-monitoring of the firm and its management.  
Thus the payment of dividends and the subsequent raising of external finance induce 
investigation of the firm by financial intermediaries such as investment banks, regulators 
of the securities exchange where the firm’s stock is traded, and potential investors. This 
capital market monitoring reduces agency costs and lead to appreciation in the market 
value of the firm.  Moreover, total agency cost, as defined by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), is the sum of the agency cost of equity and the agency cost of debt. The latter is 
partly due to potential wealth transfer from bond to equity holders through assets 
substitutions. Thus Easterbrook (1984) note that by paying out dividends and then raising 
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debt, new debt contracts can be negotiated to reduce the potential for wealth transfer.    
 
2.3  Review of selected empirical studies 
The dividend theories mentioned in the previous section relate the impact of dividend on 
value to transaction costs, taxes, risk, signalling and agency conflicts.  However, the main 
empirical studies of the dividend policy puzzle focus in particular on the tax hypothesis, 
the signalling hypothesis and agency studies5.  Thus, following the spirit in Prasad, Green 
and Murinde (2001), it is around these three theories that the following discussion is 
organised.  Transaction costs that are incurred due to changes in dividend policies are 
normally incorporated into each of these main hypotheses. These costs are commonly 
assumed to be a function of dependency on external finance and are controlled for by 
variables such as growth, size or profit. Relatively little empirical work has been 
conducted on the bird in the hand argument therefore this branch of empirical work is 
discussed no further6.   
Testing approaches depend to a large extent on the hypothesis under investigation. 
                                                          
5 Indeed these three theories (agency, asymmetric information and taxation) also commonly underlie 
empirical work of the other financing decision, namely the capital structure choice.  See for instance the 
recent and comprehensive survey by Prasad, Green and Murinde (2001). 
6 One exception is Allen and Rachim (1996) who investigate the relation between risk and the dividend 
policy using 173 Australian listed companies for the period 1972 to 1985. Stock price volatility is regressed 
on the dividend yield and on six control variables including earnings volatility, payout ratio, debt, growth, 
size and industry dummies. The study fails to find evidence that dividend yield is significantly correlated 
with stock price volatility, which suggests rejection of the bird in the hand (or duration) effect. 
 27 
The clientele effect is often assessed by an event study around the dividend payment 
days. Other tax studies look at the trading activity rather than the stock price behaviour 
around ex-dividend days. Some tax hypothesis studies take a different approach, and 
review the impact of tax reforms on relative prices while other regress the dividend 
policy on tax proxies to assess the importance of the latter in influencing the former.  
Studies that investigate the signalling hypothesis often follow an event study 
around the dividend announcement period. Other signalling studies assess revisions in 
earnings forecasts following unexpected changes in dividends. Another approach to 
testing the validity of the signalling hypothesis is by looking at changes in firm 
characteristics, following changes in its dividend policy.  A particular attention has often 
been paid to changes in earnings.  Cross sectional comparisons between firms of different 
characteristics are also used to assess how such differences may affect the value of the 
dividend signal.   
Agency theory studies generally use regression analysis to assess the degree of 
substitutability among alternative mechanisms for controlling agency problems.   Another 
approach, which is typically classified under the agency theory umbrella, is testing the 
suitability of Rozeff’s (1982) cost minimisation model.  The cost minimisation model 
actually combines transaction costs theory with agency theory, and proposes that the 
optimal payout ratio is that which minimises the sum of costs of paying dividends.  Thus 
Rozeff (1982) and subsequent studies regress a proxy of the optimal payout ratio on 
proxies for agency costs that may be controlled by paying dividends and on proxies for 
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transaction costs that are associated with dividend payment.   
The literature review of this section will proceed by examining a limited number 
of studies dealing with each of the above mentioned theories in turn.  However, some 
researchers have attempted to model the management’s decision-making process that 
determines dividend changes. Some of these behavioural models, notably Lintner’s 
(1956), have important implications in particular for the signalling theory and are hence 
described first.   
 
2.3.1  Behavioural models – The partial adjustment model7  
2.3.1.1  The main studies 
One approach to addressing the dividend puzzle is to understand the management’s 
decision-making process that determines dividend changes.   Indeed, this is the approach 
in Lintner (1956), who carry out a series of interviews with the managers of 28 US 
industrial firms about their firms’ dividend policies in the 7 years from 1947 to 1953. 
From the survey it emerges that firms tend to establish dividend policies with target 
payout ratios that are applied to current earnings.  It is also found that firms have 
adjustment rates that determine the percentage of the target change by which dividend 
levels are actually changed.  Lintner (1956) also reports that although the target payout 
ratios and speed of adjustments vary across firms, in most cases they stay reasonably 
                                                          
7 The studies reviewed in this section are summarised in Table 2.1.  This table, as well as the rest of the 
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stable over time8.  
Based on his findings, Lintner (1956) develops the partial adjustment model of 
the change in the dividend level from the previous to the current period.  The model 
reflects management’s belief that investors dislike erratic patterns in dividend levels and 
hence the emphasis is on the change from the previous actual level:  
ΔDi,t  =  αi  +  Ci  [ D*i,t  –  Di (t-1) ]   +   Ui,t                                                                  (2.2)                     
Where  
ΔDi,t = Di,t – Di (t-1)                                                                                                          (2.3) 
D*i,t = Ri (Pi,t)                                                                                                                 (2.4) 
Thus ΔDi,t is the change in the dividend payment; Di,t and Di(t-1)                       
are the amounts of dividends paid in years t and t-1 respectively; D*i,t is the target 
dividend amount where Ri is the target payout ratio and Pi,t is current profits after tax; Ci is 
the speed of adjustment; αi is a constant which in general will be positive to reflect 
management’s reluctance to reduce dividends; Ui,t is an error term.   Equation (2.2) can 
alternatively be expressed as follows: 
Di,t  =  αi,t  +  β  Pi,t  +  γ  Di  (t-1)  +  Ui,t                                                                                              (2.5) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
tables of this chapter are collected together in Appendix 2A at the chapter’s end.  
8 The target payout ratios in the Lintner (1956) survey vary from 20% to 80% with 50% being the most 
common.  The speed with which the firms in the study move toward the target payout ratio ranges from 
20% to around 50%. 
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Where   
β  =  Ci (Ri)  and  γ  =  1 - Ci
According to Lintner (1956), current net earnings, Pt, play the most important role 
in determining dividend changes.  This is because current earnings are widely available 
and hence managers’ view is that investors expect dividends to reflect changes in this 
variable.  Expanding (2.5), noting that Di(t-1) can be expressed as a function of that period’s 
profits and the previous period’s dividends, the dividend level in each period is a 
weighted average of current and past profits.  Hence the dividend pattern is a smoothed 
pattern of earnings and is indicative of the time path of permanent earnings.  The degree 
of smoothing depends on the speed of adjustment coefficient, Ci.   
Thus the three key factors in the partial adjustment model are the speed of 
adjustment coefficient, Ci, the target payout ratio, Ri, and current earnings, Pt.  Indeed, 
the three questions that are commonly raised about the Lintner model concern these 
factors.  First, some researches have investigated what determines the speed of 
adjustment and hence the degree to which smoothing takes place. Second, some 
researches try to establish whether firms have long-term target payout ratios towards 
which they move. Third, the question of whether current earnings are the key determinant 
of dividends has been investigated.   In general, however, empirical tests of the Lintner 
model have confirmed its validity.  One of the earliest and widely quoted such study is by 
Fama and Babiak (1968). Another, which is going to be reviewed here for the reason 
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explained below, is by Mookerjee (1992).   
Mookerjee (1992) is unique in that it applies the Lintner model, which has been 
developed on the basis of a US survey, to a developing rather than a developed country.  
Particularly, annual data for the aggregate Indian corporate sector for the period 1949 to 
1981, before significant reforms were introduced, is utilised to show that the basic 
Lintner model performs well in explaining dividend behaviour in India.  Modification of 
the basic model, by adding the availability of external finance as an explanatory variable, 
improves the fit of the model.  Indeed, the lagged external finance enters with a 
significant and positive estimated coefficient reflecting access to subsidised borrowing 
and hence tendency to use borrowing to finance higher dividends. Mookerjee (1992) also 
notes that the constant in the Lintner model is hypothesised to be significant and positive, 
reflecting the fact that firms are more willing to raise rather than lower dividends. 
Although the study finds the constant to be significant under all specifications, it enters 
with a negative sign in all regressions. It is suggested that this could be a reflection of the 
impact of taxes9.  
Although the study by Mookerjee (1992) is supportive of the Lintner’s model, it 
also addresses the third of the three questions mentioned above, that are often raised with 
reference to this model.  Namely this is the question of whether management set the 
desired dividend level as a fraction of current earnings or as a fraction of permanent 
                                                          
9 Mookerjee (1992) note that traditionally income tax had been very high in India, disadvantaging dividend 
payments over capital gains.  It is also noted, however, that this trend began to reverse in the mid-1970s. 
 32 
earnings.  If the latter is the case and it is assumed that earnings follow a random walk 
with a drift, than the lagged profit after tax, should enter with a negative and significant 
coefficient.  Mookerjee (1992) finds that although the lagged earnings enter with a 
negative coefficient, in all cases it is also insignificant.  In contrast, Lee (1996) finds 
stronger support for the view that it is permanent earnings as oppose to current earnings 
that determine dividend.   
The study by Lee (1996) assesses whether there is long-term relationship between 
various definitions of earnings and dividends. The study utilises a bivariate time-series 
model of earnings and dividend obtained from annual observations on the Standard & 
Poor's Index for the period 1871 to 1992.  The model is sufficiently general to allow 
various specification of target dividend to be nested within it. These restrictions are then 
tested, taking into account the non-stationarity of the dividend and earnings series and the 
cointegration between them.  The results indicate that dividend behaviour is determined 
primarily by changes in permanent earnings and that the Lintner model performs better 
when the target payout ratio is a function of permanent rather than current earnings. This 
is supportive of the signalling hypothesis in the sense that current earnings are not a good 
indicator of the long-term financial position, hence managers utilise dividends to signal 
this position.   
Shirvani and Wilbratte (1997) also use cointegration (albeit multivariate rather 
than bivariate) techniques to test the validity of the Lintner model.  However, their main 
aim is to address the second of the three questions mentioned above, namely whether 
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firms have long-term payout ratios.  Using quarterly observations on the Standard & 
Poor’s 500 index for the period 1948 to 1994, the first stage is to confirm the non-
stationarity of the dividends, earnings and price index series.   Further, as these three 
series are found to cointegrate, tests of the coefficients in the cointegrated equation point 
to a long-run relationship between earnings and dividends.  In particular the hypothesis 
that the coefficients on the logs of the dividend and earnings variables, are equal and of 
the opposite signs is not rejected.   
The Shirvani and Wilbratte's (1997) study further estimates the error correction 
model to capture short-run deviations from the long-run target payout ratio and the speed 
of adjustment.  Thus the study also touches on the first of the three questions about the 
Lintner model, namely the question of what determines the speed of adjustment. It is 
found that firms apply different adjustment rates in raising and lowering dividends. When 
the payout ratio is below its long-run target, the firm will increase dividends. However, 
when the payout ratio is above its target, the firm will hold the dividend level constant 
and wait for earnings to grow so that the target payout ratio is achieved. This ratchet 
effect is interpreted in terms of the signalling theory, and in particular as a way of 
avoiding the bad signals associated with dividend reductions.  
The idea that the speed of adjustment is determined by the signalling role of 
dividends is also supported in Dewenter and Warther (1998).  The study reports the 
results from running the partial adjustment model for each of 180 Japanese firms and 313 
US firms with at least five years of nonzero dividend during the period 1982 to 1993.  It 
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is found that the median speed of adjustment is higher for Japanese firms compared with 
US firms, and higher still for Keiretsu members. This pattern is explained by the 
observation that the Japanese business environment is characterised by less information 
problems, thus there is less need for the dividend-smoothing device in the case of these 
firms10.  
Returning to the question about the existence of long-term payout ratios, Hines 
(1996) looks at possible reasons for the Lintner (1956) observation that payout ratios vary 
across firms.  In particular, the payout rates of 505 US firms for the period 1984 to 1989 
as well as the dividend patterns for the aggregate US corporate sector during the period 
1950 to 1986 are investigated.  Hines (1996) finds that the payout rates applied to profits 
from foreign sources are about three times higher than the payout rates applied to 
domestic profits. These findings support the signalling hypothesis since information 
asymmetries surrounding overseas operations are likely to be more acute than for 
                                                          
10 Dewenter and Warther (1998) note that corporate governance in Japanese firms, and in Keiretsu-member 
firms in particular, differs from that in the US.   Specifically it is noted that close links between managers 
and investors reduce information asymmetries problems in Japanese firms relative to US. Furthermore, it is 
argued that investors in Keiretsu-member firms have longer-term investment horizon and hence can wait 
until the information signalled through dividend changes is eventually revealed through other mediums.  
Thus the higher speed of adjustment for Japanese firms is explained by the smaller role that dividends in 
these firms play in conveying information. Consequently, firms are less concerned with smoothing their 
dividend pattern and can adjust their dividend quicker towards the target payout rates. These conclusions 
are further supported by the findings that Japanese firms experience smaller stock price reactions to 
dividend omissions and initiations, and the findings that Japanese managers are less reluctant to cut 
dividends compared with US managers. 
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domestic activities. Managers, therefore, may feel a stronger need to send signals 
regarding the prospects of foreign operations. 
 
2.3.1.2  Conclusions on the empirical studies of the Partial Adjustment Model  
Table 2.1 summarises the relevant key issues of each of the empirical studies reviewed in 
this section.  Empirical findings appear to support the validity of the partial adjustment 
model, not only in respect to the behaviour of US firms, as shown in Fama and Babiak 
(1968), but also with respect to the behaviour in less developed countries as in Mookerjee 
(1992)11.  The other studies reviewed above address the three questions that are 
associated with the Lintner model regarding the existence of a target payout ratio, the 
determinants of the speed of adjustment coefficient, and the degree to which current 
earnings explain dividend levels.    
The Lintner’s idea of a long-term payout ratio is supported in Shirvani and 
Wilbratte (1997), while Hines (1996) provides evidence supporting the notion that 
variation in the payout target is due to the signalling role of dividends and the degree of 
information asymmetries faced by the firm.  The signalling role of dividends is likewise 
supported by Shirvani and Wilbratte (1997), who show that firms apply different 
                                                          
11 There are, however, some inconsistencies, for example, with regards to the constant, which Lintner 
(1956) proposes should be positive to reflect management desire to establish a gradual upward trend in 
dividend.  However, while Fama and Babiak (1968) find the model improves when the constant is dropped, 
Mookerjee (1992) records significant but negatively signed constants in all of the regressions. 
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adjustment rates to dividend increases and decreases.  Further evidence on what 
determines the speed of adjustment towards target dividend is given in Dewenter and 
Warther (1998).  Finally, Lee (1996) shows that the partial adjustment model works 
better when the target dividend is modelled as a function of permanent as opposed to 
transitory earnings.  
Before proceeding to the next section, it is important to note that other 
behavioural model to that of Lintner (1956) have been suggested and tested.  For 
example, Cyert, Kang and Kumar (1996) develop a behavioural model where firms do 
not have a target long-term payout ratio because managers do not like predicting long 
term future events.  Instead, the model is based on the notion that managers seek to avoid 
uncertainty and to optimise self welfare12.   
However, whether managers have long-term target payout ratios or whether they 
follow shorter-term goals, the behavioural models imply that managers’ intentions and 
information on the firm and its future can be inferred from the dividend decision.  This is 
the notion underlying the signalling hypothesis, the empirical evidence on which is 
reviewed immediately after the following review of selected empirical studies of the tax 
hypothesis of dividends.    
 
                                                          
12 Cyert, Kang and Kumar (1996) suggest the if managers increase dividend today, this is associated with a 
short-term reward for themselves, but also reduces funds available for investment and can increase the 
probability of a dividend cut in the next period.  The dividend policy is therefore the result of balancing the 
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2.3.2  Empirical studies of the tax hypothesis 
2.3.2.1  Tax effect13  
The basic tax hypothesis suggests that because personal taxes on dividends tend to 
exceed those on capital gains, firms have an incentive to adopt a conservative payout 
policy and such policy should be value enhancing.  A possible method to assess the 
validity of this hypothesis is to study stock price and dividend policy changes in respond 
to tax reforms.  Hubbard and Michaely (1997) and Papaioannou and Savarese (1994) 
adopt this methodology.  Alternatively the importance of taxes to the dividend decision 
may be assessed by regressing dividend policy on proxies for the tax cost of dividends. 
Gentry (1994) and Lasfer (1996) adopt this methodology.  
Using data on firms that are listed on either the NYSE or the AMEX for 1987 (65 
firms) and 1988 (64 firms), Gentry (1994) finds support for the tax hypothesis. The study 
investigates the dividend policies of corporations versus Publicly Traded Partnerships 
(PTPs) in the oil and gas exploration industry. PTPs and corporations in the oil and gas 
industry are of similar size and this makes them comparable. The main distinction 
between PTPs and corporations is that during the period studied PTPs were not taxed at 
the corporate level and hence escaped the US double taxation system. Accordingly, if the 
tax hypothesis is valid, as PTPs have lower tax cost associated with the payment of 
dividends, their payout rates should be larger.  Using cross sectional instrumental variable 
                                                                                                                                                                             
short-term rewards from dividend increases with the need to maintain a stable pattern. 
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technique, the dividend payout is regressed on an organisational form dummy as well as 
on a number of other control variables14.  Results of the study indicate that firms consider 
taxes when formulating their dividend policies and that, coherent with the tax hypothesis, 
PTP pay more dividends than corporations. 
Further support for the tax hypothesis, is provided by Lasfer (1996) who uses 108 
firms quoted on the LSE for the period 1973 to 1983. The study considers both personal 
and corporate taxes by running a regression of the partial adjustment model.  The original 
partial adjustment model is adapted to incorporate the effects of both personal and 
corporate taxes on the determination of the long run target dividend level. Lasfer (1996) 
tests whether the target dividend (and therefore also the actual dividend) is a function of 
earnings, of a tax discrimination variable and of a tax exhaustion dummy.  The tax 
discrimination variable, surrogating for the effects of personal taxes, varies inversely with 
the personal income tax rate. When the tax discrimination is larger than one, income tax 
on dividends is cheaper than tax on capital gain and the firm is expected to prefer a high 
payout policy15.  The tax exhaustion dummy, surrogating for the effects of the firm’s tax 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 The studies reviewed in this sub section are summarised in Table 2.2. 
14 Gentry (1994) notes that the organisational form may be endogenous to the dividend decision. In 
particular, firms that want to pay high dividends may select the PTP form to avoid double taxation. 
Therefore, in order to obtain consistent estimate for the organisational form, an instrument is used in place 
of the PTP dummy.  Specifically, a Probit model for the PTP dummy is run and the predicted probabilities 
replace the PTP dummy in the dividend policy regression.  Other explanatory variables in the dividend 
regression are included to control for differences in growth, profitability and debt levels. 
15 The tax discrimination variable, TD, is defined as: TD = (1-m) / [(1-z)(1-s)].  Where m is the marginal 
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position, is set to one if the taxable profit is lower than gross dividends and advanced 
corporation tax (ACT) is irrecoverable.  When ACT is irrecoverable, the firm is expected 
to prefer a low dividend payout, and hence the coefficient is expected to be negatively 
signed.   
Results in Lasfer (1996) show all variables to be significant and to enter with the 
signs predicted by the tax hypothesis. Further, results of an event study in the second part 
of the paper are also supportive of the tax hypothesis, rejecting the tax induced clientele 
effect. Specifically, significant and positive abnormal returns are reported on the ex 
dividend day consistent with the notion that the price drop on the ex dividend day is 
systematically less than the value of the dividends. The reason for this is dividend 
taxation, which causes the value of the dividends to investors to be less than their 
nominal amount.  The study concludes that taxes affects both the dividend policy and ex-
dividend day returns, and that firms set their dividend policies so as to maximise the after 
tax returns to their shareholders as well as to minimise their own tax liabilities.   
In a similar fashion to Lasfer (1996), Papaioannou and Savarese (1994) also 
utilise an extended dividend partial adjustment model on a sample of 236 industrial and 
40 utility US firms for the period 1983 to 1991.  However, they focus on firms’ reaction 
to the US Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA).  Indeed the study provides evidence that firms 
adjust their dividend policies in response to changes in the tax system and this is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
income tax on dividend, z is the effective capital gains tax rate and s is the basic rate of income tax and is 
the rate at which corporations pay ACT on gross dividend.  
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interpreted as supportive of the tax hypothesis.  It is reported that a total of 23.2% of the 
sample firms experience shifts significant at the 10 percent level in their target payout 
ratios in the post-TRA period. This provides further support for the notion that firms 
consider taxes when setting their dividend policies. 
The Tax Reform Act, 1986 is also utilised by Hubbard and Michaely (1997) to 
assess the implications of taxes on dividend policy.  In particular, it is investigated 
whether shifts in tax policies have led to shifts in the relative values of two classes of 
common shares of a single firm, the Citizen Utilities Company (CU).  It is noted that 
during the period studied holders of class A stock received stock-dividends while holders 
of class B stock received cash-dividends.  The relative price of the shares should 
therefore reflect preference or aversion to cash dividends.  Further, the TRA reduced the 
relative aversion of investors paying tax on dividends at the personal income tax rate to 
dividend16. Thus if taxes are important than the relative value of class B should have 
increase after 1987.   
Hubbard and Michaely (1997) begin by obtaining the dividend-adjusted average 
relative price of CU for each of the periods 1982-1984 (pre-TRA), 1985-1986 (TRA 
implementation period) and 1987-1989 (post-TRA).  The relative price is calculated as 
the ratio of the average price of class A to the average price of class B divided by the 
respective dividend ratio.  It is found that although the relative price declined 
                                                          
16 The reforms equalised the tax rate on dividends and on capital gains by reducing the rate of the former to 
28%. 
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significantly from 1.01 in the pre-TRA period to 0.91 in the implementation period, this 
relative increase in the value of class B shares did not have a lasting impact. The relative 
price in the post-TRA increased to its pre-TRA level.  Further, over the period 1978 to 
1993 the relative price is found to be around unity.  This is in spite of the tax 
disadvantage of cash dividends during that period, and is thus inconsistent with the tax 
hypothesis.  
Possible explanations for the inconsistency between the tax hypothesis and the 
observed price behaviour of the two classes of CU’s shares are explored in Hubbard and 
Michaely (1997).  One suggested explanation is that clientele effects may be the reason 
that value is not affected by the tax changes.  Indeed it is noted that clientele effects could 
also explain the temporary change in value during the TRA implementation period in 
terms of shifts in clientele.  Although Hubbard and Michaely (1997) do not find evidence 
in support of clientele effect, other empirical studies do.  Some of these studies are 
reviewed in the next sub section.   
 
2.3.2.2  Tax clientele effect17  
The tax clientele effect refers to the preference of various categories of investors, on the 
basis of their tax position, for various types of stock.  Accordingly firms adjust their 
dividend policies and investors move to satisfy their tax requirements, until, in 
                                                          
17 The studies reviewed in this sub section are summarised in Table 2.3. 
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equilibrium, no value can be added by changing dividend policy.  One possible method of 
establishing whether a tax-induced clientele exists is to investigate the relationship 
between the dividend yield on stocks and the marginal income tax rate of investors.  In 
particular, the finding of an inverse relation between dividend yield and marginal tax 
rates is supportive of the presence of a clientele effect.  Elton and Gruber (1970) suggest 
that clienteles’ marginal tax rates can be inferred from the ex-dividend day price 
behaviour.  This point, for the case of preferential tax treatment for capital gains, is 
explained in Green and Rydqvist (1999) as follows.  
If stocks offer no ex-dividend-day compensations then investors will be unwilling 
to sell ex-dividend.  Selling on ex-dividend days implies paying higher taxes on the 
dividends and this can be avoided by selling cum-dividend. On the cum-dividend day the 
price includes the present value of the dividends to be paid but this is taxed at the (lower) 
capital gains rate.  To ensure investors are willing to hold stock through the payment day 
and sell ex-dividend, the after tax receipts to the seller who trade on the cum-dividend 
day must, in equilibrium, be equal to the after tax receipts to the seller who trade on the 
ex-dividend day.  This equilibrium position is shown in Elton and Gruber (1970) to be:  
 
Pc – Tg (Pc – Po) = Pe – Tg [ Pe – Po] + D (1- Td)                (2.6) 
 
Where Pc is the cum-dividend day stock price; Po is the price for which the stock was 
purchased; Pe is the ex-dividend day price; D is the amount of dividend; and Tg and Td are 
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the personal tax rates on capital gains and dividends respectively.    
An expression for the ex-dividend day price drop is obtained from Equation (2.6) 
and is shown to reflect the marginal tax rate on dividend relative to capital gains of the 
clientele holding that stock: 
 
(Pc – Pe) / D = (1- Td)/ (1- Tg)                      (2.7) 
 
If tax clientele exists than the ratio of the drop in price relative to the nominal dividend 
amount should be closer to unity for high-yield stock and less than unity for low-yield 
stock.  This is because high-yield stock is held by investors who face lower tax rates on 
dividends. In contrast, investors in low-yield stock are those facing high taxes on 
dividends.  For these high tax payers, the after tax value of the dividend is substantially 
less than the amount actually received (D) and the required compensation for receiving 
the dividends is therefore higher.    
Elton and Gruber (1970) divide their sample, of 4148 stock listed on the NYSE 
which paid dividend in the 12 month period from 1 April 1966, into 10 groups according 
to the value of the dividend yield.  They find that tax brackets are negatively related to 
firms’ dividend policies. This is supportive of the tax clientele effect and suggests that a 
change in dividend policy rather then the dividend policy itself could affect value.  
However, the Elton and Gruber (1970) approach to inferring the existence of a tax 
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induced clientele effect has been criticised on a number of points. First, it has been 
suggested that an observed ex-dividend-day-premium (i.e. a price drop, which is less than 
the dividend amount) could be the result of factors other than a reflection of marginal 
taxes. Second, it has been argued that short term trading could obscure tax clientele effect 
on ex-day returns even if tax clientele exists.  Third, it is claimed that the volatility of 
equity prices invalidates inferences about tax effects from ex-dividend-day price 
behaviour.  
Frank and Jagannathan (1998) address the first point. Namely, that ex-dividend 
day price behaviour may not necessarily be the result of a tax clientele effect.  It is shown 
that prices fall on ex-dividend days by less than the value of the dividend even in markets 
where there are no taxes on either dividends or capital gains. The ex-day premium 
therefore does not reflect the tax rate faced by the stock’s clientele but is explained by the 
costs associated with collecting and reinvesting the dividends.  
The study by Frank and Jagannathan (1998) examine 1,896 cash dividend 
payments by 351 firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange between 1980 and 
1993. The sample is split into a low-dividend group and a high-dividend group.  The 
percentage price drop on the ex-dividend day is regressed on the dividend yield for the 
full sample as well as for the sub samples of low and high dividends.   The regression is 
based on a model of the form  
(Pc-Pe)/Pc= α + β (dividend yield)                                                                                 (2.8) 
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α = -Π(SPREAD)                                                                                                           (2.9) 
Where Pc and Pe are the prices on the last cum dividend trading day and on the first day 
on which the stock is traded ex-dividend respectively. Π is the ratio of rational to total 
traders; SPREAD is the average bid-ask spread around the ex-dividend day expressed as a 
percentage of the cum-price. The slope coefficient, β, represents the value of the dividend 
to market makers.   
Frank and Jagannathan (1998) find support for the notion that rational traders try 
to avoid receiving dividends due to their lack of skill and experience in collecting and 
reinvesting these payments relative to market makers.  Subsequently, on the last cum-day 
there is a selling pressure while on the ex-day there is a buying pressure. This results in a 
price drop that is smaller than the value of the dividend and this is reflected in the 
negatively signed constant.  As the dividend amount increases, Π also increases because 
of the wealth implications of ignoring the dividends. As Π rises, the ex-day premiums 
increase and this is reflected in the observation that for the high-dividend sample the 
constant is larger in absolute value. However, even for the low-dividend group, where Π 
can be expected to be at its lowest, the price drop is still lower than the value of the 
dividend as the constant is significantly different from zero.  Finally, the slope β is 
significantly lower than one for the low-dividend sample but insignificantly so for the 
high-dividend sample. This indicates the ability of market makers to benefit from 
economies of scale in handling the dividends.  
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While Frank and Jagannathan (1998) address the first criticism of Elton and 
Gruber (1970), namely that ex-dividend-day-premiums are not necessarily a reflection of 
marginal taxes, Koski and Scruggs (1998) address the second criticism. Namely this is 
the criticism that short term trading may reduce or eliminate (depending on the level of 
trading costs) the tax effect on ex-dividend-day prices.  Thus the Koski and Scruggs 
(1998) approach is based on what Allen and Michaely (1995) term a dynamic tax-
clientele effect which involves investigating trading volume around ex-dividend days. 
The argument put forward is that short-term trading, motivated by traders exploiting ex-
dividend day premiums, results in abnormal trading volume.  Therefore, even if the 
existence of a tax clientele can not be inferred from ex-dividend day premiums, it can still 
be inferred from abnormal trading volume around the dividend payment days.  
If taxes impact ex-dividend returns then security dealers, who are tax neutral, will 
increase their trading around ex-dividend days. Also, if low dividend-yield stock is held 
by dividend averse investors (as predicted by the clientele effect) then it should be 
associated with ex-day premiums.  Under such circumstances security dealers are 
expected to take long positions to capture the dividends. (They will increase their cum-
dividend buying and sell at the ex-dividend price, which will drop by less than the value 
of the dividend they collected).  Similarly for high-dividend yield stock, held by investors 
with preference for dividends, the ex-dividend price is expected to drop by more than the 
nominal amount of the dividends. In that case, dealers can be expected to take short 
positions.  Furthermore, as US firms were exempt from taxes on 70% of their inter-
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corporate dividends received during the period investigated, they are also expected to 
engage in dividend capturing by establishing short positions.   
Koski and Scruggs (1998) collect data on trading volume by dealers and by 
individuals/firms for 70 ex-dividend days between November 1990 and January 1991. 
The abnormal trading volumes on the ex-dividend day and on the previous day are based 
on an event window of 11 days centred on the ex-dividend date.  Abnormal trading 
volume is obtained as actual volume less the average volume during normal trading 
period and is standardised by the standard deviation of the normal trading volume. The 
means of the standardised abnormal volumes provide strong evidence that tax-neutral 
securities dealers engage in short selling of high yield stock around ex-dividend.  
The study further tests the hypothesis that abnormal trading volumes around ex 
dividend days are positively related to the dividend yield and negatively related to 
transaction costs. Results of the ordinary least squares regressions of the standardised 
abnormal volume on the last cum-dividend day indicate that securities dealers engage in 
short term trading on cum-dividend days. This is supportive of a dynamic tax clientele 
effect according to which tax-neutral dealers engage in trading around the ex-dividend 
date in order to capture tax-driven differences between the ex-dividend capital loss and 
the amount of dividend paid.  However, it is precisely this arbitrage activity by securities 
dealer that can eliminate tax clientele effect on ex-dividend day returns.  
Thus Koski and Scruggs (1998) address the second criticism of the Elton and 
Gruber (1970) approach by showing that short term trading could obscure tax clientele 
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effect on ex-day returns.  Green and Rdyqvist (1999) address the third criticism of the 
Elton and Gruber (1970) approach, namely the notion that equity price volatility 
invalidates inferences about tax effects from ex-dividend-day price behaviour.  They do 
this by studying ex-day price behaviour of Swedish lottery bonds, which are more stable 
than equity shares, thus reducing noise from ex-distribution price behaviour18.    
However, while more stable than equity shares, lottery bonds are similar to equity 
shares as there are tax implications to whether the bond is sold cum-lottery or ex-lottery.   
Particularly, if the lottery bond is sold on the cum-lottery day, the extra payment to the 
seller forms part of the bond price and is treated as capital gains not as accrued coupon 
payment.  Moreover, for the buyer the extra payment is treated as a capital loss and form 
part of his/her tax basis. The implication of this feature of the lottery bond is that, if tax 
differentials on capital gains and distributions matter, then ex-lottery returns, like in the 
case of equities, should reflect the marginal tax rates of their holders.   
                                                          
18 The name of the Swedish lottery bonds refers to the fact that coupon payments are distributed by lottery.  
Green and Rdyqvist (1999) justify the choice of the Swedish lottery bonds by the argument that as bonds 
are more stable than equities, studying bonds removes noise from ex-distribution price behaviour.  Further, 
unlike most other bonds, lottery bonds are taxed in a manner similar to equity shares, which enables the 
testing of the dynamic tax clientele.  Particularly, in the case of most bonds, there is no difference in 
taxation to whether the bond is sold before or after the coupon payment date.  When a bond is sold before 
the coupon payment date, the interest accrued to the seller is paid over to him by the buyer. This extra 
payment is treated as interest paid or received by both parties and is taxed as such.  For lottery bonds, 




Green and Rdyqvist (1999) note that another advantage of looking at the Swedish 
lottery bonds is that distributions are tax-exempt. In most cases, where the tax system 
favours capital gains, factors such as transaction costs of handling dividends can 
substitute for the effects of taxes, making ex-days behaviour difficult to assess19.   In the 
lottery bonds market such factors have an opposite effect to that of taxes because the tax 
system favours distributions. These non-tax factors, such as transaction costs, may 
therefore reduce the effects of taxes on lottery-bonds ex-day price behaviour, but they do 
not offer potential alternative explanation for them.   
The data in Green and Rdyqvist (1999) include 46 lottery bonds of two types 
(mixed and sequenced) with between 5-10 years to maturity, trading on the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange in the period 1986 to 1997.  There are 455 lottery payments with 287 
lottery days (due to lotteries that pay their coupons on the same days).  The sample is 
sub-divided according to the tax regime at the time when they were issued.  The oldest 
sample, issues pre-1981, has the largest tax advantage as capital losses on these bonds 
can be fully used to offset tax due on any other income.  Cumulative abnormal trading 
volumes of 10 days around the ex-distribution day are calculated for each tax regime 
sample. Abnormal volume is calculated as that day’s volume divided by the average daily 
volume over the period beginning 6 trading days after the previous distribution and 
ending 6 days before the current distribution.   In a similar manner, 20 days cumulative 
                                                          
19 This is the second criticism of the Elton and Gruber’s  (1970) approach. 
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abnormal trading volumes are also obtained.   
Green and Rdyqvist (1999) find evidence of high abnormal trading volumes for 
lottery bonds issued under all tax regimes, but the highest abnormal volumes are recorded 
for the pre-1981 sample. This evidence is supportive of the dynamic tax clientele.  There 
is an increase in trading activity around distribution days due to tax differentials amongst 
market participants, and this abnormal activity is stronger, the higher the tax benefits 
attached to the bonds.  To further investigate how taxes influence the returns around 
lottery days, these returns are regressed on the coupon yield as in the following model: 
P(t+k) - Pt  =  Pt (γ0 k)  +  C (γ1-1)                                                                                 (2.10) 
γ0 = E(r) / (1-T)                                                                                                            (2.11) 
γ1 = -T / (1-T)                                                                                                               (2.12) 
Where P(t+k) is the price on day (t+k) and Pt is the price on day t.  Thus the LHS of 
Equation (2.10) is the change in price over the period k.   
Similarly, on the RHS, k is the number of days in the trading period and the 
coefficient γ0 is defined by Equation (2.11), where E(r) is the expected after-tax daily 
return and T is the tax rate faced by the marginal investor.  So the first expression on the 
RHS of (2.10) is the pre-tax expected return over the period k.   The second expression on 
the RHS of (2.10) is the pre-tax change in price that is due to the coupon payment, C.   
The coefficient γ1 is defined in Equation (2.12), thus the implied tax rate, T, can be 
obtained from the estimates of γ1. 
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When (γ1-1) is equal to –1 (i.e. γ1 is equal to 0), the pre-tax price on the ex-coupon 
day falls by C, the value of the coupon, providing evidence of tax irrelevancy.  When  
(γ1-1) is greater than –1 (i.e. γ1 is greater than 0), then the pre-tax price on the ex-coupon 
day falls by less than C, the value of the coupon.  This provides evidence in support of 
the view that taxes drive coupon payment to be worth less than their nominal amount.  
When  (γ1-1) is less than –1 (i.e. γ1 is less than 0), then the pre-tax price on the ex-coupon 
day falls by more than C, the value of the coupon.  This provides evidence in support of 
the tax advantage of coupon payments, and is also the hypothesis put forward for 
empirical testing.   To empirically test for the value of γ1, C is added to both sides of 
Equation (2.10), which is then dividend through by Pt: 
R = γ0 k + γ1 C/Pt                                                                                                         (2.13) 
R = [P(t+k) + C – Pt]/ Pt                                                                                                (2.14) 
Where R is the pre-tax return over the trading period, k, as defined in Equation (2.14), 
and C/Pt is the coupon yield.  Green and Rdyqvist (1999) run the Weighted Least Squares 
regressions on the two types of lottery bonds.  The findings of a negative γ1 imply that the 
price on the ex-lottery day falls by more than the value of the coupon. This is consistent 
with the tax clientele effect in markets where distributions have tax advantages.  
Thus, to summarise the evidence on the tax clientele effect, Green and Rdyqvist 
(1999) find support for Elton and Gruber (1970) proposition that clientele effects can be 
observed from ex-days price behaviour. However, the implications from Koski and 
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Scruggs (1998) is that short term trading may eliminate the tax clientele effects on ex-day 
returns even if investors consider taxes when choosing stock.  In contrast Frank and 
Jagannathan (1998) note that price behaviour around ex-days may be driven by factors 
other than tax clientele effects.    
 
2.3.2.3  Conclusions on the empirical studies on dividend and taxes  
The empirical studies reviewed in this section are summarised in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.  
Table 2.2 summarises the studies of the traditional tax hypothesis, while Table 2.3 
presents key issues relating to tax clientele effects.  The general conclusion that emerges 
from the above discussion is that the presence of taxes invalidates the irrelevancy theory 
of dividend.  Indeed using various methodologies, Gentry (1994), Lasfer (1996) and 
Papaioannou and Savarese (1994) provide evidence that taxes are important determinants 
of the firm payout decision.  Further, even if taxes do not have a permanent impact on 
stock prices, as concluded in Hubbard and Michaely (1997), tax effects on prices may 
still be observed around ex-dividend days as shown in Elton and Gruber (1970) and 
Green and Rdyqvist (1999).   
However, if there are tax clienteles for different dividend policies such that there 
are no permanent premiums in the market for one dividend policy over another, is it still 
valid to argue that dividend policy is important?  [Particularly given that even these 
temporary price effects are not necessarily due to taxes, as shown in Frank and 
Jagannathan (1998)].  Moreover, as shown in Koski and Scruggs (1998) and subject to 
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transaction costs, if tax clientele effects have temporary impact on prices, in efficient 
markets such effects would be eliminated through short term trading.  It is thus clear that 
taxes alone can not explain the dividend puzzle.  
  
2.3.3  Empirical studies of the signalling hypothesis 
2.3.3.1    From theory to empirics 
The signalling hypothesis is based on the notion of asymmetric information particularly 
between managers and investors.   Under this assumption dividend changes are valuable 
in that they convey information about the firm’s prospects.  Indeed, Lintner (1956) 
observes that managers are more willing to raise rather than reduce dividend levels, and 
this has been widely interpreted as indicating that dividend decreases are associated with 
negative signals while dividend increases signal positive news.  But what precisely is the 
nature of the information contained in dividend changes?  
The risk-information hypothesis claims that dividend increases signal risk 
reduction. Alternatively, according to the cash flow signalling hypothesis, dividend 
changes contain information about future cash flows.  Another opinion is that dividend 
changes signal permanent shifts in current earnings.   In any event, as noted by Allen and 
Michaely (1995), regardless of the precise information contained in the dividend signal, 
there are principally two conditions that have to be met in order for the signalling 
hypothesis to be valid.  
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The first condition requires that market participants understand dividends as 
signals.  For example, if the unexpected dividend change signals future earnings changes, 
then market participants should revise their future earnings forecasts following the 
dividend announcement.  More generally, if unexpected dividend changes are interpreted 
as signals of new developments in the firm’s prospects, then a price reaction should be 
observed in the same direction as the unexpected dividend change announced.  The 
second condition that have to be met to validate the signalling hypothesis, is that the 
dividend change is followed by a change in the same direction in earnings or other firm’s 
characteristics that the dividend change is assumed to predict.  Empirical methods in 
studies of the signalling hypothesis have therefore focused on assessing the extent to 
which these conditions are met.   
The following empirical review looks at each of these two conditions in turn.  It 
begins with studies that are concerned with assessing market interpretation of the 
dividend signal.  This first condition is commonly tested by event studies around the 
announcement period and by studying analysts’ earnings forecasts revisions.  The validity 
of the second condition is then assessed, by reviewing empirical evidence on actual 
changes in firm’s characteristics following dividend change announcements.    
Finally, some empirical studies of the conditional signalling hypothesis are 
discussed.  The conditional signalling hypothesis proposes that the dividend signal is 
conditional on firm specific characteristics.  This implies that both the interpretation of 
the dividend signal, and actual long-term changes in the firm following the signal, are 
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conditional on firm characteristics.  Thus empirical evidence on the conditional signalling 
hypothesis looks at cross sectional variations in the immediate reaction to dividend 
announcements.   It further looks at variations in long term changes in performance and 
other characteristics following dividend changes.  These cross sectional variations are 
tested either by comparison analyses or by regression analyses.  
 
2.3.3.2   Interpretation of the dividend signal20  
Interpretation of the dividend signal is typically assessed by event studies around the 
dividend change announcement period as has been done by numerous papers. However, 
Laux, Starks and Yoon (1998) and Howe and Shen (1998) innovate by studying price 
reaction of rivals of firms that announce dividend changes.  Both these studies use US 
firms and define the event window as the two days including the day of the dividend 
change announcement and the previous day.  Both also utilise the market model, 
estimated post event, to generate abnormal returns.  
Laux, Starks and Yoon (1998) study dividend announcements in the period 1969-
1988, but restrict observations to dividend changes of at least 25 percent.  They calculate 
the averages of the cumulative two-day abnormal returns across the sub samples of firms 
declaring dividend increases and firms declaring reductions.  Consistent with the 
signalling hypothesis, it is found that firms experience significant abnormal reactions at 
                                                          
20 The studies reviewed in this sub section are summarised in Table 2.4. 
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the time of the announcement and in the same direction.  Particularly, the mean two-day 
abnormal reaction of the 217 firms declaring dividend increases is significant at 1.01 
percent. In contrast, the mean abnormal reaction of the 105 firms announcing dividend 
decreases, is significant at  –6.35 percent.   Further, the findings that the reaction to 
dividend reductions is stronger than for dividend increases confirm Lintner’s (1956) 
observation of managers’ particular dislike for dividend cuts.    
Laux, Starks and Yoon (1998) also try to determine the information that market 
participants perceive to be contained in the dividend change announcements.  They do 
this by looking at the price reaction of non-announcing firms to dividend change 
announcements by firms in the same industry.  Specifically, it is proposed that rivals’ 
price reaction should be of the same direction as that of the announcing firm if the 
dividend change announcement is interpreted as indicating industry-wide information 
(contagion effect).  In contrast, if the announcement is interpreted as signalling a shift in 
the competitive position of the announcer then the price reaction of rivals should be in the 
opposite direction (competition effects).   The two-day average abnormal return, for 
1,243 firms, rivals to dividend-increasing firms, is recorded at 0.05 percent while for 667 
firms, rivals to dividend-decreasing firms, the corresponding figure is –0.32 percent.  As 
the price reaction of rivals is in the same direction as that of the announcer, this indicates 
that announcements are interpreted as containing information about common factors for 
the industry as a whole.  
However, Laux, Starks and Yoon (1998) note that dividend change 
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announcements may also contain information about shifts in the competitive balance in 
the industry.  First, the average reactions of rivals to dividend change announcements are 
not significant, which may be the result of contagion and competition effects offsetting 
each other.  Second, it is found that rivals’ same-direction reactions are strongest for 
those rivals least likely to be affected by changes in the competitive position of the 
announcer.  Specifically, the most competitive rivals display a significant positive 
reaction to increase announcements while the least competitive rivals display a 
significant negative reaction to decrease announcements.  
Howe and Shen (1998) also investigate market’s interpretation of the nature of the 
dividend signal by studying non-announcing rivals. The sample used in the study consist 
of rivals of dividend initiating firms traded on the NYSE/AMEX, in the period 1968 to 
1992.  The price reaction and analysts’ forecast earnings revisions, following dividend 
initiation announcements by rival firms in the same industry, are analysed.  The average 
announcement period’s two-day cumulative abnormal price reaction of 3540 rivals is 
recorded as insignificant at –0.07 percent.   Similarly analysts do not revise their earnings 
forecasts for rivals of announcing firms.  The mean, unadjusted, earnings forecast 
revision across 345 rivals of dividend initiating firms is insignificant at 0.1677, while the 
mean abnormal forecast revision is insignificant at 0.167121.   It is thus concluded that the 
                                                          
21 Howe and Shen (1998) calculate unadjusted earnings forecast revisions by analysts as the difference 
between consecutive monthly forecasts divided by the stock price 15 days before the dividend 
announcement. The abnormal forecast revision is calculated as the difference between actual forecast 
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information contained in the initiation announcement is interpreted as firm specific 
without any evidence of intra-industry contagion or competition effects. 
Thus the findings in Howe and Shen (1998) are not fully consistent with those in 
Laux, Starks and Yoon (1998).   Particularly, while Laux, Starks and Yoon (1998) show 
that dividend change announcements signal information about rivals of the announcers, 
Howe and Shen (1998) do not support this view.  However, evidence in Laux, Starks and 
Yoon (1998) supports the validity of the first condition for the signalling hypothesis to 
hold, namely that dividend changes are interpreted as signals. As the first condition is 
shown to be valid, the question is whether the second condition is also met.  Particularly 
for the second condition to be valid, the dividend change announcement should be 
followed by actual changes in the firm characteristics, which the dividend change is 
predicted to signal.  This is the subject to be discussed next.  
 
2.3.3.3   Actual changes following the dividend change announcements22. 
Assessing actual changes in firms’ characteristics, following dividend change 
announcements is the subject of various empirical studies.  This is because the findings 
that dividend change announcements are followed by particular changes in the firm may 
help in establishing two things.   First, it confirms the validity of the signalling hypothesis 
                                                                                                                                                                             
revision and the expected revision, where the expected revision is obtained using a fourth-order moving-
average model. 
22 The studies reviewed in this sub section are summarised in Table 2.5. 
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because it makes sense to interpret the dividend change as a signal of an unexpected 
change if indeed it is followed by such a change.  Second, it can shed light on the precise 
nature of the information contained in the announcement.   
DeAngelo DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) investigate whether dividend change 
announcements are followed by changes in earnings that are in the same direction.   In 
order to isolate the effects of the signalling hypothesis from other effects that may 
influence firms’ dividend policy, DeAngelo DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) select firms 
experiencing a sudden earnings decline after a long period of stable growth.   In 
particular, the sample contains 145 US firms experiencing a decline in annual earnings 
between 1980 and 1987 after consistent earnings growth over at least nine years.  This 
selection method ensures that the dividend change is a signal of future rather than past 
changes.  The selection method also implies greater need for signalling because firms that 
expect the current decline to be corrected in the near future, have to convey this 
information to market participants.   
The initial results in DeAngelo DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) do not support the 
signalling hypothesis of dividends, as there is no indication that dividend increases 
represent reliable signals that the current earning problem is only temporary.  
Specifically, it is found that the 99 firms that increased their dividends in the first year of 
the earnings decline experienced no positive abnormal earnings in the subsequent three 
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years23.    To further investigate the robustness of these results, DeAngelo DeAngelo and 
Skinner (1996) use 135 firms with complete earnings data, and regress the abnormal 
future earnings on a dividend signal and a number of control variables assumed to help in 
predicting future earnings.  They find the coefficient on the dividend signal to be 
insignificantly different from zero and this result holds when alternative proxies for the 
dividend-signal are used. Thus the results from the regression analysis confirm the earlier 
findings that dividend increases are not a reliable signal of improved future earnings 
performance. 
Two possible explanations are offered in DeAngelo DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) 
for the unreliability of the dividend signal.  The first is mangers’ tendency to send over-
optimistic signals either naively or deliberately.  Second, it is suggested that the cash 
commitment associated with the dividend increase is relatively small.  The median firm’s 
dividend increase in the year of the earnings decline, amounts to only 3.5 percent of 
earnings, hence weaker firms can afford to send misleading signals.    A similar figure of 
                                                          
23 DeAngelo DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) obtain estimates of annual average abnormal future earnings 
over the three years following the year of the earnings decline as follows. The abnormal earnings figure for 
each year is calculated as that year’s earnings minus the predicted level of earnings under either the random 
walk or the growth-adjusted model.  The random walk model predicts earnings in each future year simply 
as the earnings in year 0 (the year of the earnings decline).  The growth adjusted model predicts earnings in 
each future year as year 0 earnings compounded forward at the earnings growth rate which is calculated 
over the years –5 to –1 relative to the year of the earnings decline.  All abnormal earnings are standardised 
by the book value of stockholders’ equity in year –1. The annual average abnormal future earnings figure 
for a given firm, is the average of the annual abnormal earnings over the three years following the earnings 
decline.   
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5 percent of earnings is recorded in Lipson, Maquieira and Meggison (1998) with respect 
to the dividend initiations of newly listed firms.  
Lipson, Maquieira and Meggison (1998) compare the performance of 99 newly 
public US firms that initiated dividends in the period 1980 to 1986, with similar firms 
that did not. The argument for the choice of newly listed firms is similar to that of 
DeAngelo DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) for choosing firms experiencing earnings 
decline after a long period of earnings growth.  Specifically, it is noted that the need for 
signalling as a way of distinguishing quality may be more important for these firms.   
Indeed, it is found that earnings surprises in the first and second years following dividend 
initiations are significantly greater compared with similar newly listed firms that did not 
initiate dividends.  Furthermore, the dividend cash commitment represents about 5 
percent of earnings of the newly listed firms that initiated dividends. This is significantly 
lower than 8.5 percent of earnings that similar non-initiating firms would have had to 
commit to, if they wanted to match the dividend yield, dividend to sales ratio or dividend 
to assets ratio of initiating firms24.   
Thus, Lipson, Maquieira and Meggison (1998) provide support for the view that 
dividend initiations signal future earnings prospects, as they distinguish one newly listed 
                                                          
24 Lipson, Maquieira and Meggison (1998) calculate earnings surprises in a similar manner to that in 
DeAngelo DeAngelo and Skinner (1996). Particularly, earnings surprises are calculated relative to a simple 
random walk or relative to growth-adjusted models. However, while DeAngelo DeAngelo and Skinner 
(1996) take the average earnings surprise over the three year following the event year, Lipson, Maquieira 
and Meggison (1998) study each of the two years following the event.   
 62 
public firm from another newly listed firms.  However, it is also shown that dividend 
initiations do not distinguish newly listed firms from established firms in the same 
industry.25   This provides partial support for the signalling theory and for the second 
condition, namely that the dividend changes are followed by actual changes in the firm’s 
characteristics.  It is, however, inconsistent with DeAngelo DeAngelo and Skinner 
(1996), as is the conclusion that dividend initiations are a valid signal of future 
performance, because weaker firms would find the implied resource commitment, 
required in order to match the actions of quality firms, too costly to mimic.  Thus more 
evidence is needed on the question of whether dividend changes are a reliable signal, and 
this is provided in Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997). 
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) take an empirical approach similar to 
DeAngelo DeAngelo and Skinner (1996), comparing the unexpected earnings of firms 
that changed their dividends with those that did not.  The sample contains 7186 firm-year 
observations of 1025 US firms that trade on the NYSE or the AMEX for at least two 
years during the period 1979 to 1991 and which meet various other requirements.  The 
hypothesis is that firms that increase their dividends in a given year should enjoy positive 
                                                          
25 Lipson, Maquieira and Meggison (1998) record the mean relative surprise in earnings (based on a 
random walk) of initiating firms versus non-initiating firms as 0.101 in the first year following the dividend 
initiation and as 0.141 in the second year.  These two figures are significant at the 10 and 1 percent levels 
respectively.  However, the average relative earnings surprise of initiating firms are indistinguishable from 
similar but established firms that already pay dividends.  Particularly the mean relative surprise of initiating 
firms compared with a size-matched sample of established firms is 0.034 in the first year and 0.082 in the 
second, both figures being insignificant.   
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unexpected earnings in years that follow.   Similarly, firms that decrease their dividends 
in a given year should experience negative unexpected earnings in years that follow. 
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) also investigate variation in the unexpected 
earnings across dividends increasing firms.  The hypothesis is that if signalling is costly, 
then the larger the dividend-increase, the greater should the unexpected earnings in the 
following year be26.   
Results in Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) show a strong contemporaneous 
correlation between dividend changes and earnings changes.  Firms that increase their 
dividends in year 0, experience earnings increases in that year, which are significantly 
higher than the mean earnings change of the group of firms that did not change their 
dividends.  Similarly, firms decreasing their dividends, experience significantly more 
severe earnings decreases in the same year compared with the group of firms that did not 
change their dividends.   However contrary to the signalling hypothesis no correlation is 
found between the sign and size of dividend increases in a given year, and earnings 
changes in future years.  Furthermore firms that cut dividends in a given year, experience 
significant earnings increases in the following year.   
Thus the results in Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) are supportive of 
                                                          
26 Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) calculate dividend changes as the difference between the last 
quarterly dividend per share in year 0 and in year –1, expressed as a percentage of the last quarterly 
dividend per share in year –1.  Raw earnings changes are calculated as the annual change in earnings before 
extraordinary items deflated by the market value at the start of year 0. 
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DeAngelo DeAngelo and Skinner (1996), as they also reject the link between dividend 
changes and unexpected future earnings growth. This rejection of the traditional 
interpretation of the signalling hypothesis is also the conclusion in Jensen and Johnson 
(1995).  However, what set Jensen and Johnson (1995) apart from these studies is that 
they concentrate specifically on dividend decrease announcements rather than on 
dividend changes.  The study investigates whether firms reducing dividend by at least 20 
percent after twelve consecutive quarters of positive, non-decreasing dividends, also 
experience a decline in earnings.   
The sample in Jensen and Johnson (1995) consists of 268 observations of 218 
reductions and 50 omissions by 242 different US firms in the period 1974 to 1989.  It is 
found that while earnings decline significantly in the period before the dividend cut they 
rise significantly afterwards.  The stock price, however, is found to drop at the time of the 
dividend reduction announcement and this is explained by the observation that although 
the cut marks a turning point in earnings pattern, there are still lingering problems.  For 
example, it is observed that the earnings level at the end of the second year after the 
dividend cut is still below its level three years before the cut.  The study thus proceeds to 
assess the nature of the problem more closely.   
To do that, and to investigate the precise information the reduction 
announcements contain, Jensen and Johnson (1995) look at a range of changes in various 
other firm’s financial variables.   The patterns of these variables over the three years 
before and three years after a dividend reduction are examined.  Findings indicate that 
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firms use the funds, saved from the dividend cut, to improve their positions.  The 
dividend cuts thus lead to improvements in liquidity position and to reduction in the level 
of debt.  The conclusion is that dividend reductions do not necessarily signal a decline in 
earnings.  Rather such cuts appear to signal the beginning of restructuring activities and a 
turn around in financial decline.  
Thus the implications of Jensen and Johnson (1995) are similar to those of 
Lipson, Maquieira and Meggison (1998) in the sense that both provide some evidence to 
support the notion that dividend changes are followed by actual changes in the firm.  
However, both also illustrate that dividend changes should not be simply interpreted as 
signalling future earnings increases or decreases.  Furthermore, such a blanket view on 
the nature of the dividend signal is strongly rejected in DeAngelo DeAngelo and Skinner 
(1996), and in Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997).   Results from these studies clearly 
call for further investigation into the precise nature of the information contained in 
dividend change announcements.  Alternative hypotheses, which have been put forward, 
include the permanent earnings hypothesis, the cash flow hypothesis and the risk 
information hypothesis.  Some of the relevant empirical work in these areas is discussed 
below.  
2.3.3.4   Permanent earnings, cash flow and risk information hypotheses of dividends27
The permanent earnings hypothesis proposes that changes in dividends do not necessarily 
 66 
signal future growth or contraction in the levels of current earnings. Instead, 
announcements of dividend changes contained information about permanent as oppose to 
temporary shifts in current earnings.  This view is consistent with the survey findings by 
Lintner (1956) and with Lee (1996) who finds that the partial adjustment model performs 
better when the target dividend is expressed as a function of permanent earnings. (Refer 
to Section 2.3.1 and to Table 2.1.)   
Lintner (1956) finds that mangers tend to smooth dividends, and this tendency is 
reflected in the partial adjustment model.  Indeed, the model can be manipulated so as to 
express dividends in terms of a weighted-average of current and past earnings. Thus 
according to this model, dividend trends reflect the smoothed pattern of current earnings, 
eliminating transitory fluctuations.  A signalling theory interpretation of this is that by 
smoothing out temporary fluctuations in the factors that determine dividends, the 
dividend pattern reflects the stable pattern of those factors.  As it is current earnings, 
which determine dividend levels in the partial adjustment model, a dividend change has 
to be the result of a permanent shift in current earnings.   
The second part of Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) assesses the hypothesis 
that dividend changes signal earnings stability rather than future earnings growth. The 
study compares the likelihood of a dividend-increasing firm experiencing a decline in its 
following year’s earnings with the probability of a firm that does not change its dividends 
                                                                                                                                                                             
27 The studies reviewed in this sub section are summarised in Table 2.6. 
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to experience such an event28.  The results indicate that compared with firms that 
maintain their dividend levels, dividend-increasing firms are less likely to experience 
unexpected declines in earnings at least in the first year after the dividend change.  As no 
correlation is found between dividend increases and future earnings changes, the 
conclusion arrived at is that dividends do not signal unexpected future earnings increases. 
Instead, it is concluded that, consistent with Lintner (1956), dividend increases signal that 
current earnings levels are permanent. 
This distinction between permanent and temporary changes is also explored in 
Brook, Charlton, and Hendershott (1998).  That study, however, is based on the 
hypothesis that dividend changes contain information about cash flow rather than about 
earnings.  This is the cash flow signalling hypothesis, which proposes that dividend 
changes signal changes in expected cash flows.   
Brook, Charlton, and Hendershott (1998) investigate this hypothesis and in 
particular whether dividend changes signal permanent as opposed to temporary changes 
in firms’ cash flows.  For that purpose a sample of non-regulated, US firms is divided 
into three groups on the basis of expectations regarding changes in cash flows in years 1 
through 4 where 1992 is year 029.   Classification into groups is then carried out as 
                                                          
28 Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) measure the probability of an unexpected earnings decrease as the 
percentage of firms in the sample that have experienced unexpected negative changes in earnings. 
Unexpected earnings changes are calculated as raw earnings changes as defined in the previous footnote, 
which are then adjusted by the average change for a control group of non-dividend-changing firms.  
29 However, in order to isolate the signalling effects from other factors, Brook, Charlton, and Hendershott 
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follows.  The first group, the permanent-increase group, contains 101 firms whose cash 
flows remain at least 30% above year 0 in each of the subsequent four years.  The second 
group, the temporary-increase group, contains 45 firms whose cash flows increase by at 
least 40% in year 1 but then fall to less than 20% above year 0 level in either of the 
subsequent two years. The third group, the no-increase group, consists of 34 firms whose 
cash flows increase by less than 30% over the four-year period and by less than 15% in 
each year.  
Results from the comparison analysis in Brook, Charlton, and Hendershott (1998) 
are consistent with the notion that firms use dividends to signal a permanent increase in 
cash inflows. Specifically, it is reported that the permanent-increase group’s average 
dividend per share changed by 16.5 percent in year 0, before the cash flow increase.  This 
is significantly larger than the 6.8 percent change experienced by the temporary-increase 
group.  Furthermore, comparing annual abnormal stock returns, across the three groups, 
indicates that the dividend signal is understood by market participants.  The permanent-
increase group experiences an average annual stock return, net of the CRSP value-
weighted index, of 17.5 percent in year 0.  This is statistically different from zero, and 
statistically different from the 6.5 percent experienced by the temporary-increase group.    
                                                                                                                                                                             
(1998) restrict the sample to firms with a four-year stable cash flow pattern in the period preceding the 
change.  It is noted that these firms are prime candidates to signal.  The imposed restriction is therefore that 
the difference between year –3 (1989) cash flow and year 0 (1992) cash flow must be less than 30% for a 
firm to be included in the sample.  Cash flow is measured as operating income before depreciation, minus 
interest expense and preferred stock dividends.  
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Thus consistent with the cash flow signalling hypothesis, Brook, Charlton, and 
Hendershott (1998) find a positive link between increases in permanent cash flows, 
dividend rises and stock price reaction. Firms expecting a permanent improvement in 
their cash flows, signal this information by increasing their dividends. The market 
understands the signals and the stock price rises before the actual cash flow increase 
occurs.   
Thus while Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) suggest that dividend changes 
signal changes in permanent earnings, Brook, Charlton, and Hendershott (1998) find it is 
permanent cash flows that dividend changes signal.  In both cases, however, dividends 
are used to signal changes in the pattern of long-term performance. An alternative 
explanation is that dividend changes signal information about changes in the firm’s risk. 
This is the risk information hypothesis, which is investigated in Dyl and Weigand (1998).  
In particular, Dyl and Weigand (1998) distinguish the risk information effect by 
investigating whether dividend initiation announcements are followed by reduction in 
earnings volatility and risk or by earnings increases. 
The sample in Dyl and Weigand (1998) consists of 240 firms listed on the 
NYSE/AMEX, and which initiated dividends during the period 1972 to 1993.  In order to 
assess the change in risk following dividend initiations, the total risk of returns, market 
risk of returns and earnings-per-share volatility, before and after the dividend initiation, 
are compared.  Thus proxies for these variables are calculated for each firm in respect of 
the period before the dividend initiation and in respect of the period after the initiation.  
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The means and medians for each of these proxies are obtained and the significance of the 
change from the pre-initiation period to the post-initiation period is assessed30.      
Dyl and Weigand (1998) find that 70 percent of the sample firms have lower 
variances in the post dividend initiation period. Furthermore, the hypothesis of equal 
mean variances before and after the dividend initiation is rejected.   Likewise, 68 percent 
of the sample firms have lower market risk as measured by β after the dividend initiation 
and the difference in the mean β pre and post initiation is statistically significant.   There 
is also evidence to show that earnings volatility declines in the period following the 
dividend announcement, as the post-initiation earnings volatility is significantly lower 
compared with the pre-initiation period.  In contrast, however, there is no significant 
difference in the mean of the standardised earnings per share in the pre- and post-
initiation periods.  Thus, it appears that announcements of dividend initiations are not 
followed by increases in future profitability31.   
                                                          
30 Dyl and Weigand (1998) measure risk of returns using daily returns.  The pre-event period is defined as 
day –252 before the dividend initiation to day –6.  The post event period is defined as day 6 to day 252 
relative to the dividend initiation event.  Total risk of return is calculated as the variance of returns. 
Alternatively, a conditional variance is estimated using a GARCH(1,1) which is estimated by Maximum 
Likelihood .  The market risk is measured by beta which is estimated using an extended market model by 
regressing daily stock returns on 15 lagged, 1 contemporaneous and 5 leads market returns, using returns 
on the CRSP equally weighted index as a proxy for market returns.  Earnings volatility is measured as the 
variance of sample means earnings per share in the 12 quarters preceding and following the dividend 
initiation.   
31 The results in Dyl and Weigand (1998) are somewhat inconsistent with the results in Lipson, Maquieira 
and Meggison (1998) as discussed above and summarised in Table 2.5.  Both studies assess changes in 
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Based on their findings Dyl and Weigand (1998) conclude that announcements of 
dividend initiations do not signal enhanced profitability, but instead they are signals of 
stability. This risk-information hypothesis of dividend signalling is particularly 
interesting as it highlights a weakness in the bird in the hand argument in favour of 
generous dividends. Accordingly, the reason that stock price reaction to dividend 
increases is typically positive, this is not because dividend cause risk reduction, but 
because they are signals of risk reduction and future stability.   
From the discussion in this sub section it emerges that the nature of the 
information, conveyed from the dividend change announcement, is ambiguous.  The 
studies by Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) and Brook, Charlton, and Hendershott 
(1998) conclude that dividend signal shifts in permanent as opposed to transitory 
performance.  Although the emphasis in the former study is on earnings performance 
while in the latter it is cash flow, over the long-term these are essentially the same.  These 
conclusions tie-in well with Lintner’s (1956) observation that managers seek to achieve a 
gradual upward progression in dividends that reflect long-term, permanent changes in 
performance.   In contrast, Dyl and Weigand (1998) find that dividend changes indicate 
shifts in risk and earnings volatility rather than changes in performance32.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
earnings following dividend initiation announcements. However, while Lipson, Maquieira and Meggison 
(1998) find some support for the notion that dividend initiations signal future earnings surprises, Dyl and 
Weigand (1998) find that the dividend initiations do not mark a significant change in profitability.  
32 The permanent earnings hypothesis and the risk-information hypothesis do not necessarily conflicts with 
each other.  Dyl and Weigand (1998) note that permanent income can be interpreted as stable income, 
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A possible resolution for this confusion is the idea that dividend changes convey 
different information to different firms.  The reaction to dividend-change announcements 
therefore depends on particular characteristics of the announcing firm and its 
circumstances.  This hypothesis is termed the conditional signalling hypothesis and is 
typically investigated by cross sectional comparisons, or by regression analysis where 
firm characteristics are entered as explanatory variables.   
 
2.3.3.5   The conditional signalling hypothesis33  
Researches have investigated three main factors that may cause variations in the 
signalling function of dividends across firms or even over time for the same firm.  First, 
such variations may be due to the combination of activities with which the firm engages 
prior to the dividend change announcement.  Second, variations in the meaning and 
interpretation of the dividend signal may be caused by differences in the environment in 
which the firm operates.  Third, cross sectional differences in the meaning of the dividend 
signal may be the result of differences in firms’ characteristics.  The discussion that 
follows presents some of the empirical work on each of these three factors, namely, prior 
activities, the environment and firm’s characteristics34.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
which implies reduction in the volatility of income.   
33 The studies reviewed in this sub section are summarised in Table 2.7. 
34 Two caveats are in order at this point.  First, the distinction between prior activities, environmental 
influences and firm’s characteristics as three separate factors is somewhat artificial.  For instance, Tobin’s 
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Related to the first factor, the effect of prior activities on the dividend signal, is 
the idea that the value of the dividend signal depends on the surprise with which it is met 
by market participants.   For example, a dividend change announcement that comes after 
certain activities, such as the publication of earnings data, may be less informative than if 
such prior activity did not occur.  Similarly, a dividend change announcement that 
follows a particular activity may contain different information than if it came after a 
different activity.  The first issue is dealt with in Balachandran, Cadle and Theobald 
(1999), while the second issue is the subject of Born and Rimbey (1993). 
Born and Rimbey (1993) argue that financing activity, undertaken prior to 
dividend increase announcements, can distinguish dividend increasing firms with future 
growth prospects from those firms that disinvest.  The study investigates this hypothesis 
by regression analysis methodology of the price reactions to surprise dividend increase 
announcements.  To ensure only surprise and hence informative increases, enter the 
sample, the selection procedure imposes the restriction that only firms initiating or 
resuming dividends after at least ten years of omissions are included.  This selection 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Q is generally defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm’s debt and equity to its total assets, and in 
that sense it is a firm’s characteristic.  However, to the extent that Tobin’s Q represents investment 
opportunities, it can also be viewed as an environmental factor.  In the discussion that follows, Tobin’s Q is 
treated as a firm’s characteristic.  The second caveat is with reference to the limited coverage of the review.  
For example, variation in the signalling function of dividends that are due to stock ownership patterns is not 
discussed.  Yet DeAngelo DeAngelo and Skinner (2000) provides some empirical support for the notion 
that the long-term decline in special dividends is related to ownership patterns and in particular to the shift 
from individual investors to institutional domination.        
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procedure results in a sample of 490 US firms that have initiated or resumed dividend in 
the period 1962 to 1989.  For these firms the whole of the dividend is taken as 
unexpected.   The sample is then partitioned on the basis of whether the firm has been 
engaged in financing activity in the twelve months prior to the dividend change 
announcement.  This provides a sub sample of 102 firms that were engaged in prior 
financing activity, and a sub sample of 388 firms that were not.    
Born and Rimbey (1993) begins their empirical investigation by running separate 
regressions for each sub sample, of the reaction to the dividend increase announcement 
on a constant and the dividend yield35.   Results indicate that the intercept is lower for the 
sub sample of prior-financing firms compared with the sub sample of non-financing 
firms.  This is consistent with the notion that prior financing activity leads to partial 
anticipation of a dividend increase, which impacts the share price prior to the actual 
increase announcement.   Results also show that for the sub sample of prior-financing 
firms, the abnormal return per unit of dividend yield is much larger than for the non-
financing firms. (2.800 as oppose to 1.745).  This is consistent with the notion that prior 
financing activity alters market reaction to dividend increase announcements as it 
                                                          
35 Born and Rimbey (1993) define the capital market response to the dividend announcement as the 
cumulative abnormal return for the period (–1, 0) where 0 is the day the dividend is announced in the Wall 
Street Journal.  Abnormal Returns are obtained using the market model, which is estimated pre-event over 
sixty trading days.  The explanatory variable, the dividend yield, is obtained by dividing the dividend 
amount by the closing price of the share two trading days before the announcement.  
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distinguishes firms with good growth prospects from those with poor growth 
opportunities.   
Based on these results Born and Rimbey (1993) proceed to assess the effect of the 
size of the prior financing activity on the reaction to the dividend announcement.  
Utilising the sub sample of prior-financing firms only, the price reaction to the dividend 
announcement is regressed on the dividend yield and on the financing yield36.  The 
estimated coefficient on the financing yield is shown to be positive and significant.  This 
is taken to indicate that the larger the amount of finance, raised prior to the dividend 
increase announcement, the stronger is the positive price reaction to the announcement. 
Thus Born and Rimbey (1993) conclude that a dividend increase announcement that 
follows prior financing activity, is interpreted as a stronger indication of growth 
compared with announcements that do not follow such activity.  However, the prior 
activity also reveals information and results in anticipation of a dividend change, 
therefore the actual dividend change announcement has less informative value.  This last 
point is further taken in Balachandran, Cadle and Theobald (1999), who also investigate 
the effects of prior activities (albeit not financing) on the dividend signalling function.  
                                                          
36 Born and Rimbey (1993) define the financing yield as the ratio of per-share-financing divided by the 
closing price of the share two trading days before the announcement.  Per-share-financing is defined as 
total financing divided by the number of common shares outstanding at the time of the dividend 
announcement.  Total financing is defined as total financing in the twelve months before the dividend 
announcement and includes the value of new securities, new loans received, and increases in credit 
agreements in place.  
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Balachandran, Cadle and Theobald (1999) look at the extent to which interim 
dividend reductions (IDR) announcements can be anticipated from prior dividend cuts or 
other factor.  It is proposed that anticipations of IDR should lead to weaker price reaction 
on the announcement date compared to situations where these announcements come as a 
surprise.  To test this proposition, price reactions to IDR announced by 242 non-financial 
UK firms, in the period 1986 to 1993 are studied37.   The study, however, begins by 
testing the traditional signalling hypothesis assumption consistent with which the IDR 
announcements should lead to negative price reactions.  Indeed, the unadjusted mean 
abnormal return in the event window around the IDR announcement is found to be 
negative and significantly different from zero across the five return generating processes.  
In the next stage of the investigation, Balachandran, Cadle and Theobald (1999) 
look at differences in price reaction between IDR that follow previous dividend 
reductions and IDR that do not.  To do this the sample of IDR announcements is divided 
into 142 First Interim Dividend Reductions (FIDR) and 100 Subsequent Interim Dividend 
Reductions (SIDR)38.  The hypothesis put forward is that FIDR lead to more negative 
                                                          
37 Balachandran, Cadle and Theobald (1999) measure price reaction to IDR announcement as the 
cumulative abnormal daily return over a three-day event window, that is centred around the IDR 
announcement.  Abnormal daily returns are measured using five alternative return generating models but all 
models give results similar to those obtained using the market model.   The coefficients for the market 
model are estimated using one hundred pre-event daily returns from day –120 relative to the event date.  
The market return proxy is the FTA All Share Index. 
38 Balachandran, Cadle and Theobald (1999) define FIDR as IDR announcements, where there were no 
dividend reductions in the three years preceding the IDR.  SIDR are defined as IDR announcements that 
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price reactions than SIDR because the former provide more information to the market 
while SIDR are to some extent anticipated.   Using the market model, the mean 
unadjusted price reaction to FIDR announcements is recorded as significant at –0.094 
while reaction to SIDR announcements is significant at –0.053.  As the difference 
between these reactions is significant, the results support the hypothesis that price 
reaction to dividend signals are weaker the more they are anticipated. 
In the third stage of the investigation, Balachandran, Cadle and Theobald (1999) 
focus on SIDR announcements.  It is proposed that when the subsequent interim dividend 
reduction is greater than the Prior Final Dividend Reduction (PFDR), the price reaction 
should be stronger compared with when the SIDR is less than the PFDR.  This may be 
the case if the increased dividend reduction at the interim stage provide further 
information and is tested by splitting the SIDR sample into two groups.  The first group 
consists of 39 SIDR where the percentage dividend reduction is greater than the 
percentage PFDR, and the second group consists of 61 SIDR where the percentage 
dividend reduction is less or equal to the percentage PFDR.  Using the market model, the 
mean unadjusted reaction when the SIDR is greater than the PFDR is –0.098, while when 
the SIDR is not greater than the PFDR the mean reaction declines to –0.025.   Thus the 
results are supportive the proposition that price reaction should be stronger, the stronger 
the surprise.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
follow a Prior Final Dividend Reduction (PFDR) immediately before the IDR but where there have been no 
reductions in the previous three year period. 
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In the final stage of the investigation, Balachandran, Cadle and Theobald (1999) 
search for factors that could explain cross sectional differences in price reactions to IDR.  
For this purpose, the cumulative abnormal returns around the IDR, generated from the 
market model, is regressed on various variables that are hypothesised to impact the 
surprise in the IDR39.   Results indicate that, consistent with signalling hypothesis, the 
price reaction to the IDR is significantly related to the size of the reduction.  Furthermore, 
there are mixed results about the importance of changes in interim earnings in influencing 
price reaction.  This is consistent with the view that the dividend signal is valuable 
because the information in the earnings change is a noisy signal of future performance.  
The regression results also support the conditional signalling hypothesis and the notion 
that cross sectional differences may result in variations in the signalling function of 
dividends.  Particularly, the price reaction is significantly influenced by whether the firm 
has previously reduced its dividends and by the gearing ratio.  The environment in which 
the firm operates also appears important as the surprise in the IDR and thus the price 
reaction to it, are influenced by prior dividend reductions by other firms in the industry.  
The impact of the environment in which the firm operates on market 
                                                          
39 Balachandran, Cadle and Theobald (1999) include the following factors as possible explanatory 
variables. The information content of the reduction as measured by the magnitude of the reduction.  
Availability of other information as reflected by the change in interim earnings.  Degree of surprise as 
reflected by prior dividend reductions either by the firm itself or by other firms in the same industry. The 
gearing ratio, because highly geared firms are expected to experience higher earnings volatility, and 
information leakage and size control variables.    
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interpretation of the dividend signal is also the subject in Impson (1997).   However, the 
emphasis there is on differences between regulated and unregulated firms.  The 
hypothesis is that, due to the particular circumstances faced by utilities, dividend 
reduction announcements by these firms result in stronger reaction than in the case of 
other firms.  The study uses 262 regulated and unregulated US firms declaring dividend 
reductions/omissions between 1974 and 1993 and the Weighted Least Squares cross 
sectional regression approach.  Thus the price reaction to the dividend announcement is 
regressed on a regulated-firm dummy and on control variables40.  
Results in Impson (1997) indicate that regulated utilities experience significantly 
more severe reaction to dividend reduction announcements compared with unregulated 
firms.  It is suggested that the surprise in the dividend reduction announcements may be 
greater for regulated utilities as these firms have traditionally been associated with high 
                                                          
40 Impson (1997) measures the dependent variable, the price reaction to the dividend reduction 
announcement, as the two-day cumulative prediction error obtained from the market model.  The event 
window includes the day of the dividend announcement and the previous day.  The parameters for the 
market model are estimated from the pre-event period from day –280 to day –31 relative to the dividend 
announcement day.  The regulated-firm explanatory variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 for public 
utilities and 0 otherwise.  The control variables include the average quarterly dividend yield, calculated 
over the four quarters before the announcement, as well as the change in the quarterly dividend, 
standardised by the price at the month-end before the announcement.  Other control variables include a firm 
size variable which is measured by the log of the market value of equity at the month-end before the 
announcement, and an over-investment variable which is measured by Tobin’s Q.  It is calculated as the 




yields and stable pattern of dividends.  Furthermore, the coefficients on the Tobin’s Q 
and size control variables are positive and significant.  The former indicates that the 
higher the over-investment, the more negative is the price reaction to the dividend cut 
announcement.  The latter indicates that the smaller the firm, the more severe is the 
reaction.   Thus, consistent with the conditional signalling theory, firm’s characteristic 
and environmental factors are found to be important in explaining price reaction to 
dividend change announcements.   
The importance of Tobin’s Q and firm size recorded in Impson (1997), as well as 
the importance of the gearing level recorded in Balachandran, Cadle and Theobald 
(1999), are suggestive of a link between firms’ characteristics and the dividend signal. 
Akhigbe and Madura (1996) investigate this issue further, by assessing cross sectional 
variation in long-term price performance following dividend change announcements.  
The study is based on a sample of US firms announcing dividend changes during the 
period 1972 to 1990.  However, prior to assessing cross sectional variations in long-term 
performance following dividend change announcement, a basic signalling hypothesis’ 
prediction is tested.  This is the prediction that dividend increase signals should be 
realised by improvements in long-term performance while decreases should be realised 
by future decline in performance.  For this end, the mean long-term price performance of 
128 firms initiating dividends is compared to the mean for the 299 firms omitting 
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dividends41.  Indeed, it is found that firms tend to experience a favourable share price 
performance, over the longer term, following dividend initiations and unfavourable 
performance following omissions.   
To assess cross sectional variations in long-term price performance following 
dividend initiations and omissions Akhigbe and Madura (1996) regress the 36-month 
cumulative abnormal return on firm characteristics and the size of the dividend change. 
Results of this procedure indicate that larger cuts in dividends are associated with more 
severe long-term price performance.  Further, the coefficient on the past profitability 
measure is negative and significant in the initiation sample, suggesting that firms with 
inefficient management improve their performance following dividend initiations.  With 
regards firm size it is found that smaller firms tend to perform significantly better in the 
three years following dividend initiations while large firms tend to perform significantly 
worse following dividend omissions.   Finally, long term reaction to dividend initiations 
is influenced by the Tobin’s Q measure, implying that firms that over-invest perform 
significantly better following dividend initiations.  These findings are consistent with the 
conditional signalling hypothesis and with the findings in Gombola and Liu (1999)42. 
                                                          
41 Akhigbe and Madura (1996) measure the performance following the dividend change announcement by 
estimating the average abnormal monthly return for the sub-samples of dividend increasing and decreasing 
firms over the first, second and third years starting one month after the dividend announcement.  The size 
and beta adjusted model is used to generate the monthly abnormal stock return for each firm, where the 
parameters are estimated from month +1 to month +36 after the month of the dividend announcement.  
42 The results in Akhigbe and Madura (1996) with regards to size can be contrasted with those in Impson 
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Gombola and Liu (1999) explore the link between Tobin’s Q and the short-term 
price reaction to dividend increase announcements.  In particular, the study analyses the 
price reaction to 196 Special Designated Dividend announcements made by US firms 
between 1977 and 1989.  It is hypothesised that firms facing low investment 
opportunities, with low Tobin’s Q, should experience stronger price reaction to the 
announcement of Special Designated Dividend.  This is consistent with the signalling 
hypothesis, because the surprise in the special dividend announcement should be greater 
for firms with little investment opportunities.  Indeed the event study methodology finds 
that the mean three-day cumulative abnormal return around the Special Designated 
Dividend announcement for the low Tobin’s Q sample is positive and significant.  
However, the mean price reaction for the high Tobin’s Q sample is insignificantly 
different from zero, while the mean difference between the two groups is significant43.    
                                                                                                                                                                             
(1997) who finds that the immediate price reaction to dividend reduction announcements tend to be more 
severe the smaller the firm.  The contradiction may be suggestive of miss-interpretation by the market of 
the dividend omission signal.  In particular, the severity of the information contained in the dividend 
omission may be under-reacted to, in the case of large firms and over-reacted to, in the case of smaller 
firms. Akhigbe and Madura (1996) also find that long term reactions to dividend omissions are unrelated to 
the degree of over or under investment as measured by Tobin’s Q.   This can also be contrasted with 
Impson (1997) who finds that over investment is significantly and positively related to the immediate price 
reaction to dividend reductions/omissions. This again can be indicative of lack of understanding of the 
dividend omission signal.  If the long-term performance of firms omitting dividends is not significantly 
worse for over-investing relative to other firms, then the immediate price reaction to the announcement 
should also not be significantly different. 
43 Gombola and Liu (1999) use the market model with CRSP equally weighted index as a proxy for market 
returns. The coefficients for the model are estimated over the pre-event period in days –260 to –61 relative 
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The approach in Gombola and Liu (1999) is based on an earlier study by Lang 
and Litzenberger (1989).  Both studies investigate the validity of the conditional 
signalling hypothesis with respect to Tobin’s Q, but while the former focuses on price 
reaction to special dividend, the focus of the latter in on substantial changes in regular 
dividends.  According to the conditional signalling hypothesis the reaction to substantial 
dividend change announcements should be larger for firms with low investment 
opportunities.  The rationale for this is explained as follows.  Investors expect an increase 
in cash flows for firms with good investment opportunities and they also expect these 
firms to announce dividend increases to signal this.  Therefore the reaction to dividend 
increase announcements should not be strong for high Tobin’s Q firms while the reaction 
to announcements of substantial dividend cuts should be strong.   In contrast firms 
without high investment opportunities are not expected to enjoy an increase in cash 
flows, thus large dividend increases or decreases are not expected for low Tobin’s Q 
firms.  If such dividend changes are announced, market reaction should be strong.   
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) therefore predict that if the price reaction is 
measured as the average to all dividend changes (increases and decreases), the average 
reaction in the case of low Tobin’s Q firms should be stronger than for high Tobin’s Q 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to the special dividend announcement. The cumulative abnormal return includes the three days centred 
around the announcement day.  In addition to the event study, the authors also use regression analysis of 
the cumulative abnormal return on the investment opportunities variable as measured by Tobin’s Q and 
other control variables.  Further, abnormal earnings forecast revisions, following the special dividend 
announcement, are analysed to give support for signalling but not for agency theories.  
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firms.  To test this prediction the study utilises 429 substantial dividend change 
announcements made between 1979 to 1984 by US firms.  To ensure the dividend change 
is substantial, a restriction is imposed where the absolute value of the percentage 
dividend change of each observation must be greater then 10%.   The average reaction on 
the day of the announcement for firms with Tobin’s Q less than unity is recorded as 
0.011, as opposed to 0.003 in the case of high Tobin’s Q firms.  Further, the 0.008 
difference in the mean reaction between low and high Tobin’s Q firms is highly 
significant.   
However, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) point out that a stronger price reaction to 
substantial dividend changes by low Tobin’s Q firms compared with high Tobin’s Q 
firms is also consistent with the over-investment hypothesis.  Large dividend increases by 
firms with low investment opportunities reduce the potential for over-investment by these 
firms.  Such announcements should therefore be received with more positive reaction 
compared with reaction to similar changes by firms that face many investment 
opportunities.  Similarly, large dividend decrease announcements by firms with low 
investment opportunities indicate an increase in the probability of over investment by 
management.  Such announcements by low Tobin’s Q firms should therefore be met by 
more severe reaction.  Thus similar to the conditional signalling hypothesis, the over-
investment hypothesis also predicts a stronger reaction to substantial dividend increases 
or decreases by low Tobin’s Q firms.    
To distinguish between the conditional signalling hypothesis and the over-
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investment hypothesis, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) further partition their sample of 
low and high Tobin’s Q groups into dividend increase and dividend decrease 
announcements.  The reaction to announcements of substantial dividend decreases is the 
key to distinguishing between the two hypotheses.  Particularly, the conditional signalling 
hypothesis predicts strong reactions to dividend decreases regardless of the firm’s 
Tobin’s Q, which is due to the negative information such announcements contain 
regarding future expected cash flows.  In contrast, the over-investment hypothesis 
predicts that the reaction to dividend changes will always be greater for low Tobin’s Q 
firms because the potential for over-investment in the case of firms with little investment 
opportunities is greater.   
Based on this distinguishing feature between the two alternative hypotheses, Lang 
and Litzenberger (1989) compare the mean price reaction to dividend decrease 
announcements. They find that the average reaction to dividend decreases by high 
Tobin’s Q firms is insignificant, at –0.003, while for low Tobin’s Q firms the reaction is 
significant at –0.027.  These results indicate that there is a significant difference in the 
price reaction to dividend cut announcements between firms with high and low 
investment opportunities.  These findings are consistent with the over-investment 
hypothesis and inconsistent with the conditional signalling hypothesis.   Similar results in 
support of the over-investment hypothesis over the conditional signalling hypothesis are 
also obtained from comparing the post-announcement revisions of analysts’ current 
earnings forecasts.    
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Thus the results in Lang and Litzenberger (1989) in favour of an agency theory 
based explanation for market reaction to dividend changes contradict the conclusions in 
Gombola and Liu (1999) in favour of conditional signalling theory.   However, the results 
in Akhigbe and Madura (1996), Impson (1997), and Balachandran, Cadle and Theobald 
(1999) are consistent with Gombola and Liu (1999).  These studies show that firms’ 
characteristics, and in particular investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q), are important in 
determining how the dividend signal is interpreted. Impson (1997) and Balachandran, 
Cadle and Theobald (1999) further illustrate that environmental factors, such as whether 
the firm is regulated or the dividend behaviour of other firms in the industry, also 
influence the price reaction to the dividend signal.  Finally, Balachandran, Cadle and 
Theobald (1999) and Born and Rimbey (1993) show that activities undertaken by the 
firm prior to declaring dividend changes have implications for how this signal is 
interpreted.  In particular, Balachandran, Cadle and Theobald (1999) show that prior 
activities such as past dividend announcements by the firm, influence the amount of 
surprise and hence the value of the dividend signal.  Similarly, Born and Rimbey (1993) 
show that past activities such as prior financing can distinguish dividend initiating firms 
that signal quality from dividend initiating firms that disinvest.  
 
 
2.3.3.6   Conclusions from the empirical studies on the signalling theory of dividend 
The empirical studies of the signalling theory that were reviewed in this section are 
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summarised in Tables 2.4 to 2.7.  Table 2.4 focuses on studies that seek to clarify the 
market’s interpretation of the information contained in the dividend change 
announcement.  Table 2.5 summarises some of the empirical work that assesses whether 
dividend signals are realised by actual changes.  Table 2.6 extends on Table 2.5 by 
presenting work that puts forward and tests various theories of what information the 
dividend announcements convey.  Table 2.7 is devoted to empirical work on the 
conditional signalling hypothesis.    The importance of the signalling theory is apparent 
from the huge amount of empirical work on the area as is also reflected in the selected 
review provided above.   
There is substantial empirical evidence to support the view that dividends are 
perceived to contain important information, and that the dividend signal is picked-up by 
market participants.  Indeed consistent with Lintner (1956), it is generally found that 
dividend increases are typically perceived as good news with positive price reaction 
while the reverse is typically true for dividend reductions.   However, evidence is not 
conclusive on the precise information that the dividend change announcement is 
perceived to convey.   Furthermore, as noted in Allen and Michaely (1995), most if not 
all of the empirical work in the area can not distinguish whether dividend policy are 
intended as a signalling device by firms.  Evidence is also not conclusive on whether 
market’s interpretation of dividend changes is justified by actual future changes in 
performance.  Finally it is noted that cross sectional differences among firms can make 
the dividend signal difficult to understand.  Such variation, however, are sometimes 
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utilised to disentangle the effects of signalling from agency related effects such as the 
over-investment theory.   It is evidence on the effects of the latter on dividend policy that 
is discussed next.   
 
2.3.4  Empirical studies of the agency theory of dividends 
2.3.4.1    From theory to empirics 
Agency theory predicts that managers abuse their position as agents of the firm to 
appropriate benefits to themselves.  A number of studies have investigated the validity of 
this assumption. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) show that managers tend 
to accumulate excess cash when they have the opportunity to do so.  However, they also 
find that firms with excess cash do not use it to over-invest as predicted by agency 
theory. There is also no evidence of reluctance by managers to return cash to 
shareholders in the form of dividends when investment opportunities are low.   
Similar conclusions are also reported in Long, Malitz and Sefcik (1994) who 
investigate the validity of the agency cost of debt.  In particular, the study investigates the 
under investment problem, which predicts that firms will increase dividends following 
the issuance of debt as a means of expropriating wealth from debt holders to equity 
holders.  However, Long, Malitz and Sefcik (1994) find no evidence to support the view 
that firms act in a manner consistent with the wealth expropriation hypothesis. It is 
therefore concluded that reputation has greater value to the firm and its management than 
the value of the benefits to be obtained by a one off wealth expropriation.   
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If reputation is important to managers and acting as predicted by agency theory 
can harm their reputation, then it may be in managers’ interests to show that the firm is 
free of potential agency problems.  One way for managers to create reputation, 
particularly in countries with poor protection for minority shareholders, is by paying 
dividends which signals decent treatment of minority shareholders.  This idea is 
developed in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) who term it the 
substitute model of dividends.  However, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2000) reject the substitute model in favour of what they term the outcome model 
of dividends.  In the outcome model dividends are the outcome of effective pressure by 
minority shareholders and therefore higher payout ratios tend to be observed in countries 
with good protection for minority shareholders.   
Whether the motivation to pay dividends is due to the need by insiders to create 
reputation for good treatment of minority shareholders, or is the outcome of pressure by 
minority shareholders, dividends derive their value from reducing agency problems.  
Dividends can reduce agency problems by reducing the free cash flows (Jensen, 1986) or 
by forcing the firm to the capital market thus inducing capital market monitoring of the 
firm and its management (Easterbrook, 1984).  Rozeff (1982) incorporates the agency-
related value of dividends into a model, which he calls the cost minimisation model and 
which allows for empirical testing of the agency theory of dividends.   
There are, however, other ways to control agency costs which may be less costly 
than the dividend device.  For example, growing firms are likely to resort to external 
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financing on a regular basis, and thus subject themselves to external monitoring even 
without using dividends.   Similarly Jensen (1986) proposes that agency costs may be 
controlled by debt.   Other alternatives to dividends in controlling agency costs include 
managerial ownership and management compensation schemes that are designed to align 
the interests of managers and outside shareholders. Indeed, Fama and French (2001) 
propose that the declining trends in dividends by US firms may be due to growing use of 
stock options by managers, which lower the benefits of dividends in controlling agency 
costs.  Thus the availability and cost of non-dividend monitoring mechanisms may 
impact the degree to which the dividend device is used and thus the validity of the cost 
minimisation model.   
In light of the above discussion, the following selective review of empirical 
studies of the agency theory of dividends is dividend into two sub sections.  The first sub 
section describes some studies of the cost minimisation model.  The second sub section is 
devoted to some of the studies that seek to assess the degree of substitutability amongst 
the various methods by which firms can control agency costs.     
 
 
2.3.4.2  The cost minimisation model44
 Rozeff (1982) introduces the cost minimisation model according to which the optimal 
                                                          
44 The studies reviewed in this sub section are summarised in Table 2.8. 
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dividend payout is at the level that minimises the sum of transaction costs and agency 
costs.  Transaction costs are incurred when external finance is raised, which may be 
necessary when internal funds are paid out as dividends.  Agency costs are the costs 
associated with the agency problem.  These costs can be reduced by the payment of 
dividends as suggested by Easterbrook (1984).  
Rozeff (1982) tests the cost minimisation model using Ordinary Least Squares 
cross sectional regression and 1000 US firms with data relating to 1981.  Transactions 
costs faced by the firm are measured by past and forecasted growth rates in revenues and 
by the firm’s beta, which represents risk.  An agency cost variable is taken as the natural 
logarithm of the number of outside shareholders, which measures ownership dispersion. 
It is expected to be positively related to the payout ratio because the more dispersed is the 
ownership structure, the more difficult monitoring becomes.  An inverse agency cost 
variables is the fraction of the firm owned by insiders.  It is expected to be negatively 
related to the payout ratio, because by increasing their holdings in the firm, managers 
align their interests with that of outside investors.  Rozeff (1982) shows the estimated 
coefficients on the five explanatory variables to be significant and to bear the signs 
predicted by the cost minimisation model.   
Innovations on the Rozeff’s (1982) model can basically be split into three types, 
including adding new variables, improving the empirical technique or focusing on 
particular types of firms.   Llyod, Jahera and Page (1985) innovate by adding a new 
variable, namely firm size, and by refining the empirical approach.  The empirical 
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approach follows Rozeff (1982) by employing the Ordinary Least Squares method and 
data on 957 US firms for 1984.   However, innovation comes in an attempt to reduce 
correlation between the explanatory variables by regressing the agency variables on the 
size variable, and using the residuals obtained in place of the original agency variables. 
Results indicate that after multicollinearity is properly controlled for, the cost 
minimisation model is still valid.  All the explanatory variables appear important and 
enter the model with the expected signs.  Further, the study concludes that size is also an 
important explanatory variable.  
Schooley and Barney (1994) also innovate on the Rozeff’s (1982) model by 
adding a new variable, namely the squared of insider holding, and by attempting to 
improve the technique.  In particular they relax the linearity assumption with regard 
insider holdings and assess whether the relationship between this variable and the optimal 
payout ratio may be more complex than originally assumed.   Rozeff (1982) suggests that 
the optimal payout ratio should decline monotonically with rises in insider ownership.  
As insider ownership increases, insiders’ interests are more aligned with that of 
shareholders, hence agency costs are reduced and the need for the dividend tool to control 
these costs is lessened.  Schooley and Barney (1994) suggest that at low level of 
ownership the relationship between dividends and insider ownership is as predicted by 
Rozeff (1982).  However, when the level of insider ownership reaches a certain level, 
further increases cause agency costs to start rising and the need for the dividend control 
tool becomes necessary.  This occurs due to two reasons.  First, when high proportion of 
 93 
their wealth is invested in the firm, insiders become less diversified. They then tend to 
evaluate projects based on total risk and may reject projects even when these are justified 
based on systematic risk. Second, when insiders hold substantial percentage of voting 
rights they achieve a sufficient level of control that diminishes their risk of being 
replaced.  The results of the Ordinary Least Squares regression, using 1980 data of 235 
industrial US firms provide support for the cost minimisation model.  Further, the 
relationship between insider ownership and the firm’s dividend policy appears to confirm 
to expectation45. 
Moh’d, Perry and Rimbey (1995) innovate on the cost minimisation model by 
adding a number of new variables, and by using Weighted Least Square methodology and 
panel data for 341 US firms over 18 years from 1972 to 1989.  The aim is to test whether 
variation in payout ratios across time can be explained by changes in the agency 
cost/transaction cost structure.  To capture the dynamics in the dividend process, 
variables are not aggregated and the previous period’s dividend payout ratio is added to 
the RHS of the model.  The study also decomposes beta, the systematic risk, into its 
components to assess more directly the separate effects of financial leverage, operating 
                                                          
45 Schooley and Barney (1994) propose another innovation to improve Rozeff (1982) model.  They replace 
the payout ratio as the dependent variable in the cost minimisation model, with the dividend yield.  It is 
suggested that this modification ensures that the denominator of the dependent variable is a market measure 
(share price), rather than an accounting measure (net income).  Further, replacing the payout ratio with the 
dividend yield avoids the problems of negative or very high dependent variables when the firm net income 
is negative or zero. 
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leverage and the intrinsic business risk.  Further, institutional ownership is added as an 
explanatory variable.  According to agency theory, the presence of institutional investors 
should reduce payout ratios due to their role in monitoring managers’ activities as 
suggested in Shleifer and Vishny (1986).  However, if investors consider taxes on 
dividends and on capital gains, then the presence of institutional ownership should 
increase the firm’s payout ratio as suggested in Redding (1997).   Indeed, results with 
respect to institutional holdings indicate support for the tax hypothesis of dividends.  The 
study also provides supports for the dynamic nature of the dividend process according to 
which firms adjust their dividend each year, as new information becomes available.  
Holder, Langrehr and Hexter (1998) add two new variables to the cost 
minimisation model.  Free cash flow is added as an agency proxy and the firm’s focus is 
added to test stakeholder theory.  Stakeholder theory proposes that non-investors that 
have implicit contracts with the firm, such as employees, customers, suppliers and others, 
also influence the firm’s decisions including its dividend policy decisions. Particularly, 
dividend policy can create value because by reducing its payout ratio, the firm signals to 
implicit claimants an increase in its ability to meet implicit claims. Using panel data for 
477 US firms each with eight years of observations from 1983 to 1990, the study 
provides support for both the agency model and stakeholder theory.  
All the innovations to Rozeff (1982) reviewed above focused on adding new 
variables to variants of the cost minimisation model.  In contrast the innovation in 
Hansen, Kumar and Shome (1994) is with respect to the type of firms for which the 
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model is applied, namely the regulated electric utility industry.  It is proposed that the 
agency theory of dividend should fit particularly well to the behaviour of regulated firms 
for two main reasons.   First, agency conflicts in regulated firms are predicted to be 
particularly severe as they include conflicts between shareholders and regulators.  
However, by paying dividends the regulated firm exposes its managers and its regulators 
to capital market monitoring, which in turn contributes to reducing agency costs.  Second, 
it is proposed that the costs associated with dividend-induced capital monitoring are 
lower for utilities because direct flotation costs of issuing new equity can be passed on, at 
least in part, to ratepayers.  The study begins by comparing the mean payout ratios of 
utilities and S&P400 industrial firms over the period 1981-1985 and over the period 
1986-1990.  Results are consistent with the prediction that utilities have higher payout 
rates as in both periods the averages payout ratio of utilities are significantly greater than 
that of non-regulated firms.  Further, results of cross sectional Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions offer support for the monitoring rationale for dividends in the case of 
regulated firms.  Indeed, it is concluded that the monitoring rationale for dividends could 
be the answer to the puzzle of why firms often issue new equity while at the same time 
paying large dividends.  
The innovation in Hansen, Kumar and Shome (1994) of applying the cost 
minimisation model to a particular type of firms, is also the approach in Rao and White 
(1994).  However, while the former study applies the model to firms for which the 
monitoring rationale for dividend is predicted to be particularly suited, the latter study 
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applies the model to the opposite type of firms.   Thus, Rao and White (1994) apply the 
cost minimisation model to private firms for which the monitoring rationale for dividend 
is predicted to be particularly unsuitable.   Indeed, it is noted that the motivation to use 
dividend as an agency-cost controlling device may be less important for private firms due 
to less agency problems.  Moreover, as private firms do not participate in the capital 
market, the rationale for dividends as inducing further equity issues leading to capital 
market monitoring also loses some of its momentum.   
Another innovation in Hansen, Kumar and Shome (1994) is that they incorporate 
taxes into the model, as it is argued that tax savings considerations may contribute to 
private firms’ preference for low payout policies.  This is explained as follows.  
Owners/managers of private firms receive returns in the form of either salary, which is a 
tax deductible business expense, or dividends. There is therefore incentive to minimise 
the dividends and to increase the salary component.  Although limits are imposed on the 
amount of salary that can be paid, owners may still have incentive to minimise dividends 
due to tax differentials between dividends and capital gains.  However, it is noted that if 
the Internal Revenue Service suspects that a firm is retaining its earnings for the purpose 
of avoiding taxes, it may take steps to impose Accumulated Earnings Tax on that firm.   
Thus AET is added to the model to proxy for the tax cost of not paying dividends.  
The third innovation in Rao and White (1994) is the empirical technique, which is 
the limited dependent variable regression as opposed to Ordinary Least Squares.  The 
rationale for this is as follows.  The sample includes 66 private US firms that had been 
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challenged in court by the Internal Revenue Service for Accumulated Earnings Tax 
liability between 1928 and 1988.  However, as the Internal Revenue Service is unlikely to 
challenge firms with high payout ratios, the sample excludes firms with payout ratios 
greater than some high latent level.  This implies that the dependent variable of the firms 
included in the sample is not normally distributed but truncated from above, and Ordinary 
Least Squares method is inappropriate.  
Results in Rao and White (1994) show that the agency cost variables, namely the 
fraction of shares held by insiders, and the dispersion of ownership as reflected in the 
number of shareholders, influence the payout ratio in the manner predicted.  This 
suggests that the agency cost argument for dividends appears applicable even for private 
firms that do not participate in the capital market.  It is suggested that by paying 
dividends private firms can still induce monitoring by bankers, accountants and tax 
authorities.  The proxy for the Accumulated Earnings Tax cost is also found to be 
important and to enter the model with the predicted sign.  This suggests that tax cost 
considerations influence the dividend decisions of private firms.  Thus firms that are 
likely to be challenged and charged by the Internal Revenue Service for Accumulated 
Earnings Tax, reduce the probability of facing such costs by increasing their payouts. 
Rao and White (1994) demonstrate the relevance of agency considerations to 
dividend decisions not merely in the most likely cases as shown in Hansen, Kumar and 
Shome (1994) for regulated firms, but rather in the least likely cases such as private 
firms.  Hansen, Kumar and Shome (1994) contribute to the discussion by emphasising the 
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use of dividend to control conflicts beyond shareholders and managers, such as conflicts 
with regulators.  In the same trend, Holder, Langrehr and Hexter (1998) discuss how 
dividend can be used to control conflicts relating to non-investor stakeholders in the firm.   
The complexity of agency behaviour, and in particular how insider holdings influences 
agency costs, is emphasised in Schooley and Barney (1994), while Moh’d, Perry and 
Rimbey (1995) address the dynamic nature of the agency/transaction cost structure.  The 
latter study also illustrates the importance of tax considerations in determining the payout 
ratio of firms as reflected in the positive and significant impact of institutional investors 
on payout levels.  The importance of incorporating tax into the model is also picked-up in 
Rao and White (1994), while the importance of firm size is shown in Holder, Langrehr 
and Hexter (1998), Moh’d, Perry and Rimbey (1995), and Llyod, Jahera and Page (1985).    
One thread, however, common to all the above-mentioned studies is that they 
provide support for the monitoring rationale of dividend and for Rozeff’s (1982) cost 
minimisation model.  However, as predicted by tax and transaction cost theories, and 
indeed as incorporated in the cost minimisation model, using the dividend monitoring 
device is not costless.  It has therefore been suggested by a number of studies, that the 
extent to which the dividend-monitoring device is used to control agency cost should 
display sensitivity to the availability of alternative mechanisms.  Some of the empirical 




2.3.4.3 The partiality of the monitoring rationale for dividends (or substitutability 
among dividend and non-dividend mechanisms for controlling agency costs)46 
Easterbrook (1984) points to two important implications of the monitoring rationale for 
dividends.  First, it is noted that dividends must influence the firm’s financing policies, if 
the reason that they are paid is to drive the firm to the capital market.  Second, as the 
dividend-monitoring device is costly, the presence of alternative mechanisms that limit 
agency problems, or conditions that force the firm to the capital market, should reduce 
the use of the dividend device47. The implications of these two points are that the 
dividend rationale is applicable only in some cases.  Further, in these cases, the dividend 
and capital structure decisions are endogenous variables and should be modelled as a pair 
of simultaneous equations in a signal model.   
Noronha, Shome and Morgan (1996) test whether the presence of growth-induced 
monitoring or other non-dividend devices that limit agency problems, lessen the 
monitoring role of dividends and the simultaneity of dividend and capital structure 
decisions.  For that purpose a sample of 341 US industrial firms is stratified according to 
the presence of growth opportunities as measured by Tobin’s Q.  A firm with Tobin’s Q 
                                                          
46 The studies reviewed in this sub section are summarised in Table 2.9. 
47 Indeed Hansen, Kumar and Shome (1994) illustrate the validity of this point by studying the time trend in 
the payout ratios of their sample of utility firms.  They find that while the average asset growth rate 
declined significantly from 7.88% in 1985 to 6.47% in 1990, the mean payout ratio has increased 
significantly from 69.16% in 1985 to 76.43% in 1990.  Thus when conditions of growth force firms to the 
capital market, the use of the dividend device to achieve the same results is reduced. 
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value above the sample average is classified as high on growth opportunities. The sample 
is then further stratified according to the presence of alternative non-dividend monitoring 
mechanisms.  A firm is classified as possessing alternative non-dividend monitoring 
mechanism if it satisfies two conditions.  First, the firm has to have an above average 
incentive component in its managerial compensation package, which serves to align 
managers-shareholder interests.  Second, the firm has to have a single large outside 
shareholder holding at least 5% of the firm’s equity, because a large outside shareholder 
serves as an external monitor and a potential take-over threat.48
The stratification procedure, in Noronha, Shome and Morgan (1996), results in 
two sub-samples. Sample A consists of 131 firms with high alternative control 
mechanisms and/or growth-induced capital market monitoring.  Sample B consists of 210 
firms with low alternative control mechanisms and low growth opportunities.  The 
sample data is pooled from the period 1986 to 1988 following a Chow test that fails to 
reject the null of stability.  The monitoring rationale for dividends is tested by an 
Ordinary Least Squares regression of a variant of the cost minimisation model, where 
firm size is taken as a proxy for transaction costs.   Results for group A are weak, as none 
of the agency cost/transaction cost structure variables are insignificant.  In contrast, 
                                                          
48 Noronha, Shome and Morgan, (1996) measure Tobin’s Q as the market to book ratio which is defined as 
the market value of equity plus book value of long-term debt and preferred stock all divide by the book 
value of total assets.  The incentive component in the managerial compensation package is measured as 
total compensation to the firm’s top executives less the salary component, expressed as a ratio of total 
compensation. 
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results for group B support the cost minimisation model as the coefficients on all the 
variables bear the expected signs, and all but the coefficient on firm size, are significant.  
In the second part of the study, Noronha, Shome and Morgan (1996) test for 
simultaneity between dividend and capital structure decisions. It is predicted that 
simultaneity should be evident only in cases where the dividend monitoring rationale 
applies.  Indeed, results of a Three Stage Least Squares tests show no evidence of 
simultaneity of dividend and capital structure decisions for group A. The equity ratio 
explanatory variable in the payout equation, and the payout variable in the equity ratio 
equation are both not significant.  In contrast, for group B both, the equity ratio variable 
in the payout equation and the payout variable in the equity ratio equation are negative 
and significant.  These results as well as the results from testing the validity of the cost 
minimisation model, support the partial explanation of the monitoring rationale for 
dividends. 
More support for the partial explanation of the monitoring rationale for dividends 
is provided by Johnson (1995), who studies 129 straight debt offerings by NYSE/AMEX 
industrial firms between 1977 and 1983.  However, while in Noronha, Shome and 
Morgan (1996) alternative agency cost controlling devices include growth opportunities, 
management incentive schemes and a large outside shareholder, in Johnson (1995) it is 
debt.   In particular it is shown that dividends and debt are alternative devices to reduce 
the agency problem associated with free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). This is because both 
debt and dividend signal a commitment to pay out cash and both may increase visits to 
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the capital market thus inducing capital market monitoring of management’s actions.  
Indeed, the study finds the average two-day excess return around the debt issue 
announcement day is positive and significantly different from zero for low payout firms 
(0.78 percent).  This is interpreted as implying that the issue is indicative of reduced 
agency problems.  However, for high payout firms, the average excess return on the debt 
issue announcement is insignificantly different from zero (-0.18 percent).   
Johnson (1995) further utilises a Weighted Least Squares methodology to regress 
the two-day excess return around the debt issue announcement day on a payout variable. 
The results from this procedure also support the notion that dividends and debt are 
alternative mechanisms for controlling agency problems.  Particularly, the intercept is 
positive and significant suggesting that the price reaction to debt issue announcement is 
generally positive. However, the coefficient on the payout variable is negative and 
significant suggesting that the reaction to the debt issue announcement is weaker for 
dividends paying firms.   These effects are stronger when the regression is run on a sub 
sample of 64 low growth firms but weaker when run on a sub sample of 65 high growth 
firms.  This is consistent with the view that the potential for wasting free cash flow is 
greater when profitable investment opportunities are low.  Thus Johnson (1995) provides 
further support for the conclusions in Noronha, Shome and Morgan (1996) regarding the 
substitutability of growth opportunities and dividend as agency costs controlling 
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devices49.  
Johnson (1995) illustrates the importance of debt as an alternative to dividends in 
controlling agency costs.  Crutchley and Hansen (1989) make the same point and suggest 
that leverage can achieve these results because debt finance reduces equity financing and 
hence manager-shareholder conflicts.  Crutchley and Hansen (1989) further note that 
manager-shareholder conflicts may also be reduced by increasing insider holdings.  
However, the crucial point in the study is the realisation that each of the three agency 
control devices, namely managerial ownership, leverage and dividends, is costly.  For 
example, while increasing management’s ownership helps to align manger-shareholder 
interests, it also increases the proportion of the manager’s total personal wealth, which is 
invested in the firm.  As the manager suffers increasing lack of diversification, she will be 
more risk averse even when this is not in line with shareholder interests.   
To test the agency theory of managerial ownership, leverage and dividends, 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) use 603, US industrial firms for the period 1981 to 1985, 
and Ordinary Least Squares analysis.  Particularly, each of the three policy decisions is 
                                                          
49  Another important point made in Johnson (1995) relates to distinguishing between the two possible ways 
by which both debt and dividends can control agency costs.  Easterbrook (1984) suggests that the issuance 
of debt in a series ensures that refinancing is continuous and thus debt, just like dividends, induce capital 
market monitoring, which is a solution to the free rider problem.  However, Johnson (1995) finds no 
significant relationship between the frequency of visits to the capital markets and the price reaction to debt 
issue announcements.  It is thus concluded that the other method by which debt and dividend can reduce 
agency costs, namely the commitment to pay out cash and thus reducing the discretionary resources under 
management’s control, dominates the Easterbrook’s (1984) explanation, at least in the case of debt.  
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regressed on five firm’s characteristics that are hypothesised to influence the levels of the 
costs associated with each policy.  These explanatory variables include firm 
diversification, earnings volatility, flotation costs, advertising and R&D expenditure, and 
firm size.  The results support the notion that managers employ a mix of policies 
including leverage policy, dividend policy and managerial ownership incentives in an 
effort to control for agency costs in the most efficient manner.  The precise combination 
of policies varies across firms and is determined by firm’s characteristics.    
First Crutchley and Hansen (1989) find that managers of diversified firms bear 
relatively lower costs in increasing the percentage of their wealth invested in the firm’s 
equity.  Thus diversified firms tend to use more of the managerial ownership device and 
less of the debt and dividend devices to control agency costs.   Second firms with volatile 
earnings face higher bankruptcy risk thus managers reduce leverage and increase 
dependency on managerial ownership and dividends.  Third firms with volatile stock 
expect to pay higher underwriting fees when issuing new equity thus they tend to increase 
the use of managerial ownership and leverage, but avoid using dividends.   Forth, firms 
with high R&D expenditure have more freedom to engage in wealth expropriation from 
both debt and share holders, thus these firms tend to use less debt and dividends and more 
managerial ownership.  Fifth, large firms face lower bankruptcy costs and lower flotation 
costs on the issue of new equity, while managers of these firms find it more expensive in 
terms of diversification costs to increase their percentage holdings.  Thus large firms tend 
to rely more on the debt and dividend policy devices and less on managerial ownership. 
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Similar to Crutchley and Hansen (1989), Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) also 
investigate the substitutability between leverage, dividends and management ownership 
in controlling agency costs.  The study utilises 71 industry-size matched pairs of all-
equity and levered firms for the year 1981, and an Ordinary Least Squares regression 
analysis.  Specifically, proxies for dividend policy are regressed on leverage, managerial 
ownership, an interaction term, and on two control variables including free cash flow and 
growth.   Results show the coefficient on the leverage dummy, to be negative and 
significant, which is consistent with the prediction that all-equity firms follow a policy of 
higher payout ratios than levered firms.  Similarly, consistent with the prediction that 
firms with lower insider ownership adopt higher payout ratios, the coefficient on this 
variable is reported as negative and significant. This negative correlation between 
dividends and insider ownership is stronger in all-equity firms as observed by the positive 
and significant coefficient on the interaction term between leverage and insider 
ownership.   
Bathala and Rao (1995) introduce Board composition as a possible agency-cost-
controlling device. They investigate the interrelation between Board composition, insider 
ownership, dividends and leverage as alternative mechanisms for reducing manager-
shareholder conflicts.  It is argued that outside directors on the Board can reduce conflicts 
due to their independence and due to the need to maintain reputation in the market for 
their services.  To test this, 261 non-regulated, US firms are used in a cross sectional 
Ordinary Least Squares regression of a measure of Board composition on alternative 
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agency-cost control devices and on a set of control variables.   The results from this 
procedure show that the alternative agency-cost control devices, including insider 
holdings, dividends and leverage, have a negative and significant impact on the fraction 
of outside directors on the Board.    These findings are consistent with the notion of firms 
relying on a mix of alternative mechanisms, including Board composition, to control 
agency conflicts.    
Bathala and Rao (1995) note that alternative mechanisms may control different 
aspects of agency conflicts and that each mechanism may have other, non-agency-related 
benefits, associated with its use.  Empirical work appears to confirm the presence of 
substitutability amongst various mechanisms including dividends, leverage, managerial 
ownership and incentive schemes, the presence of a large shareholder, growth, and 
outside directors on the Board.  In the face of these many alternatives, the agency related 
value of dividends is still unclear.  
 
2.3.4.4  Conclusions from the empirical studies on the agency theory of dividend 
The agency theory of asserts that dividends reduce agency costs by either forcing the firm 
to the capital market thus solving the collective monitoring problem, or by reducing the 
free cash at the discretion of management.  The cost minimisation model as designed by 
Rozeff (1982) encapsulates this idea and shows that there is an optimal payout level that 
minimises the transactions-agency costs structure.  Table 2.8 summarises the key points 
from Rozeff (1982) and subsequent studies of the cost minimisation model.  The results 
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appear to support Easterbrook’s (1984) proposition that dividends have agency related 
value.  
However, even if dividends may contribute to reducing agency costs, rather than 
merely signalling internal information, which will be revealed in the longer-term whether 
or not dividends are paid, the value of the dividend contribution is still unclear.  The 
reason for the ambiguity is the availability of a wide range of alternative non-dividend 
mechanisms to reduce agency costs.  Some researchers have sought to shed light on the 
degree substitutability amongst the various agency controlling devices, and some of the 
relevant studies that are reviewed in this chapter are summarised in Table 2.9.  Indeed, all 
of the studies in Table 2.9 support the partiality of the agency-costs controlling rationale 
for dividends.  Thus the agency theory of dividends, like the signalling and tax 
hypotheses, does not provide a conclusive explanation for the dividend puzzle.   
 
2.4  Conclusions and promising research ideas 
The empirical literature has recorded systematic variations in dividend behaviour across 
firms, countries and time, as well as in the type of dividend paid. Such systematic 
variations are inconsistent with Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) irrelevancy theory, but 
can be expected in imperfect markets. Indeed, once the assumptions underling the 
irrelevancy theory are relaxed, it may be unreasonable to expect that dividends will have 
no effect on expected earnings, investment decisions or on the firm’s risk.  If dividend 
policy influences any of these factors, then it is also likely to affect value.  Precisely how 
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dividend policy affects value, in the presence of market imperfections, is the subject of 
various dividend theories, which together form the dividend controversy. 
The aim of this chapter was to take stock of the generic theories that have evolved 
under market imperfections such as transaction costs, taxes, information asymmetries and 
agency conflicts.  It was also intended to review the main empirical methodologies and 
evidence collected so far, in an endeavour of clarifying where the dividend controversy 
stands today, after four decades of debate. 
The generic dividend theories introduced in Section 2.2 include the transaction 
costs theory, the tax hypothesis, the bird in the hand argument, and the signalling and 
agency theories.  The transaction cost theory of dividends is based on transaction costs 
and control considerations that are associated with paying dividends and then resorting to 
external finance to fund investments. Also incorporated under this theory are pecking 
order considerations, which are based on information asymmetries and which become 
relevant if dividends are paid and external finance raised.  Thus, the transaction cost 
theory of dividends basically suggests that firms should utilise retained earnings to the 
extent possible before paying out dividends. 
The tax hypothesis proposes that government distortions by way of taxes have 
important implications for dividend policy and firm value.  Thus the tax hypothesis 
generally states that due to differences between taxes on dividends and on capital gains, 
generous dividends reduce wealth.  Accordingly, the share prices of firms that adopt high 
payout policies will reflect this tax disadvantage.  The underlying assumption here is that 
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all investors are taxed the same and that dividend income is taxed more heavily than 
capital gains.  Alternatively, if there exist tax-based clienteles for low and high dividend 
policies, or if transaction costs are not too high as to prohibit active trading, then tax 
effects on prices should disappear.     
    The bird in the hand argument is the traditional rationale for generous 
dividends, and is based on the idea that dividends reduce risk because they bring 
shareholders’ cash inflows forward.  This argument, however, is commonly repudiated by 
the assertion that the risk of the firm comes from the investments in which it is involved, 
not from how the proceeds from these investments are distributed.  A more credible 
argument in favour of dividends is the signalling theory, which is based on information 
asymmetries between managers and outside shareholders.  Thus according to the 
signalling theory, unexpected dividend changes convey valuable information to market 
participants that relate to managers’ expectations regarding the prospects of the firm.   
The last dividend theory discussed in Section 2.2 is the agency theory of 
dividends which, like the signalling theory, proposes that dividends are value enhancing.  
However, while the signalling theory is based on the assumption that managers always 
act in the interests of existing shareholders, the agency theory relaxes this assumption and 
allows for agency conflicts.  The agency theory of dividends is different from the 
signalling theory in another crucial respect.  Particularly, according to the signalling 
theory dividends have no value in themselves, but their value is derived from the 
information they contain about the firm’s fundamentals.  In contrast, the agency theory of 
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dividends states that the payment of dividends is in itself valuable because it controls 
agency costs in two ways.  First, the payment of dividends reduces the free cash flows 
under managers’ discretion.  Second, the payment of dividends forces the firm to the 
capital market inducing external monitoring of the firm and its management, which is 
valuable due the free rider problem of collective monitoring. 
The discussion on the theoretical themes that have developed to explain the 
dividend puzzle was followed by a review in Section 2.3 of some of the relevant 
empirical methodologies and evidence.  Event studies around ex-dividend days are 
typically used to investigate tax clientele effects. Similarly, the market reaction to the 
dividend signal is often investigated by event studies around dividend announcement 
dates, while other methodologies include comparison and regression analyses.  However, 
one unique approach to understanding dividend policy, whose findings have been central 
to the dividend debate is the Lintner’s (1956) survey of US managers.  The main 
conclusions from this study are that managers concern themselves primarily with the 
stability of dividends, believing that the market reacts favourably to dividend increases 
and unfavourably to decreases.  Furthermore, the level of earnings is the most important 
determinant of the dividend level, and the dividend decision is taken before other 
decisions such as investment decisions, which are then adjusted.  
Lintner’s (1956) study is consistent with the signalling rationale for dividends.  
However, evidence from empirical studies of the signalling hypothesis is mixed.  In 
general it appears that the market reacts strongly to unexpected dividend changes, and 
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that the reaction is typically in the same direction as the dividend change.  However, 
evidence is weaker on actual changes in performance that follow the dividend change 
announcement.  Similarly no consensus has been achieved on the effects of taxes, 
particularly on whether taxes have permanent or only temporary impact on prices, 
although the general conclusion is that taxes enter the dividend decision.  The 
transaction/agency costs structure faced by the firm appears important in determining its 
dividend policy.   However, there is also evidence of substitutability amongst dividends 
and other agency cost control devices such as leverage, managerial ownership, incentive 
schemes, investment opportunities and others.  Thus the general conclusion is that after 
four decades of debate, the jury is still out on the dividend puzzle.  
For this matter, further research is required to sustain the spotlight on the dividend 
puzzle.  In particular, there are four promising research ideas (PRIs), which derive 
directly from the theoretical and empirical literature surveyed in this chapter.  The first 
PRI relates to the role of agency theory in explaining dividend policy for firms operating 
in emerging markets, where imperfections are the norm rather than the exception.  In 
these markets agency conflicts and information problems can be expected to loom strong 
and the finance gap to be particularly wide.  Thus models that incorporate these factors, 
such as the cost minimisation model reviewed in Section 2.3.4.2, should describe well the 
target payout process of firms in emerging markets.      
The second PRI is inspired by developments in areas of corporate governance, 
and therefore seeks to attain a synergy between corporate governance and the dividend 
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policy puzzle.  It may be that the failure to unravel the dividend puzzle has been 
amplified by failure to recognise interaction of the dividend policy practice with other 
business features.  One idea is to bring together the literature on business groups and firm 
ownership in order to understand dividend policy, especially in the case of emerging 
markets.  
The third PRI recognises that different theories may have the same practical 
implications thus making difficult the task of distinguishing amongst them.  For instance, 
both agency theory and signalling theories predict a positive reaction to dividend 
increases and negative reaction to decreases.  One possible method of distinguishing 
between these theories is by exploiting institutional differences across countries, as in 
Dewenter, and Warther (1998) with respect to the US and Japan.  Furthermore, cross-
country comparisons can also assist in establishing fine distinctions between various 
under-themes within major theories.  For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (2000) use cross-country comparisons to distinguish between two competing 
agency models of dividends, namely the outcome and substitute models.  
Finally, the forth PRI is to use a system of equations instead of the single equation 
model of dividends. This idea is discussed in Prasad Green and Murinde (2001), and 
acknowledges the possibility that policy choices may be simultaneously determined.  An 
example is Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992), where insider ownership, debt and dividend 
policies are modelled as a simultaneous equations system.   
While the current study attempts to implement the first two PRIs, the latter two 
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are left for future studies. Specifically, the cost minimisation model is applied to 
emerging market’s firms in chapter 3, while business group theory is incorporated into a 
dividend model in chapter 5.  However, cross-country comparisons and multi-equation 
models are beyond the scope of this study.     
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Appendix 2A:  Survey tables 
 
Table 2.1 Selected empirical studies of the Partial Adjustment Model 
 
Study Aim Methodology (Data and model) and results Conclusions 
Lintner 
(1956) 
To assess the 




with managers of 
US firms 
Data:  
US, 28 industrial firms selected to ensure a wide range of circumstances under which managers operate, 1947-1953 
Methodology:  
? Survey – interviews with managers to learn of the dividend policy of their firms over the previous seven years 
? Constructing a model that describes the dividend change behaviour. 
? Testing the model in predicting post-war dividend of all American corporations 
Model:  
Change in dividend = α + (speed of adjustment coefficient) (target dividend – actual lagged dividend) 
 
Where target dividend is the target payout ratio applied to the current year’s profits after taxes.  
 
? Firms are primarily concerned with 
the stability of dividends. Managers 
prefer a gradual upward trend in 
dividends 
? Earnings are the most important 
determinants of any change in 
dividends 
? Dividend policy is set first and other 
policies are then adjusted 
? The market reacts positively to 
dividend increase announcements 









US, 392 major industrial firms over the period 1946 to 1964 
Methodology:  
1. Ordinary Least Squares time series of a number of specifications of the Lintner model for individual firms, 
assessing the statistical characteristics of the distribution of the estimated coefficients (using part of the 
sample to estimate the models and the other part to validate it) 
2. Monte Carlo experiments – generating series for earnings, dividends and the error terms based on assumptions 
regarding the data generating process. Then using artificial samples to estimate the coefficients. The estimated 
coefficients are compared with the coefficients of the model actually used to generate the data.  
Model:  
The Lintner model 
? Net income appears to explain the 
dividend change decision better than 
a cash flow measure.  
? The Lintner model performs well 
relative to other models. However, 
deleting the constant and adding the 
lagged earnings variable leads to a 
slight improvement in the predictive 












Annual data for the aggregate Indian corporate sector, 1950-1981 (all variables expressed in real termed by 
deflating by the consumer price index). 
Methodology:  
Ordinary Least Squares 
Model:  
Δ(dividend) = α0 + α1 (Profit after tax) – α2 (Lagged profit after tax) – α3 (Lagged dividend) + α4 (Lagged 
external finance) 
Results:  
? Δ(dividend) = -0.33 + 0.62 (Profit after tax)  – 0.73 (Lagged dividend) 
? Δ(dividend) = -1.04 + 0.28 (Profit after tax)  – 0.79 (Lagged dividend) + 0.37 (Lagged external finance) 
? Δ(dividend) = -0.99 + 0.32 (Profit after tax) – 0.09 (Lagged profit after tax) – 0.72 (Lagged dividend) + 0.36 
(Lagged external finance) 
 
? The basic Lintner model is good in 
explaining the dividend behaviour in 
India. All variables are significant at 
conventional levels and the model 
explains 61% of variation. 
? Adding external finance in previous 
period as explanatory variable 
improves the model. This is 
explained by access to subsidised 
borrowing which encourage firms to 
use borrowings to finance dividends. 
? The constant is significant but enter 
with a negative sign, reflecting 
dividend tax disadvantage in India.  
Source:  Compiled by author from a selective review of the literature 
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Table 2.1 (concluded)  Selected empirical studies of the Partial Adjustment Model 
 










that the Lintner 
model performs 
better when the 
target dividend is a 
function of 
permanent as 
opposed to current 
earnings.  
Data:  
US, annually, aggregated (real) data on the S&P Composite Index, 1871-1992  
Methodology:  
? Testing for cointegration between various definitions of earnings and dividends.  
? Constructing a Bivariate Vector Autoregression (BVAR) of change in dividends and the spread between 
earnings, and dividends 
? Testing nested models in the BVAR to assess whether permanent earnings, transitory earnings or current 
earnings, influence dividends. 
Model:  
? Permanent earnings hypothesis: Change in dividend = α1 (change in the permanent component of earnings) 
? Partial adjustment model:  Change in dividend = (speed of adjustment) X (target dividend – lagged dividend) 
Results:  
? Earnings and dividends are non-stationary but are cointegrated. 
? Hence the Bivariate Moving Average Representation of the first difference in dividends and the spread 
between earnings and dividends in invertible and can be specified as a BVAR.   
? Changes in dividends are influenced 
by permanent earnings, but not by 
transitory earnings. Therefore, the 
spread between dividends and 
earnings is influenced by transitory 
earnings but not by permanent 
earnings. 
? The hypothesis that the target 
dividend in the partial adjustment 
model is a function of permanent 
earnings is not rejected while the 
hypothesis that the target dividend is 







analysis to check 
for existence of a 
long-term stable 
payout ratio.  Use 
the error 
correction 
equations to assess 
the ratchet effect.   
Data:  
US, quarterly, aggregated (real terms) data on the S&P500, 1948:1 to 1994:4 
Methodology:  
Multivariate cointegration tests 
Model:  
Long-run model:     Error term = θ1 log of dividend – θ2  log of earnings + θ3 log of price level + θ4  
Results:  
Long-run model: Error term = log of dividend – 1.045 log of earnings +  0.097 log of price level + 0.185  
LR test of H0: θ1 + θ2 = θ3 = 0:  χ21 = 0.75 with probability value of 0.30.  
? Current earnings is the strongest proxy 
for ability to pay dividends 
? The cointegration results suggest that 
firms pursue a long run payout ratio, 
consistent with the Lintner model. 
? Short run ratchet effect – firms apply 
different adjustment methods to 
raising and lowering payout ratios. 






the dividends of 
US and Japanese 
firms to earnings 
changes 
Data:  
313 US firms and 180 Japanese companies with at least 5 years of nonzero dividend and earnings data. 1982-1993 
Methodology:  
Run the Lintner model without the intercept term for each firm and obtain the median speed of adjustment 
coefficient for the samples of US firms and Japanese firms. Also split the Japanese sample according to keiretsu 
membership and compare the median speed of adjustment across these sub-samples.   
Model:  
Lintner model without the constant 
Results: 
The median speed of adjustment estimates are 0.055 for all US firms, 0.094 for all Japanese firms, and 0.117, 
0.082, and 0.021 for keiretsu, hybrid, and independent firms, respectively.   
? The dividends of Japanese keiretsu 
firms are more responsive to 
earnings changes than those of both 
US firms and Japanese independent 
firms.   
? Thus US dividends are smoother 
than Japanese dividends and this is 
due to the observation that Japanese 
firms and keiretsu firms in particular,  
face less information asymmetry and 
fewer agency conflicts than US firms 
Hines (1996) Look at possible 
determinants of 




ratios and the 




US, 505 firms for the period 1984-1989 and aggregate US data covering the time period 1950 to 1986 
Methodology:  
? Ordinary least squares regression using cross sectional firm-level data for each of the years 1984 to 1989 
? Ordinary least squares regression using time series on aggregate data  
Model:  
Dividend payout = [after tax domestic profits + η (after tax foreign profits)] α  
Results:  
Firm-level for year 1986:  Dividend payout = 0.2353 after tax domestic profits + 0.7290 after tax foreign profits 
? Different payout ratios are applied to 
domestic and foreign profits - US 
corporations pay dividends out of 
their foreign profits at about three 
times the rate that they do out of their 
domestic profits.  
? This may be due to the signalling 
function of dividends if foreign 
profits are particularly difficult for 
investors to verify.  
Source:  Compiled by author from a selective review of the literature 
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Table 2.2  Selected empirical studies of the tax hypothesis of dividends 
 
Study Aim Methodology (Data and model) and results Conclusions 
Gentry 
(1994) 




of Publicly Traded 
Partnerships that 
are not subject to 
the US double 
taxation system 




US, 65 Publicly Traded Partnerships (PTP) and corporations in the oil and gas exploration industry, for the years 
1987 and 1988  
Methodology:  
Cross sectional IV regression technique where the PTP dummy variable is replaced by the fitted probabilities from 
a Probit model.  
Model:  
Payout = α - β1 debt ratio + β2 PTP dummy - β3 growth rate + β4 profit 
Results:  
? 1987:   
Payout = 0.0179 – 0.215 debt ratio + 0.747* PTP dummy + 0.261 growth rate + 0.495 profit 
? 1988:   
Payout = 0.133 – 0.210 debt ratio + 0.425* PTP dummy +  0.181 growth rate + 0.262 profit 
? Controlling for other factors, PTP 
tend to pay more dividends 
compared with similar corporations – 
For both the years 1987 and 1988, 
the PTP dummy enters the dividend 
model with a positive estimated 
coefficient that is significant at the 5 
percent level.   
? The results are consistent with the 
tax hypothesis because PTP face 
lower tax costs on dividend 
payments 





decisions to tax 




UK, 108 non-financial firms quoted on the LSE for the period 1973-1983  
Methodology:  
Panel data, generalised least squares method 
Model:  
Desired payout = (target payout) EPS - β1 dummy indicating ACT irrecoverable + β2 inverse for personal income 
tax rate 
Results:  
Dividend level = -0.011 + 0.034 EPS + 0.831 lagged dividend – 0.002 ACT irrecoverable + 0.015 inverse for 
personal income tax rate 
? Results show that both the personal 
tax proxy and the corporate tax 
exhaustion variable exert significant 
impact on the level of dividend 
payment.  
? Both the personal and corporate tax 
variables enter the model with signs 








taxes by studying 
the effect of the 
Tax Reform Act 




US, 236 industrial firms and 40 utility firms with quarterly data,  3rd quarter of 1983 to 1st quarter of 1991  
Methodology:  
Regression analysis of a modified Lintner model to test for structural shifts in target payout ratio. The model is 
applied to: aggregate data (for industrial firms only); industry-specific data (including the utility industry); and 
individual firm data 
Model:  
Current quarter dividend = α + β1 lagged dividend +β2 current quarter earnings +β3 (post TRA dummy X current 
quarter earnings) 
? Where β1=1-the adjustment factor; β2=the adjustment factor X the target payout ratio; β3=the adjustment 
factor X the incremental change in the target payout ratio as a result of the TRA.  
Some support for the prediction that the 
lowering of the ordinary income tax rates 
and the elimination of the preferential tax 
treatment of capital gains were associated 
with increases in the corporate dividend 
payout ratios. For instance, β3 for 21.2% 
of the specific regressions (50 out of 236 
industrial firms) is positive and significant 






Testing the impact 
of the tax 
disadvantage of 
dividend on share 
valuation  by 
looking at  
changes in relative 
prices following 
the TRA 1986 
Data:  
US, Citizen Utilities Company (CU). Using average daily prices and dividend for the period 1973-1993.  
Methodology:   
? Tracing the behaviour of the average Dividend –Adjusted-Relative-Price (DARP) of CU’s stock dividend 
shares (class A) and cash dividend shares (class B).  DARP = (PA/PB) / (DA/DB) 
? In particular the DARP is compared over the three sub-periods around the TRA: pre-TRA (1982-1984), TRA 
implementation period (1985-1986)and post-TRA (1987-1989).  
Results for the sub-period analysis:  
? Dividend-Adjusted Relative Price for pre-TRA period (1982-1984) = 1.01 
? Dividend-Adjusted Relative Price for implementation period (1985-1986) = 0.91 
? Dividend-Adjusted Relative Price for post implementation period (1987-1989) = 1.01 
Inconsistent with the tax hypothesis:  
? Although the relative price of class B 
increases during the TRA 
implementation period, this effect is 
only temporary.  
? The prices of the two classes of 
shares are on average equal while 
there are tax disadvantages 
associated with the cash-dividend 
shares (class B).  
Source:  Compiled by author from a selective review of the literature 
118 
Table 2.3  Selected empirical studies of tax clientele effects around ex-dividend dates 
 
Study Aim Methodology (Data and model) and results Conclusions 
Elton and 
Gruber (1970)  
 




marginal tax rates 
and dividend yield 
using an ex-dividend 
date price date.    
Data:  
US, 4148 stock traded on the NYSE, which paid dividend between 1966-1967.  
Methodology:  
Event study around the ex-dividend date: 
? Calculate the ratio of the change in price over the ex-dividend date to the nominal dividend amount (ΔP/D). 
? Arrange the data observations by decile according to the value of the dividend yield. 
? Compare the tax rates implied by the means of the ratios of the change in price to dividend across the dividend yield 
categories  
? If a tax clientele effect is present than there should be a negative relationship between investors’ tax brackets and the dividend 
yields of the stock they hold 
Results: 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between D/P and ΔP/D is 0.9152 which is significant at the 1% level 
? Strong evidence of a clientele effect  - 
Find an inverse relationship between 
dividend yields and tax brackets. This 
implies that investors at high income tax 
brackets select low dividend yield stock.  
? Changes to the dividend policy rather than 
the policy itself could affect value. This is 
due to trading costs which investors will 
incur in moving from one stock to another 






Offer an alternative 
to the tax clientele 
effect for why prices 
drop by less than the 
value of the dividend 
on the ex-dividend 
day  
Data:  
Hong Kong, 1980-1993, 1,896 payments 351firms.  
Methodology:  
Event study. Cross sectional regression based on a model developed theoretically 
Model:  
ΔP/ P = - (ratio of rational to total traders) X (average bid-ask spread) + β (dividend yield) 
Results: 
? Full sample: ΔP/ P =  -  0.944   +  0.77  dividend yield 
? Low yield stock: ΔP/ P =  - 0.51  +  0.46 dividend yield 
? High yield stock: ΔP/ P =  - 1.17  +  0.98 dividend yield 
Ex-dividend day premiums are not caused by tax 
clientele effects, because they are observed in 
markets where neither dividends nor capital 
gains are taxed. Instead they are caused by 
market microstructure: Market makers are in a 
better position to collect and reinvest the 
dividends. The resultant trading pressure around 
the ex-dividend day causes return premiums to 





Test for dynamic tax 
clientele by analysing 
abnormal trading 
around ex div day 
Data:  
US, 70 ex-dividend day observations 63 trading days between November 1990 to January 1991   
Methodology:  
Event study with an event window of 11 days centred on the ex-dividend date. Cross sectional ordinary least squares regression of 
the standardised abnormal trading volume (SAV) on the last cum-dividend day on dividend yield and transaction costs 
Model:  
SAV = α + β1 YIELD – β2 SPREAD 
Where SAVi is the standardised abnormal trading volume on the last cum-dividend day and is obtained as actual volume less the 
average volume during normal trading period, standardised by the standard deviation of the normal trading volume;  YIELD is the 
dividend yield where the price is the mean of closing prices for stock i over days –10 to -6 relative to ex-dividend day 0; SPREAD 
is proxy for transaction costs and is measured as the average of spreads (expressed in percentage terms) for all bid and ask quotes 
for stock i on the cum-dividend day.    
Results: 
? SAV (purchases) = 1.281 + 75.955** YIELD – 66.523** SPREAD 
? SAV (sales) = 1.296 + 70.596* YIELD – 64.504** SPREAD 
? Supportive of a dynamic clientele effect 
where securities dealers who are tax-
neutral are motivated to engage in trading 
around the ex-dividend day.  
? This abnormal activity is motivated by 
potential trading profit which is due to tax-
driven abnormal ex dividend returns 
? The higher the dividend yield, the greater 
the potential profit from trading  
? The higher the transaction costs, the lower 







Test for tax clientele 
effect on ex-
distributions returns 
of Swedish lottery 
bond. These are 
taxed like equities 
but enjoy the relative 
price stability of 
bonds.   
Data:  
Sweden, 46 lottery bonds trading on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in the period 1986-1997. The sample is sub divided according 
to tax-regime at time of issue: Pre-1981, 1981-1990, Post-1990.   
Methodology: WLS 
1. Cumulative abnormal trading volume for 10-day and 20-day windows around ex-coupon payment dates. 
2. Obtaining estimates of implied tax rates and of ex-coupon dates price drop using the Cross sectional Weighted Least Squares 
regression.  
Model:  
Pre-tax return over the trading period = γ0 (trading period) + γ1 ( distribution yield) 
Results: 
Mixed bonds:   R  =  0.00021 k  –  0.288 C/Pt               Sequenced bonds: R  =  0.00024  k  –  0.511  C/Pt 
Taxes impact lottery bonds consistent with tax 
clientele effect: 
? Abnormal trading volume around 
distribution period is high for bonds issued 
under all tax regimes but highest for pre-
1981 when capital losses can be set 
against all taxable income.   
? The tax system favours distributions to 
capital gains, therefore the ex-day price 
fall is greater than the coupon 
Source:  Compiled by author from a selective review of the literature 
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Table 2.4  Selected empirical studies of the signalling hypothesis – Are dividend change announcements interpreted as valuable signals by the market? 
 




Study stock price 
reaction of 
industry rivals to 
dividend change 
announcements by 
firms.  Assess 





dominate or cancel 
out each other. 
Data:  
US, 1,243 rivals of 217 firms announcing dividend increases and 667 rivals of 105 firms announcing dividend 
decreases. Period 1969-1988 
Methodology:  
Event study 
? Event window is the day of the announcement and the previous day.  
? Abnormal return is measured using the market model which is estimated post event 
? Comparing average cumulative abnormal return of announcers of dividend increases and decreases 
? Comparing abnormal returns of rivals of firms announcing dividend changes 
? Splitting the samples of rival firms according to relative market power and relative growth opportunities and 
comparing abnormal reaction across the sub-samples. 
Results: 
? Announcing firms experience significant abnormal reaction to dividend change announcements. Dividend 
decreases are met with stronger reaction.  
? The most competitive rivals display significant positive reaction to increase announcements.  
? The least competitive rivals display significant negative reaction to decrease announcements.  
? Dividend changes are interpreted as 
signals as price reaction to both 
increases and decreases is strong.  
? Dividend increases signal positive 
changes for the announcing firm, 
while dividend decreases signal bad 
changes.  
? Managers’ reluctance to decrease 
dividends is justified by the stronger 
reaction associated with dividend 
decreases compared with increases.    
? The dividend change announcement 
contains information about changes 
in industry-wide factors as well as 
shifts in the competitive position of 










reaction in terms 





US, 3540 rivals of firms announcing dividend initiations for the price reaction study, and 345 rivals of firms 
announcing dividend initiations for the earnings forecast revisions study. Period 1968-1992 
Methodology:  
Event study 
? Event window is the day of the announcement and the previous day.  
? Abnormal return is measured using the market model which is estimated post event 
Announcement month forecast revisions of the earnings of rivals 
? Test significance of analysts’ EPS forecast revisions from month before to month of the dividend event 
Results: 
The mean cumulative abnormal return is –0.07 percent while the mean abnormal forecast revision is 0.1671  
? Stock prices of industry rivals do not 
significantly react to initiation 
announcements of firms in same 
industry.  Nor do analysts 
significantly revise their EPS 
forecasts for these rival firms.  
? This indicates that the information 
contained in initiation is firm-
specific rather than industry wide. It 
also implies lack of both contagion 
and competitive intra-industry effects 
Source:  Compiled by author from a selective review of the literature 
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Table 2.5  Selected empirical studies of the signalling hypothesis – Is the dividend signal justified by subsequent changes in firms’ characteristics? 
 






Do firms use 
dividend to signal 
future earnings 
prospects? Focus 
on firms with 




decline after a 
long period of 
earnings growth 
Data:  
US, 145 firms experiencing earnings decline after at least nine consecutive years of growth. Period 1980-1987 
Methodology:  
? Comparison analysis of annual average abnormal future earnings over three years following surprise earnings 
decline. The comparison is between the sub-sample of firms announcing dividend increases in the year of the 
earnings decline and the sub-samples of similar firms that did not change their dividend or that announced 
dividend cuts.  
? Cross sectional regression of abnormal future earnings on dividend signal and control variables.  
Model: 
Abnormal future earnings = α0 + α1 historical earnings growth rate + α2 lagged earnings + α3 current earnings 
+ α4 extraordinary items + α5 discounted operations + α6 special items + α7 dividend signal 
? No support for the notion that 
dividend change announcements 
signal reliable information about 
future earnings.  
? Support for two prime reasons for the 
unreliability of the dividend signal: 
1. Mangers tend to send over-optimistic 
signals naively or deliberately.  
2. The cash commitment associated 
with the dividend increase is 
relatively small. Thus weaker firms 












weaker firms find 
too costly to send?  
Focus on the 
experiences of  
newly-listed firms 
Data:  
US, 99 newly listed firms initiating dividend and matched samples of non-initiating firms. Period 1980-1986 
Methodology:  
? Comparison analysis of earning surprises across samples dividend-initiating and non-initiating firms.  
? Comparing the dividend commitment of initiating firms with the commitment that non-initiating firms would 
make if they were to imitate similar commitment. Similar commitment is defined as a commitment that 
generates the same dividend yield, the same dividend-to-sales ratio, or the same dividend-to-assets ratio.  
Results: 
The difference in the means of the dividend-to-sales ratios between initiating and non-initiating firms (in the 
initiation year) is 20.04, which is significant at the 1 percent level.  
Firms initiate dividend to signal quality 
relative to otherwise similar firms:  
? Unexpected earnings following 
dividend initiations are significantly 
higher for initiating relative to 
similar but non-initiating firms. 
? The dividend commitment for 
initiating firms is significantly lower 
than that of non-initiating firms if the 






changes in some 
financial 
characteristics of 
firms before and 
after a dividend 
reduction 
announcement. 
Assess the reasons 
for the dividend 
reduction and the 
information 
contained in the 
announcement. 
Data:  
US, 268 observations of dividend reduction/omissions of at least 20% by 242 different firms. Period 1974-1989.   
Methodology:  
Examining 21 firm characteristics in the three years before and in the three years after the dividend reduction: 
? Financial variables are grouped into six categories: Performance; Sales & costs; Financial position; Long term 
financing; Restructuring variables; and Discretionary expenses. 
? The median values for each variable in each year from three years before to two years after the dividend 
reduction announcement is calculated. This is the unadjusted data.  
? The industry-adjusted data is obtained by subtracting the associated industry median from the value obtained 
for each firm. The sample median is then used.  
? The unadjusted results are used to assess changes over time and the adjusted results are used to assess the 
position of reducing firms relative to their industry 
? The Wilcoxon signed ranks test is used to assess the significance of the differences in the value of the 
variables at various times. 
Results: 
? Performance:  Earnings and stock prices decline before the dividend reduction but this trend is then reversed 
? Financial: Cash decreases while debt increases before the dividend reduction but this trend is then reversed 
? Long term financing: debt issuance declines after the dividend reduction while equity issuance declines in the 
pre-reduction period 
? Restructuring variables: Sales of fixed assets increases after the dividend reduction while purchases decline 
? Discretionary expenses: Spending on R&D increase before the dividend reduction and decline afterwards.    
Dividend reduction announcements mark 
the end of a firm’s financial decline and 
the beginning of a restructuring period, 
rather than an action of last resort: 
? Earnings level two years after the 
reduction are still lower than their 
level three years prior to the dividend 
reduction. Other variables also 
indicate continuation of financial 
problems.  
? After the reduction, firms tend to 
reduce asset purchases, increase asset 
sales and reduce spending on R&D.  
This restructuring activity together 
with the dividend savings could be 
the reason for the observed 
improvements in liquidity and debt 
positions. 
Source:  Compiled by author from a selective review of the literature 
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Table 2.6  Selected empirical studies of signalling theories – The permanent earnings, permanent cash flow and risk-information hypotheses 
 











US, 1025 firms and 7186 firm-year observations in the period 1979 to 1991  
Methodology:  
Categorical analyses: comparing unexpected changes in earnings of firms that decrease, increase or maintain their 
dividends. Unexpected earnings changes are measured in four alternative ways for up to two years from the year of 
the dividend change announcement. 
Support for the permanent earnings 
hypothesis: Dividend-increasing firms do 
not necessarily experience subsequent 
earnings increases, but they are less likely 
to experience subsequent earnings declines 














US, 180 non-regulated firms with 4 consecutive years of steady cash flows.  Period 1989-1996 
Methodology:  
Comparison analysis: 
? Classifying the sample into groups based on future increases in cash flows: 101 firms experiencing permanent 
increases, 45 firms experiencing temporary-increase, and 34 firms experiencing no increase in cash flows.  
? Compare the following variables across the three groups: dividend changes prior to the cash flow increases, 
and market-adjusted stock returns in the year before the cash flow increases 
Support for the permanent cash flow 
hypothesis: Firms expecting large 
permanent cash flow increases tend to 
increase their dividend to signal this 
information.  Investors understand the 
signal as the stock price increases 
significantly in the year of the dividend 










earnings or a 
reduction in 
earnings volatility 
and hence in either 
market and/or 
systematic risk of 
stock return? 
Data:  
US, 240 NYSE/AMEX firms initiating dividend payments in the period between 1972 and 1993 
Methodology:  
Comparing the mean and median values of the following variables in the period before and after the dividend 
initiation announcement: 
? Systematic risk – obtained by regressing daily stock returns on 15 lagged, contemporaneous and 5 leading 
market returns. The CRSP equally weighted index is used as the market proxy. The pre-event period is 
defined as days –252 to –6, and the post-event period is defined as days 6 to 252, relative to the event.  
? Total risk – measured as the sample mean variance of daily returns. The pre and post event studies are defined 
as for the systematic risk.  A conditional total risk measure is also calculated using a GARCH(1,1) model.  
? Earnings – Average EPS for the sample in the 12 quarters preceding and following the dividend initiation.  
? Earnings volatility -  The variance of mean EPS in the 12 quarters preceding and following the announcement. 
Support for the risk-information 
hypothesis:  
? The initiation of cash dividends 
signals a decrease in firm total and 
market risk and this change in risk 
occurs immediately following the 
dividend initiation announcement. 
? Although earnings do not increase 
following the dividend initiation, the 
volatility of earnings in the three 
years following the announcement is 
significant.  
Source:  Compiled by author from a selective review of the literature 
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Table 2.7  Selected empirical studies of the conditional signalling hypothesis 
 






effects of prior 
activities  (in 
particular, prior 
financing activity) 




US, 490 firms announcing dividend initiations between 1962-1989: 102 engaging in financing in the twelve months 
prior to the dividend initiation announcement and 388 that do not. 
Methodology:  
Regression analysis of the price reaction to the dividend increase announcement, which is measured as follows: 
? A single-factor (market) model is estimated for each firm using sixty pre-event trading days of returns 
? The capital market response to the dividend announcement is defined as the cumulative abnormal returns 
obtained from the market model over the day of that the dividend announcement is recorded in the Wall Street 
Journal Index and the previous day.  
Model:  
price reaction to the dividend announcement = α0 + α1 (dividend yield) + α2 (financing per share/ price) 
Results:  
? Full sample:                         price reaction =   0.001  + 2.018 (dividend yield) 
? Prior-financing group:         price reaction = - 0.008  + 2.800 (dividend yield) 
? Non-financing group:          price reaction =   0.015  + 1.745 (dividend yield) 
? Prior-financing group:         price reaction = - 0.015  + 2.512 (dividend yield)  +  0.022 (financing yield) 
Financing activity prior to dividend 
increase announcements distinguishes 
firms that initiate dividend to signal future 
growth prospects from those that initiate 
dividend due to disinvesting: 
? The constant is lower for the prior-
financing group because such 
activity causes anticipation of a 
dividend-increase signal of growth.  
? The positive price reaction per unit 
of dividend yield is higher for the 
financing sample, because the news 
under such circumstances is better.  
? The higher the financing yield, the 
stronger the price reaction to the 






reaction to Interim 
Dividend 
Reductions, and  
identify factors 
that impact the 
price reaction 
Data:  
UK, 242 non-financial firms, declaring Interim Dividend Reductions (IDR) in the period 1986-1993. 
Methodology:  
? Event study – employing five models to generate abnormal returns around the dividend change 
announcement. The price reaction is measured as the two-day cumulative abnormal return including the day 
of the announcement and the previous day.  
? Regression analysis – regressing the price reaction, obtained from the market model, on factors that have the 
potential to explain the magnitude of the reaction and cross sectional differences in reaction.    
Model and Results:  
Price Reaction to IDR  =  -0.035  - 0.094 (magnitude of the dividend reduction) +  0.0003 (standardised change in 
interim earnings) +  0.066 (dummy for prior dividend reduction) +  0.107(gearing ratio) - 0.068 (dummy for prior 
dividend reduction by other firm in the industry) - 0.025 (information leakage control variable) - 0.002(firm size) 
Reaction to dividend reduction depends on 
the surprise in the announcement.  This, in 
turn, depends on prior dividend behaviour 
and other factors relating to characteristics 
of the firm itself, and the environment in 
which it operates:  
? IDR lead to negative price reaction.  
? Reaction is stronger when IDR does 
not follow a Prior Final Dividend 
Reduction (PFDR).   
? When IDR is greater than the PFDR, 
reaction is stronger compared to 
when IDR is less or equal the PFDR. 
? The magnitude of the price reaction 
to the IDR is influenced by the size 
of the reduction, the gearing ratio, 
and to prior dividend reductions by 














US, A wide sample of 725 regulated and unregulated firms declaring quarterly dividend decreases/omissions in the 
period 1974-1993.  The sample includes 65 utilities and 660 unregulated firms.  A narrow sample of 262 firms. 
Methodology: 
Weighed Least Squared cross sectional regression of the price reaction to the dividend announcement. The price 
reaction is obtained using the single index market model estimated pre-event using 250 days.  
Model and Results: 
Price reaction  = -0.0734 – 0.0504 (regulated-firm dummy) – 0.2528 (average quarterly dividend yield) + 2.0293 
(size of the dividend reduction) + 0.0036 (firm size) + 0.0365 (Tobin’s Q) 
The circumstances under which the firm 
operates, and in particular whether it is 
regulated or unregulated, have an 
important impact on the price reaction to 
dividend decrease announcements. Other 
firm’s characteristics, such as Tobin’s Q 
and firm size also have important impact 
on the price reaction to the dividend 
announcement.  
Source:  Compiled by author from a selective review of the literature 
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Table 2.7  (concluded) Selected empirical studies of the conditional signalling hypothesis 
 




Test the extent to 
which dividend 
signals are realised 






US, 128 announcement of dividend initiations and 299 announcements of dividend omissions. 1972-1990 
Methodology: 
? Assessing the significance of the average monthly abnormal returns following dividend change announcements, 
where averages are calculated over the first, second, and third years starting one month after the dividend 
announcement.   
? Cross Sectional regression of the long-term price performance following the dividend change announcement on the 
size of the dividend change, firm’s size, past profitability and over or under investment as measured by Tobin’s Q.  
Model and Results: 
? Dividend initiations:  long-term abnormal performance = 1.0069 + 0.1078 (dividend change) – 0.0872 (size)  –  
0.1213 (Tobin’s Q) – 2.6820 (profitability) 
? Dividend omissions: long-term abnormal performance = -0.0670 - 0.0290 (dividend change) – 0.0355 (size)  –  
0.0221 (Tobin’s Q)  – 0.0531 (profitability) 
Long-term price performance following 
dividend changes varies with firm 
characteristics:  
? For initiations the smaller the firm, the 
higher the degree of over investment 
and the less efficient is the management 
team, the stronger the positive long-
term performance.  
? For omissions the larger the dividend 
change and the larger the firm, the more 





between firms with 
high and low 
investment 
opportunities to 
assess whether the 
dividend signal is a 
function of this 
factor. 
Data:  
US, 196 firms announcing Special Designated Dividend in the period 1977-1989 
Methodology: 
? Event study - The sample is divided on the basis of Tobin’s Q values.  The means of the three-day cumulative 
abnormal return are compared across the two sub-samples.  
? Cross sectional regression – of abnormal stock return on investment opportunities and control variables.  
? Distinguish between signalling and agency theories by analysing the abnormal earnings forecast revisions following 
Special Designated Dividend announcements.  
Model and Results: 
? Abnormal stock return = 2.391(investment opportunities dummy) –0.059 (free cash flow) + 0.105 (Special 
Designated Dividend yield) – 0.475 (firm size) 
? Abnormal stock return = 0.18715 (abnormal earnings forecast revision) 
? Abnormal earnings forecast revision = 0.00532 (abnormal stock return) –0.0003 (post announcement abnormal 
return) + 0.00118 (divergence of opinion among analysts) 
? The price reaction to the Special 
Designated Dividend announcement is 
positive and significant for low Tobin’s 
Q firms but not significant for high 
Tobin’s Q firms.  This is consistent 
with the signalling hypothesis: the 
surprise in the announcement is greater 
for firms facing poor investment 
opportunities. 
? Analysts revise their current year 
earnings forecast upward significantly 
following the Special Designated 
Dividend announcement. This is 
consistent with signalling but not with 
agency theory.  
Lang and  
Litzenberger  
(1989) 







reaction to large 
dividend changes 
Data:  
US, 429 announcements of substantial dividend changes of more than 10 percent in absolute value, 1979-1984 
Methodology: 
? Event study - comparison the average daily returns on dividend announcement days for firms with average Tobin’s Q 
less than unity and for firms with average Tobin’s Q greater than unity. The sample is further divided into dividend 
increasing and dividend decreasing announcements. 
? Analysis of post-announcement revisions in analysts’ current earnings forecasts – the sample of dividend increase 
announcements is split into firms with average Tobin’s Q less than one and firms with Tobin’s Q greater than one. 
The sample of dividend decrease announcements is similarly split.  
Results: 
? Average daily returns on dividend change announcement days for firms with Tobin’s Q greater than unity is 0.003, 
with probability value of 0.021.  
? Average daily returns on dividend change announcement days for firms with Tobin’s Q less than unity is 0.011, with 
probability value of 0.000. 
? Average daily returns on dividend decrease announcement days for firms with Tobin’s Q greater than unity is -0.003, 
with probability value of 0.371  
? Average daily returns on dividend decrease announcement days for firms with Tobin’s Q less than unity is –0.027, 
with probability value of 0.000. 
? The difference in the average price reaction to dividend increases by firms with Tobin’s Q less than unity and firms 
with Tobin’s Q greater than unity is –0.0024 with probability value of 0.027.  
? Average reaction to substantial 
dividend changes is stronger for over-
investing firms compared with high 
firms whose Tobin’s Q is greater than 
unity. This is supportive of both the 
signalling theory and the over-
investment theory.  
? Average reaction to substantial 
dividend decreases is insignificant for 
high Tobin’s Q firms but significant for 
firms with Tobin’s Q of less than unity. 
This evidence is supportive of the over-
investment theory but is inconsistent 
with signalling theory.   
? Consistent with the over-investment 
theory but not with signalling theory 
analysts do not appear to substantially 
revise their current earning forecasts in 
response to dividend change 
announcements.  
Source:  Compiled by author from a selective review of the literature 
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Table 2.8  Selected empirical studies of the cost minimisation model 
 
Study Aim Methodology (Data and model) and results Conclusions 
Rozeff  
(1982) 
Develop and test 
the cost 
minimisation 
model of dividend  
Data:  
US, 1000 firms, 1981  
Methodology: 
Cross Sectional Ordinary Least Squares regression of the payout ratio on agency and transaction costs variables. 
Model and Results: 
Payout ratio = 47.81 – 0.09 (percentage of common stock held by insiders)   –  0.321(average growth rate of 
revenues over past five years)   –  0.526 (forecast of average growth rate of revenues over future five years)  – 
26.543 (beta coefficient) +  2.584 (log of number of common stockholders) 
Provide support for a model that describes 
the optimal payout ratio as that which 
minimises the sum of transaction costs of 
external financing on the one hand, and of 
agency costs that arise from conflicts of 
interests between managers and outside 





importance of size 
as explanatory 




US, 957 firms, 1984  
Methodology: 
Cross Sectional Ordinary Least Squares regression controlling for multicollinearity. 
Model and Results: 
Payout ratio =  0.52  – 0.093 (residuals from regression of inside holdings on size)  –  0.564 (past growth)   –  0.216 
(forecast growth)   –  0.184 (beta coefficient) +  0.025 (residuals from regression of log number of stockholders on 
size)   +   0.016 (log of sales) 
The agency variables in the original cost 
minimisation model may be proxies for 
size because larger firms are likely to have 
lower insider holdings and wider 
dispersion of ownership.  After including a 
size variable and controlling for 
multicollinearity, provide support for the 







the optimal payout 
ratio and CEO 
ownership. 
Data:  
US, 235 industrial firms, 1980 
Methodology: 
Cross Sectional Ordinary Least Squares 
Model and Results: 
Dividend yield = 0.10657  –  0.18055 (expected growth)  +  0.03302  (past growth)  –  0.04843 (beta coefficient)  +  
0.05519 (log number of shareholders)  –  0.00149 (CEO holdings)+  0.00005 (Squared CEO holdings) 
Support for the cost minimisation model 
but with parabolic relation between 





Testing a dynamic 




US, 341firms with 18 years of data, 1972-1989 
Methodology: 
Panel data, Weighted Least Squares 
Model and Results: 
? PAYOUT = 27.058 – 0.136 past growth – 0.593 expected growth + 0.824 size –  5.834 intrinsic business risk 
-23.277 operating leverage risk –  23.415 financial leverage risk + 0.063  institutional holdings – 0.122 
inside holdings  +  3.754 log number of shareholders                          
? PAYOUT = 13.533 + 0.465 lagged payout ratio  + 0.013 past growth – 0.473 expected growth + 0.310 size -
1.868 intrinsic business risk – 16.266 operating leverage risk – 12.492 financial leverage risk +  0.036 
institutional holdings – 0.054 inside holdings +  1.140 log number of shareholders  
? Results excluding the lagged 
dependent variable support the cost 
minimisation model with all 
coefficients bearing expected signs 
and being significant.  
? Adding the lagged dependent 
variable appears to be important, 
indicating that managers adjust their 
payouts through time as well as 
across firms in response to changes 






theory variable to 




US, 477 firms, 1983-1990 
Methodology: 
Panel data regression  
Model and Results: 
Payout ratio  = 53.849 - 4.361 focus of the firm operations + 1.859 size  – 0.081insider ownership  + 1.879 number 
of shareholders  + 21.794 free cash flow – 11.743 growth  – 349.028 risk 
Provide support for the cost minimisation 
model but also for the importance of 
stakeholder theory in determining the 
firm’s payout decision.    
Source:  Compiled by author from a selective review of the literature 
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Table 2.8  (concluded) Selected empirical studies of the cost minimisation model 
 










regulated utilities.   
Data:  
US, 81 electric utility firms for 1985 and 70 electric utility firms for 1990 
Methodology: 
? Comparison analysis of the mean payout ratio of utilities and S&P 400 industrial firms 
? Panel data regression  
Model and Results: 
? For 1985:  Payout ratio = 99.95 –1.24 inverse for degree of regulation –0.73 ownership concentration –3.60 
flotation costs –0.49 growth 
? For 1990: Payout ratio =104.36  –2.30 inverse for degree of regulation –0.48 ownership concentration –1.05 
flotation costs –0.55 growth 
 
? The mean payout ratio of electric 
utility firms is significantly greater 
than for S&P400 industrial firms. 
This is consistent with monitoring 
rationale as agency problems in 
regulated firms extend to conflicts 
with regulator and because for 
utilities using the dividend device 
may be relatively less costly.  
? Growth induced monitoring is an 
alternative to the dividend device – 
when growth rate declined in 1990, 
utilities increased their payouts.  
? The dividend policy of utilities is 
determined by the degree of conflicts 
with managers and regulators as well 




applicability of the 
monitoring 
rationale for 
dividend to the 
case of private 
firms.  The study 
also innovates by 
incorporating a tax 
cost consideration 





US, 66 private firms challenged in court by the Internal Revenue Service for Accumulated Earnings Tax in the 
period 1928-1988 
Methodology: 
Maximum Likelihood Latent Truncation Regression 
Model and Results: 
Payout ratio = 44.98 + 0.52 number of common stockholders – 7.16 past growth rate of revenues + 14.20 expected 
direct costs of Accumulated Earnings Tax – 43.32 percentage of stock held by insiders 
? The past growth variable is not 
significant, but the rest of the 
explanatory variables are.  
? Firms expecting high Acumulated 
Earnings Tax can reduce this cost by 
increasing their payouts.  
? The monitoring rationale for 
dividends is valid even for private 
firms. It is possible that by paying 
dividend these firms can induce 
monitoring by bankers, accountants 
or the tax authorities. 




Table 2.9  Selected empirical studies on the partiality of the monitoring rationale for dividend 
 





Test whether the 
simultaneity of the 
dividend and 
capital structure 
decisions and a 












US, 341 industrial firms: Group A consisting of 131 firms with alternative agency-controlling devices and/or 
growth-induced capital market monitoring. Group B consisting of 210 firms with no such alternatives.  1986-1988 
Methodology: 
Pooling firms over the period after a Chow test confirms the stability of the coefficients.  The following regressions 
are then run separately on group A and on group B: 
? Cross sectional Ordinary Least Squares regression of a variant of the cost minimisation model  
? Three Stage Least Squares simultaneous equations model.   
Model and Results: 
? Group A:    Payout ratio = 0.935 - 0.527 insider holdings - 0.068 log number of shareholders + 0.026 
variance of daily returns + 0.065 firm size - 0.005 growth  
? Group B:   Payout ratio= 0.292 - 0.312 insider holdings + 0.039 log number of shareholders - 0.331variance 
of daily returns  + 0.016 firm size – 0.003 growth  
? System equations for group A 
Payout ratio= 0.798 - 0.321equity ratio - 0.315 insider holdings + 0.030 log number of shareholders - 0.342 
variance of daily returns - 0.013 firm size  - 0.003 growth 
Equity ratio =  0.841 + 0.018 payout ratio + 0.753 advertising and R&D + 0.195 income volatility - 0.301 
non debt tax shield 
? System equations for group B 
Payout raio = 1.300 - 1.497 equity ratio - 0.178 insider holdings + 0.089 log number of shareholders - 0.435 
variance of daily returns - 0.021 firm size  - 0.002growth 
Equity ratio = 0.989 - 0.231 payout ratio + 0.511 advertising and R&D - 0.799 income volatility - 0.169 non 
debt tax shield 
Support for the partial explanation of the 
dividend monitoring rationale: 
? For Group B (with no alternative 
agency cost control mechanisms) the 
modified cost minimisation model is 
valid. The coefficients on all the 
variables bear the expected signs and 
all but the coefficient on the size 
variable are significant at the 5% 
level.  In contrast for group A, with 
alternatives to the dividend agency 
control device, the model gives weak 
results. 
? Simultaneity is evident only for 
Group B. For that group, both the 
coefficient on payout ratio in the 
equity ratio equation and the 
coefficient on equity ratio in the 
payout equation are significant.  
However for Group A no 







and debt in 
controlling the 
agency problem of 
free cash flow 
being wasted by 
management. 
Data: 
US, 129 debt offerings by industrial firms over the period 1977-1983.  The sample is divided into low and high 
payout firms and further divided into high and low growth in sales. 
Methodology: 
? Event study. Using market model, which estimated post event over 150 days from day 21 to 170 relative to 
the debt issue announcement day.   The reaction to the debt issue announcement is calculated as the two-day 
abnormal return over the day before and the day of the debt issue announcement.  
? Weighted Least Squares regressions are run on the full sample and separately on low growth and high growth 
sub-samples.  
? Comparison analysis across groups of firms categorised on the basis of their payout ratios and growth 
prospects, of the five-year average number of visits to the capital market. 
Model and Results: 
? For full  sample:                abnormal reaction to debt issue announcement = 0.0093 - 0.0299 (payout ratio) 
? For low growth sample:   abnormal reaction to debt issue announcement = 0.0164 – 0.0416 (payout ratio) 
? For high growth sample:  abnormal reaction to debt issue announcement = -0.0018 + 0.0145 (payout ratio) 
? Price reaction to debt issue 
announcements is strongest when the 
free cash flow problem is most 
severe (low growth firms) and where 
no alternative mechanisms for 
reducing the problem are used (low 
payout firms).  
? Growth and payout levels increase 
the frequency of visits to the capital 
market.  
? Insignificant relationship is found 
between the frequency of visits to the 
capital market and the price reaction 
to debt issue announcements. This 
implies that the commitment to pay 
out cash, which is signalled by the 
debt issue announcement, is more 
important than the capital market 
induced monitoring. 
Source:  Compiled by author from a selective review of the literature 
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Table 2.9 (concluded)  Selected empirical studies on the partiality of the monitoring rationale for dividend 
 










US, 603 industrial firms, 1981-1985. 
Methodology: 
Cross sectional, Ordinary Least Squares 
Model and Results: 
? OWNERSHIP = - 0.007 + 0.167 Diversification + 0.388 Earnings volatility + 0.456 Standard deviation of 
returns - 0.058 Advertising and R&D - 0.015 Size 
? LEVERAGE = 0.160 -0.846 Diversification - 1.848 Earnings volatility + 3.151 Standard deviation of returns - 
0.875 Advertising and R&D + 0.021 Size 
? DIVIDEND = 0.076 - 0.035 Diversification + 0.034 Earnings volatility - 0.442 Standard deviation of returns - 
0.037 Advertising and R&D + 0.004 Size 
? Firms adopt alternative policies to 
control for agency costs. 
? These policies include managerial 
ownership, leverage and dividends. 
? The mix of policies is determined by 
firm’s specific characteristics, which 
impact the associated costs.  
? These characteristics include 
diversification, earnings volatility, 
flotation costs, spending on R&D 














US, 71 industry-size matched pairs of all-equity and levered firms for 1981.  
Methodology: 
Cross sectional, Ordinary Least Squares 
Model and Results: 
Payout ratio = 0.501– 0.300 leverage – 0.004 insider holdings + 0.003 (insider holdings X leverage) - 0.302 free 
cash flow – 0.072growth 
 
? Find support for the hypothesis that 
dividends and debt are substitute 
mechanism for controlling agency 
costs of free cash flow.   
? Dividend and managerial ownership 
are substitute mechanisms for 










dividend policy in 
controlling agency 
costs.   
Data:  
US, 261 non-regulated firms for 1986.  
Methodology: 
Cross sectional, Ordinary Least Squares 
Model and Results: 
Fraction of outside directors on the Board = 0.8201 - 0.2128 insider holdings - 0.0817 payout ratio - 0.1121 
leverage + 0.0874 institutional holdings - 0.0016 growth rate - 0.0007 earnings volatility - 0.0033 length of time 
that the CEO has held that position - 0.0027 firm size 
? Due to their independence and the 
need to maintain reputation, outside 
directors on the Board can reduce 
manager-shareholders conflicts.  
? This is confirmed by the findings of 
significant and negative relationships 
between the fraction of outside 
directors on the board and other 
policies to control for agency costs.  
Source:  Compiled by author from a selective review of the literature 
 
 




3.1  Introduction 
Agency theory, as articulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), is a theory of the 
relationship between the principal and the agent of the principal.  Within the context of 
the firm, agency theory is primarily concerned with owner-manager relationship and with 
the need for shareholders to monitor management behaviour.  This need arises due to the 
separation of ownership and control and the associated conflicts of interests that arise 
between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents).  Conflicts of interests mean that 
managers may pursue objectives other than shareholder wealth maximisation in order to 
fulfil various self-interests.  For example, it may be in the interest of managers to divert 
the firm’s resources for the consumption of perquisites. While enjoying the total benefit 
from the perquisites consumed, the cost to the manager of this consumption is only a 
fraction of the total cost of the wasted resources. The remaining cost is borne by other 
owners.   However, managers may also suffer as a result of acting as predicted by agency 
theory.   If it is suspected that they are not acting to increase shareholder wealth, then 
managers may lose their position through, for example, a hostile take-over. Further, if the 
market suspects managers are inefficient, this has an adverse effect on the share price and 
hence on managers’ holdings and possibly their salary, reputation and career 
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opportunities.    
In light of the cost to managers from possible agency problems it becomes 
important to them that the firm is seen to be free of agency problems.  Managers will thus 
take measures, in addition to those taken by shareholders, to reduce the potential for 
agency conflicts.  Consequently, agency costs are defined as the loss to shareholders of 
controlling agency behaviour, through measures taken by themselves and by managers as 
well as the costs from any agency behaviour that has not been controlled.  These are the 
three components of agency costs, which Jensen and Meckling (1976) term monitoring 
expenditures, bonding expenditures and residual loss, respectively.  However, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) note that agency costs arise as a result of a co-operative effort between 
any group of people. Hence, within the context of the firm, agency costs may arise due to 
conflicts between, or within, any group of stakeholders including employees, customers, 
regulators etc.  
This chapter is concerned with agency theory as applied to dividend policy.  This 
is the agency theory of dividend, which claims that one measure, used by managers to 
control agency behaviour, is the payment of dividends. Specifically it is proposed that by 
inducing external monitoring, dividends reduce agency costs, although at the same time 
increasing the transaction costs associated with raising external funds.  The argument is 
due to Easterbrook (1984) and it goes as follows.  Monitoring of the firm and its 
management is helpful in reducing agency problems and in convincing the market that 
the managers are not in a position to abuse their position.  Some shareholders may be 
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monitoring managers, but the problem of collective action (the free-rider problem) results 
in too little monitoring taking place. One way of solving this problem is by increasing the 
payout ratio. When the firm increases its dividend payment, assuming it wishes to 
proceed with planned investment, it is forced to go to the capital market to raise 
additional finance. This induces monitoring by potential investors of the firm and its 
management, thus reducing agency problems.   
Rozeff (1982) develops a model that underpins this theory, which is given the 
name the cost minimisation model. The model combines the transaction costs that may be 
controlled by limiting the payout ratio, with the agency costs that may be controlled by 
raising the payout ratio.  It thus predicts a negative relation between agency costs and the 
payout ratio and a positive relation between the transaction costs of raising external 
finance and the payout ratio.  The central idea on which the model rests is that the 
optimal payout ratio is at the level where the sum of these two types of costs is 
minimised.   
This chapter seeks to contribute to the agency theory of dividend in three ways.  
First, it applies the cost minimisation model to a developing economy, India.  
Considering that most similar studies are US-based, this approach could shed a fresh light 
on the agency rationale for dividend outside the initial testing ground.  Second, unlike 
most other studies that utilise the cost minimisation model, the assumption of a linear 
relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables is relaxed.  For that 
purpose, the unrestricted model includes polynomial terms of the second degree of all 
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non-dummy explanatory variables as well as interaction terms between all possible pairs.  
A simplification procedure is then carried out to arrive at the parsimonious specification.    
The third contribution of this study is that a broader definition of what constitutes 
agency costs is considered.  Particularly it is assumed that agency costs extend beyond 
owner-managers conflicts, to include conflicts within owner groups and between owners 
and other stakeholders.  One implication of this assumption is that agency costs are 
higher in an interventionist business environment due to administrator-owner conflicts.  
The dividend device can help to solve such conflicts in a manner similar to the 
Easterbrook (1984) explanation.  Specifically, the payment of dividends can reduce the 
costs associated with administrator-owner conflicts because it forces the firm to go to the 
capital market to raise funds for investment.  When the firm is forced to the capital 
market, management actions are monitored by potential investors and by analysts.  There 
is therefore increased pressure on managers to become more efficient, and to challenge 
the decisions imposed upon the firm by regulators.  Consequently, the agency rationale 
for dividend should describe particularly well the situation in a highly administered 
environment such as the Indian business environment, and this is tested in the study.  
However, two possible qualifications can be advanced against this proposition. 
First is the observation that the Indian financial system is bank-oriented.  This implies 
less severe agency problems in India, and hence less need for the dividend-controlling 
device, compared with stock market-oriented systems such as in the US.  Second, in spite 
of the traditional tendency towards central planning and intervention, India has been 
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moving towards a more liberalised economy1.  Progress, however, is slow and the 
government continues to play an important role in the Indian business environment.   
Bearing these two qualifications in mind, the proposition remains that agency costs are 
relatively high in the Indian environment.  Therefore the agency costs variables included 
in the model are expected to be significant and important in explaining the dividend 
policies of Indian firms.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 3.2 reviews some 
previous studies of the cost minimisation model.  Section 3.3 states the empirical model 
and explains the predictions.  Empirical procedures and results are presented in Section 
3.4 while Section 3.5 concludes.  
 
3.2  A selective review of the literature 
The original cost minimisation model is due to Rozeff (1982), who specifies it as a 
regression of the firms’ target payout ratios on five variables that proxy for agency and 
transactions costs.  Transaction costs in the model are represented by three variables that 
proxy for the firm’s growth rates and risk.  High growth and high risk imply greater 
dependency on external finance either due to investment needs, or in order to honour 
financial obligations.  This, in turn, means, that the firm raises external finance more 
frequently, hence bears higher transactions costs that are associated with raising external 
                                                          
1 Liberalisation of the Indian economy began in the latter half of the 1980s, and more formally in the 1990s 
through a policy of reform programmes, which was initiated in July 1991.  (Joshi and Little, 1997) 
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finance.  Rozeff (1982) measures the firm’s growth by the five-year average growth rate 
of revenues.  An historic growth rate, that is based on the previous five years, as well as a 
predicted future growth rate that is based on the next five years, are calculated.  The 
firm’s risk is measured by its beta coefficient.  
The model captures agency costs with two proxies.  First, the fraction of the firm 
owned by insiders, α, is a proxy for insider ownership and is expected to be negatively 
related to the payout ratio.  As insiders hold more of a firm’s equity, the need to monitor 
their actions is reduced because the incentive for managers to misuse corporate resources 
falls.  Second, the natural logarithm of the number of outside shareholders is a proxy for 
ownership dispersion.  It is expected to be positively related to the payout ratio because 
the greater the dispersion, the more severe is the collective action problem of monitoring.  
Rozeff (1982) applies an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) cross sectional regression to 
1981 data on 1000 US firms, to give the results presented in Table 3.1, Study (1).    
The results in Rozeff (1982) support the theory put forward, as all the estimated 
coefficients are highly significant and bear the hypothesised signs.  The three transactions 
costs variables, past growth, future growth and risk, have negatively-signed estimated 
coefficients, as does the estimated coefficient of the variable measuring insider 
ownership.  Similarly, the variable measuring ownership dispersion is shown to be 
significantly and positively related to the payout ratio.  Thus the model provides good fit 
and consequently has attracted the attention of subsequent studies.  
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Moh’d et al 
(1995) 




Rao & White 
(1994) 
Study (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Method OLS, CS OLS, CS OLS, CS WLS, panel OLS, panel OLS, CS ML, CS 
No. firms 1000 957 235 341 477 81 66 
Period 1981 1984 1980 1972-1989 1983-1990 1985 1928-88 
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F-statistic 185.47  39.654 83.032 299.69 7.58 7.44 
Key:  CS = Cross Sectional;  OLS = Ordinary Least Squares;  WLS = Weighted Least Squares;  ML= Maximum Likelihood;  
T-statistic in parentheses;  Significance levels: ** = 5%; *** = 1%;  Variable definitions are given in Appendix 3A. 
Source:  Complied by author from a selective review of the literature 
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The study by Llyod, Jahera and Page (1985) is one of the first studies to modify 
Rozeff’s (1982) model.  The argument advanced is that the agency variables in the 
original model could be proxies for size in the sense that a large firm is likely to have a 
lower fraction of insider ownership and a higher number of shareholders.  A size variable 
is therefore added to the model. To eliminate multicollinearity between the two agency 
variables and firm’s size each of the agency variables is regressed on the size variable.  
The residuals then replace the original agency variables.   Llyod, Jahera and Page (1985) 
apply an OLS cross sectional regression to 1984 data on 957 US firms, to give the results 
shown in Table 3.1, Study (2).  These results indicate that after multicollinearity is 
properly controlled for, the cost minimisation model is still valid, with the estimates of all 
coefficients being significant and bearing the expected signs.  Further, the study 
concludes that firm size is also an important explanatory variable and shows it to be 
positively related to the payout ratio. 
Another study that questions some of the agency variables in Rozeff’s (1982) 
model is by Schooley and Barney (1994).  In particular, the relationship between insider 
ownership and the payout ratio is explored.  According to Rozeff (1982) dividends 
decline monotonically with rises in the fraction of insider ownership.  Schooley and 
Barney (1994) suggest that the relationship between dividend and insider ownership may 
be non-monotonic.  At low levels of ownership the relationship between dividends and 
insider ownership is negative as predicted by the original cost minimisation model.  
However, when the fraction of insider ownership reaches a certain point, further increases 
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cause agency costs to start rising and the need for the dividend control tool becomes 
necessary.  Two explanations are put forward of why, at high levels of insider ownership, 
further rises in α increase agency costs. 
First, when high proportion of their wealth is invested in the firm, insiders 
become less diversified. They then tend to evaluate projects based on total risk and may 
reject projects even when these are justified based on systematic risk.  Second, when 
insiders hold a substantial percentage of voting rights, they achieve sufficient level of 
control that diminishes their risk of being replaced.  If these explanations are valid, then a 
parabolic relation should be observed between insider ownership and dividends.  
Schooley and Barney (1994) empirically test this hypothesis using a variant of the cost 
minimisation model.  However, unlike in the original model, the dependent variable is 
defined as the dividend yield and not the payout ratio.  This ensures that the denominator 
of the dependent variable is a market measure (share price) rather than an accounting 
measure (net income). Further, replacing the payout ratio with the dividend yield avoids 
the problems of negative or very high dependent variable when the firm’s net income is 
negative or close to zero.  The broad definition of insiders in the original cost 
minimisation model is also modified and is replaced by a narrower definition of the chief 
executive officers (CEO).  
The results of the OLS cross sectional regression analysis, using 1980 data on 235 
industrial US firms are reported in Table 3.1, Study (3).   The findings of a significant 
and negative estimated coefficient for CEO ownership, and a significant and positive 
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estimated coefficient for the squared CEO ownership, support the hypothesis.  CEO 
ownership is negatively related to the dividend yield over low levels of ownership, while 
the relation becomes positive when CEO ownership is high.  Schooley and Barney (1994) 
estimate that the minimum dividend yield is when CEO ownership is at around 14.9 
percent.  The study provides further support for Rozeff’s (1982) model and its main 
contribution to the debate, is by questioning the assumption of linearity in the relationship 
between α and the firm’s dividend policy.  
More support and further contribution to the agency theory of dividend debate, is 
provided by Moh’d, Perry and Rimbey (1995).  They introduce a number of 
modifications to the cost minimisation model and in particular address the dynamic 
nature of the model.  The idea is that if the model is dynamic, variation in the payout 
ratios across time can be explained by changes in the agency cost/transaction cost 
structure.   To assess the dynamics in the dividend process, variables are not aggregated 
and the previous period’s dividend payout ratio, (the lagged dependent variable), is added 
to the RHS of the model.   Another modification is the inclusion of 26 industry dummies, 
following an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test that rejects the assumption of a common 
intercept across different industries2. Other innovations include breaking up beta, the 
                                                          
2 Glen, Karmokolias, Miller and Shah (1995) note that some industries are subject to significant volatility 
in their prices, and thus earnings, while other may be growing at different rates compared to the economy 
as a whole.  It is hypothesised that such differences should have an impact on the dividend policy decision.  
Indeed, when the payout ratios of a number of Indian industries in 1990 and 1994 are compared, significant 
differences are recorded across industries as well as within the same industry over time.  
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systematic risk, into its three components to assess more directly the separate effects of 
financial leverage, operating leverage and the intrinsic business risk.  Further, 
institutional ownership is added as an explanatory variable.    
According to agency theory, the presence of institutional investors should have an 
adverse effect on the firm’s payout ratio due to their role in monitoring managers’ 
activities3.  However, the prediction in Moh’d, Perry and Rimbey (1995) is of a positive 
relation between the payout ratio and the percentage of common stock held by 
institutions.  This is justified by legal restrictions imposed on institutions against owning 
non-dividend-paying shares and also by the preference for dividends by institutions due 
to tax considerations4.  The results of a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression, 
employing panel data on 341 US firms over 18 years from 1972 to 1989 are given in 
                                                          
3 The value of large shareholders, including institutions, in monitoring the firm, is the subject of Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986).  It is proposed that large shareholders are in the best position to monitor the firm’s 
management and implement improvements.   
4 A positive relation between institutional shareholders and dividends, due to tax preferences, is also 
implied by the hypothesis put forward in Redding (1995).  The study explores the connection between firm 
size and its dividend policy and it is hypothesised that large firms pay dividends to satisfy the tax 
preferences of their institutional-dominated clientele.  Empirical results support this hypothesis when the 
dividend policy decision is whether or not to pay dividends, but not when the decision is the amount of 
dividend to be paid.   A more complex relationship, between institutional ownership and dividend-policy, 
that takes into account taxes as well as agency costs and the monitoring value of large shareholders, is 
described in Shleifer and Vishny (1986).  They suggest that the payment of dividends is a type of 
compensation paid to large shareholders, with tax-related preference for high dividends, in return for their 
monitoring.  This is why most firms pay dividends, in spite of being predominantly owned by small 
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Table 3.1, Study (4).  These results support the view that the dividend process is of a 
dynamic nature as the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is found to 
be highly significant.  The estimated coefficient on the institutional ownership variable is 
positive and significant, which is in line with tax explanations but contradicts the idea 
about the monitoring function of institutions.  
Holder, Langrehr and Hexter (1998) expand the discussion by considering 
conflicts between the firm and its non-equity stakeholders.  Stakeholder theory proposes 
that non-investor stakeholders in the firm, such as suppliers or customers, also influence 
the firm’s decisions, including its dividend decisions.   Specifically, stakeholders have 
implicit contracts with the firm and face the risk of the firm being unable to honour these 
contracts.  The firm can reduce this risk by showing it has the ability to meet implicit 
obligations, and the net value it can create this way, is termed Net Organisational Capital 
(NOC). Firm whose activities are concentrated in a core business will find it more 
difficult to create NOC value. This is because problems in one business line are likely to 
pass on to related lines and increase the risk of the firm being unable to meet implicit 
obligations.  However, the crucial point is that firms can use dividend policy to create 
NOC, because by reducing its payout ratio, the firm signals to implicit claimants an 
increase in its ability to meet implicit claims.   Thus, in order to create NOC value, highly 
focused firms adjust their dividend policies downward, and business focus is expected to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
investors with tax-related preference for low dividends.  It is also the reason that firms are co-owned by 
large and small shareholders in spite of different tax preferences.    
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be negatively-related to the payout ratio.   
OLS regression results, utilising panel data on 477 US firms each with 8 years of 
observations, from 1983 to 1990, are presented in Table 3.1, Study (5).  Free cash flow is 
an additional agency variable, which measures the free cash flow available to the 
managers of firm i in year t after investment in positive Net Present Value projects.  In 
line with Jensen (1986), the higher free cash flow, the higher the potential for managers 
to misuse these resources.  This means the agency problem is more severe, thus 
controlling it becomes more important.  The positive relation found between the 
dependent variable and the free cash flow variable is therefore consistent with 
expectations. The rest of the results also confirm to expectations. The estimated 
coefficient on the stakeholder theory variable is shown to be significant and negative as 
predicted.  The estimated coefficients on all the other explanatory variables are also 
shown to be statistically significant and to bear the hypothesised signs. Thus the findings 
in Holder, Langrehr and Hexter (1998) support both the agency model and stakeholder 
theory and have particular relevance in the case of India, as will be discussed at the end 
of this section. 
Of similar relevance to the Indian case is the study by Hansen, Kumar and Shome 
(1994).  The study also takes a broader view of what constitutes agency costs, and applies 
a variant of the cost minimisation model to the regulated electric utility industry.  The 
prediction is that the agency rationale for dividend should be particularly applicable in the 
case of regulated firms because agency costs in these firms extend to conflicts of interests 
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between shareholders and regulators.  
Results of cross sectional OLS regression for a sample of 81 utilities and for the 
period ending 1985 are shown in Table 3.1, Study (6).  All the estimated coefficients in 
the study are significant and bear the expected signs.  The variable measuring ownership 
concentration has a negative estimated coefficient that is highly significant.  This has 
been predicted because as ownership concentration rises there is greater per-owner 
benefit from monitoring and therefore there is less need for dividend-induced monitoring.  
The two explanatory variables that measure transaction costs are flotation costs 
and the past growth rate.  Flotation cost is measured as utility’s u expected cost of raising 
external equity. A higher expected cost of flotation implies a higher cost of using the 
dividend mechanism.  Hence the negative sign on the estimated coefficient of this 
variable is consistent with expectations.  Similarly, the past growth rate, which represents 
the increase in demand for external funds when the firm experiences growth, is expected 
to have a negative coefficient.  This is borne by the results.  
Lastly, the regulation rank variable is utility’s u regulatory commission rank and 
is based on estimation regarding the rate of return the regulatory commission permits the 
utility to earn.  A high rank implies a lower degree of stockholder-regulator conflicts.  As 
the need for the dividend monitoring device declines with reductions in agency conflicts, 
the coefficient on the regulation rank is expected to be negative.  Indeed, results as 
reported in Study (6) of Table 3.1, show the estimated coefficient on this variable to be 
negative and significant.  This indicates that the degree of regulations influences firms’ 
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target payout ratios in a direction that is consistent with agency theory.  
While Hansen, Kumar and Shome (1994) apply the cost minimisation model to 
regulated firms, Rao and White (1994) apply it to private firms.  In the case of private 
firms, the agency-related motivation to pay dividends may be less important, compared 
with publicly traded firms, for two main reasons.  First, as agency problems that arise 
from the separation of ownership and control, are less applicable in the case of private 
firms, agency costs can be expected to be lower in the case of these firms.  Second, as 
private firms do not participate in the capital market, the rationale for dividends as a 
mechanism for capital market monitoring is also weaker. In light of this, Rao and White 
(1994) empirically test whether agency-costs considerations still enter the dividend 
decisions of private firms.   
The sample in Rao and White (1994) includes 66 private US firms that had been 
challenged in court by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for tax evasion between 1928 
and 1988.  It is noted that tax saving considerations may influence private firms towards 
preference for low payout policies. However, if the IRS suspects that a firm is retaining 
its earnings for the purpose of avoiding taxes, it may take steps to impose Accumulated 
Earnings Tax (AET) on that firm.   As the IRS is unlikely to challenge firms with high 
payout ratios, the dependent variable of the firms included in the sample is not normally 
distributed. OLS methods are therefore inappropriate and a limited dependent variable, 
maximum likelihood technique is used to correct for this bias.  Results are presented in 
Table 3.1, Study (7).   
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The results in Rao and White (1994) show the estimated coefficient on the 
variable measuring the expected tax cost of not paying dividends, the retained earnings to 
assets ratio, to be positive and significant as expected.  When the firm expects a high 
AET cost, it can reduce this by paying higher dividends.   Further, the results in Rao and 
White (1994) show insider ownership and shareholder dispersion, to be significant, with 
negative and positive estimated coefficients respectively.  This implies that agency costs 
are an important consideration even for private firms.  It appears that an agency rationale 
for dividends applies even to private firms that do not participate in the capital market.  
The authors note that perhaps by paying dividends, private firms can still induce 
monitoring by bankers, accountants and tax authorities.  
To summarise, the agency theory of dividend in general, and the cost 
minimisation model in particular, appear to offer a good description of how dividend 
policies are determined.  The variables in the original Rozeff’s (1982) model remain 
significant with consistently signed estimated coefficients, across the other six models 
reviewed above.   Specifically, the constant is, without exception, positively related to the 
dividend policy decision, while the agency costs variable, the fraction of insider 
ownership, is consistently negatively related to the firms’ dividend policy.  The latter is 
with exception of the study by Schooley and Barney (1994) were the relationship is found 
to be of a parabolic nature.  Similarly, the agency costs variable, ownership dispersion, is 
consistently positively related to the firm’s dividend policy, while the transaction cost 
variable, risk, is consistently negatively related to the firm’s dividend policy regardless of 
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the precise proxy used.  The other transaction cost proxies, the growth variables, are also 
mainly significant and negatively related to the firm’s dividend policy, although past 
growth appears to be a less stable measure than future growth5.    
However, in spite of the apparent goodness of fit of the cost minimisation model, 
its applicability to the Indian case may be challenged.  Samuel (1996) hypothesises that 
agency problems are less severe in India compared with the US. This is due to the 
financial system in India being bank-oriented while that in the US is stock market-
oriented6.   Empirical testing in Samuel (1996) supports this hypothesis.  In particular, 
consistent with the assumption that the Indian financial system is debt-oriented, Samuel 
(1996) finds that Indian firms rely more heavily on external debt (particularly from 
Development Financial Institutions7) than on external equity.  Furthermore, consistent 
with the hypothesis that agency problems are less severe in India compared with the US, 
Samuel (1996) finds less dependency on internal finance as a source of funding by Indian 
                                                          
5 Glen, Karmokolias, Miller and Shah (1995) find only a weak link between growth and dividend policy in 
a group of developing countries.  These empirical results are also supported by their field-work, where it is 
found that some firms in high growth industries paid high dividends due to shareholders’ demands. 
6 As pointed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the lower the amount of outside equity, the less motivated are 
managers to exploit outside shareholders. Similarly, Easterbrook (1984) notes that increases in the debt to 
equity ratio can reduce the agency cost of equity.  
7 In the late 1960s the Indian government created Public Sector Development Financial Institutions (DFI) to 
provide medium and long term finance for investment.  The three most important DFI include the Industrial 
Development Bank of India (IDBI), the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) and 
the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI).  
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managers compared with US managers8.   
However, in contrast to the view expressed in Samuel (1996), other aspects of the 
Indian economy imply a particular suitability of the agency theory, and of the cost 
minimisation model, to this economy.  Notably, as explained in Haque (1999), many 
developing countries, including India, established state-centred regimes following their 
independence9.  These regimes drew their ideology from socialist and Soviet ideas and 
were accompanied by highly centralised economic policies.10  It is this feature of the 
Indian economy that is hypothesised to lead to increasing agency problems and agency 
                                                          
8 Preference by managers, for internal over external finance, is consistent with agency behaviour and with 
managers’ tendency to over-invest. It is easier for managers to over-invest out of internal rather than 
external finance because the latter subjects them to the discipline of the external capital market.  
9 Haque (1999) observes that since the late 1970s most of these countries have adopted more liberal 
regimes based on market-oriented ideologies.  Joshi and Little (1997) note that liberalisation of the Indian 
economy began in the 1980s but more formally in the 1990s.  However, it is also noted that in spite of these 
reforms, during the 1990s government intervention has remained relatively high.   
10 Joshi and Little (1997) list some of the economic controls established in India and the theoretical reasons 
behind them. These include the following: Capacity controls aimed at ensuring supply and demand met, 
and requiring licences for routine business decisions such as setting up or expanding plants.;   Monopoly 
controls aimed at preventing monopolies and requiring firms of certain sizes to receive clearances prior to 
expansion.;  Concessions to small-scale industry, such as tax concessions, aimed at promoting employment 
on the assumption that small businesses are labour intensive.;  Foreign trade controls for the purpose of 
achieving self-reliance and including controls over imports, and restrictions on foreign ownership.;  
Financial markets controls including nationalisation of the banks in 1969 and high intervention in the 
banking and financial sectors.;  Price and distribution controls aimed at ensuring access by the poor to 
certain basic necessities.;  Labour market controls including wage regulations and heavy regulations on 
hiring and firing.   
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costs.  This, in turn, means that the agency rationale for dividends should become more 
important. 
Explicitly, these policies are hypothesised to increase agency costs on three 
accounts.  First, they increase managers’ agency behaviour per se.  Indeed Joshi and 
Little (1997) note that when domestic firms enjoy subsidies or a policy of protectionism, 
the pressure on managers to become more efficient is relaxed.  Second, high state 
intervention means an extension of agency problems to shareholder-administrator 
conflicts.  Indeed, Hansen, Kumar and Shome (1994) show that the degree of industry 
regulation enters the dividend policy decision.   Third, when management of the economy 
is based on social philosophies of protecting the weaker sectors such as employees or 
poorer customers, this influences managers to consider the interests of non-equity 
stakeholders.   This implies that stakeholder theory should be particularly relevant to the 
Indian case, and, as shown by Holder, Langrehr and Hexter (1998) this may lead to a 
downward pressure on dividend levels.   The relevance of stakeholder theory to the 
Indian case also implies extension of agency problems to conflicts of interests between 
equity holders and other stakeholders, increasing the need for shareholders to monitor 
management behaviour.   
It is thus the case that on the one hand stands the prediction by Samuel (1996) that 
agency costs should be lower in the Indian business environment.  This implies that the 
agency rationale for dividends should be less applicable in the case of India.  To contrast 
this, the agency rationale for dividends is predicted to become particularly applicable to 
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India, due to the extension of agency problems on three accounts as explained above.   
An empirical procedure is the natural way to settle these differences and in this study the 
empirical approach draws from the study by Schooley and Barney (1994).  There the 
assumption of a linear relationship is relaxed with respect to insider ownership, while in 
this study the assumption of linearity is relaxed with respect to all the explanatory 
variables. 
Finally, Rao and White (1994) show that the agency theory of dividends is 
applicable even in the case of private firms.  This also has particular important 
implications when the agency theory is investigated in the Indian context, because 
unlisted firms form a large part of that economy.  It is to this investigation, of the agency 
theory of dividends in the Indian context, that attention is now turned.   
 
3.3  The model 
The model used in this study is a variant of the cost minimisation model where an attempt 
is made to capture the factors that are likely to be important in influencing the dividend 
policy of firms operating in the Indian environment.  The general model, which captures 
the main variables identified in the selective literature review, is of the following form: 
PAYOUTi     =   α0   +   α1 AGENCY COSTSi   +   α2 TRANSACTION COSTSi    
                    +   α3 FIRM SIZEi    +   α4 INDUSTRY DUMMYi   +   εi           (3.1) 
Where the subscript, i, denotes the sample observation, i = 1,2,…n; PAYOUT is a proxy 
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for the firm’s target payout ratio;  AGENCY COSTS represents agency costs;  
TRANSACTION COSTS captures transaction costs; FIRM SIZE measures firm size; 
INDUSTRY DUMMY captures the effect of the industry type on the intercept, α0; and εi 
is the disturbance.   
The model in Equation (3.1) can be expanded by exploring the key variables that 
represent agency and transaction costs. To measure agency costs, the AGENCY COSTS 
variable in Equation (3.1) is broken down into five variables. These include: GOV, 
measuring government ownership; INST, measuring institutional ownership; DIRS, 
measuring insider ownership; PUBLIC, measuring ownership dispersion; and FOREIGN, 
measuring foreign ownership.  The TRANSACTION COSTS variable is broken down 
into two risk variables and a growth variable.  The two risk variables include RISK1, 
measuring business risk, and DEBT1, which is a measure of financial risk. The growth 
variable, GROW1, represents growth opportunities. Equation (3.1) can thus be more 
specifically expressed in the form: 
PAYOUT1i   =   β0   +   β1 GOV i +   β2 INST i +   β3 DIRS i +   β4 PUBLIC i  
                       +   β5 FOREIGN i +   β6 RISK1 i +   β7 DEBT1 i +   β8 GROW1 i  
                                                +   β9 SIZE1 i +   Σ λj (INDS j) i +   ε i                            (3.2) 
Variable definitions are given in Appendix 3B, and the subscript j denotes the industry 
dummy as listed in that appendix. There are nineteen industry dummies, j = 0,1,3…19. 
However, the nature of the relationship between the dependent and explanatory 
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variables may not necessarily be linear.  Therefore, to allow for a parabolic relation, a 
quadratic formulation is introduced. Further, the marginal effect of one explanatory 
variable may depend on another variable.  To capture this, interaction terms are also 
added.  The extended model, including the nine non-dummy explanatory variables, their 
quadratic and interaction terms, as well as the industry dummies and a constant, form the 
general model.  For ease of notation, the non-dummy explanatory variables associated 
with the coefficients β1 to β9 in Equation (3.2) are marked as X1 to X9 respectively.  The 
general model is hence: 
PAYOUT i = β0  +  Σ βk (X k) i    +  Σ γ k (X2 k) i +  Σ Σ δ k (X k Xm) i  
                                                                                        +  Σ λj (INDS j) i +   ε i     (3.3) 
Where the subscripts k and m, denote the explanatory variable X.  k = 1,2…9,  m = 
2,3….9, and m > k.  The Xs are the non-dummy variables that appear on the RHS of 
Equation (3.2) and are defined in Appendix 3B.  The subscript j denotes the industry 
dummy and the subscript i denotes the sample observation, i =1,2,…n.   The 
hypothesised relationships between each of the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable are now discussed. 
The linear relationship between the percentage held by the state and central 
governments, GOV, and the payout ratio is expected to be negative. The government is in 
a position to monitor the extent to which the firm is acting in its interests through 
parliamentary questions and audits. The need for the dividend mechanism to induce 
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capital market monitoring is hence reduced11.   In contrast, it could be argued that the 
larger the percentage held by the government, the higher the incentive of other 
shareholders to induce capital market monitoring.  This is due to conflicts of interests 
between the state, whose objectives may not necessarily be that of wealth maximisation, 
and other shareholders.  Hence as the percentage of government holding in the firm 
increases, other shareholders will demand higher dividends.  This ensures that the firm is 
forced to go to the capital market and is thus monitored by the market, reducing the 
ability of government ownership to influence managers’ behaviour.   The expectation is 
thus of a linear negative relationship between GOV and the dependent variable but a 
positive relationship between the dependent variable and interaction terms that include 
GOV and other shareholders.  The overall marginal effect of GOV on the target payout 
ratio is thus undetermined.   
Next is INST, the fraction of institutional ownership.  Relative to other investors, 
institutions have more incentive to spend resources on monitoring the firm and its 
management.  This is due to their expertise and better ability to monitor management 
actions at relatively low cost.  They also stand to benefit more from monitoring, because 
their percentage holding is normally relatively large.  Furthermore, institutions are in a 
better position, compared with individuals, to take over inefficient firms and this threat is 
                                                          
11 It could, however, be argued that there is a possibility of a positive linear relationship between the 
percentage of government holding and the payout ratio.  This may be the case when political governance 
breaks down, and ministers engage in asset stripping.  
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another aspect forcing managers to become more efficient. Consequently, institutional 
ownership has traditionally been viewed as an answer to the free rider problem. This 
implies that the larger the percentage held by institutions, the less is the need for dividend 
induced monitoring.  This, in turn, suggests an inverse relationship between INST and the 
dependent variable.  However, Joshi and Little (1996) note that although Development 
Financial Institutions (DFI) and investment institutions have acquired dominant equity 
holdings in Indian firms, they have been unable to freely trade in shares and to challenge 
insiders12. This particular aspect of the Indian system may prevent institutions from 
carrying out their traditional monitoring role, and thus weakens the argument in favour of 
a negative marginal effect of INST on the target payout ratio13.  Furthermore, conflicts of 
                                                          
12 Joshi and Little (1996) explain the inability of institutions to freely trade in shares and to challenge 
insiders, by the observation that most Indian firms are still controlled by a small group of shareholders 
referred to as the ‘promoters’.  The ‘promoters’ are often from the same family with relatively small 
percentage holding. However their controlling position has been protected by government legislation, court 
practice, and also by regulations introduced by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). For 
example, the government can refuse the transfer of shares if this would change the control structure in the 
firm.  Similarly SEBI introduced a new take over code in November 1994 aimed at discouraging this 
practice, which is vital to the ability of institutions to discipline management. 
13 Another aspect with implications on the ability of Indian financial institutions to carry out the traditional 
monitoring role is inefficiency.  Joshi and Little (1997) note the low internal and organisational efficiency 
of Indian banks.  Wogart (1999) notes the difficulties and greater exposure to risk faced by DFIs, which 
were brought about by the introduction of the 1991 reforms.  In particular, the source of weakness of the 
DFIs was due to the abandonment of industrial licencing leading to increase in demand for long term 
finance at the same time when previously subsidised funds became less available. This, together with their 
concentration in stressed (sick) industries led to fears that the balance sheets of the main DFIs contain many 
non-performing assets.  This, in turn, led to market valuation problems for these institutions. 
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interests, other than those between shareholders and managers, could mean a positive 
rather than a negative marginal effect of INST on the dependent variable, as is now 
explained.  
First, as mentioned in the discussion on the government variable, GOV, conflicts 
of interests between the government group of shareholders and other shareholders 
become more severe with increases in the percentage of government holdings.  As the 
percentage of institutional ownership increases, so does the ability of this group of 
shareholders to influence management to increase the payout ratio in order to reduce 
conflicts.  This implies a positive sign on the estimated coefficient of the interaction term 
of GOV and INST14.  Second, in a highly interventionist environment such as India, 
conflicts with regulators mean that a higher level of monitoring is required to control 
agency problems.  In this case the level of monitoring carried out by the large 
shareholders may still be below the optimal level and shareholders will push for higher 
payouts to induce capital market monitoring.   The higher is INST, the greater their 
ability to influence management actions, implying a positive direct relationship between 
INST and the dependent variable.  Third, when management of the economy is based on 
socialist ideology, non-equity stakeholders can be expected to have more power.  In line 
                                                          
14 This argument is wakened by the extent to which the institution involved is controlled by the 
government.  All banks in India were nationalised in 1969 and heavy regulations were imposed on the 
banking and financial sectors.  However, this policy has been reversed by the economic reforms of the 
1990s.  For example, in the process of reforms, the government has allowed new Private Sector banks to 
enter and also encouraged some of the Public Sector banks to partially privatise.  
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with stakeholder theory, these stakeholders will push for lower payouts to ensure the firm 
can meet its implicit obligations. This may be against the interest of shareholders, thus 
creating pressure by, in particular influential shareholders, for higher payouts.  Again, 
this implies a positive relation between INST and the payout ratio within the Indian 
context.   Faced with these contradicting predictions, the overall marginal effect of INST 
on the target payout ratio is undetermined.   
The higher is the percentage held by directors and their families, DIRS, the more 
aligned are their interests with those of outside shareholders.  This is because as their 
level of holding in the firm rises, insiders bear more of the costs associated with their 
consumption of perquisites and stand to gain more if the firm does well and its stock 
price rises. Thus as the percentage of insider holdings rises, there is less potential for 
agency problems and less need for the dividend control mechanism. The prediction is 
therefore of an inverse relationship between DIRS and the dependent variable. 
The percentage held by the public at large, PUBLIC, is a measure of ownership 
dispersion, assuming that the average holding per individual is relatively small.  A better 
measure of dispersion (and the one that have been used by all the studies reviewed in 
Section 3.2) is based on the number of shareholders.  However, this data is not available 
on the database, PROWESS, used in this study.  The more widely spread is the ownership 
structure, the more acute the free rider problem and the greater the need for outside 
monitoring.   The marginal effect of PUBLIC, on the dependent variable, is therefore 
expected to be positive.  
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FOREIGN is a measure of the percentage of foreign ownership.  Glen, 
Karmokolias, Miller and Shah (1995) note that investors in developed countries often 
hold stock of developing countries for its long-run growth potential. If developing 
countries’ stock is held for growth rather than for income, this suggests a negative 
relation between FOREIGN and the payout ratio.  Furthermore, foreign holding increases 
foreign analysts’ interest in the firm, resulting in more monitoring and hence with less 
need for the dividend induced monitoring device.  Again, implying a negative relation 
between the percentage of foreign holdings and the payout ratio.  On the other hand, if it 
is assumed that the task of monitoring management is more difficult and costly for 
overseas investors, than the need to pay dividends is increased with increases in the 
percentage of foreign holdings.  In light of these contradicting predictions, the nature of 
the relationship between FOREIGN and the dependent variable is undetermined15.  
The three transaction costs variables are GROW1, RISK1 and DEBT1.  When the 
firm is expected to need to raise external finance more often, its transaction costs are 
expected to be higher. Dependency on external finance rises with growth opportunities 
and with the volatility of earnings.  Hence both GROW1 and RISK1 are expected to have 
negative marginal effects on the dependent variable.  
Similarly DEBT1 represents both an increase in dependency on external finance 
                                                          
15 A possible limitation to the use of FOREIGN as an agency variable, is foreign ownership restrictions in 
India. These restrictions imply that foreign investors are not totally free in their investment decisions and 
this could have implications on the interpretation of the observed relationship between FOREIGN and the 
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and an increase in the total risk of the stock.  It represents dependency on external finance 
to the extent that it represents the fixed costs, which the firm is committed to, and 
because debt has to be repaid, leading to the need for re-financing.  Further, DEBT1 
represents risk, in the sense that it is a proxy for the financial risk associated with the 
stock.  As a risk variable, a higher level of debt implies a higher level of fees when 
external finance is raised.  Thus, DEBT1, like the other risk variable, RISK1, is also 
predicted to be negatively related to the payout ratio.  Moreover, debt and dividends are 
sometimes viewed as alternative mechanisms to control agency costs. Jensen (1986), 
Johnson (1995), Crutchley and Hansen (1989) and Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) among 
others, note that the free cash flow problem can be controlled by either issuing debt or by 
paying dividends. This is for two reasons. First, both debt and dividends lead to more 
frequent visits to the capital market thus both induce capital market monitoring of the 
firm. Second, both, having debt in the capital structure and paying dividends, are forms of 
a commitment to pay out cash.   If debt and dividends are alternative ways to achieve the 
same goal, than there should be an inverse relationship between them. 
The nature of the relationship between firm size and the payout ratio is not 
predicted but is to be determined by the data.  This is because both a negative and a 
positive relationship between the size of the firm and its dividend policy can be justified 
by agency theory.  On the one hand large firms face relatively lower cost per dollar raised 
externally.  This is because a large part of issuance costs are fixed so larger firms benefit 
                                                                                                                                                                             
dependent variable.    
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from economies of scale when raising (larger amounts of) external finance.  At the same 
time, larger firms are likely to have more dispersed ownership structure and in that sense 
face higher potential for agency problems.   The lower transaction costs and the higher 
potential for agency problems, imply a positive correlation between firm’s size and the 
use of the dividend control mechanism.  However, large and influential firms usually 
attract more attention and are likely to be tensely monitored by the media, and the general 
public. These firms also tend to have highly traded stock and are thus likely to be 
continuously monitored by participants in the secondary market.  Further, large firms 
tend to have easier access to the alternative agency cost control mechanism, namely debt.  
There is therefore less need for managers of large firms to induce monitoring through the 
payment of dividends.  This implies a negative correlation between firm size and the 
dependent variable.  The expected marginal effect of SIZE1 on the dependent variable is 
hence not specified.  
The hypothesised signs on the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables 
are summarised in Table 3.2.  Not included in Table 3.2, however, are the predictions 
regarding the nature of the relationship between dividends, and the industry dummies, 
INDSj.   Firms in different industries operate under different set of regulations and often 
face different levels of risk and growth potential. The industry dummies, INDSj, are 
included to test for a difference in the intercept when the firm belongs to specific 
industries.  The prediction is that firms that operate under a higher degree of regulation 
face higher agency costs due to conflicts between owners and regulators.  Such firms are 
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expected to have significantly higher payout ratios.  Similarly, firms facing opportunities 
for growth or higher risk are expected to have significantly lower payout ratio compared 
with the controlled group16. 
 
Table 3.2  Predicted signs on the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables when regressed on a 




Predicted sign of the linear association between 
payout and the explanatory variable 
 
Overall marginal effect 
GOV (-) Undetermined 
INST (-/+) Undetermined 
DIRS (-) Negative 
PUBLIC (+) Positive 
FOREIGN (-/+) Undetermined 
RISK1 (-) Negative 
DEBT1 (-) Negative 
GROW1 (-) Negative 
SIZE1 (-/+) Undetermined 
Variable definitions are given in Appendix 3B. 
 
Empirical procedures are applied to test the above predictions, which can be 
summarised as follows.  Of the nine non-dummy explanatory variables, PUBLIC is the 
only variable predicted to be positively related to the target payout ratio while DIRS, 
RISK1, DEBT1 and GROW1 are all predicted to be negatively related to the target 
payout ratio.  The remaining non-dummy explanatory variables include GOV, INST, 
FOREIGN and SIZE1.  Although the nature of the relationship between these variables 
and the dependent variable have been considered, no definite predictions are made 
regarding their marginal effects on the target payout ratio.  The testing procedures and 
testing results are discussed in the next section, starting with description of the data. 
                                                          
16 See footnote (5).  
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 3.4  Empirical procedures and results 
3.4.1  The data  
The data are retrieved from the PROWESS database updated to 8 March 200017. All 
input/raw values that are based on numbers reported in audited accounts are stated in 
crore (ten million) Indian rupees. Utilising the annualised mode in PROWESS, all profit 
and loss and associated figures are annualised to correct for values reported in respect of 
periods other than 12 months. 
At the time the data were collected, the PROWESS database contained nearly 
8000 firms of which about 4800 were listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE).  This 
paper initially took the universe of 4829 BSE-quoted companies and screened them on 
the basis of the following criteria: none of the raw data requested from PROWESS are 
missing; profit after tax in each of the years 1994 to 1998 is positive.  This process 
resulted in a sample of 952 firms.   However, as Public Sector firms are assumed to 
behave fundamentally different to Private Sector firms, 42 firms associated with the 
former were excluded, to give a sample of 910 firms.  This sample was further reduced in 
the process of constructing the variables and the weighting series and due to the removal 
of outliers.  The sample construction procedure is described in Appendix 3C and resulted 
in a sample size of 880 observations, the descriptive statistics of the non-dummy 
                                                          
17 PROWESS is a database developed and maintained by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy 
(CMIE). 
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variables of which are presented in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics for Model 1: Indian Private Sector firms 1994-1998 
(Number of observations: 880)  
 
 Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Sum Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
PAYOUT1 0.2948 0.1523 0.0000 0.8621 259.4325 0.0232 0.6620 0.7875 
GOV 0.0051 0.0329 0.0000 0.4177 4.4774 0.0011 8.1871 73.2186 
INST 0.0997 0.1098 0.0000 0.5151 87.6965 0.0121 1.0401 0.0934 
DIRS 0.1381 0.1786 0.0000 0.8828 121.4813 0.0319 1.4542 1.4864 
PUBLIC 0.2670 0.1584 -0.2576 0.9508 234.9698 0.0251 0.9433 1.2370 
FOREIGN 0.1312 0.1859 0.0000 0.8028 115.4829 0.0346 1.5763 1.4685 
RISK1 0.0788 0.0539 0.0054 0.3153 69.3512 0.0029 1.5228 2.7659 
DEBT1 0.3323 0.1563 0.0000 0.9038 292.3900 0.0244 0.1374 -0.0237 
GROW1 0.2374 0.2211 -0.6093 2.9989 208.8684 0.0489 3.4821 30.8976 
SIZE1 4.5534 1.4243 0.2531 9.6629 4007.0155 2.0286 0.3468 0.2282 
Correlation Matrix 
 PAYOUT1 GOV INST DIRS PUBLIC FOREIGN RISK1 DEBT1 GROW1 
PAYOUT1 1.0000         
GOV 0.0097 1.0000        
INST -0.0326 0.0741 1.0000       
DIRS -0.0683 -0.0975 -0.3170 1.0000      
PUBLIC 0.0531 -0.0203 -0.2105 -0.1420 1.0000     
FOREIGN 0.0816 -0.0290 0.0397 -0.2877 -0.2501 1.0000    
RISK1 -0.1866 -0.0155 -0.1558 0.1446 -0.0709 0.0411 1.0000   
DEBT1 -0.0565 -0.0265 0.0906 0.0210 0.0551 -0.2919 -0.2411 1.0000  
GROW1 -0.0802 -0.0370 -0.1687 0.0681 0.1514 -0.1071 0.0507 0.1777 1.0000 
SIZE1 -0.0319 0.0408 0.4627 -0.3772 -0.1216 0.1591 -0.1731 0.1775 -0.0003 
Variable definitions are given in Appendix 3B.  
 
Table 3.3 also presents the correlation matrix for the non-dummy variables. There 
does not appear to be high correlation between any two of the explanatory variables 
(With exception, perhaps, of INST and SIZE1 with correlation value of 0.46).   However, 
to assess more directly whether multicollinearity is present, the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) procedure is undertaken.  VIF(βk) can be interpreted as the ratio of the actual 
variance of the estimated coefficient, VAR(βk), to what it would have been in the absence 
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of multicollinearity. (In the latter case, the coefficient of multiple determination, R2k, in a 
regression of the explanatory variable, Xk, on all other explanatory variables is zero).   
VIF values for all the non-dummy explanatory variables of Equation (3.2) are reported in 
Table 3.4.  As can be observed from Table 3.4, all the VIF values are close to unity and 
none exceeds two, confirming that the sample data do not suffer from multicollinearity. 
The specification of the model of Equation (3.2) includes 19 industry dummies 
and the relevance of including these dummies is assessed in a manner similar to the 
approach in Moh’d, Perry and Rimbey (1995).  Specifically, the hypothesis that there is 
no difference in the means of the dependent and independent variables, across the 
different industries, is tested using an ANOVA procedure.  For this purpose, each of the 
non-dummy variables of Equation (3.2) is regressed on a constant and on the 19 industry 
dummies, (INDS0-INDS1, INDS3-INDS19).  The F-statistics, testing the hypothesis that 
none of the explanatory variables influences the dependent variable, are presented in the 
last column of Table 3.4.  
As can be seen from Table 3.4, the hypothesis that there is no difference between 
the means is rejected at the 1 percent significance level in all but two cases.  In the first of 
these two cases, where GOV is the dependent variable, the null hypothesis is rejected at 
the 10 percent significance level.  In the second case, where DIRS is the dependent 




Table 3.4 Results of: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Procedure and of Analysis Of Variance (ANOVA) 
Procedure for the dependent variable and all the non-dummy independent variables 
 
 VIF Procedure ANOVA procedure 
Variable R2k VIF F-STAT 
PAYOUT1   4.8094 
GOV 0.3623 1.0529 1.5813 
INST 0.3623 1.5682 4.7554 
DIRS 0.3369 1.5080 1.8557 
PUBLIC 0.2385 1.3132 3.0403 
FOREIGN 0.3017 1.4321 4.6246 
RISK1 0.1294 1.1486 2.4420 
DEBT1 0.3118 1.4531 10.5647 
GROW1 0.1390 1.1614 3.2462 
SIZE1 0.3743 1.5981 4.3445 
R2k is the R-squared in a regression of Xk (the variable on the left most column) on a constant and the rest of the explanatory variables. 
VIF(βk) = 1/ (1- R2k) where βk is the estimated coefficient on the explanatory variable, Xk. 
Sample size, n = 880; Variable definitions are given in Appendix 3B. 
Critical values for F(19,860) are as follows:  
Upper tail area 0.01 = 1.9274, Upper tail area 0.05 = 1.5982, Upper tail area 0.10 = 1.4396 
 
3.4.2   Empirical procedures 
The approach taken to model formulation is the general to specific, starting by applying 
Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) procedure to the general model of Equation 
(3.3)18.  This unrestricted model is based on theory but allows for possible non-linear 
effects and for interactions among variables.  A simplification procedure is then carried 
out and involves putting the general model through Wald and t-tests, to arrive at the 
parsimonious specification.    
In order to construct the weights for the FGLS procedure, the variances of the 
disturbances are assumed to be proportional to the expected values of the dependent 
variable. That is, the variance function is assumed to be of the form: 
                                                          
18 The FGLS procedure has been applied to correct for possible heteroskedasticity, which is a common 
problem in cross sectional data.  As the structure of the heteroskedasticity is unknown, an auxiliary 
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Var(εi) = αZ i                          (3.4) 
Z i = E(PAYOUT1i)  
The fitted values from the OLS regression, which constitutes the auxiliary regression, are 
used as estimates of Z i.  The weights are the inverses of the fitted values unless these are 
non-positive, in which case they are replaced by the actual value of the dependent 
variable, PAYOUT1i.  
The weighted data are computed by multiplying the original data by the square 
roots of the weights.  However, the TSP programme normalises the weights by dividing 
them by a constant, so that they sum to the number of observations. The normalisation 
procedure ensures that the magnitudes of the weighted data and of the weighted residuals 
are similar to those of the original data and residuals.  Models based on the original data 
and on an alternative weighting-scheme, that uses the squared OLS residuals, were also 
experimented with to give similar results19.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regression is used to obtain estimates of the factor to which the variances of the disturbances are assumed 
to be proportional.  
19 In the alternative weighting scheme it is assumed that all the explanatory variables are the source of the 
heteroskedasticity in the disturbances. However, as the variances of the disturbances are unknown, they are 
replaced by the squared residuals.  Therefore, the squared residuals, obtained from the original OLS 
regression, are regressed on a constant, the nineteen industry dummies and the nine non-dummy 
explanatory variables, their squares and cross products. The fitted values from this auxiliary regression are 
used to compute the weights.  Nonetheless, where these fitted values are non-positive they are replaced by 




Table 3.5  Results for the specified weighted regression  
 
 MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 
Dependent PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT2 
observations 880  893  847  870  893  881  867  
Adj. R-squared 0.526  0.237  0.218  0.732  0.531  0.641  0.298  
F-statistic  41.717 [.000] 13.029 [.000] 9.436 [.000] 95.836 [.000] 38.336 [.000] 61.334 [.000] 15.172 [.000] 
               
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
C 0.462 [.000] 0.368 [.000] 0.598 [.000] 0.479 [.000] 0.495 [.000] 0.435 [.000] 0.678 [.000]
GOV -0.654 [.000] -0.619 [.002] -2.097 [.001]    -0.768 [.000]
INST    -0.221 [.162] 
DIRS      -0.393 [.001]
PUBLIC   0.389 [.000]    
FOREIGN    -0.236 [.053]    -0.270 [.045]
RISK1 -1.491 [.000] n/a n/a -1.559 [.000] -1.533 [.000] -1.450 [.000] -1.190 [.001]
RISK2  n/a  n/a n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
RISK3 n/a  n/a -0.132 [.004] n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
DEBT1 -0.293 [.079] -0.608 [.000] -0.171 [.012] n/a -0.300 [.066]   -0.487 [.012]
DEBT2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
GROW1    -0.292 [.000] n/a    
GROW2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a -0.291 [.000] n/a  n/a
SIZE1   -0.057 [.000] -0.028 [.000]  n/a  -0.055 [.000]
SIZE2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a    n/a
SQR(INST)   -0.179 [.152]   
SQR(DIRS) 0.166 [.088] 0.163 [.080] 0.205 [.023] 0.154 [.100] 0.182 [.079] 0.317 [.015]
SQR(PUBLIC) -0.322 [.001] -0.462 [.000] -0.370 [.001] -0.402 [.000] -0.505 [.000] -0.353 [.000] -0.506 [.000]
SQR(RISK1) 3.022 [.001] n/a n/a 2.908 [.003] 3.371 [.000] 2.914 [.002] 2.735 [.015]
SQR(DEBT1) -0.311 [.016] n/a -0.271 [.020] -0.288 [.000] -0.354 [.014]
SQR(GROW1) 0.053 [.050] 0.076 [.001] n/a  0.075 [.028] 0.059 [.004]
SQR(GROW2) n/a  n/a n/a n/a 0.040 [.001] n/a  n/a
SQR(SIZE1) -0.003 [.001] -0.002 [.016] -0.003 [.002] n/a  
SQR(SIZE2) n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a  -0.002 [.005] n/a
GOV INST 4.277 [.000] 4.292 [.001] 5.584 [.000] 4.307 [.000] 4.358 [.000] 4.574 [.000]
GOV DIRS   8.949 [.000]    
GOV RISK1   n/a n/a -8.325 [.000] -6.663 [.000] -6.508 [.001] 
GOV SIZE1   0.435 [.001]  n/a  
INST PUBLIC   0.452 [.016]    
INST FOREIGN   0.652 [.000]   
INST RISK2 n/a  -1.425 [.001] n/a n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
INST RISK3 n/a  n/a -0.199 [.024] n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
INST DEBT1   0.473 [.008] n/a    
INST GROW1   -0.237 [.081] n/a    
INST SIZE2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a  0.044 [.150] n/a
DIRS DEBT1 0.278 [.081] 0.372 [.030] 0.295 [.093] n/a 0.343 [.031]   0.467 [.028]
DIRS SIZE1 -0.049 [.001] -0.062 [.000] -0.044 [.003] -0.041 [.001] -0.057 [.000] n/a  
DIRS SIZE2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a  -0.031 [.025] n/a
PUBLIC RISK1 1.058 [.022] n/a n/a 1.409 [.003] 1.222 [.018] 0.961 [.039] 0.806 [.142]
PUBLIC RISK2 n/a  -0.708 [.000] n/a n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
PUBLIC GROW1 -0.312 [.001] -0.261 [.035] -0.249 [.002] n/a  -0.247 [.012] -0.214 [.031]
PUBLIC SIZE1 0.052 [.000] 0.082 [.000] 0.056 [.000] 0.054 [.000] n/a  0.071 [.000]
PUBLIC SIZE2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a  0.058 [.000] n/a
FOREIGN GROW1   -0.557 [.002] n/a  -0.332 [.097] 
FOREIGN SIZE1 0.021 [.001] 0.017 [.007] 0.068 [.008] 0.045 [.000]  n/a  0.071 [.011]
FOREIGN SIZE2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a  0.035 [.000] n/a
RISK2 DEBT1 n/a  0.800 [.006] n/a n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
RISK3 GROW1 n/a  n/a 0.097 [.000] n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
RISK3 SIZE1 n/a  n/a 0.024 [.013] n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
DEBT1 GROW1 0.502 [.001] 0.474 [.001] 0.498 [.005] n/a n/a  0.429 [.003] 0.554 [.001]
DEBT1 GROW2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a 0.592 [.000] n/a  n/a
DEBT1 SIZE1 0.055 [.030] 0.076 [.000] n/a 0.039 [.133] n/a  0.101 [.001]
GROW1 SIZE1 -0.043 [.000] -0.050 [.000] n/a  n/a  -0.067 [.000]
GROW1 SIZE2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a  -0.043 [.001] n/a
INDS1   0.035 [.086]   
INDS3   -0.034 [.105]    
INDS4   -0.034 [.052] -0.038 [.023] -0.037 [.036]  -0.036 [.037] -0.033 [.078]
INDS5 -0.091 [.000] -0.090 [.000] -0.110 [.000] -0.098 [.000] -0.081 [.000] -0.086 [.000] -0.108 [.000]
INDS7 -0.041 [.014] -0.050 [.004] -0.045 [.010] -0.041 [.021] -0.030 [.064] -0.047 [.006] -0.044 [.040]
INDS9   -0.037 [.035] -0.034 [.034]  -0.029 [.077] 
INDS10 -0.083 [.000] -0.080 [.000] -0.079 [.000] -0.089 [.000] -0.069 [.000] -0.087 [.000] -0.062 [.005]
INDS11   -0.057 [.082]    
INDS12 0.143 [.000] 0.116 [.000] 0.112 [.000] 0.109 [.000] 0.149 [.000] 0.112 [.000] 0.147 [.000]
INDS13   0.050 [.017]   
INDS14 0.126 [.008] 0.125 [.006] 0.112 [.006] 0.119 [.014] 0.128 [.004] 0.133 [.018] 0.091 [.043]
INDS17   -0.064 [.061]    
INDS19   0.031 [.068] 0.028 [.115] 0.028 [.127]   
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2); Method of estimation is weighted least squares; Statistics are 
based on transformed data; [probability values] 
 
Table 3.5, Model 1, presents the results of the specified model.  However, to 
assess the sensitivity of the results to the selection of proxies, each of the transaction 
costs and size proxies as well as the dependent variable have been substituted by 
alternative measures, to form six additional models, Model 2 to Model 7.  The use of 
different variable definitions resulted in different sample sizes for each model as 
indicated in Table 3.5.  Changes from Model 1, in each of the additional models, are 
discussed below while definitions for the alternative variables are given in Appendix 3B. 
Models 2 and 3 use alternative risk variables, while Model 4 uses an alternative 
financial risk variable.  In Model 2, RISK1, which measures the volatility of the return on 
capital employed, is replaced by RISK2, which is the standard deviation of the daily 
stock returns.  In Model 3 RISK1 is replaced by RISK3, which measures the volatility in 
the first difference of annual profits.   Model 4 replaces DEBT1, which is the average 
ratio of total borrowings to total assets, with DEBT2, the average ratio of profit before 
interest to profit after interest.    
The growth variable in Model 1, GROW1, is measured as growth in income, 
which is consistent with most of the studies reviewed in Section 3.2.  In Model 5 this is 
replaced by GROW2, which measure the growth in total assets, consistent with Hansen, 
Kumar and Shome (1994).  Similarly, Model 6 use SIZE2 in place of SIZE1 of Model 1, 
which measures firm size in terms of total assets.  SIZE2, is also a firm size variable but 
is based on income as in Lloyd, Jahera and Page (1985), Moh’d, Perry and Rimbey 
(1995), and Holder, Langrehr and Hexter (1998).   
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Finally, in Model 1 the dependent variable, PAYOUT1, is measured as the ratio 
of the sum of common dividend paid during a five-year period to the sum of profits in the 
same period.  This is consistent with Hansen, Kumar and Shome (1994), but differs from 
the approach taken by most other studies reviewed in Section 3.2.  This more common 
approach to measuring the target payout ratio is taken in Model 7, where PAYOUT1 is 
replaced by PAYOUT2, which is the five-year average annual payout ratio.   
 
Table 3.6 Marginal Effects (based on the unweighted means) 
 
 MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 
Dependent PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT2 
GOV -0.2274 -0.1915 1.1181 -0.10499 -0.0983 -0.0788 -0.3107
INST 0.0218 0.0256 0.0126 -0.02717 0.0712 -0.0031 0.0236
DIRS -0.0829 -0.1132 -0.0578 -0.12877 -0.1008 -0.0869 -0.1502
PUBLIC 0.0757 0.1303 0.1168 0.092468 0.0724 0.0839 0.0675
FOREIGN 0.0963 0.0773 0.0731 0.073817 0.0649 0.0776 0.0556
RISK1 -0.7319 - - -0.76634 -0.7056 -0.7667 -0.5458
RISK2 - -0.0653 - - - - - 
RISK3 - - -0.0208 - - - - 
DEBT1 -0.0929 -0.0351 0.0330 - -0.0899 -0.0888 -0.0661
DEBT2 - - - - - - 
GROW1 -0.0854 -0.0700 -0.1291 -0.1273 - -0.1217 -0.1499
GROW2 - - - - -0.0714 - - 
SIZE1 -0.0090 -0.0103 -0.0130 -0.012779 -0.0078 - -0.0086
SIZE2 - - - - - -0.0112 - 
 
The results of Table 3.5 are summarised in Table 3.6, which presents the marginal 
effects of each of the non dummy explanatory variables on the dependent variable.  The 
marginal effect of the explanatory variable, Xk, on the dependent variable, Y, represents 
the expected change in Y for a unit change in Xk.  Marginal effects are obtained by 
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partially differentiating the dependent variable with respect to each of the nine non-
dummy explanatory variables, using mean values of the original (non-weighted) variables 
where necessary.  The results in Table 3.6 and Table 3.5 can be used to assess whether 
the relationships between the dependent and independent variables confirm to 
expectations. This assessment is carried out in the next section. 
 
3.4.3.  Estimation and testing results 
As shown in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, the model appears to be relatively robust to 
alternative specifications.  In most cases, the marginal effects of all the non-dummy 
explanatory variables, on the dependent variable, bear the expected signs as predicted by 
the agency theory of dividends.  Furthermore, excluding the size variable, the results are 
consistent with findings in the studies reviewed in Section 3.2.   These results are, in 
general, supportive of the hypothesis that the agency theory of dividends and the cost 
minimisation model describe well the Indian data20.  
The first agency variable, GOV, measures the percentage of common equity held 
by the government.  A negative linear relationship was predicted between GOV and the 
dependent variable, because government is in a relatively good position to monitor. 
(Hence the need for dividend-induced capital market monitoring is reduced).  Indeed, in 
                                                          
20 Appendix 3D presents the results for the unweighted procedure while Appendix 3E contains the results 
for the alternative weighting scheme regressions.  These results are similar to those reported in Tables 3.5 
and 3.6. 
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the four models (Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 7) where a simple linear relation 
is retained, the estimated coefficient is consistently negatively signed and significant at 
the 1 percent significance level.   This negative relation between GOV and the payout 
ratio can also be interpreted in the context of by Hansen, Kumar and Shome (1994).  The 
hypothesis is that a policy of state intervention increases the potential for agency conflicts 
by extending the problem to owner-regulator conflicts.  As higher percentage of shares 
are held by the government, investors’ goals shift from wealth maximisation to social and 
political issues and consequently owner-regulator conflicts are smoothed out.  However, 
the interaction term of GOV and INST, appears with a positive coefficient that is 
significant at the 1 percent level in all models but Model 3.  This is also consistent with 
the prediction made in Section 3.3 and is indicative of conflicts of interests between 
government and other (mainly influential) shareholders such as institutions21.  While the 
prediction of the overall marginal effect of GOV was inconclusive, the actual effect is 
found to be negative in all but Model 3. 
 The overall marginal effect of INST, the percentage of common equity held by 
institutions, was also not decisively predicted.  In five of the seven models (Model 1, 
Model 2, Model 3, Model 5 and Model 7) the marginal effect of INST on the dependent 
variable is found to be positive.  This is inconsistent with the view that the ability of 
institutional shareholders, to more effectively monitor the firm, reduces the need for the 
dividend mechanism.  However, evidence of a positive relation between INST and the 
                                                          
21 But see footnote (14) 
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payout ratio is consistent with the preference-for-dividends-related prediction and results 
in Moh’d, Perry and Rimbey (1995).  It is also consistent with the notion that due to 
greater agency conflicts, the level of institutional monitoring is insufficient.  Hence this 
influential group of shareholders pushes for higher payouts to induce capital market 
monitoring.  
The marginal effect of the percentage of insider ownership, DIRS, on the 
dependent variable is negative under all specifications in line with the prediction made.  
In six models (Model 1, Model 2, Model 4, Model 5, Model 6 and Model 7) the estimated 
coefficient on the squared DIRS is positive and significant at the 10 percent significance 
level at least.  This is consistent with the results in Schooley & Barney (1994) and 
indicates positive impact, which becomes stronger at high levels of insider ownership.  It 
implies that although the overall impact of insider ownership is to reduce agency costs, 
high levels of insider ownership give rise to additional agency problems22.  
The marginal effect of PUBLIC, the variable measuring ownership dispersion, on 
the target payout ratio is positive.   As predicted it appears that increases in the dispersion 
of ownership increases the collective action problem of monitoring and thus the need for 
the dividend induced capital market monitoring.  However, under all models the 
                                                          
22 See the review of the study by Schooley & Barney (1994) in Section 3.2, where it is suggested that at 
high levels of insiders ownership, agency problems become more severe for two reasons:   
1. At high levels of inside ownership, insiders become more risk averse as they are less well 
diversified.  
2. When insiders have sufficient voting powers, they become immune to the threat of being replaced.  
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estimated coefficient of the squared PUBLIC variable is negative and significant at the 1 
percent level.  This indicates that high dispersion of ownership, particularly at high 
levels, can contribute to reducing agency costs.   Perhaps as more people hold the shares, 
activity in the secondary market increases, as does the public attention directed towards 
the firm, thus inducing monitoring and reducing the need for the artificial dividend 
mechanism.   
The prediction regarding the marginal effect of the percentage of foreign 
ownership, FOREIGN, on the payout ratio was inconclusive. However, the actual 
marginal effect is found to be positive in all models.  This indicates that the greater the 
percentage held by foreign institutions, the greater the need to induce capital market 
monitoring.  It is consistent with the view that, relative to other shareholders, it may be 
more difficult for overseas investors to monitor the firm and its management.    
The transaction costs variables, measuring growth opportunities, business and 
financial risks, generally confirm to the prediction of a negative impact on the payout 
ratio.  The marginal effect of the variable entered as a proxy for business risk, 
(RISK1/RISK2/RISK3) is found to be negative in all models.  The variables RISK1 and 
RISK3 enter the models in which they are included with negative estimated coefficients, 
which are significant at the 1 percent significance level. The variable RISK2 (replacing 
RISK1 in Model 2) does not enter the specified model on its own, but appears only in two 
interaction terms (with INST and with PUBLIC).  It should be noted, however, that 
RISK2 represents the total risk associated with holding the firm’s shares rather than its 
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business risk alone. (RISK2 is the standard deviation of daily stock returns).   
Evidence regarding the nature of the relationship between debt and the target 
payout ratio is not very strong.  The financial risk variable is shown to have the predicted 
negative marginal effect on the payout ratio in five models (Model 1, Model 2, Model 5, 
Model 6 and Model 7).  However, in Model 3, the level of debt in the firm’s capital 
structure, appears to have a positive effect on the target payout ratio. In Model 4, where 
DEBT2 measures the effect of interest payments on profits, this debt variable completely 
drops out of the specified model.  
The marginal effect of the growth variable on the payout ratio appears to be 
negative in all models.  It is interesting to note, however, that the estimated coefficient on 
the interaction term between the growth variable and DEBT1 is positive and significant at 
the 1 percent significance level.  Indeed this apparently important interaction term enters 
all the specified models where DEBT1 is included regardless of how growth is measured 
(that is, in all models apart of Model 4 where DEBT2 replaces DEBT1).  This may 
suggest that in line with agency behaviour growing firms, that finance their growth by 
borrowings, are under greater pressure to increase their payout ratios.  This may be 
explained by the risk that the uncertain cash flows to be generated from growth 
opportunities will be insufficient to meet owners’ needs after all creditors have been paid.  
Consistent with Lloyd, Jahera and Page (1985) firm size appears to be an 
important factor in determining target payout ratios.  The variable measuring firm size 
enters each model, in one form or another, with a significant estimated coefficient.  No 
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definite prediction was made in this study regarding the nature of the relationship 
between the firm’s size and its dividend policy.  However, the marginal effect of size on 
the payout ratio is repeatedly negative and this is opposite to the findings by all the 
studies reviewed in Section 3.2, which introduce a size variable.  These include Lloyd, 
Jahera and Page (1985), Moh’d, Perry and Rimbey (1995), and Holder, Langrehr and 
Hexter (1998).   The negative impact of size on the payout ratio may be due to better 
access by large firms to debt finance, which substitutes for dividends in controlling 
agency costs.  Alternatively, large firms may be able to create reputation for responsible 
behaviour by managers, hence the need for the dividend commitment is reduced.   
Finally, before moving to Section 3.5, where conclusions are presented, the 
results are reviewed with respect to the industry dummies. INDS12 and INDS14 appear 
with significant and positive estimated coefficients in all models.  The financial services 
sector (INDS12) is positively related to the target payout ratio in all models at the 1 
percent significance level.  Similarly, the transport and communication services sector 
(INDS14) is positively related to the payout ratio in all models at the 5 percent 
significance level at least.  The financial services sector, due to high level of regulations, 
can be expected to suffer from higher degree of owner-regulator conflicts and thus the 
use of the dividend mechanism to control for agency costs is justified23.  An agency cost 
rationale can also explain the significant and positive relation recorded between the 
                                                          
23 Firms in the financial services sector may also be operating under codes and regulations that restrict their 
flexibility in determining payout ratios. 
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transport and communication services and the dependent variable24. 
The industries appearing with significant and negative estimated coefficients in all 
models include INDS5, INDS7 and INDS10.  The non-metallic mineral products 
(INDS5) and wood, paper and paper products (INDS10), are both shown to be 
significantly negatively related to the firm’s payout ratio at the 1 percent significance 
level across all models.  The non-electrical machinery manufacturers sector (INDS7) is 
negatively related to the target payout ratio across all models at the 10 percent 
significance level at least.  Such relationship may be due, for example, to growth 
opportunities or high risk.  
 
3.5.  Conclusions and promising research ideas 
The agency rationale for dividends as articulated by Easterbrook (1984) and modelled in 
Rozeff (1982) appears to be borne by the results of this study, although the relationships 
between variables are shown to be more complex than has previously been assumed.  The 
results are consistent with the idea that Private Sector firms in India set their target 
                                                          
24 Within the transport and communication services is the telecommunications industry, which had been 
under public sector monopoly until 1994.  However, as noted in Ahluwalia (1998), unlike other public 
sector industries, telecommunications has generated substantial internal surplus.  The surplus was the result 
of the industry exploiting its monopoly position by highly charging for long distance calls, which was 
politically possible because the target consumers were considered to be high-earners. It could be argued 
that this surplus has increased the potential for agency problems by increasing the opportunities for 
managers to misuse internal funds, thus increasing the need for the dividend mechanism to control these 
problems.  
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payout ratios so as to minimise the sum of agency costs and the costs associated with 
raising external finance.   Thus while foreign ownership and the dispersion of ownership 
have positive impact on the payout ratio, business risk, growth and insider ownership 
negatively influence dividend levels.   
Moreover, it is suggested that agency costs, that enter the cost minimisation 
model, include additional conflicts faced by owners besides those with managers. 
Specifically, it is proposed that costs also arise due to conflicts between owners and 
regulators, conflicts between owners and other stakeholders and conflicts amongst the 
different owner groups.   An important implication of this is that the level of intervention 
in the economy, which has an adverse effect on conflicts of interests within the firm, also 
influences the dividend policy decision.   Indeed, it is shown that the percentage of shares 
held by central and state governments is an important determinant of the firm’s target 
payout ratio.  This is due to the implications of such holdings on agency costs within the 
firm. 
Inconclusive results are obtained with respect to the variables measuring 
institutional ownership and financial risk, while the results on the size proxy are 
contentious.   These clearly require further investigation, perhaps allowing the dividend 
decision, the capital structure decision, and ownership structure patterns to be 
simultaneously determined.  Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that these decisions are 
interdependent and therefore a system of equations, as in Jensen, Solberg and Zorn 
(1992) and in Noronha, Shome and Morgan (1996), may be the better testing approach. 
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Another future research idea is to incorporate agency costs of debt into the model.  
In particular, conflicts between owners and debt holders and the latter’s attitudes towards 
dividend policy were also not addressed in this chapter, but are likely to prove important.  
Other extensions could include adopting empirical methodologies that account for 
dividend trends over time, such as the panel procedure that allows for time effects.  This 
procedure, however, calls for relatively long time periods, which is often problematic 
with data from emerging markets due to the recent origin of available databases.   
Additional promising research idea is to investigate the impact of group affiliation on 
agency costs and on the dividend decision.  This last idea may be particularly relevant in 
the Indian corporate context due to the importance of Business Houses in that 
environment, and is taken up in Chapter 5.  
 
174 
APPENDIX 3A: Definitions of variables in studies of the cost minimisation model 
 
1 - DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Study Name Definition 
Rozeff (1982) PAY The average payout ratio, 1974-1980 
 
Lloyd, Jahera and 
Page, (1985) 
PAYOUT The average payout ratio in the last seven years from Value 
Line  (1984 issue)  
Schooley and 
Barney (1994) 
DIVYD80 The dividend yield in 1980 
Moh’d, Perry and 
Rimbey (1995) 
PAYOUT The common dividend to net income for year t.  
Holder, Langrehr 
and Hexter (1998) 
DP The mathematically smoothed payout ratio in year t. 
Hansen, Kumar and 
Shome (1994) 
POR The sum of all dividends paid during the 5 years prior to and 
including 1985 over the sum of all shareholders’ earnings in the 
same period 
Rao and White 
(1994) 
PAY The average of the most recent payout ratios from the time of 




 2 - INSIDER OWNERSHIP 
Study Name Definition 





RSINS (-) The residual from a regression of the percentage of common 
stock held by insiders on the size variable. 
CEOOWN (-) The percentage of the firm’s stock held by chief executive 
officers, year ending 1980 
Schooley and 
Barney 








INS (-) The residual from a regression of insider ownership in year t 
on the size variable. 
Rao and 
White (1994) 
INS (-) The percentage of stock held by insiders on year of the court 
case. 
 
The hypothesised signs of the coefficients are included in brackets following the variable name.  
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3 - STAKEHOLDER THEORY 




FS (-) The focus of firm i in year t. It is the maximum proportion of a firm’s 
sales attributed to a distinct business line. FS = [Max (Sj)] / S, where 
Max (Sj) is the sales for the business line j with the maximum sales of 
all firm i's lines, and S is total sales for firm i for year t 
 
4 - REGULATION RANK 




COMMRANK (-) Utility’s u regulatory commission rank as of year-ending 
1985. It is based on estimation regarding the rate of return 
the regulatory commission permits the utility to earn 
 
5 - TAX COST OF NOT PAYING DIVIDENDS 






The ratio of retained earnings to total assets in the year of the court case. It 
is a proxy for the expected direct costs of Accumulated Earnings Tax, 
associated with not paying dividends.  
 
The hypothesised signs of the coefficients are included in brackets following the variable name.  
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6 - PAST GROWTH 
Study Name Definition 
Rozeff (1982) GROW1 (-) Average growth rate of revenues, 1974-1979 
 
Lloyd, Jahera and 
Page, (1985) 
GROW1 (-) The five-year average historic growth rate of revenues 
relative to 1984 
Schooley and 
Barney (1994) 
PASTSALE (-) The annual sales’ growth from 1975 to 1979 
Moh’d, Perry and 
Rimbey (1995) 
GROW1 (-) The average rate of revenue growth over the previous 5 
years, relative to year t, as reported in Value Line 
Holder, Langrehr 
and Hexter (1998) 
GROW (-) It is measured as the beta coefficient in a regression of the 
natural logarithm of sales in year t, LSALES, on time.  
LSALESn = α + β TIMEn (for n = t, t-1…t-4)  and GROW = 
β = [Cov (LSALESn, TIMEn) / Var (TIMEn)]. 
Hansen, Kumar 
and Shome (1994) 
TAGROW (-) Growth rate in total assets measured over the five-year 
period ending in 1985.  
Rao and White 
(1994) 
GROW (-) Average annual percentage change in revenues. The number 
of years over which the average is calculated varies across 
firms from 2 to 10 from the year of the court case, 
depending on data availability. The mean number of years of 
data availability is 4.5 
The hypothesised signs of the coefficients are included in brackets following the variable name.  
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7 - FUTURE GROWTH 
Study Name Definition 
Rozeff (1982) GROW2 (-) Value Line’s forecast of average growth rate of revenues, 1979-
1984 
Lloyd, Jahera and 
Page, (1985) 
GROW2 (-) The 5 year average growth rate of revenues as forecasted by the 





Value Line’s forecasted annual sales growth from 1980 to 1985 
Moh’d, Perry and 
Rimbey (1995) 
GROW2 (-) Value Line’s forecast of average growth in revenues over the 
next five years relative to year t.  
 
8 - RISK 
Study Name Definition 
Rozeff (1982) BETA (-) The beta coefficient of returns obtained from Value Line Investment 
Survey (1981 issue). It is measured as the covariance of the firm’s stock 
return with the market return divided by the variance of the market 
return.  This is estimated using 5 years of weekly data on the firm’s 




BETA (-) The beta coefficient as reported in the 1984 edition of Value Line 
The hypothesised signs of the coefficients are included in brackets following the variable name.  
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 8 – RISK (continued) 
Study Name Definition 
Schooley and 
Barney (1994) 
BETA (-) The beta coefficient as reported in the 1980 edition of Value Line 








β0 (intrinsic business risk) =  β/ [(1-t) (C/S + D/S) +1] 
OLRISK (operating leverage risk) =  (1-t)β0 C/S  
FLRISK (financial leverage risk) =  (1-t)β0 D/S 
Where:  
β is the firm’s systematic risk calculated using the market model and 
daily returns for each full year. The equally-weighted CRSP index 
serves as a proxy for the market return. t is corporate income tax rate. 
C is risk-adjusted present value of total fixed costs. D represents 
market value of risky debt but is measured using book value of debt 




STD (-) The standard deviation of monthly returns in calendar year t. 
 
The hypothesised signs of the coefficients are included in brackets following the variable name.  
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 9 - OWNERSHIP DISPERSION 
Study Name Definition 





RSTOCK (+) The residual from a regression of the natural logarithm of the 






The log of (1 + number of common shareholders year ending 










LCSHR (+) The residual from a regression of the natural logarithm of the 
number of common shareholders in year t on the size variable. 
Rao and 
White (1994) 
STOCK (+) The number of common stockholders in year of the court case 
 
The hypothesised signs of the coefficients are included in brackets following the variable name.  
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10 – OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 







Relates to year-end 1985. OWNSHIP = Nm Sm2 + Ni Si2 + No So2.  
Where Nm, Ni and No are the numbers of stockholders in the managers’ 
group of investors, institutional group of investors and the group of 
remaining stockholders respectively. Sm, Si and So are the average 
percentages of stock held by each shareholder in the respective groups.  
 
11 - INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
Study Name Definition 




The percentage of common stock held by institutions in year t. 
 
12 - FIRM SIZE 
Study Name Definition 
Lloyd, Jahera and Page, (1985) SIZE (+) The natural logarithm of sales for 1983 
Moh’d, Perry and Rimbey (1995) SIZE (+) The natural logarithm of sales for year t.  
Holder, Langrehr and Hexter 
(1998) 
LSALES (+) The natural logarithm of sales in year t. 
 
The hypothesised signs of the coefficients are included in brackets following the variable name.  
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13 - LAGGED DEPENDENT 




LAGPAY The one-year lag of PAYOUT, the dependent variable 
 
14 - FREE CASH FLOW 






 [net income + depreciation + interest expenses - capital expenditure] / 
total assets 
 
15 - FLOTATION COSTS 







The firm’s historical average flotation cost incurred in selling 
common stock, expressed as a percentage of the gross proceeds. 
Each firm’s historical average FLOTCOST is estimated from equity 
offerings during the period 1971 to 1986 
 
The hypothesised signs of the coefficients are included in brackets following the variable name.  
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APPENDIX 3B:  Variable definitions  
 
1 - Dependent variable 
(Alternative proxies for the target payout ratio) 
 
PAYOUT1 - The sum of common dividends paid during the five years from 1994 to 1998, over the sum of 
the profit after tax (PAT) in the same period. This variable is the dependent variable in Model 1 to 
Model 6. 
 
PAYOUT2 - The five-year average (1994-1998) of the ratio of common dividends to PAT.  This is the 
dependent variable in Model 7.  
 
 
2 - Agency variables 
 (The information is for the latest available date as reported in the PROWESS database, updated to 8/3/00) 
 
GOV  - The number of equity shares held by central and state governments as a ratio of total equity shares. 
 
INST - The number of equity shares held by financial institutions, insurance companies, mutual funds and 
commercial banks, as a ratio of total equity shares. 
 
DIRS - The number of equity shares held by directors of the firm and their relatives as a ratio of total equity 
shares. 
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 PUBLIC - The number of equity shares held by the Indian public at large, as a ratio of total equity shares. 
 
FOREIGN - The number of equity shares held by foreign entities as a ratio of total equity shares.  Foreign 




3 - Alternative Risk variables 
 
RISK1 - The standard deviation of the annual adjusted returns on capital employed (ROCE) over the period 
1994 – 1998.  The ROCE, for year t, is calculated by PROWESS as:  
ROCE = 100 X PBIT (nnrt) / average capital employed 
PBIT (nnrt) is the profit before interest and tax excluding extra ordinary items.  Average capital 
employed is the average funds used by the firm during year t including equity and preference 
capital, reserves and long term borrowings.  As ROCE in PROWESS is expressed in percentage 
terms, RISK1 is obtained by dividing the standard deviation of ROCE by 100.  RISK1 is used in 
all models excluding Model 2 and Model 3.  
 
RISK2 - The standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 365 calendar days ending on 31 December 
1998.  The variances of daily returns, expressed in percentage terms, are obtained from 
PROWESS.  RISK2 is calculated by taking the square root of the variance and dividing by 100.  
RISK2 is thus a measure of total risk of holding the firm’s equity.  It is included as the measure of 
risk in Model 2.    
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 RISK3 -  The standard deviation of the first difference of annual earnings over the period 1994 to 1998. 
The first difference of annual earnings for year t is calculated as:  
FDIFFt  = LOG(PATt) – LOG(PATt-1). 




4 - Alternative Financial Risk variables 
 
DEBT1 - A measure of the financial risk to which the firm is exposed. It is the five-year average (1994 to 
1998) of the ratio of total borrowings to total assets. Total borrowings include all forms of secured 
and unsecured, short-term and long-term debt. Total assets include fixed assets, investments and 
current assets.  DEBT1 is the proxy for financial risk in all but Model 4.    
 
DEBT2 - The five-year average financial leverage risk in the period 1994-1998.  The financial leverage risk 
in year t, FLRISKt is obtained from PROWESS and is defined as:   
FLRISKt = PBIT (nnrt) t / PBT (nnrt) t. 
The nominator is profit before interest and tax excluding extra ordinary items, and the dominator 
is profit before tax excluding extra ordinary items.  FLRISKt measures by how much profit before 
interest is greater than profit after interest, hence the higher the value, the greater the degree of 




5 - Alternative Growth variables 
 
GROW1 - The average annual growth in total income during the period 1994 to 1998, calculated as:   
GROW1 = (total income 1998/ total income 1993) (1/5) - 1 
Total income is defined as the sum of sales plus change in stock plus other income, where the 
latter is defined as recurring income from sources other than the firm’s main business activities.  
GROW1 is the growth variable in all but Model 5.  
 
GROW2 - The average annual growth in total assets during the period 1994 to 1998, calculated as:   
GROW2 = (total assets 1998/ total assets 1993)(1/5) - 1 
Total assets include fixed assets, investments and current assets. GROW2 replaces GROW1 in 
Model 5.  
 
 
6 - Alternative size variables 
 (Expressed in logs to correct for scale effects) 
 
SIZE1 - The natural logarithm of the average total assets in the five years 1994 to 1998.  Total assets 
include fixed assets, investments and current assets.  SIZE1 is the firm size proxy in all but Model 
6.  
 
SIZE2 - The natural logarithm of the average total income in the five years 1994 to 1998.  Total income is 
the sum of sales plus change in stock plus other income. Other income is defined as recurring 
income from sources other than the firm’s main business activities.  SIZE2 replaces SIZE1 in 
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Model 6.  
 
7 - Industry dummies 
 
INDSj - A dummy representing industry j where j = 0, 1, 3, 4,…. 19. Nineteen industry dummies are 
included to measure the change in the intercept from the control group, which is the textiles 
industry (INDS2).   These are listed below. 
 
A description of the industry dummies (Based on PROWESS industry classification listing) 
NAME DESCRIPTION 
INDS0 Chemicals: paints & varnishes, dyes & pigments, drugs & pharmaceuticals, soaps & detergents, cosmetics 
& toiletries 
INDS1 Food & beverages 
INDS2 Textiles 
INDS3 Chemicals: polymers, plastic products, petroleum products, tyres & tubes, rubber & rubber products 
INDS4 Chemicals: Inorganic chemicals, alkalies (including: caustic soda, soda ash), fertilisers, pesticides, organic 
chemicals, others chemicals 
INDS5 Non-metallic mineral products 
INDS6 Metals & metal products 
INDS7 Machinery: non-electrical machinery 
INDS8 Machinery: electronics 
INDS9 Transport equipment 
INDS10 Wood, paper & paper products 
INDS11 Leathers products, clocks & watches, miscellaneous manufactured articles 
INDS12 Financial services 
INDS13 Trading 
INDS14 Transport services, communication services 
INDS15 Construction & offshore drilling 
INDS16 Hotel & tourism, health services, recreational services, miscellaneous services 
INDS17 Infrastructure services: mining & quarrying, electricity 
INDS18 Diversified
INDS19 Machinery: electrical machinery 
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Collecting the initial sample 
Firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange 4829
Less:  Firms with missing data or with non-positive profit after tax1 -3877
Less:  Firms classified by the database as under public ownership.  -42
Initial sample  910
 
Observations lost in construction of the variables: 
GROW1 (The denominator, income in 1993 is 0) 12
RISK3 (non positive profit after tax in 1993, thus log is undefined) 62
Weights are set to missing values   2
Outliers (RISK1>=0.32) 16
                                                          
1 PROWESS classifies each company into a unique ownership group with which it is deemed to be most 
closely associated.  The classification is based on a continuous monitoring of company announcements and 
a qualitative understanding of the company concerned.  This study generated a dummy variable, 
OWNCODE, which equals 1 when a firm is classified by PROWESS as controlled by either the central or 
state governments, and 0 if the firm is associated with any other private group.  All firms with OWNCODE 




Appendix 3D: Results of the unweighted regressions 
 
Table 3D.1  Results for the specified unweighted regressions  
 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 
Dependent  PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT2 
observations 882  895  848  871  894  882  869  
Adj. R-squared 0.201  0.179  0.198  0.217  0.220  0.217  0.181  
F-statistic 13.285 [.000] 9.854 [.000] 8.760 [.000] 11.067 [.000] 9.668 [.000] 12.634 [.000] 7.612 [.000] 
          
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
C 0.401 [.000] 0.313 [.000] 0.390 [.000] 0.481 [.000] 0.560 [.000] 0.372 [.000] 0.504 [.000] 
GOV -0.606 [.003]   -0.454 [.042]   -0.881 [.001]   -0.427 [.080] 
INST   0.148 [.010]         0.197 [.025] 
DIRS             -0.280 [.034] 
PUBLIC 0.370 [.001] 0.496 [.000] 0.547 [.000]     0.353 [.001] 0.260 [.106] 
FOREIGN         -0.240 [.072]     
RISK1 -1.502 [.000] n/a  n/a  -1.583 [.000] -1.612 [.000] -1.497 [.000]   
RISK2 n/a    n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  
RISK3 n/a  n/a  -0.159 [.000] n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  
DEBT1 -0.200 [.000] -0.435 [.000] -0.120 [.071] n/a  -0.495 [.001]   -0.597 [.000] 
DEBT2 n/a  n/a  n/a    n/a  n/a  n/a  
GROW1         n/a      
GROW2 n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  -0.339 [.000] n/a  n/a  
SIZE1     -0.022 [.015] -0.032 [.000]   n/a  -0.026 [.083] 
SIZE2 n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a    n/a  
SQR(GOV)   -1.664 [.014]           
SQR(DIRS) 0.270 [.013] 0.222 [.032] 0.229 [.018] 0.242 [.016] 0.183 [.109] 0.252 [.027] 0.322 [.031] 
SQR(PUBLIC) -0.648 [.000] -0.530 [.000] -0.561 [.000] -0.396 [.001] -0.511 [.000] -0.622 [.000] -0.640 [.000] 
SQR(RISK1) 2.894 [.004] n/a  n/a  2.816 [.008] 3.437 [.001] 3.151 [.002] 2.355 [.032] 
SQR(DEBT1)       n/a    -0.254 [.000]   
SQR(GROW1)       0.067 [.033] n/a      
SQR(GROW2) n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.049 [.001] n/a  n/a  
SQR(SIZE1)   -0.002 [.016]     -0.004 [.001] n/a    
GOV  INST 3.906 [.000] 3.346 [.007] 3.164 [.002] 5.390 [.000] 5.133 [.001] 4.159 [.000] 5.468 [.000] 
GOV  DIRS     4.550 [.012]         
GOV  FOREIGN         1.114 [.064]     
GOV  RISK1   n/a  n/a  -8.211 [.000] -4.086 [.075] -6.005 [.001] -5.826 [.025] 
GOV  DEBT1       n/a  1.359 [.041]     
INST  RISK2 n/a  -1.826 [.001] n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  
INST  RISK3 n/a  n/a  -0.225 [.019] n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  
INST  DEBT1     0.437 [.017] n/a        
INST  GROW1         n/a    -0.614 [.041] 
DIRS  RISK1   n/a  n/a        -0.896 [.104] 
DIRS  DEBT1       n/a  0.305 [.119]   0.412 [.079] 
DIRS  SIZE1 -0.042 [.004] -0.038 [.007] -0.048 [.001] -0.044 [.001] -0.059 [.002] n/a    
DIRS  SIZE2 n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  -0.040 [.010] n/a  
PUBLIC  RISK1 1.153 [.063] n/a  n/a  1.475 [.007] 1.365 [.014] 1.131 [.063]   
PUBLIC  RISK2 n/a  -0.696 [.000] n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  
PUBLIC  GROW1     -0.342 [.008] -0.298 [.007] n/a      
PUBLIC  SIZE1       0.059 [.000] 0.056 [.000] n/a  0.040 [.121] 
FOREIGN  GROW1     -0.359 [.056] -0.591 [.002] n/a      
FOREIGN  SIZE1 0.018 [.003] 0.020 [.002] 0.033 [.001] 0.047 [.000] 0.064 [.020] n/a  0.017 [.024] 
FOREIGN  SIZE2 n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.020 [.001] n/a  
RISK3  GROW1 n/a  n/a  0.110 [.000] n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  
RISK1  SIZE1   n/a  n/a      n/a  -0.161 [.001] 
RISK2  SIZE1 n/a  0.088 [.003] n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  
RISK3  SIZE1 n/a  n/a  0.028 [.003] n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  
DEBT1  GROW1 0.474 [.001] 0.542 [.001] 0.394 [.046] n/a  n/a  0.438 [.001] 0.467 [.010] 
DEBT1  GROW2 n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.680 [.000] n/a  n/a  
DEBT2  GROW1 n/a  n/a  n/a  0.008 [.135] n/a  n/a  n/a  
DEBT1  SIZE1   0.056 [.001]   n/a  0.039 [.139] n/a  0.079 [.009] 
GROW1  SIZE1 -0.048 [.000] -0.057 [.000] -0.045 [.010]   n/a  n/a  -0.052 [.002] 
GROW1  SIZE2 n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  -0.051 [.000] n/a  
INDS1       0.040 [.078] 0.031 [.147] 0.041 [.057] 0.044 [.076] 
INDS4   -0.038 [.027] -0.034 [.053] -0.031 [.067] -0.026 [.118] -0.036 [.042] -0.032 [.116] 
INDS5 -0.089 [.000] -0.092 [.000] -0.099 [.000] -0.090 [.000] -0.093 [.000] -0.094 [.000] -0.113 [.000] 
INDS7 -0.040 [.030] -0.046 [.011] -0.045 [.016] -0.038 [.042] -0.042 [.016] -0.037 [.041] -0.048 [.036] 
INDS10 -0.078 [.000] -0.085 [.000] -0.069 [.001] -0.079 [.000] -0.079 [.000] -0.085 [.000] -0.063 [.010] 
INDS12 0.127 [.000] 0.120 [.000] 0.127 [.000] 0.099 [.000] 0.119 [.000] 0.107 [.000] 0.134 [.000] 
INDS13             0.048 [.121] 
INDS14 0.124 [.008] 0.136 [.005] 0.122 [.007] 0.135 [.008] 0.120 [.007] 0.126 [.013] 0.113 [.021] 
INDS17     -0.061 [.086] -0.068 [.052] -0.062 [.103] -0.072 [.040] -0.084 [.030] 
INDS19     0.034 [.043] 0.032 [.072]       
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2); Method of estimation is ordinary least squares; [probability 
values] 
 Table 3D.2  Marginal Effects (for unweighted regressions) 
 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7
Dependent PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT2
GOV -0.2171 0.3153 0.4824 -0.1153 -0.0962 -0.0598 -0.3384
INST 0.0205 0.0145 -0.0179 0.0280 0.0266 0.0218 0.0798
DIRS -0.1187 -0.1096 -0.1322 -0.1303 -0.1172 -0.1077 -0.1248
PUBLIC 0.1146 0.1558 0.1689 0.1031 0.0897 0.1092 0.0996
FOREIGN 0.0818 0.0886 0.0661 0.0726 0.0578 0.0880 0.0756
RISK1 -0.7369 - - -0.7863 -0.7230 -0.7291 -0.5172
RISK2 - 0.0305 - - - - - 
RISK3 - - -0.0252 - - - - 
DEBT1 -0.0872 -0.0510 0.0152 - -0.0785 -0.0645 -0.0726
DEBT2 - - - 0.0019 - - - 
GROW1 -0.0615 -0.0801 -0.1357 -0.1031 - -0.0795 -0.1423
GROW2 - - - - -0.0856 - - 
SIZE1 -0.0150 -0.0077 -0.0139 -0.0163 -0.0087 - -0.0122
SIZE2 - - - - - -0.0150 - 
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Appendix 3E: Results of the alternative weighting-scheme regressions 
 
Table 3E.1  Results for the specified alternative weighting-shceme regressions  
 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 
Dependent PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT2
observations 882  895 848 871 894 882  869
Adj. R-squared 0.536  0.580 0.599 0.882 0.968 0.563  0.518
F-statistic 45.333 [.000] 66.061 [.000] 58.417 [.000] 271.32 [.000] 1166.44 [.000] 43.030 [.000] 45.475 [.000]
      
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
C 0.584 [.000] 0.403 [.000] 0.587 [.000] 0.476 [.000] 0.520 [.000] 0.605 [.000] 0.416 [.000]
GOV   -0.690 [.000] -2.037 [.000]  -0.631 [.000] -0.628 [.000]
INST    -0.382 [.005] 
DIRS -0.129 [.005]  -0.038 [.104] 
PUBLIC   0.386 [.003]    0.492 [.000]
FOREIGN    -0.409 [.002] -0.328 [.002]    
RISK1 -1.260 [.000] n/a n/a -1.371 [.000]  -2.637 [.000] -1.058 [.000]
RISK2  n/a  n/a n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
RISK3 n/a  n/a -0.110 [.003] n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
DEBT1   -0.376 [.000] n/a    
DEBT2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
GROW1  -0.267 [.000] -0.205 [.000] -0.251 [.000] n/a    
GROW2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a -0.378 [.000] n/a  n/a
SIZE1 -0.050 [.000] -0.058 [.000] -0.040 [.000] -0.039 [.002] n/a  -0.029 [.000]
SIZE2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a  -0.047 [.000] n/a
SQR(DIRS)   0.367 [.004]    
SQR(PUBLIC) -0.573 [.000] -0.332 [.007] -0.435 [.000] -0.291 [.006] -0.560 [.000] -0.385 [.000] -0.681 [.000]
SQR(RISK1) 3.654 [.000] n/a n/a 3.533 [.001] 1.395 [.011] 4.219 [.000] 3.784 [.000]
SQR(DEBT1) -0.378 [.000] n/a -0.335 [.000] -0.222 [.001] -0.587 [.000]
SQR(GROW1) 0.055 [.045] 0.067 [.020] n/a  0.098 [.004] 0.059 [.000]
SQR(GROW2) n/a  n/a n/a n/a 0.038 [.044] n/a  n/a
SQR(SIZE1)   -0.004 [.000]  n/a  
GOV INST 2.909 [.000] 2.018 [.000] 4.107 [.000] 3.173 [.065] 3.398 [.000] 3.520 [.000]
GOV DIRS    9.371 [.000]    
GOV RISK1 -5.065 [.000] n/a n/a -7.505 [.000]    
GOV RISK2 n/a  3.712 [.000] n/a n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
GOV DEBT1    n/a  0.584 [.077] 
GOV SIZE1    0.412 [.000] -0.108 [.025] n/a  
INST FOREIGN    0.191 [.181] 0.811 [.020]   
INST RISK2 n/a  -0.634 [.000] n/a n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
INST GROW1    -0.541 [.000] n/a    
INST GROW2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a -0.194 [.351] n/a  n/a
INST SIZE1    0.030 [.003]  n/a  
INST SIZE2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a  0.080 [.002] n/a
DIRS PUBLIC       -0.343 [.026]
DIRS RISK1   n/a n/a    -0.690 [.007]
DIRS DEBT1    n/a 0.429 [.014]   0.292 [.042]
DIRS SIZE1   -0.075 [.001] -0.038 [.011] -0.009 [.196] -0.047 [.001] n/a  
PUBLIC RISK1   n/a n/a 0.860 [.019] 
PUBLIC RISK2 n/a  -0.469 [.008] n/a n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
PUBLIC GROW1    -0.322 [.001] n/a  -0.240 [.007] 
PUBLIC SIZE1 0.089 [.000] 0.066 [.000] 0.068 [.000] 0.083 [.002] n/a  
PUBLIC SIZE2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.064 [.000] n/a
FOREIGN DEBT1    n/a   -0.530 [.000]
FOREIGN GROW1 -0.420 [.003] -0.472 [.003] n/a  -0.480 [.006] 
FOREIGN SIZE1 0.040 [.000] 0.090 [.000] 0.075 [.000] 0.042 [.000]  n/a  0.044 [.000]
FOREIGN SIZE2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a  0.042 [.000] n/a
RISK1 DEBT1   n/a n/a n/a -2.715 [.000]   
RISK1 SIZE2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.186 [.002] n/a
RISK3 DEBT1 n/a  n/a -0.160 [.017] n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
RISK3 GROW1 n/a  n/a 0.066 [.004] n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
RISK3 SIZE1 n/a  n/a 0.029 [.000] n/a n/a  n/a  n/a
DEBT1 GROW1 0.461 [.000] 0.360 [.001] 0.315 [.000] n/a n/a  0.317 [.011] 
DEBT2 GROW1 n/a  n/a n/a 0.008 [.051] n/a  n/a  n/a
DEBT1 GROW2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a 0.901 [.000] n/a  n/a
DEBT1 SIZE1 0.011 [.531] 0.052 [.000] n/a  n/a  0.085 [.000]
GROW1 SIZE1    n/a  n/a  -0.050 [.000]
GROW1 SIZE2 n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a  -0.047 [.000] n/a
INDS0    0.024 [.129]    
INDS1    0.054 [.008] 0.043 [.022]   
INDS4    -0.029 [.000]  -0.027 [.063] 
INDS5 -0.064 [.000] -0.070 [.000] -0.063 [.000] -0.045 [.091] -0.100 [.000] -0.120 [.000]
INDS6 0.038 [.002] 0.032 [.103] 0.030 [.110]    
INDS8   0.025 [.123]    
INDS9 -0.033 [.033]  -0.035 [.013] 
INDS10 -0.082 [.000] -0.094 [.000] -0.087 [.000] -0.069 [.000] -0.057 [.000] -0.085 [.000] -0.043 [.001]
INDS11 -0.053 [.142]    
INDS12 0.158 [.000] 0.126 [.000] 0.137 [.000] 0.134 [.000] 0.142 [.000] 0.105 [.000] 0.231 [.000]
INDS13    0.023 [.310]   0.075 [.001]
INDS14 0.067 [.000] 0.062 [.057] 0.057 [.000] 0.101 [.004] 0.095 [.003] 0.065 [.075] 
INDS15    0.028 [.233]   
INDS17    -0.050 [.101] -0.080 [.000]
INDS18 0.047 [.037]    
INDS19   0.059 [.008] 0.039 [.074]   
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2); Method of estimation is weighted least squares; Statistics are 
based on transformed data; [probability values] 
Table 3E.2  Marginal Effects (for alternative weighting scheme regressions) 
 
 MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 
Dependent PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT1 PAYOUT2 
GOV -0.1102 -0.1821 1.1316 -0.1865 -0.1730 -0.0977 -0.2760
INST 0.0153 -0.0420 0.0250 0.0296 0.0686 -0.0089 0.0188
DIRS -0.1288 -0.2390 -0.1265 -0.0424 -0.0723 -0.0379 -0.0485
PUBLIC 0.0996 0.1697 0.0687 0.0782 0.0767 0.0876 0.0812
FOREIGN 0.0799 0.0011 0.0144 0.0801 0.0808 0.0722 0.0253
RISK1 -0.7096 - - -0.8522 -0.6836 -0.9152 -0.5576
RISK2 - -0.1690 - - - - - 
RISK3 - - -0.0140 - - - - 
DEBT1 -0.0934 -0.0550 -0.0404 - -0.1296 -0.0689 -0.0340
DEBT2 - - - 0.0018 - - - 
GROW1 -0.1426 -0.0847 -0.1009 -0.1486 - -0.1824 -0.1969
GROW2 - - - - -0.0757 - - 
SIZE1 -0.0177 -0.0151 -0.0130 -0.0144 -0.0235 - -0.0067
SIZE2 - - - - - -0.0131 - 
A note on the alternative weighting scheme:   
1. Assuming that the variances of the disturbances are a function of: a constant, the dummy variables, the non-dummy variables 
their squares and cross products.   
2. As the variances are unknown they are replaced by the squared residuals. 
3. The auxiliary regression is the squared residuals on the variables listed in point (1) above.  
4. The weights are the inverses of the fitted values from the auxiliary regression. 




CHAPTER 4: THE DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE - 
EVIDENCE FROM MAURITIUS 
 
4.1  Introduction 
The previous two chapters looked at the dividend policy decision, while in this chapter 
attention is turned to the second financing choice faced by the firm, namely the capital 
structure decision.  More specifically, the aim here is to empirically study the 
determinants of capital structure of Mauritian firms.  The motivation is consistent with 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), and more recently and with reference to developing countries, 
with Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001).  Particularly the idea is 
to assess whether the various capital structure theories that have been formed mainly in 
relation to developed markets, can stand the test of different markets.  If this is the case 
then firm characteristics that have been found important in determining the capital 
structure of US firms should be similarly correlated with the leverage ratios of Mauritian 
firms.  However, where the nature of correlation between leverage and other firm 
characteristics in Mauritius differs from the pattern recorded for US data, this does not 
necessarily imply a rejection of the underlying theory.  Indeed, such deviation could still 
support theory to the extent that it may be explained by differences in the institutional 
structure of the Mauritian market.  
Capital structure theories are concerned with explaining how the mix of debt and 




by Modigliani and Miller (1958) and their proposition that the value of the firm is 
independent of its debt-equity mix, the two basic theories that have dominated the capital 
structure debate are the “trade off theory” and the “pecking order theory”.  The trade off 
theory proposes that the optimal level of debt is where the marginal benefit of this source 
of finance is equal to its marginal cost.  There is variation, however, among researchers 
on the view of what constitute the benefits and costs of debt.   One benefit of debt, from 
the point of view of existing shareholders, is that bondholders have no voting rights.  This 
makes external debt more attractive relative to external equity particularly in the case of 
small or tightly controlled firms, whose owners are reluctant to give up control.  Glen and 
Pinto (1994) note that control considerations may be particularly relevant for the capital 
structure decisions of firms in emerging markets, due to the long tradition of family 
ownership.  Certainly in Mauritius avoiding dilution of control can be expected to be 
important, as the dominance of family owned groups is strong.   
Apart from control considerations another benefit of debt is the tax deductibility 
of interest payments at the corporate tax level.  Specifically, Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) note that because interest payments are deducted in arriving at the profit figure on 
which tax is charged, these payments actually reduce the corporate tax liability. The 
corporate tax benefit of debt, however, may be offset, at least to some extent or in some 
cases, by the tax disadvantage of interest payments at the personal level.  Indeed, Miller 
(1977) shows that capital structure may still be irrelevant when the benefit of the interest 




This may be the case when the effective personal tax rate on equity income, from both 
dividends and capital gains, is sufficiently lower than that on interest income. Further, as 
suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) the value of the corporate tax deductibility of 
interest also depends on the corporate tax level, whether the firm has generated taxable 
profits, and the availability of non-debt tax shields.  Thus given non-debt tax shields such 
as capital allowances, tax credits, pension contributions, or tax losses carried forward, the 
trade off theory typically sets the corporate tax benefit of debt against costs that are 
associated with debt, such as financial distress.   
Financial distress costs include the costs associated with bankruptcy, such as legal 
and administration fees and the costs incurred in liquidating assets.  Liquidation costs are 
high if the value of the asset in liquidation is substantially less than its value in current 
use.  This partly depends on the type of assets held.  For example, the secondary market 
for specialised machinery is likely to be thin therefore liquidation costs for such assets are 
likely to be high.  Likewise, intangible assets such as brand names, trademarks, or human 
capital have no value on liquidation hence liquidation costs for such assets will also be 
high.  Brealey and Myers (2000) note that even before the firm is declared bankrupt, it 
may incur distress costs that are associated with being in a position of financial 
difficulties. These costs may be associated with lost reputation or manpower migration, 
which are likely to occur when it becomes known that the firm is financially distressed.  
In short, financial distress should be an important disadvantage of using debt and its costs 




financial distress are not the only benefit and cost of debt.  Agency theory as articulated 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) has further implications for the trade off theory of capital 
structure.  
There are at least four agency-related benefits of using debt in the capital structure 
mix.  First, conflicts of interests between managers and outside shareholders may be 
controlled by debt.  Specifically, higher levels of debt in the capital structure of firms 
imply that managers hold a larger fraction of the firm’s equity, which reduces agency 
problems by aligning the interests of managers with that of outside shareholders.  Second, 
Jensen (1986) argues that higher level of debt implies a commitment to pay out more 
cash, which may otherwise be wasted by managers.  Third, managers’ tendency to over 
invest, in order to advance their self-interests, can be controlled through monitoring by 
lenders and by debt covenants.   Forth, Harris and Raviv (1990) propose that debt in the 
capital structure generate information valuable in controlling agency behaviour.  
Particularly it is noted that for self-interest reasons, managers are always reluctant to 
liquidate the firm or to provide information that could lead to liquidation. This is the case 
even when liquidation is the best course of action from investors’ point of view.  
However, debt is a disciplining device because default on debt obligations triggers an 
investigation of the firm.  Such investigation, although costly in terms of legal fees and 
disruption to normal operations, generates information to investors and lead to the 




To summarise, agency theory predicts that debt should reduce conflicts between 
managers and outside owners because it increases the fraction of management’s 
ownership, and because interest is a commitment to pay out cash.  Further, debt is 
valuable because debt covenants restrict managers’ freedom, and because default on debt 
triggers information and changes in policies.  Bearing these agency-related benefits of 
debt, there are also agency-related costs to debt, which are due to conflicts of interests 
between equity and debt holders of levered firms.   One such conflict is over risk levels, 
and is commonly referred to as the problem of risk shifting or asset substitution.  
Accordingly, debt in the capital structure induces moral hazard problems by encouraging 
owners to engage in investments riskier than those anticipated by debt holders.  By 
increasing the variance of cash flows, wealth is expropriated from debt holders because 
the level of interest required by them has been fixed before the shift in risk.   This way if 
the risky projects are successful the extra gains accrue to shareholders while if the risky 
projects are unsuccessful the costs are shared among all security holders.  Risk shifting 
behaviour has adverse effects on debt in the capital structure as it leads to debt becoming 
more expensive, more constraining and less available as a future source of finance1.   
However, just as financial distress costs partly depend on the type of assets held, 
                                                          
1 Risk shifting behaviour causes the cost of debt to increase as debt-holders price such tendencies into their 
required return.  Similarly, risk-shifting behaviour leads to debt becoming a more constraining form of 
finance as debt covenants incorporate conditions aimed at preventing such behaviour.  Furthermore, risk-





so is the ability of equity holders to expropriate debt holders’ wealth through risk-shifting 
actions, also depends on the firm’s asset structure.  For instance, when growth prospects 
constitute a substantial part of the firm’s assets, providing it with many alternative 
investments, this increases the opportunity for risk-shifting actions by equity holders.  
Similarly, Viswanath and Frierman (1995) argue that the potential for risk-shifting 
behaviour is directly related to assets’ fungibility, or the ease with which the variance of 
cash flows to be generated from a particular asset may be altered.  The similarity between 
intangibility and fungibility is noted.   Thus Viswanath and Frierman (1995) remark that 
intangible assets such as the skills of lawyers of a law firm are fungible because it is 
difficult to monitor the type of cases in which these lawyers engage.  In contrast a 
tangible fixed asset such as land is non-fungible.  This is because it is relatively easy to 
monitor the way in which land is used, thus limiting the ease with which the variance of 
cash flows from the use of this asset may be altered.   
From the above discussion it emerges that agency-related costs, that are 
associated with risk shifting behaviour by equity holders may be higher for firms with 
many intangible or fungible assets.  However, risk shifting or asset substitution is not the 
only agency cost of debt.  Another such cost is the cost associated with under investment.  
This problem applies particularly to firms in financial distress, when owners may be 
unwilling to invest even in good projects.  Instead equity holders may prefer to receive 
higher dividends rather than the firm generating cash flows that may be sufficient to pay 




is an agency cost of debt that may reduce the benefits from the value of debt, in 
controlling the agency cost of equity.   However, whether or not the agency costs and 
benefits of debt are considered, and whatever other non-agency related factors are 
assumed to constitute the benefits and costs of debt, central to the trade off theory is the 
idea of an optimal capital structure.  This can be contrasted with the pecking order theory, 
where the central idea is that firms follow a preference order with respect to the various 
sources of finance.   
The pecking order theory is due to Myers (1984) and is based on two realistic 
assumptions.  The first assumption is the presence of asymmetric information between 
managers and outside investors.  The second assumption is that mangers, acting in the 
interest of existing security holders, tend to issue securities when these are over valued.  
The first assumption implies that due to information problems outsiders do not know the 
true value of the firm but that they should use managers’ actions as signals to this value.  
The second assumption implies that new issues should be interpreted as bad news and 
should therefore be met with price reductions2.  The combination of price reductions and 
issue expenses increases the cost of external funds relative to internal funds, and leads to 
                                                          
2 When managers are aware that the current market value of the firm is lower than the fair value based on 
their superior information about the firm, then they will be reluctant to issue new securities at the depressed 
price.  In contrast, managers may be more willing to issue new securities when they view the firm to be 
overvalued.  If shares are issued under such circumstances, there will be a wealth transfer from new to old 
shareholders when prices eventually settle at their fair value.  The result of this behaviour is that new issues 




preference by firms for the latter.  It also implies that when internal funds are insufficient 
to meet the financing needs of the firm, external debt is preferred to external equity 
because it is less risky and less exposed to mis-pricing. 
Thus there is a principle difference between the trade off and pecking order 
theories.  This difference relates to the question of whether firms follow a target capital 
mix or whether capital structure is determined by the most preferred source that is 
available to the firm when the need for funds arises.  However, while the distinction 
between these two theories may be clear-cut, the practical implications of pecking order, 
agency costs, trade off, and control considerations are difficult to disentangle.  To 
distinguish between these theories as possible explanation for the capital structure 
decision, investigators typically study the relationships between leverage and other firm’s 
characteristics.  However, often the direction of correlation between leverage and a 
particular firm characteristic is consistent with more than one theory.  This is a serious 
limitation to the investigation at hand as distinguishing between these theories, is 
precisely the aim here.   
Bearing this limitation in mind, the study progresses as follows. Section 4.2 
presents some of the empirical evidence on the validity of various capital structure 
theories.  Section 4.3 presents the model and the theoretical predictions. Section 4.4 gives 
a brief description of the Mauritian economy and corporate sector and describes the 
database.  Empirical procedures are described in Section 4.5, estimation and results are 




4.2  Review of selective empirical studies 
As noted in the previous section, the principle difference between the trade off and 
pecking order theories is related to the question of whether firms follow a target capital 
mix3. Alternatively, in line with pecking order considerations, capital structure is 
determined by the most preferred source that is available to the firm when the need for 
funds arises.  Kamath (1997) has attempted to understand which theory dominates the 
capital structure decision by studying the views and practices of financial managers of 
142 US firms that were listed on the NYSE on the last day of 1988.  Based on a survey 
administered in 1990, Kamath (1997) concludes that pecking order considerations appear 
to be more important to managers than maintaining a target capital structure.  Indeed, 
there is general support in the empirical literature, for the importance of pecking order 
considerations to the capital structure decision of firms in developed economies.   
Similar to Kamath (1997), the capital structure decision is also examined in Singh 
(1995) but there the investigation is by a different methodology, focusing on different 
markets and reporting contradicting results.  Specifically Singh (1995) carries out a 
comparison analysis to examine corporate financial patterns of firms in developing 
countries, and finds that these firms do not follow a pecking order. These findings 
contradict the prediction that pecking order considerations should be particularly 
                                                          
3 Reference to the trade off theory here relates not only to the tax advantage versus distress costs, but also 




important in less efficient markets where the finance gap is wider.  Such contradicting 
findings justify the vast amount of related empirical work that have emerged4.    
Certainly, a survey approach as in Kamath (1997), or a comparison analysis as in 
Singh (1995) are possible methods to investigate the practical validity of competing 
theories.  Another approach is to study firms’ financial data.  Particularly, whether firms 
have target capital structure, or they simply follow a preference-order often have different 
implications for firms with differing characteristics, operating in different environments.  
The relationships between firms’ characteristics and their capital structures can therefore 
be useful in distinguishing between trade off, agency, control, and pecking order theories.  
The type of assets held by the firm, non-debt tax shields available to it, profitability, risk, 
growth, and size, are among the characteristics that are commonly included as 
explanatory variables in empirical studies of capital structure.   Table 4.1 presents the 
results of a selected number of empirical studies.  
                                                          
4 Singh (1995) examines corporate financial patterns of the top 100 listed manufacturing firms in each of 
ten developing countries for the period 1980 to 1990.  The main findings are as follows: 
? Compared with firms in developed countries firms in developing countries rely more on external 
sources to finance growth.  
? Equity as a source of external finance is used relatively more by firms in developing countries 
compared with those in developed economies.   
? The notion that firms in developing countries are more highly geared compared with those in 
developed countries is not supported by the data.  
However, the study by Singh (1995) focuses on the largest listed firms and neither addresses the question 
of size nor the question of unlisted firms.  
203 
Table 4.1  Summary results of selected studies of the determinants of capital structure.   
Panel A: Predictions 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Study Bradley, Jarrell, Kim (1984) Alderson & Betker (1995) Titman & Wessels (1988) Rajan & Zingales (1995) 
Liquidation 
costs 
 (-) – High debt increases the 
probability of having to 
liquidate assets. 
  
Firm size  (?) – Included in the regression 
but the nature of relationship 
with the dependent variable is 
not predicted. 
(+) – Large firms tend to be 
more diversified and less risky 
therefore can support more debt. 
(-) – Small firms bear higher 
costs when issuing new equity 
and hence prefer to issue debt. 
(+) – Large firms are diversified, 
thus less likely to face bankruptcy. 
(-) – A proxy for the availability 
of information that outsiders have 
about the firm. This increases the 




(-) – Non-debt tax shields such 
as accelerated depreciation and 
investment tax credits, reduce 
the firm’s tax liabilities and thus 
the value of interest tax shield.  
(-) – Firms with high non-debt 
tax shield reduce their debt to 
ensure they can use the 
alternative tax shield. 
(-) – Non-debt tax shields are 
substitutes for the debt tax 
shield. Therefore firms with 
high non-debt tax shields, 
relative to their expected cash 
flows, will have less debt in 





assets / The 
fraction of 
fixed assets 
  (+) – Assets with high collateral 
value can back more debt.  
(-) – The use of assets with low 
collateral value (intangible 
assets), are more difficult to 
monitor. In such cases, debt can 
be used as a monitoring device. 
(+) – Tangible assets can be used 
as collateral and diminish the risk 
to lenders from risk shifting and 
other agency problems of debt.  
(+) – Tangible assets retain more 




  (-) – There are more 
opportunities for shareholders to 
expropriate bondholders’ wealth 
if the firm is facing many 
investment opportunities. Also, 
growth opportunities add value 
but cannot be used as security 
for lenders and do not generate 
current cash flows that can be 
shielded against tax by interest.   
(-) – Firms that are highly geared 
are more likely to pass up 
profitable investments.  Therefore 
growing firms should use greater 
amount of equity finance.  [But, 
when growth is measured in terms 
of market to book value, the 
negative correlation with the debt 
ratio may be due to over-pricing. 
If the stock price is high, equity 
becomes attractive] 
Uniqueness   (-) – When the firm’s product is 
unique, liquidation is likely to 
impose high costs on suppliers, 
customers and workers. 
 
Profitability   (-) – Pecking Order: profitable 
firms have sufficient retained 
earnings, which is a preferred 
source of funds compared with 
external finance.  This 
preference for internal finance is 
due to the costs associated with 
raising external funds including 
transactions costs and costs that 
arise due to information 
asymmetric problems.  
(-) – Pecking Order: profitable 
firms have sufficient retained 
earnings, which are preferred to 
debt.  
(+) – Agency theory:  If the 
market for corporate control is 
efficient, then debt is a 
commitment to pay out cash. 
(-) – Agency theory: If market for 
corporate control is inefficient, 
then managers prefer to avoid the 
disciplinary role of debt.   
(+) – Supply consideration: 
Lenders prefer to lend to 
profitable firms.  
Risk (-) – When the costs of financial 
distress are significant, then debt 
ratios are inversely related to the 
variability of firm value.  
 (-)  
Investments 
in R&D and 
advertising 
(-) – Since such investments can 
be expensed in the year they are 
incurred, they reduce the firm’s 
tax liability and hence the value 
of the interest tax shield.  
(-) - The future value of assets 
created by such investments, is 
subject to more managerial 
discretion. This implies higher 
agency costs, including the 
agency problem of under 
investment, and thus with lower 
debt levels.  
   
Industry 
classification 
(-/+) – Because firms’ 
characteristics tend to vary 
across industries, Industry 
classification may partly explain 
variation in debt ratios across 
firms.  
 (-) – Manufacturers of 
specialised equipment face 
higher liquidation costs because 
the secondary market for such 
assets is thin.  
 
    Source:  Complied by author from a selective review of the literature 
 
Table 4.1 Summary results of selected studies of the determinants of capital structure.   
Panel A: (concluded) Predictions 
 
 5 6 7 8 
Study Wiwattanakantang  (1999) Jordan, Lowe, Taylor (1998) Hussain (1997) Hirota (1999) 
Firm size (+) – Large firms have higher 
debt capacity and their risk of 
bankruptcy is lower due to being 
well diversified. 
(-) – Less information problems 
make equity issuance more 
appealing to larger firms. 
(+) – Larger firms are less prone 
to bankruptcy, so they tend to 
use more debt than smaller 
firms. 
(+) – Large firms are less prone 
to bankruptcy, hence use more 
debt than small firms. 
(+) – Large firms tend to be 
more diversified and hence less 




(-) – Items such as depreciation or 
pension funds provide alternatives 
to interest in shielding profits 
from tax. 
  (-) – The gain from the tax 
advantage of interest is larger 
when the firm does not enjoy 
other, non-debt, tax shields.  
Tax  (+) – Greater use of non-debt tax 
shields (e.g. depreciation) 
reduces the effective tax rate, and 
thus the value of the debt tax 
shield. 
(+) – The double taxation of 
equity at corporate and personal 
levels implies that high taxes 





assets / The 
fraction of 
fixed assets 
(+) – Tangible assets can be used 
as collateral  
(+) – Asset substitution, which is 
an agency cost of debt, is less 
likely to occur when the firm has 
more assets already in place.  
(+) – High ratio of fixed to 
current assets is associated with 
high barriers to entry, lower 
earnings risk, and greater ease 
of raising debt as fixed assets 
may be used as collateral. 
 (+) – The cost of financial 
distress depends partly on the 
type of assets held by the firm.  
Tangible and fixed assets tend to 
have higher resale value 





(-) – Growth prospects provide 
owners with greater 
opportunities to expropriate 
wealth from debt holders through 
sub-optimal investments or risk 
shifting. Hence, firms with high 
investment opportunities relative 
to their tangible assets should 
have low debt levels.   
(+) – Growing firms need funds. 
Small firms, in particular, prefer 
debt to equity because the latter 
involves giving up control. 
(-) – Shareholders of growing 
firms have greater opportunities 
to expropriate bondholders’ 
wealth. Lower debt may reduce 
the severity of this agency cost. 
 (-) – Firms with many 
investment opportunities prefer 
equity to debt because highly 
levered firms tend to pass up 
profitable investments. Also, 
firms with high investment 
opportunities face high 
liquidation costs. 
(+) – Signalling theory: 
Prosperous firms use debt to 
signal their quality  
Profitability (-) – Pecking Order 
considerations suggest that firms 
prefer internal to external funds. 
Higher profits imply less need to 
rely on debt.  
(+) – Lenders prefer borrowers 
with high current cash flows. 
(-) – Pecking Order: profitable 
firms have sufficient retained 
earnings hence depend less on 
debt.   
(-) – Profitable firms and those 
expecting high future 
profitability are likely to rely 
more on equity. 
(-) – Pecking order: profitable 
firms have sufficient retained 
earnings hence need to rely less 
on external debt. 
Risk (-) – High probability of being 
financially distressed   
  (-) – Uncertain operating 










 (-) – Innovation means 
investment in firm-specific 
assets with lower liquidation 
value. 
(-/+) – Differentiation means 
investment in intangible assets 
such as reputation with zero 
liquidation value but which can 
be used as security for lenders 
(+/-) – Cost reduction means 
investment in tangible modern 
equipment with high liquidation 
value, or in firm-specific assets 





  (+)  - Pecking order: when 
retained earnings are insufficient, 




has been a 
problem 
 (+) – Implying that the firm’s 
debt level has approached that 
high level, which outsiders 





 (-) – Non-executive directors 




  (+) – Implies strong cash 
position. This increases the 
ability to borrow at good terms. 
It also implies greater need for 







   (+) – Link  with main bank. 
(+) – Group affiliation. 
(+) – Regulatory constraints on 
the issues of public equity.  







   (-) – The agency theory of free 
cash flow: financing choice is 
based on the free cash flow that is 
retained in the firm for managers to 
use.  
    Source:  Complied by author from a selective review of the literature 
Table 4.1  Summary results of selected studies of the determinants of capital structure.   
Panel B: Definitions 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Study Bradley, Jarrell, Kim (1984) Alderson & Betker (1995) Titman & Wessels (1988) Rajan & Zingales (1995) 
Method OLS – Cross sectional OLS – Cross sectional  Factor analytical technique – 
Cross sectional 
Maximum likelihood and a 
censored Tobit model – Cross 
sectional  
Sample US firms US firms that reorganised 
under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act.   
US manufacturing firms Non-financial, listed G-7 
firms: US, UK, Japan, 
Germany, France, Italy, 
Canada 
Period 20 years: 1962 - 1981 1982-1993 9 years: 1974-1982 4 years: 1987-1991 
Variables 
construction 
Debt ratio, volatility, and non-
debt tax shield are calculated 
over 20 years. Advertising and 
R&D expenditure is calculated 
over 10 years (1971-1982).  
Data items, including 
estimates of going-concern 
and assets’ liquidation values, 
are obtained from the 
bankruptcy disclosure 
statements of the sample 
firms. 
All variables, excluding the 
risk variable, are averaged 
over three years. The risk 
variable is calculated using 
the full sample period of nine 
years.  
Separate regressions for each 
country.  Variables are 
averaged over 4 years 
Number of 
observations 
821 all firms,  
655 non-regulated firms 
88  469 2079 for US, 175 for 
Germany, 117 for France, 522 
for UK 
Dependent Variable Sum of annual book value of 
long term debt / [Sum of 
(Market value of equity + 
book value of long term debt)] 
1. Long term debt / Total 
assets 
2. Total liabilities / Total 
assets 
1. Long term debt / 
Market value of equity 
2. Short term debt / 
Market value of equity 
Adjusted short-term and long-
term debt / (Adjusted short-
term and long-term debt + 
Book value of adjusted equity 
in 1991) 
Liquidation costs  (Going-concern value - 
Liquidation value) / Going-
concern value 
  
Firm size  Log (total assets) 1. Log (sales) 
2. Rate at which employees 
voluntarily leave their jobs.  
Large firms offer wider 
career opportunities and 
hence have lower quit rate. 
Thus the voluntarily quit 
rate is an inverse measure 
of size.  
Log (net sales) 
Non debt tax shield Sum of (Annual depreciation 
+ Investment tax credits) / 
Sum of annual earnings before 
interest, depreciation, and 
taxes 
Net operating loss carry 
forward  / Total assets. 
1. Investment tax credit / 
Total assets 
2. Depreciation / Total 
assets 
3. Non-debt tax shield 
(NDT) / Total assets.    NDT 
is obtained from federal 
income tax payments (T), 
operating income (OI), 
interest payments (i), and 
corporate tax rate during the 
sample period (48%): 
T = 0.48 (OI – i – NDT) 
NDT = OI – i – T/0.48 
 
Asset structure / 
Capital intensity / 
Tangibility of 
assets 
  1. Intangible assets / Total 
assets 
2. (Inventory + Gross plant & 
equipment) / Total assets  
Fixed assets / Total assets 
Growth 
opportunities 
  1. Capital expenditure / Total 
assets 
2. Percentage change in total 
assets 
3. R&D expenditure / Sales 
Market to book ratio 
Uniqueness   1. R&D expenditure / Sales. 
2. Selling expenses / Sales.   
3. Rate at which employees 
voluntarily leave their jobs. 
 
Profitability   1. Operating income / Total 
assets.   
2. Operating income / Sales 
Earnings before interest, taxes 
and depreciation / Book value 
of assets 
Risk / Firm 
volatility 
Standard deviation of the first 
difference in annual earnings 
before interest, depreciation 
and taxes / Average total 
assets  
 Standard deviation of 






Sum of annual R&D and 
advertising expenses / Sum of 
annual net sales 
   
Industry 
classification 
25 two-digit SIC industry 
classification dummies.  
 A dummy that equals one if 
firm produces machines and 
equipment. 
 
? OLS = Ordinary Least Squares,  FGLS/WLS  = Feasible Generalised Least Squares/ Weighted Least Squares 
? MV = Market Value, BV = Book Value 
    Source:  Complied by author from a selective review of the literature 
 
Table 4.1  Summary results of selected studies of the determinants of capital structure.   
Panel B: (concluded) Definitions 
 
 5 6 7 8 
Study Wiwattanakantang (1999) Jordan, Lowe, Taylor (1998) Hussain (1997) Hirota (1999) 
Method OLS – Cross sectional  OLS and FGLS/WLS – 
Cross sectional 
Panel – POOLED OLS – Cross sectional 
Sample Thai non financial listed 
firms 
UK SMEs Largest listed 
manufacturing firms: 93 
Korean, 98 Malaysian  
Large Japanese firms  
Period 1996 1989-1993 Korea: 1980 - 1990 
Malaysia: 1983 - 1990 
1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 
Variables 
construction 
Single year data Financial data averaged over 
the whole period. Non-
financial  data obtained from 
a questionnaire 
Separate regression for each 
country (panel) 
Most variables averaged 
over three years including 




244 173 847 for Korea, 507 for 
Malaysia 
407 for 1977, 467 for 1982, 
466 for 1987, 545 for 1992 
Dependent 1. BV of total debt / (BV of 
total liabilities + MV of 
total equity) 
2. BV of total debt / BV of 
total assets 
Natural log (average debt to 
equity) 
 
Log (Long term debt / Paid 
up capital) 
Total debt / (Total debt + 
Book value of equity) 
Firm size Log (sales) Log (average turnover) Log (Total assets) Log (Real sales) 
Non debt tax 
shield 
Depreciation costs / Total 
assets 
  [Profit before tax – (Tax 
paid / Tax rate)] / Total 
assets 
Tax  Effective tax rate = Average 
tax paid / Average Profit 
before interest & tax 
Log (Taxes)  
Asset structure / 
Capital intensity / 
Tangibility of 
assets 
(Net property, plant & 
equipment) / Total assets 
Log (Fixed assets / Current 
assets) 
 1. Fixed assets / Total 
assets 
2. (R&D + Advertising 
expenditure) / Sales 
Growth 
opportunities 
Market value of total assets 
/ Book value of total assets 
Growth rate of turnover  Market value of firm to 
book value of total assets 
Uniqueness  As assessed from 
questionnaire’s results. 
  
Profitability (Earnings before interest & 
tax) / Total assets 
1. Profit before interest & 
tax (PBIT) / Turnover 
2. Square (PBIT / 
Turnover) 
1. Current:  Log (Net profit 
margin) 
2. Future: Log (PE ratio) 
(Operating income + 
depreciation) / Total assets 
Risk Standard deviation of first 
difference in operating 
income 5 years before 1996 
/ Average value of total 
assets over that period.  
Variation of profit before 
interest & tax 
 Standard deviation of the 
first difference in operating 
income over 10 years / 
Average value of total 




 1. Dummy = 1 if SIC code 
>1 
2. Dummy = 1 for firms 





 Dummies to represent: 
Innovation, Differentiation, 
and Cost Reduction 
strategies.  
  
Cash flow  PBIT + Depreciation – Tax   
Importance of 
access to finance 
 Dummy = 1 if access to 
finance is important to firm. 
  
Difficulty of 
access to finance 
 Dummy = 1 if access to 
finance has been a problem. 
  
Non-executive 
directors on Board 
 Number of non executive 
directors / Number of 
executive directors on 
Board 
  
Retained earnings   Log (Retained earnings / 
Paid up capital). 
 
Relationship with 
the main bank 
   Share of borrowings from 
the main bank in total 
liabilities.  
Group affiliation    A dummy variable that 





   A dummy that equals one 
for firms that meet two out 
of the three conditions that 
are required in order to 
issue equity.  
Free cash flow 
based financing 
decisions 
   The spread between interest 
rate and dividend yield for 
firms that are allowed to 
issue equity.  
? OLS = Ordinary Least Squares,  FGLS/WLS  = Feasible Generalised Least Squares/ Weighted Least Squares 
? MV = Market Value, BV = Book Value 
     Source:  Complied by author from a selective review of the literature 
Table 4.1  Summary results of selected studies of the determinants of capital structure.   
Panel C: Results 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Study Bradley, Jarrell, Kim 
(1984) 
Alderson & Betker 
(1995) 
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Key findings • Industry classification 
is an important 
determinant of capital 
structure.  
• Support for the trade 
off theory: Firm 
leverage ratios are 
related inversely and 
strongly to earnings 
volatility and to the 
intensity of R&D and 
advertising 
expenditures. 
• Firm leverage ratios 
are significantly and 
positively related to 
the proxy of non-debt 
tax shield measured 
in terms of 
depreciation and tax 
credits. This 
contradicts the theory 
that interest payments 
and depreciation and 
tax credits are 
alternative tax 
shields.  A possible 
explanation is that the 
proxy used for non-
tax shields is an 
instrumental variable 
for the type of assets 
and their collateral 
value.  
Asset structure is an 
important determinant 
of capital structure: 
Firms with assets that 
are associated with 
high liquidation costs 
select capital structures 
that reduce the 
likelihood of financial 
distress 
• Firms with unique 
products have lower 
debt ratios.  This is due 
to the high costs that 
will be imposed on 
customers, suppliers and 
workers of such firms in 
the case of liquidation. 
• Support for the pecking 
Order theory: Smaller 
firms use more short-
term debt relative to 
larger firms. This is 
because small firms face 
higher transaction costs 
of raising long-term 
debt or equity.  
• No support for 
importance of non-debt 
tax shields, volatility, 
asset structure or growth 
prospects in determining 
firms’ capital structures. 
However, this may be 
due to measurement 
problems.  
• Factors that have been previously 
identified as important determinants of the 
debt ratios of US firms have similar 
influence on the debt ratios of other major 
industrialised countries. 
• However, institutional effects and 
inaccurate proxies make it difficult to 
identify the theoretical model that explains 
the determinants of capital structure.  
• Thus a better understanding of how 
institutional factors influence debt ratios, 
can help to identify the valid theoretical 
model.  
? MV = Market Value, BV = Book Value 
? (p-values), [t-ratios], {standard errors} 
? Significant levels indicators are added where they are included in the relevant study: *, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
respectively 
    Source:  Complied by author from a selective review of the literature 
 
Table 4.1  Summary results of selected studies of the determinants of capital structure.   
Panel C: (concluded) Results 
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SIC code > 1 
  -0.1524 
(0.443) 
       
Diversification – 
New products in 
new markets 
  0.0342 
(0.864) 
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Cash flow based 
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Key findings • Support for the trade 
off theory: In particular 
size is positively 
related to debt levels, 
which is consistent 
with the trade off 
theory rather than with 
information asymmetry 
models. 
•  Agency conflicts and 
voting power 
considerations also 
play a role in the 
capital structure 
decision. It is for that 
reason that ownership 
structure influences 
debt ratios.   
• Competitive 
strategy is an 
important 
determinant of 
debt ratios while 






latter may be due 
to measuring 
problems. 
• Tax rate and risk 
are significantly 
related to debt 
ratios but in a 
manner opposite 
to predictions.  
• Size does not 
appear 
important, 
perhaps due to 
focus on SMEs. 
• Consistent with 
expectations, size and 
retained earnings are 
positively related to 
leverage.  
• Inconsistent with 
expectations, taxes 
are negatively related 
to leverage.  
• Opposing results in 
Korea and Malaysia 
with regards 
profitability. 
• Institutional factors 
such as tax rules and 
other government 
policies also 
influence debt ratios.  
• Capital structure theories that have been 
developed in the US are also applicable in the 
Japanese context.  
• Institutional and regulatory factors in the 
Japanese capital market, such as relationships 
with the main bank, group affiliation, and 
regulation on new issues, re important in 
corporate financing decisions.  
• The relationships between leverage and its 
determinants appear to be stable over time. 
 
? MV = Market Value, BV = Book Value 
?  (p-values), [t-ratios], {standard errors} 
? Significant levels indicators are added where they are included in the relevant study: *, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively 
    Source:  Complied by author from a selective review of the literature 
 
 
Table 4.1 is split into three panels.  Panel A summarises the predictions in each of 
the studies reviewed, regarding the relationships between the firm’s debt ratio and its 
determinants. Panel B summarises the empirical procedures and gives variable 
definitions.  Panel C presents the regression results and key findings, which are discussed 
below.   
Using cross sectional, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedure, Bradley, Jarrell 
and Kim (1984) investigate the validity of the trade off theory with a sample of 
approximately 800 US firms for the period 1962 to 1981.  In particular, the study uses 
three proxies to measure the importance of tax, agency and financial distress 
considerations in influencing the debt decision.  The tax advantage of debt is inversely 
measured by the presence of non-debt tax shields, being depreciation and investment tax 
credits.  Further, investments in R&D and advertising also represent non-debt tax shield 
because these capital investments are expensed immediately thus reduce the tax liability 
of the firm.  However, expenditure on R&D and advertising is also a proxy for the agency 
costs of debt.  This is because managers have relatively high discretion over assets 
created from such expenditure, increasing the opportunities for under investment and risk 
shifting5.  The third explanatory variable is risk as measured by earnings volatility, and 
which stands for the cost of financial distress.  Specifically, because financial distress is 
                                                          
5 The duplicity of R&D and advertising expenditure in reflecting both the availability of alternative non-
debt tax shields and agency costs of debt is an illustration of the point made earlier. Particularly it shows 




costly, firms with volatile earnings are predicted to have less debt in their capital 
structure.  Lastly, the importance of industrial classification to firms’ long-term debt 
ratios is analysed by including 25 industry dummies. 
Table 4.1, Panel C shows that the results in Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) 
confirm to expectations. Particularly, the extent that the estimated coefficients on the 
variables measuring earnings volatility and investments on R&D and advertising are 
negatively signed and significant. Furthermore, the study concludes that target debt ratios 
are strongly related to industrial classification even when regulated firms are excluded 
from the sample6.  Target debt levels are also found to be significantly and positively 
related to the proxy for the non-debt tax shields, measured in terms of depreciation and 
tax credits. This is inconsistent with the predicted negative relationship which is based on 
the idea that depreciation and tax credits are alternatives to interest payments in shielding 
tax. Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) attempt to reconcile these results by suggesting that 
the level of depreciation and tax credit may be a proxy for the type of assets held by the 
firm.  Specifically, it is noted that high levels of depreciation and tax credits may be 
reflecting asset tangibility because it is this type of assets that tend to generate them.   
                                                          
6 The study by Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) begins by examining the relationship between leverage and 
industry classification.  A standard ANOVA procedure, where leverage is regressed on industry dummies, 
finds a strong positive relation between regulated firms and leverage.  In particular the dummies of highly 
regulated firms including telephone, electric and gas utilities, and airlines all have positive estimated 
coefficients with high t-ratios. To isolate the possibility that results are distorted by this strong relationship 
between leverage and regulations, empirical procedures proceed by running tests that exclude regulated 




Tangible assets are often assumed to be an inverse proxy for liquidation costs, as they 
have greater value on liquidation compared with intangible assets such as brand names or 
reputation.  Thus the direct correlation between liquidation value, tangibility, and 
depreciation may be the reason for the positive sign found on the non-debt tax shield. 
This means that, consistent with the trade off theory, assets with high liquidation value 
and lower expected bankruptcy costs can support more debt and should be positively 
related to debt ratios.  This link between liquidation value and debt ratios is also the 
subject of Alderson and Betker (1995).  
Alderson and Betker (1995) use data on 88 US firms that have reorganised under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code during the period 1982 to 19937.  This selection 
procedure allows liquidation costs to be measured directly as the fraction of going-
concern value that would be lost if the firm liquidated.  A significant and negative 
correlation of –0.26 is reported between this direct measure of liquidation costs and the 
degree of assets’ tangibility measured in terms of fixed to total assets.  This supports the 
explanation in Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) that depreciation and thus the degree of 
assets’ tangibility is an inverse proxy for liquidation costs.  Further, by way of an OLS, 
cross sectional regression analysis, Alderson and Betker (1995) show that the level of 
                                                          
7 Under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Reform Act, 1978, a firm may apply to the court for protection 
from its creditors while it carries out reorganisation of its affairs so as to be able to pay off its creditors.   
Firms that reorganise under the Code must disclose by way of a Bankruptcy Disclosure Statement, their 





debt in firms’ capital structures is inversely related to liquidation costs.  As can be seen 
from Panel C of Table 4.1, the estimated coefficient of the liquidation costs variable 
remains significantly negatively signed whether the dependent variable is measured in 
terms of long-term debt or total liabilities.   
This last point regarding various measurements of the dependent variable is also 
addressed by other capital structure studies.  Rajan and Zingales (1995) look at the issue 
closely.  They note that the ratio of total liabilities to total assets reflects what is left for 
shareholders in the case of liquidation.  Thus this broadest measure of debt ratio is 
particularly appropriate in the Alderson and Betker’s (1995) study which uses a sample 
of firms that have narrowly escaped liquidation.   In contrast, in Titman and Wessels 
(1988) the debt level is not aggregated but is separately measured as the levels of long-
term debt, short-term debt and convertible debt.  This separation serves to assess the 
different theoretical implications on each source of debt finance8.  For their investigation 
of the determinants of capital structure, Titman and Wessels (1988) use factor analytic 
technique and nearly 500 US manufacturing firms in the period 1974 to 1982.   The 
results of this study are also reported in Table 4.1.  
                                                          
8 Although not reported in Table 4.1, Alderson and Betker (1995) also run separate regressions for the 
different types of debt.  In particular, private debt to total debt, convertible debt to total debt and secured 
debt to total debt are regressed on a constant, liquidation costs and firm size.  The study reports significant 





As shown in Table 4.1, Panel C, Titman and Wessels (1988) find most of the 
estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables in the long-term debt and short-term 
debt regressions to bear the predicted signs.  In general the results appear to support the 
pecking order theory according to which information asymmetries and transaction costs 
influence the firm’s choice of funds.  For example, smaller firms tend to use more short-
term debt than larger firms as implied by the significantly negative estimated coefficient 
on the size variable in the short-term debt regression. This reflects the higher degree of 
information asymmetries and higher transaction costs, that small firms face when issuing 
long-term debt or equity.  Furthermore, profitable firms, with sufficient internal funds, 
tend to have less debt relative to the market value of their equity.  This is indicated by the 
significantly negative estimated coefficients on the profitability variable.  However, while 
Titman and Wessels (1988) find the pecking order proxies generally to be significant, 
their results also show that the proxies for the trade off theory are not.  Thus assets’ 
tangibility, non-debt tax shields, volatility of earnings, and growth opportunities appear 
not to be important in determining firms’ capital structures. Titman and Wessels (1988) 
conclude that their results are not conclusive but that the failure to find support for the 
trade off theory may be due to measurement problems.  Similarly, Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) also conclude that the puzzle of what determines capital structure is still 
unresolved but that this may be due to inaccurate proxies or to institutional influences.   
With reference to institutional influences, Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that 




structure debate.  Particularly it is proposed that factors such as tax and bankruptcy rules 
or the historic role played by banks and the securities markets may obscure the validity of 
theoretical models.  Therefore, in an attempt to assess the impact of institutional 
structures, Rajan and Zingales (1995) extend their testing ground beyond the US.  The 
idea is that by examining countries with different institutional structures, a better 
understanding of the fundamental determinants of capital structure may be obtained.   
Specifically the study addresses the question of whether four factors, that have been 
consistently identified as important determinants of capital structure in the US, are also 
important in other industrialised countries.  Separate Tobit models are estimated for a 
sample of non-financial, listed, firms from each G-7 country, for the period 1987 to 1991.  
The results for the US, Germany, France and the UK are presented in Table 4.1. These 
indicate that the same factors, which were found to be important in explaining the capital 
structure of US firms, are also important in other G-7 countries.  Specifically, the results 
indicate that the degree of assets’ tangibility is always positively correlated with leverage, 
while growth opportunities and debt are always negatively correlated.  Similarly, in all 
countries but Germany, size is always positively related to debt while profitability is 
always negatively related to debt.  
Like Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wiwattanakantang (1999) also deviates from the 
common practice of focusing on US firms.  Instead Wiwattanakantang (1999) focuses on 
an emerging economy, namely, Thailand.  The study is an OLS cross sectional regression 




1996.  Contribution to the capital structure debate is principally by assessing agency-
related influences on the trade off theory of debt.  Specifically, it is suggested that due to 
agency-related costs of debt, firms with alternative mechanisms for controlling the equity 
costs of equity should use less of the debt-controlling device.  Further, it is proposed that 
high managerial ownership, large institutional investors, and high ownership 
concentration could provide alternative control-mechanisms to debt.  Therefore it is 
hypothesised that these ownership structure features should be negatively related to debt 
ratios.  The empirical results for the agency effects on financing decisions in 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) are not reported in Table 4.1, as they are not directly relevant 
to this study.  However, a relevant conclusion from this investigation is that control and 
voting power considerations, as well as agency costs considerations are important in 
determining firms’ debt ratios.   Indeed, it is found that in single-family owned firms 
there is positive and significant relationship between the level of debt and the percentage 
of shares held by CEOs and directors.  This is inconsistent with the notion that high 
managerial ownership reduces agency problems and the need for the debt-controlling 
device.  Instead the findings could be explained by the role of debt in protecting the 
voting powers of owners/managers, which may be particularly important in family-
owned firms.   Wiwattanakantang (1999) however, also suggests an alternative 
explanation, which is based on agency theory.  Accordingly family-owned firms may 




their commitment to reducing agency costs associated with conflicts of interest between 
controlling and minority shareholders9.  
In addition to investigating agency effects, Wiwattanakantang (1999) also 
investigates tax and information effects on financing decisions, the results of which are 
presented in Table 4.1.  There is an important point to be made about the relationship 
between size and the level of debt in the capital structure.  Results in Wiwattanakantang 
(1999) as in Rajan and Zingales (1995) show size to be positively and significantly 
related to the debt ratio.   However, as in Titman and Wessels (1988), and Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Wiwattanakantang (1999) also does not provide a definite prediction 
about the nature of the relationship between size and debt.   Indeed, all these studies 
suggest that size could be positively or negatively related to debt, depending on the 
relative importance of pecking order and trade off considerations.  Thus the sign on size 
could help in distinguishing between these two competing theories.  To the extent that 
size reflects diversification, trade off theory supports a positive relation between size and 
debt because large and diversified firms are less likely to fall into financial distress. In 
                                                          
9 Wiwattanakantang (1999) notes that conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders may arise 
from wealth expropriation by the former.  This may be done through payments of the firm’s cash flows to 
the controlling shareholder or trading with other companies with which the controlling shareholder is 
associated at terms that are advantageous to those companies.  Further, in cases where the controlling 
shareholder is a family, conflicts may arise if the family ensures the firm provides jobs to its members even 
when this may not be in the best interests of minority shareholders.  Thus an agency-related explanation for 
the findings of high debt in tightly controlled firms, is that debt can help in reducing conflicts between 




contrast, to the extent that size reflects access to information about the firm, pecking 
order and asymmetric information considerations should result in a negative sign between 
size and debt10.  Thus the significant and positive sign on size in Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and in Wiwattanakantang (1999) is supportive of trade off theory.   
In an attempt to isolate the impact of size on the firm’s debt decision Jordan, 
Lowe and Taylor (1998) take two actions.  First, they focus on approximately 200 small 
and medium sized (SMEs) UK firms for the period 1989 to 1993.   Second, they measure 
diversification directly.  Table 4.1 presents the results of this study from both OLS and 
Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) methods.11  The results lend strong support 
to the pecking order theory as reflected by proxies such as profitability, cash flow, and a 
measure of the importance of access to external finance.  There is also evidence to 
support the importance of the firm’s assets structure, which is partly influenced by some 
competitive strategies like innovation.  However, there is no evidence that diversification, 
                                                          
10  If asymmetric information considerations play an important part in determining firms’ debt ratios, then 
larger firms, with less information problems, should tend to issue more external equity.  However, the 
failure in Wiwattanakantang (1999) to find support for this theory may be due to information effects being 
obscured by the aggregation of the debt ratio to include both short and long-term debt.  This is because for 
smaller firms with many information problems, long-term debt, like external equity, is also subject to 
possible significant mis-pricing.  Indeed, as reported earlier, Titman and Wessels (1988) find that smaller 
firms tend to use significantly more short-term debt but insignificantly more long-term debt.   
11 In the FGLS case the predicted values from the non-weighted regression are used to construct the 




firm size, or growth influence the debt ratios of SMEs12.   In addition, inconsistent with 
expectations, risk is found to be strongly and positively related to debt while the effective 
tax rate is found to be strongly but negatively related to the level of debt.   This puzzling 
result of a strong and negative relation between taxes and debt is repeated in Hussain 
(1997). 
Hussain (1997) studies two emerging economies, namely the Republic of Korea 
and Malaysia in the period directly following their financial liberalisation between 1980 
and 1990.  The panel procedure is applied to two samples of just under 100 of the largest 
listed manufacturing firms from each country.  This results in approximately 800 
observations in the case of Korea and approximately 500 in the case of Malaysia13.  The 
                                                          
12 Jordan, Lowe and Taylor (1998) note that their failure, to find strong support for the importance of 
diversification in determining capital structures, may be due to the difficulty in finding accurate proxies for 
this corporate strategy.  With relation to the apparent insignificance of size, the claim is that this may be 
due to the concentration of the study on SMEs, or to the fact that the sample firms may not have crossed the 
size threshold, which is seen as important in reducing the risk of bankruptcy.  With regard growth, the 
study does not predict the sign on the estimated coefficient of this variable although it is expected to be an 
important explanatory variable.  On the one hand the study predicts a positive relation between growth and 
debt due the need of growing firms for funds combined with control considerations.  This is suggested to be 
particularly the case for small firms whose owners/managers prefer to finance growth by debt rather than 
by external equity in order to maintain their control.  On the other hand, the agency theory of debt predicts 
a negative relationship between growth and debt due to greater opportunities for growing firms to 
expropriate bondholders’ wealth. To minimise this agency problem, growing firms have lower debt ratios 
in their capital structure.  
13 The reason for the smaller number of observations in the case of Malaysia is because while the period for 
Korea spans the years 1980 to 1990, that for Malaysia starts from 1983 to 1990.  It is also worth noting that 




explanatory variables include the familiar size, profitability, taxes and industry dummies.  
In addition to these variables Hussain (1997) also includes future profitability as 
measured by the PE ratio, and dependency on retained earnings.  The idea is that 
optimistic firms that expect high future profitability tend to rely more heavily on equity. 
Therefore the expectation is of a negative relationship between leverage and future 
profitability.  In contrast, firms that have accumulated high levels of retained earnings 
tend to use more debt because the high cash position gives them better access to debt 
finance and also increases the need for debt as a disciplinary mechanism. Thus Hussain 
(1997) predicts a positive estimated coefficient on the retained earnings variable.  Some 
of the results in Hussain (1997) are reproduced in Table 4.1.  
Consistent with the prediction made in the study and with the general results in 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and in Wiwattanakantang (1999), Hussain (1997) finds size 
and leverage to be strongly and positively related.  Further, the results with regards 
current and future profitability are also strong but of opposing signs for Korea and 
Malaysia.   Another important contribution of Hussain (1997), is the conclusion regarding 
the importance of institutional factors such as tax structure and other government policies 
to firms’ capital structure decision.  For example, after comparing stock market 
development and capital structures of Korea and Malaysia, Hussain (1997) suggests that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
coefficients for each whole sample. It is explained that if this assumption is relaxed, to allow for the Fixed 
effects model then this requires the exclusion of the industry dummies. Hussain (1997) also notes that the 




the predominance of the debt sector in Korea, despite the rapid growth of the Korean 
equity sector could be due to tax rules.  Specifically tax rules resulted in the after-tax cost 
of debt remaining lower relative to the cost of equity, thus maintaining preference for 
debt14.  Hussain (1997) further reports strongly positive estimated coefficients on the 
Korean manufacturing firms’ dummies, when the dependent variable is measured in 
terms of bank-debt.  This apparent importance of bank loans to some sectors could be due 
to government policy, which made priority loans from the government available to 
selected industries.   
It can therefore be concluded that the approach in Hussain (1997) is in line with 
the suggestion in Rajan and Zingales (1995), that better understanding of institutional 
effects may help to identify the theoretical determinants of capital structure.  Another 
study that takes the same approach is Hirota (1999) with respect to Japan.  Specifically, 
Hirota (1999) runs cross sectional OLS regressions of total debt to capital for each of the 
years 1977, 1982, 1987 and 1992 as well as a pooled regression for all years. The study 
                                                          
14 Hussain (1997) suggests that the rapid growth of the equity sector in Korea during the 1980s could be 
partly due to government policy. For example, during this period the government has encouraged interest in 
the stock markets by the selling of its equity holdings in nationalised firms.  Further, a number of measures 
were introduced in 1987 to reduce the fraction of bank-loans in the capital structures of the 30 largest 
business groups.  These groups were forced to repay their debts by raising new capital in the stock market.  
However, Hussain (1997) also notes that during the same period the after-tax cost of debt remained lower 
relative to the cost of equity.  This was due mainly to a low tax on interest income of 18%, while dividend 
income for high-income individuals was taxed at 70% (although no tax was charged on capital gains).   
Thus the dominance of the debt sector in Korea, in spite of the rapid growth of the equity sector was driven 




uses between 400 to 500 manufacturing and non-manufacturing Japanese firms for each 
of the four years, resulting in just over 1,800 observations for the pooled regression.  
Explanatory variables in Hirota (1999) include the traditional variables as well as specific 
institutional and regulatory proxies.   The traditional variables include non-debt tax 
shields, type of assets, growth opportunities, risk, profitability and firm size.  The 
institutional and regulatory variables include proxies for factors appropriate to the 
Japanese business environment such as relationship with the main bank.  Other 
institutional variables include group affiliation dummy, and a dummy that represents 
whether regulations in the Japanese environment allow the firm to issue external equity.    
Another explanatory variable that is included in Hirota (1999) is the spread 
between interest rate and dividend yield for firms that are allowed to issue equity. The 
aim is to measure the importance of agency conflicts and in particular the agency 
problem of free cash flow and how this influences financing decisions.  The idea is that 
managers’ financing decisions may be based on how much cash the firm has to pay in the 
form of interest rates relative to dividends because this influences the free cash flow 
available to themselves.  Therefore the greater the difference between the rate of interest 
and the dividend yield, the more motivated is the manager to issue equity rather than 
debt.  This implies a negative relationship between debt and the spread between the 
interest rate faced by the firm and its dividend yield.  Indeed as shown in Table 4.1, 
Hirota (1999) finds the estimated coefficient on the spread between the interest rate and 




These results support the idea that managers in Japan tend to behave as predicted by 
agency theory.  Other results in Hirota (1999) lead to the conclusions that, consistent with 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), capital structure in Japan can be partly explained by 
theoretical factors developed in the US. The importance of institutional and regulatory 
characteristics of the Japanese environment in influencing financial decisions of Japanese 
firms is also established.   
The key findings, in Hirota (1999) and the rest of the studies reviewed above, are 
summarised in Panel C of Table 4.1.   Clearly, there is wide support for the notion that 
trade off, agency and pecking order considerations influence the capital structure 
decisions of firms in the US and elsewhere.  Specifically, there is strong support for 
pecking order in a survey by Kamath (1997), as well as in Jordan, Lowe and Taylor 
(1998) and Titman and Wessels (1988).   With reference to the trade off theory, the 
relevance of distress costs is illustrated particularly clearly in Alderson and Betker (1995) 
who manage to measure liquidation costs directly.  There is, however, less agreement on 
the importance of non-debt tax shields as illustrated in Titman and Wessels (1988) and in 
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) where non-debt tax shield is positively related to debt. 
Agency-related considerations enter the debt decision in Wiwattanakantang (1999) who 
also illustrates the importance of control considerations.  Finally, the relevance of the 
various theories to the debt decision of firms outside the US is illustrated in Rajan and 
Singales (1995) and Hirota (1999) in general, and in the case of emerging economies in 




In an attempt to contribute to the capital structure debate, this study draws from 
the key findings and procedures of previous work. In particular, the explanatory 
variables, their measurements, and predictions regarding relationships with the dependent 
variable, are based on the studies reviewed above.  Further, the empirical approach here 
is in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and the other studies that focus on economies 
different to the US.  
 
4.3  A theoretical model of the determinants of capital structure  
4.3.1  The model 
Based on the capital structure theories discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, and on the basis 
of previous empirical studies as reviewed in Harris and Raviv (1991) and Prasad, Green 
and Murinde (2001) it is useful to specify a generic model of capital structure as follows: 
(LEVERAGE)i,t = α + β1 (AGE)i,t + β2 (FIRM SIZE)i,t + β3 (AVPROFIT)i,t  
                       + β4 (GROWTH)i,t + β5 (FIRM RISK)i,t + β6 (ASSETS)i,t  
                                + β7 (TXSHIELD)i,t   + β8 (DEBTORS)i,t + μ i,t          (4.1)   
Where variable definitions are as follows:  LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets;  AGE is either the number of years since the year of incorporation 
(AGEINCOR) or the number of years since the year of listing on the Mauritius Stock 
Exchange (AGELIST); FIRM SIZE is either the natural log of total assets (SIZE), the 




LARGE.  SMALL is set to one for the smallest size firms whose log of total assets falls 
in the first quarter of the sample size distribution.  LARGE is set to one for the largest 
size firms whose log of total assets falls in the forth quarter of the sample size 
distribution;  AVPROFIT is a measure of profitability and is the average ratio of profit 
before interest and exceptional items to total assets for a period of three years; GROWTH 
is the annual percentage increase in total assets during the two years up to the current 
year;  FIRM RISK is the volatility of earnings and is represented by stock price volatility.  
It is measured alternatively by RISK and by ARISK which are both based on the 
residuals from a regression of the natural log of the daily stock price on a constant and 
time;  ASSETS is the asset structure, given by the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; 
TXSHIELD is a proxy for non-debt tax shield measured as the ratio of depreciation to 
total assets; DEBTORS is the ratio of debtors less creditors to total assets.   
Alternatively the model of Equation (4.1) can be expressed in logarithmic form.  
In this case the natural logarithms are taken of the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables that assume only positive values:   
(LOGLEV)i,t = α + β1 (AGE)i,t + β2 (FIRM SIZE)i,t + β3 (AVPROFIT)i,t  
                       + β4 (GROWTH)i,t + β5 (FIRM RISK)i,t + β6 (LOGASST)i,t  
                                + β7 (LOGTAX)i,t   + β8 (DEBTORS)i,t + μ i,t          (4.2)   
Where all variables are as defined above excluding the following three variables: 




of ASSETS; and  LOGTAX, which is the natural log of TXSHIELD.  A more detailed 
description of all the variables in Equations (4.1) and (4.2) is contained in the Appendix 
4A.  
 
4.3.2  Theoretical predictions 
The hypothesised directions of influence of the main explanatory variables on the 
endogenous leverage variable are based on the trade off, pecking order, agency, and 
control considerations as well as previous empirical studies.   The predictions can thus be 
summarised as follows.  
Age 
The theoretical direction of relationship between the firm’s age and its debt level is 
indeterminate.  Based on trade off considerations, it may be argued that with the passage 
of time the firm establishes a historical record for honouring financial obligations and this 
reputation increases its debt capacity.  Thus mature firms can borrow at better terms and 
the predicted impact of age on debt should be positive.  In contrast, it may be argued that 
the greater availability of information on older firms reduces information asymmetries 
associated with equity.  Hence in line with pecking order considerations, mature firms 
should tend to use the capital market for equity relatively more compared with younger 
firms.  There is a further argument for a negative correlation between age and debt.  
Accordingly if firms follow a pecking order, and mature firms are likely to have 




external debt finance.  Thus in the case of age the sign on the estimated coefficient 
distinguishes between the trade off theory, when the sign is expected to be positive, and 
pecking order considerations, when a negative sign is expected.    
Size 
Larger firms tend to be more diversified, and hence less risky and less prone to 
bankruptcy.  These firms, therefore, have higher debt capacity and in line with the trade 
off theory a positive link is expected between size and leverage.  This is consistent with 
the general results generated by Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wiwattanakantang (1999), 
Hussain (1997), and Hirota (1999).  Further, if maintaining control is important then it is 
likely that firms achieve larger size through debt rather than equity financing.  Thus 
control considerations also support positive correlation between size and debt.  However, 
it could also be argued that size serves as a proxy for the availability of information that 
outsiders have about the firm.  From a pecking order point of view, less information 
asymmetry makes equity issuance more appealing to the firm, thus a negative link can be 
expected between size and leverage.   This view is consistent with some of the empirical 
results reported in Titman and Wessles (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995)15.  The 
theoretical relationship between size and leverage is thus undetermined but can 
distinguish between pecking order and between trade off and control considerations.  
Specifically, positive correlation is in line with the trade off theory, while a negative 
                                                          




correlation is supportive of asymmetric information and pecking order considerations.  
Profitability 
Another indeterminate relationship is that between profitability and leverage.  In the 
context of the pecking order theory of financing choices, profitable firms are likely to 
have sufficient internal finance that ensures they do not need to rely on external sources. 
Moreover, in an agency theory framework, if the market for corporate control is 
inefficient, managers of profitable firms will use the higher levels of retained earnings in 
order to avoid the disciplinary role of external finance.  These two rationales point to a 
negative correlation between profitability and leverage.  This prediction is consistent with 
the broad results in Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), Hussain (1997) and Hirota (1999).  However, it can also be 
argued that lenders prefer profitable borrowers with high current cash flows.  Moreover, 
in an agency theory framework, if the market for corporate control is efficient, managers 
of profitable firms will seek debt as a disciplinary device because debt is regarded as a 
commitment to pay out cash in the future.  Theory, therefore, also supports a positive 
correlation between profitability and leverage.   This prediction is consistent with some of 
the results in Jordan, Lowe and Taylor (1998) and Hussain  (1997).  Thus to the extent 
that pecking order and supply side considerations, do not distort the results, the sign on 




market for corporate control16.   
Growth (investment opportunities) 
The theoretical direction of the relationship between growth and leverage is 
undetermined.  In line with the agency theory of debt, conflicts between owners and 
lenders point to a negative correlation between growth opportunities and leverage due to 
two problems.  The first problem is that of under investment, or the tendency by highly 
levered firms to pass up profitable investments.  The reason for this is that when debt 
levels are high investors are reluctant to provide further equity funds because they are 
aware that cash flows generated from investments will go to service debt before any is 
returned to them.  Moreover, for the same reason existing shareholders will prefer the 
firm to pay out dividends rather than invest.  The higher the firm’s growth opportunities, 
the more severe are the consequences of the under investment problem.   The second 
problem is that of risk shifting, or the tendency by equity holders to increase the firm’s 
risk profile.  Similar to the under investment problem, the consequences of the risk 
shifting problem also become more severe as growth opportunities increase.  This is 
because firms with high investment opportunities provide more scope for shareholders to 
                                                          
16 Agency theory predicts both a negative and a positive relationship between profitability and debt.  The 
precise direction depends on the efficiency of the market for corporate control.  If the market is efficient, 
profitability is expected to be positively related to leverage because interest payments are a commitment to 
pay out cash which may otherwise be wasted by management.  On the other hand, if the market is 
inefficient, profitability should be negatively related to leverage, as managers of profitable firms will use 




expropriate wealth from bondholders through changes to risk profiles.  Thus the agency 
theory of debt predicts that due to the problems of under investment and risk shifting, 
growing firms should have low debt levels and use greater amount of equity finance. 
Considerations based on the trade off theory also point to negative correlation 
between growth and leverage.  For example, although growth opportunities add value, the 
firm cannot use growth opportunities as security for lenders in order to support more debt 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988).  Furthermore, it may also be argued that growing firms face 
higher costs of financial distress, as growth opportunities have no value on liquidation.  
Thus the trade off theory and the agency theory of debt both support a negative 
relationship between the firm’s growth opportunities and debt.  This negative sign is 
consistent with the empirical results reported in Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Wiwattanakantang (1999), and Hirota (1999). 
However, in a corporate governance context, when tightly-controlled firms are 
growing, they have greater need for funds and may prefer debt to equity because the latter 
involves giving up control.   This implies a positive correlation between growth and 
leverage and can be particularly applicable to the case of Mauritius17.  Further, in line 
with pecking order theory growing firms, that need funds, prefer debt to external equity.  
Thus based on corporate governance and pecking order considerations, the relationship 
between growth opportunities and leverage is predicted to be positive.  But based on the 
                                                          





agency theory of debt and on the trade off theory the relationship between growth and 
leverage should be negative. 
Earnings volatility (risk) 
Risk should be negatively associated with leverage due to trade off considerations.  
Particularly, the probability of being unable to meet financial obligations increases with 
the volatility of earnings.  As the present value of the costs of financial distress increases 
with the probability of being financially distress, risky firms prefer less debt.  Further, the 
agency theory of debt also predicts a negative association between debt and risk.   
Specifically, as equity holders are aware that high risk implies that there may be 
insufficient funds to pay them, they become prone to risk shifting or under investment 
activities.   These theoretical predictions are consistent with some of the empirical results 
reported in Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) and Hirota (1999), but not with the findings 
in Jordan, Lowe and Taylor (1998). 
Asset structure 
The ratio of fixed to total assets represents the degree of assets’ tangibility.  The trade off 
theory predicts tangibility to be positively related to debt levels for two main reasons, 
namely security and the costs of financial distress.   First, tangible assets normally 
provide high collateral value relative to intangible assets, which implies that these assets 
can support more debt.   Second, tangible assets often reduce the costs of financial 
distress because they tend to have higher liquidation value.    




positive association between assets’ tangibility and the firm’s debt levels. The first of 
these reasons relates to the ease by which the variance of the cash flows generated from 
the asset can be increased.  Viswanath and Frierman, (1995) note that it is usually more 
difficult to alter the variance of the cash flows generated from tangible rather than 
intangible assets.  Thus asset tangibility reduces the scope for risk shifting and firms with 
tangible assets will support more debt.   Second, Harris and Raviv (1990) develop the 
idea of the role of debt in disciplining management and providing information for this 
purpose.   It is argued that tangible assets have higher value on liquidation, which means 
that liquidation is often the best strategy when the firm is financially distressed.  However 
it is when liquidation may be the best course of action that managers, due to self-interest 
considerations, will be most reluctant to provide useful information that can lead to such 
outcome.  Under these circumstances debt can ensure information is available because 
default on debt obligations, triggers investigation into the firm’s affairs.   Thus firms with 
tangible assets, whose managers tend to conceal information in order to avoid liquidation, 
will have more debt due to its role in disciplining managers and providing information.  
Thus on the basis of both the trade off and agency theories, the ratio of fixed to 
total assets is predicted to be positively related to the level of debt in the capital structure.  
This positive sign is consistent with the empirical results reported in Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Jordan, Lowe and Taylor (1998), and Hirota (1999).  However, Titman and 
Wessels (1988) provide an agency theory based argument for a negative relationship 




monitor the use of tangible rather than intangible assets, which means that firms with 
intangible assets will tend to use more debt for monitoring purposes. 
Non-debt tax shield 
In the context of the trade off theory, non-debt tax shields provide alternative measures to 
interest tax shield.  Therefore firms with high non-debt tax shields, such as accelerated 
depreciation and investment tax credits, relative to their expected cash flows, should use 
less debt.   This leads to prediction of a negative correlation between non-debt tax shields 
and debt, which is consistent with the general results reported in Wiwattanakantang 
(1999) and Hirota (1999).  There is one point to note, however, when the implications of 
corporate taxation on the capital structures of listed firms in Mauritius are considered.  In 
general, the lower tax rate, which is faced by listed companies relative to other 
companies, reduces the value of tax shields.  This implies that corporate tax 
considerations may not play as important role as they may otherwise do in determining 
the level of debt in firms’ capital structures. Thus the predicted negative association 
between debt and other non-debt tax shields should be weaker for listed firms and the 
proxy for the latter may turn out to be insignificant.    
Table 4.2 presents a summary of the predicted signs on the estimated coefficients 
of all the explanatory variables of Equations (4.1) and (4.2), which are included to proxy 
for the various theories as discussed above.  In addition to these variables, a control 
variable, DEBTORS, is also included in the above equations and its relationship with the 




Table 4.2  Predicted signs on the proxies for the competing leverage determinants theories 
 
Variable Pecking order theory Trade off theory Agency theory Control considerations 
Age (-) – Mature firms suffer less 
information problems thus 
find external equity more 
attractive 
(-) – Older  firms with 
sufficient retained earnings 
rely primarily on internal 
funds 
(+) – Older firms have access 
to debt at better terms due to 
having longer record of 
proper treatment of creditors 
  
Size (-) – Larger firms suffer less 
information problems thus 
find external equity more 
attractive. 
(+) – Larger firms tend to be 
more diversified, less risky 
and thus less prone to 
bankruptcy and can support 
more debt. 
 (+) – Firms achieve 
large size through debt 
rather than equity 
financing 
Profitability (-) – Profitable firms have 
sufficient retained earnings 
thus rely less on external 
funds. 
(+) – Profitable firms enjoy 
better borrowing terms, as 
lenders prefer profitable 
firms. 
 (+) – In an efficient 
market,  profitable 
firms employ debt to 
prevent waste by 
managers 
(-) – In an inefficient 
market, managers tend 
to avoid the disciplinary 
role of debt. 
 
Growth  (+) – Growing firms need 
funds, and they prefer debt to 
external equity because debt 
is less subject to mis-pricing.  
(-) – Growth opportunities 
can not be offered as security 
to lenders. 
(-) – Growth does not 
generate current cash flows 
which may be protected from 
tax liability by interest 
(-) – Growth opportunities 
tend to have low value on 
liquidation 
(-) – Risk shifting: 
growth opportunities 
give greater scope for 
expropriation of 
lenders’ wealth 
(-) – Under investment: 
highly geared firms 
tend to pass up 
investment 
opportunities 
(+) –  Firms prefer to 
support growth through 
debt because this form 
of finance does not 
dilute control.  
Risk  (-) – Earnings volatility 
increases the probability, and 
thus the present value, of the 
costs of financial distress 
(-) – The probability of 
risk shifting or under 
investment increases 
with increases in the 




 (+) – Tangible assets can be 
offered as security to lenders 
and are likely to have high 
value on liquidation. 
(-) – Difficult to 
monitor the use of 
intangible assets hence 
employ debt for this 
purpose 
(+) – Harder to engage 
in risk shifting when 




 (-) Reduces the value of the 









which the firm operates, and it is thus reasonable to expect that excess over the trade 
credit received from suppliers, should be financed by other liabilities of similar 
durability. Moreover, Mauritius is a small island economy hence to the extent that trade 
depends on imports and exports, matching trade debtors with creditors is likely to be 
more difficult leading to the need to meet trade credit with other liabilities.   For these 
reasons, the variable net debtors to total assets, is expected to be positively related to the 
firm’s total liabilities. 
 
4.4  Mauritius and the database18
4.4.1  The Mauritius corporate sector and securities market 
Mauritius is a small island in the Indian Ocean near Africa, with an area of less than 
2,000 square kilometres, and population that totals just over 1 million.  The island was 
occupied by the French from 1715 until 1810 and then by the British until 1968 when it 
gained independence.  The economy has traditionally been based on the sugar industry, 
but more recently has diversified into manufacturing, tourism, and financial services.  In 
spite of its small size, Teal (1999) notes that since the 1970s the Mauritian economy has 
became highly export oriented, and has experienced high growth rates19.   
                                                          
18 Review of the Mauritian economy and corporate sector is based in part on the contribution of C. Ah-Hen, 
from the Department of Accounting and Finance, the University of Mauritius, to a joint paper that was 
presented at a Finance and Development Research Programme, Manchester University, 5-6 April 2001.   
19 Teal (1999) notes that the Mauritian economy had enjoyed 3-4% growth rates in real GDP per capita for 




The Mauritian corporate sector is governed by the Companies Act of 1984, while 
the tax law is defined in the Income Tax Act of 1995 with a tax year that typically ends 
on 30 June.  The corporate sector is characterised by ownership structure that is 
predominantly family oriented, and by large fraction of unlisted firms.  For example, in 
1997 out of 616 public companies 46 were quoted on the official list of the Stock 
Exchange of Mauritius (SEM).  Furthermore, SEM is not representative of the economy 
as a whole.  For instance, none of the garment manufacturers which constitute an 
important part of the economy in general and of the exporting sector in particular, are 
listed on the stock exchange.  This may be explained by the recent origin of SEM, which 
was set up by the Stock Exchange Act of 1988 and began operations in 1989.  On 
inception, in 1989, SEM listed 5 companies with a market capitalisation of about US$ 90 
million.  But by 1999 market capitalisation has exceeded US$ 1 billion and the official 
list of SEM included over 40 companies and 16 debentures.      
The market, however, is highly concentrated with the top 5 companies 
representing over 50 percent of market capitalisation.  Furthermore, the SEM is 
characterised by low liquidity and is dominated by institutional investors with individual 
investors representing only 5 percent of the population at the end of 1996.   Thus in order 
                                                                                                                                                                             
$341 in 1980 to $823 in 1995.  Indeed, comparing Mauritius’ performance with that of five other sub-
Saharan African economies, it is concluded that Mauritius is the only economy which maintained growth of 
income and exports over the period from 1970 to 1995.  Teal (1999) also illustrates the export orientation 
of the Mauritius economy through a survey conducted in 1994.  It is recorded that over half of all firms in 




to stimulate activity and to encourage firms to list on the stock exchange, the government 
has introduced a number of incentives.  For example, dividends received from listed 
companies and gains from the sale of shares and debentures of such companies are 
exempt from tax20.  Likewise, companies quoted on the official list pay corporate tax at 
the reduced rate of 25 percent compared with the basic corporate tax rate of 35 percent.  
Further, in 1994 the stock market was opened to foreign investors with only limited 
restrictions, such as on holdings in sugar companies, remaining.  Indeed, foreign 
participation on the SEM has increased from about 1 percent of turnover in 1994 to 
nearly 25 percent in 1999, and from just about 0.5 percent of volume in 1994 to nearly 22 
percent of volume in 1999.   
As at 31 October 2000, the official market comprises of 41 local companies, 1 
foreign company and 20 corporate debentures.  These companies are classified into seven 
sectors including banks and insurance, industry, investments, sugar, commerce, leisure 
and hotels and transport.  The dataset for the present study focuses on the non-financial 
companies on the official market.  Table 4A.1 lists the companies constituting the sample 
while the next sub section describes the database.  
 
4.4.2  The database 
The above brief description of the Mauritian corporate sector and securities market 
                                                          




provides background to the database.  Indeed the dataset is based on accounting data and 
daily stock prices for all non-financial firms listed on the official market in Mauritius for 
the period 1990 to 2000.  However, in spite of having data for eleven years, the empirical 
analysis covers only the nine years from 1992 to 2000.  The reason for the loss of the two 
earliest years (1990 and 1991) is due to the way some of the variables in the model are 
defined.  In particular, as detailed in the Appendix 4A, the variable GROWTH and the 
variable AVPROFIT are based on data for the current and previous two years.       
There are twenty-four non-financial companies on the official market, distributed 
across five industry sectors as follows. Seven firms are classified under Commerce while 
a further seven are classified under Industry.  Four firms are in Leisure and Hotels, five 
are in the traditional Sugar business and one is in Transport21. Companies names, their 
average size, average leverage and other variables averaged over the period studied are 
presented in Table 4A.2 of the Appendix22.    
The information presented in Table 4A.2 confirm the previously mentioned the 
deep roots of the Mauritian economy in the sugar industry.  Indeed, as can be seen, listed 
                                                          
21 As noted in the previous sub section, in addition to the five non-financial sectors, there are another two 
financial sectors on the official market, which were excluded from this study. These are the Banks and 
Insurance sector and the Investments sector.  
22 The averages for each firm in Table 4A.2 are calculated over the period 1992 to 2000.  However, due to 
missing data the number of years over which these averages are calculated varies between firms. In 
particular the number of years per firm ranges from a maximum of nine years (1992 to 2000) to a minimum 
of four years.  Details of the years included in the calculation of the averages of each firm are given in 




firms in the sugar industry have, in general, been incorporated much earlier compared 
with listed firms in other industries.  Another interesting observation from Table 4A.2 is 
the distribution of the average gearing ratios across firms from the same industrial sector.  
Looking at this distribution, it is not obvious that firms in the same sector have similar 
capital structures.  For example, LEVERAGE in the Commerce sector ranges from just 
over 20 percent (CMPL) to nearly 70 percent (Rogers & Co).  This is in contrast to the 
observation in Harris and Raviv (1991) where it is noted as a basic stylised fact that firms 
within an industry tend to have similar capital structures.  It is likely, however, that this 
apparent lack of industry trend in the present sample is due its small size23.  
Table 4.3 is split into two panels the first of which, Panel A, presents descriptive 
statistics of the variables of interest for the 24 firms pooled over the period 1992 to 2000. 
                                                          
23 The observation in Harris and Raviv (1991) of the importance of industry classification in determining 
the capital structure of firms is consistent with a number of empirical studies.  For example, Bradley, Jarrell 
and Kim, (1984), conclude that debt ratios are strongly related to industry classifications even when 
regulated firms are excluded. Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest that the type of assets firms hold is 
influenced by their industry and for that reason industry classification should also influence debt levels. 
Hussain (1997) suggests that some industries may enjoy better access to loans due to government policy. 
Indeed, Hussain (1997) finds that in Korea manufacturing firms tend to have higher bank-debt to equity 
ratios possibly due to preference access to government loans that is available to selected industries.  The 
influence of government policy on the link between industry classification and capital structure should be 
particularly strong in Mauritius due to the various incentive schemes available in that economy.  Thus the 
apparent lack of trend in the debt ratios of Mauritian firms across industries, as shown in Table 4A.2, is 
puzzling and may be an indication that by excluding non-quoted firms, the sample is not a good reflection 
of the Mauritian corporate sector as a whole.   The fact that this study does not consider industrial 
classification is due to the small sample size properties of the data.  
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Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics for 24 firms for the period 1992 - 2000 
Panel A: Results of covariance procedure 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Sum Variance Skewness Kurtosis Median 1st Qrt 3rd Qrt 
Dependent
LEVERAGE 0.3619 0.1897 0.0226 0.8093 59.3457 0.0360 0.2914 -0.6581 0.3483 0.2222 0.4885 
LOGLEV -1.2084 0.7117 -3.7901 -0.2115 -198.1706 0.5064 -1.3107 1.9287 -1.0549 -1.5042 -0.7166 
Age of firm
AGEINCOR 42.0427 37.8438 3.0000 172.0000 6895.0000 1432.1515 2.0615 4.0751 32.0000 21.0000 44.0000 
RESAGE 0.0000 25.6282 -65.9011 80.7257 0.0000 656.8040 0.7441 1.0744 -3.0823 -17.7967 15.0368 
AGELIST 4.7866 2.6301 0.0000 10.0000 785.0000 6.9174 0.1838 -0.8561 5.0000 3.0000 7.0000 
Size of firm            
SIZE 20.1171 1.1747 17.5242 22.9480 3299.1966 1.3800 0.5163 -0.0132 19.9924 19.3139 20.7442 
SIZE2 20.4829 1.3419 17.3361 23.6334 3359.1943 1.8006 0.0066 -0.0426 20.4355 19.7532 21.1879 
SMALL 0.1890 0.3927 0.0000 1.0000 31.0000 0.1542 1.6032 0.5772 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LARGE 0.2805 0.4506 0.0000 1.0000 46.0000 0.2031 0.9863 -1.0400 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Profitability of firm
AVPROFIT 0.0936 0.0502 -0.0128 0.2711 15.3486 0.0025 0.4000 0.3466 0.0932 0.0570 0.1228 
RESPROF 0.0000 0.0355 -0.1045 0.1042 0.0000 0.0013 0.3252 0.9618 -0.0028 -0.0230 0.0194 
Firm growth            
GROWTH 0.1429 0.1411 -0.1700 0.8839 23.4345 0.0199 1.8532 6.5554 0.1137 0.0465 0.2139 
Firm risk            
RISK 0.0599 0.0384 0.0084 0.2292 9.8233 0.0015 1.9774 4.9212 0.0525 0.0349 0.0694 
ARISK 0.0073 0.0106 0.0001 0.0708 1.1950 0.0001 3.4939 13.8542 0.0043 0.0022 0.0077 
Capital intensity
ASSETS 0.6044 0.1958 0.1258 0.9742 99.1165 0.0383 -0.3211 -0.4289 0.6047 0.4748 0.7557 
LOGASST -0.5725 0.4086 -2.0732 -0.0261 -93.8907 0.1669 -1.5086 2.8110 -0.5031 -0.7449 -0.2801 
Non-debt tax shield
TXSHIELD 0.0372 0.0257 0.0049 0.1153 6.0942 0.0007 1.3453 1.3630 0.0326 0.0182 0.0456 
RESTAX 0.0000 0.0157 -0.0336 0.0477 0.0000 0.0002 0.7285 0.6236 -0.0016 -0.0102 0.0085 
LOGTAX -3.5192 0.6937 -5.3135 -2.1603 -577.1466 0.4812 -0.1859 -0.2483 -3.4235 -4.0086 -3.0874 
Net debtors to assets
DEBTORS -0.0506 0.1583 -0.4930 0.6462 -8.2944 0.0251 0.6619 2.3373 -0.0648 -0.1309 0.0313 
For variable definitions see Appendix 4A; Number of observations is 164 as detailed in Table 4A.1 
 
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics for 24 firms for the period 1992 - 2000 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 
 LEVERAGE LOGLEV AGEINCOR RESAGE AGELIST SIZE SIZE2 SMALL LARGE AVPROFIT RESPROF
Dependent
LEVERAGE 1.0000           
LOGLEV 0.9136 1.0000          
Age of firm            
AGEINCOR -0.4255 -0.4785 1.0000         
RESAGE -0.2371 -0.2663 0.6772 1.0000        
AGELIST -0.0561 -0.0343 0.2948 0.1185 1.0000       
Size of firm
SIZE 0.6023 0.5185 -0.2017 0.0000 0.0706 1.0000      
SIZE2 0.3472 0.2327 0.1921 0.0000 0.1944 0.8117 1.0000     
SMALL -0.1896 -0.2176 -0.0402 -0.2347 -0.1151 -0.6223 -0.5046 1.0000    
LARGE 0.5624 0.4635 -0.2335 -0.0947 -0.0268 0.8007 0.6738 -0.3014 1.0000   
Profitability of firm
AVPROFIT 0.1189 0.1555 -0.5288 0.0000 -0.3213 -0.0078 -0.2670 -0.0927 -0.0113 1.0000  
RESPROF -0.0800 -0.1033 0.0000 0.3364 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1319 -0.0062 0.7079 1.0000
Firm growth
GROWTH 0.0619 0.0468 -0.0675 0.0000 -0.1039 0.2058 0.3083 -0.1444 0.2021 0.2247 0.0000
Firm risk
RISK 0.0535 -0.0022 0.0632 0.0000 0.0040 0.0078 0.0079 0.0355 -0.0252 -0.0725 0.0000
ARISK 0.0923 0.0554 0.0010 0.0000 0.0325 0.0644 0.0303 -0.0160 0.0148 0.0120 0.0000
Asset structure
ASSETS -0.4553 -0.4010 0.1707 0.0000 -0.2384 -0.2467 -0.0903 0.2334 -0.1223 -0.0899 0.0000
LOGASST -0.4003 -0.3643 0.2150 0.0625 -0.2214 -0.2290 -0.0992 0.2263 -0.1350 -0.1316 -0.0175
Non-debt tax shield
TXSHIELD 0.2005 0.2794 -0.3188 0.0000 -0.1372 -0.1201 -0.5311 -0.0482 -0.1962 0.3815 0.0000
RESTAX 0.1966 0.2135 0.0000 -0.2708 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1205 -0.0914 0.0000 -0.2502
LOGTAX 0.2695 0.3680 -0.3480 -0.0215 -0.1575 -0.0411 -0.4609 -0.0776 -0.1299 0.3069 -0.0712
Net debtors to assets
DEBTORS -0.1919 -0.2495 0.2572 0.0000 0.1691 0.1084 0.3720 -0.1697 0.0238 -0.0774 0.0000
 
 GROWTH RISK ARISK ASSETS LOGASST TXSHIELD RESTAX LOGTAX DEBTORS
Firm growth
GROWTH 1.0000         
Firm risk
RISK -0.0798 1.0000        
ARISK -0.0933 0.9480 1.0000       
Asset structure
ASSETS 0.1217 -0.2487 -0.2973 1.0000      
LOGASST 0.0714 -0.2812 -0.3432 0.9604 1.0000     
Non-debt tax shield
TXSHIELD -0.2623 -0.0646 -0.0431 -0.0600 0.0315 1.0000    
RESTAX 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0630 0.6122 1.0000   
LOGTAX -0.2456 -0.0945 -0.0655 -0.0668 0.0476 0.9204 0.5246 1.0000  
Net debtors to assets
DEBTORS 0.1754 0.0937 0.1294 -0.2366 -0.3614 -0.4580 0.0000 -0.5312 1.0000




Panel B of Table 4.3 presents the correlation matrix and there are a number of 
interesting points to note when looking at the matrix.  First, as expected, there appears to 
be high and positive correlation between the alternative firm size proxies as well as 
between the alternative firm risk proxies.  The correlation coefficient between SIZE and 
SIZE2 is 0.81, while that between RISK and ARISK is 0.95.  The correlation between the 
alternative firm age variables, AGEINCOR and AGELIST, is somewhat weaker although 
still positive, at 0.2924.   
While a high positive correlation among alternative proxies is expected, high 
correlation among non-alternative explanatory variables may indicate the presence of 
multicollinearity.  The effect of near multicollinearity among explanatory variables is to 
increase the estimated standard errors of the regression coefficients and to reduce the t-
statistics.  Large standard errors imply that estimated coefficients may by imprecise, 
while low t ratios may lead to misinterpretation of the importance of variables.   
Another important point to note, therefore, when looking at Panel B of Table 4.3, 
is the high pair-wise correlations of, in particular, two of the explanatory variables of 
Equation (4.1).  The proxy for non-tax shield, TXSHIELD, is highly and negatively 
correlated with AGEINCOR  (-0.32), with SIZE2 (-0.53), with DEBTORS (-0.46) and 
                                                          
24 Similarly, as expected, the correlation between variables and their log equivalents are also high.  The 
correlation between LEVERAGE and LOGLEV, between ASSETS and LOGASST, and between 




with GROWTH (-0.26).  Similarly, the proxy for firm profitability, AVPROFIT, is highly 
and negatively correlated with AGEINCOR (-0.53), with AGELIST (-0.32) and with 
SIZE2 (-0.27).  There is also high and positive correlation between TXSHIELD and 
AVPROFIT at 0.3825.   
To assess more directly whether the sample suffers from multicollinearity, the 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for each of the explanatory variables were calculated26, 
and the results are presented in Table 4.4.  As can be seen from Table 4.4, all the VIFs 
are relatively small.  None of the factors exceeds the value of 3 and most are below the 
value of 2.  Consistent with the observation made from studying the correlation matrix of 
Table 4.3, the variables from Equation (4.1) associated with the highest VIF values 
include TXSHIELD (2.67) and AVPROFIT (2.00).  Another variable associated with a 
high VIF value is AGEINCOR with a factor value of 2.1827.   
 
 
                                                          
25 LOGTAX, which substitutes TXSHIELD in Equation (4.2) is also highly correlated with AGEINCOR  (-
0.35), with SIZE2 (-0.46), with DEBTORS (-0.53), with GROWTH (-0.25), and with AVPROFIT (0.31). 
26 The Variance Inflation Factor is defined as: VIF (βk) = 1/(1-R2k).  Where R2k is the coefficient of 
multiple determination when the variable, X k is regressed on all the other explanatory variables.  The VIF 
can be interpreted as the ratio of the actual variance of the estimated coefficient, βk, to what it would have 
been if there was no multicollinearity and R2k = 0.  
27 As can be seen from Table 4.4, the introduction of the log version of Equation (4.1), as presented in 
Equation (4.2), does not necessarily reduce VIF values.   LOGTAX, in particular, has a relatively high VIF 




Table 4.4 Variance Inflation Factors  
 
Variable Definition  R2k VIF 
Age of firm    
AGEINCOR Number of years since the year of incorporation 0.5414 2.1805 
RESAGE Residuals from regression of AGEINCOR on rest of explanatory variables 0.1673 1.2009 
AGELIST Number of years since the year of listing 0.2357 1.3083 
Size of firm    
SIZE Log of turnover 0.2045 1.2570 
SIZE2 Log of total assets 0.3900 1.6394 
Firm profitability    
AVPROFIT Average profit over current and previous two year 0.4989 1.9956 
RESPROF Residuals from regression of AVPROFIT on rest of explanatory variables 0.1419 1.1654 
Firm growth    
GROWTH Growth rate in total assets over past two years 0.3010 1.4306 
Firm risk    
RISK Mean of absolute residuals from regression of log of daily price on time.  0.0966 1.1069 
ARISK Mean of square residuals from regression of log of daily price on time. 0.1100 1.1236 
Asset structure    
ASSETS Ratio of fixed to total assets 0.3455 1.5280 
LOGASST Log of ASSETS 0.4391 1.7829 
Non-debt tax shield    
TXSHIELD Ratio of depreciation to total assets 0.6252 2.6680 
LOGTAX Log of TXSHIELD 0.6038 2.5240 
RESTAX Residuals from regression of TXSHIELD on rest of explanatory variables 0.1026 1.1144 
Net debtors    
DEBTORS Ratio of net debtors to total assets 0.4017 1.6713 
R2k is the coefficient of multiple determination when the variable listed on the left column is regressed on the rest of the 
non-dummy explanatory variables of Equation (4.1) or (4.2); VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor, defined as VIF = 1/ 
(1 - R2k).  It represents the ratio of the actual variance of the estimated coefficient of the variable in question, to what it 
would have been in the absence of multicollinearity when R2k is zero.  
 
In an attempt to deal with possible near multicollinearity and to isolate the 
separate effects of the explanatory variables, the three variables from Equation (4.1) with 
the highest VIF values are replaced by alternative variables.  AGEINCOR, measuring age 
since incorporation, is regressed on a constant and the rest of the explanatory variables of 
Equation (4.1).  The residuals from this regression, RESAGE, then replace AGEINCOR.  
Similarly, RESPROF replaces the original profitability measure, AVPROFIT, and is the 




explanatory variables in (4.1).  Finally, TXSHIELD, the non-debt tax shield proxy, is 
replaced by RESTAX, which is the series of residuals obtained by regressing TXSHIELD 
on a constant and the rest of the explanatory variables in (4.1)28.  
 
 
4.5  Empirical procedure 
The empirical procedure is in two stages.  The first stage involves cross-section analysis 
on a yearly basis.  The second stage involves time-series cross-section analysis using the 
panel data procedure.  Each of these stages is described in turn.     
 
4.5.1  The yearly cross sectional analysis29
The yearly analysis uses variants of Equations (4.1) and (4.2) to run on yearly 
observations for each year from 1992 to 1999.  For a given year, t, four regressions are 
run which are of the following form where all variables are as defined in Appendix 4A.  
LEVERAGEi = α + β1 AGEINCORi + β2 SIZEi + β3 AVROFITi + β4 GROWTHi  
              + β5 RISKi + β6 ASSETSi + β7 TAXSHIELDi + β8 DEBTORSi + μ i     (4.1’) 
                                                          
28 Appendix 4A presents definitions of the three alternative variables, while their means for each of the 24 
firms is given in Table 4A.1.  Descriptive statistics are included in Table 4.3, while VIF values are 
presented in Table 4.4.  
29 In some recent studies, yearly cross section analysis is used to track the movements in the residuals of the 





That is, in (4.1’) the dependent variable is LEVERAGE and the firm age proxy is 
AGEINCOR, age since incorporation.  
LEVERAGEi = α + β1 AGELISTi + β2 SIZEi + β3 AVROFITi + β4 GROWTHi  
             + β5 RISKi + β6 ASSETSi + β7 TAXSHIELDi + β8 DEBTORSi + μ i              (4.1’’) 
That is, in (4.1’’) the dependent variable is LEVERAGE and the firm age proxy is 
AGELIST, age since listing on the Mauritius Stock Exchange.  
LOGLEVi = α + β1 AGEINCORi + β2 SIZEi + β3 AVROFITi + β4 GROWTHi  
         + β5 RISKi + β6 LOGASSTi + β7 LOGTAXi + β8 DEBTORSi + μ i      (4.2’) 
That is, in (4.2’) the dependent variable is measured in log terms, LOGLEV, and the firm 
age proxy is AGEINCOR, age since incorporation.  Further, LOGASST replaces 
ASSETS as a log representation of the asset structure of the firm, and LOGTAX replaces 
TXSHIELD as a log representation of non-debt tax shield.  
LOGLEVi = α + β1 AGELISTi + β2 SIZEi + β3 AVROFITi + β4 GROWTHi  
         + β5 RISKi + β6 LOGASSTi + β7 LOGTAXi + β8 DEBTORSi + μ i               (4.2’’) 
That is, in (4.2’’) the dependent variable is the log version, LOGLEV, and the firm age 
proxy is AGELIST, age since listing of the Mauritius Stock Exchange. Also here, 
LOGASST replaces ASSETS as a log representation of the asset structure of the firm, 
and LOGTAX replaces TXSHIELD as a log representation of non-debt tax shield.  
The regression procedure in this stage is OLS, utilising the ROBUST facility in 




however, associated with the yearly analysis is low degrees of freedom.  There are only 
twenty-four firms in the population, and the number of explanatory variables in the 
regressions, including the intercept, is nine.  Therefore, the maximum degree of freedom, 
in a year where data is available for all firms, is 15 (24-9).  Indeed, this is the reason why 
there are no results reported for the year 2000, when the number of firms with available 
information is insufficient to run a regression.   
 
4.5.2  Time series cross sectional analysis – the panel data procedure 
The second stage of the empirical procedure utilises all the available yearly observations 
from 1992 to 2000 for all the firms as detailed in Table 4A.1 of the Appendix.  Also here 
the analysis is based on variants of Equations (4.1) and (4.2) using the alternative proxies 
to represent firm size, risk and age.  There are three alternative measures of size (SIZE/ 
SIZE2/ SMALL & LARGE), two alternative measures of risk (RISK/ ARISK) and two 
alternative measures of age (AGEINCOR/ AGELIST).  There are thus twelve different 
variations of Equation (4.1).    A further twelve variants of Equation (4.1) are obtained 
when the residuals of AGEINCOR (namely, RESAGE), AVPROFIT (namely, 
RESPROF) and TXSHIELD (namely, RESTAX) replace the original regressors.   
Similarly there are twelve variants of Equation (4.2) when the logs of LEVERAGE 
(namely, LOGLEV), ASSETS (namely, LOGASST) and TXSHIELD (namely, 
LOGTAX) replace the original variables.  




command in TSP 4.4 produces four regressions: the TOTAL model, the FIXED effects 
model, the BETWEEN model and the RANDOM effects model.  The first three models 
produce OLS estimates while the RANDOM effect model produces FGLS estimates.  
Various tests are also produced to assist in selecting the most appropriate model.  The 
basic model is of the form30:  
Yi,t = αi + Σ βk Xk,i,t + εi,t            (4.3) 
There are K regressors excluding the constant terms, αi. 
The TOTAL model is based on the assumption that both slopes and intercept 
coefficients are the same across firms and time.  Under this assumption OLS provides 
consistent and efficient estimates of α and βk , and Equation (4.3) becomes: 
Yi,t = α  + Σ βk Xk,i,t + εi,t            (4.4) 
The FIXED and RANDOM effects models relax the assumption that the intercept 
coefficients are constant across firms.  The FIXED effects model takes αi to be firm-
specific constant terms while the RANDOM effects model takes αi to be firm-specific 
disturbance terms that are constant across time for each firm.  Thus the FIXED effects 
model allows for different intercepts for each individual firm.  The procedure is to 
subtract the individual firm mean from each variable and run the regression on this 
transformed data. Because the firm-specific effects are assumed constant over time, by 
subtracting the individual means for each variable, the firm-specific effects are 
                                                          




eliminated.  They can, however, be recovered from the BETWEEN model. The 
BETWEEN model is an OLS regression on a constant and the means for each individual. 
It is thus equivalent to Equation (4.4) where the dependent variable, Yi, the explanatory 
variables, Xk,i, and the disturbances εi , represent the means for firm i, while the constant, 
α, is the overall constant common to all firms31: 
Yi = α  + Σ βk Xk,i + εi                    (4.5) 
The residuals obtained from Equation (4.5) are the mean residuals for each firm. They are 
therefore equivalent to the individual effects, αi, in the FIXED effects model and 
represent the deviation of firm i from the common mean (or constant), α32. 
TSP 4.4 produces an F-test for the significance of the firm-specific effects, which 
is of the form:  
                                                   (RSST – RSSF)  :  (n-1)       
F[(n-1),  (no. observations  – n – k)]    =   (RSSF ) : (no. obs – n – k)        (4.6) 
                                                          
31 There are only 24 observations for the BETWEEN model, the firms’ means.  
32 For the individual effects, αi, in the FIXED effects model, to represent the deviation of firm i from the 
common constant, the model has to be formulated with a constant, α, and n specific-firm effects, αi.  
(Where n is the number of firms, 24). However, for the purpose of estimation one of the specific-firm 
effects has to be set to zero.  Assume the specific effect for firm n is set to zero (αn = 0). Under this 
formulation, the constant, α’, represents the specific-firm effect for firm n, so α’ = αn. The remaining (n-1) 
individual effects now represent deviation from firm n  [α’i = (αi - αn ) ].  Alternatively the constant, α, 
may be omitted.  In this case the fixed effects represent deviation from zero, so it is assumed that there is no 
common constant.  In any event, as both the constant and the firm-specific effects are eliminated from the 
FIXED effects model, their precise specification is irrelevant. The firm-specific deviations, αi, from the 




Where n is the number of firms (24), RSST is the Residual Sum of Squares from the 
TOTAL model and RSSF is the Residual Sum of Squares from the FIXED effects model.  
The null hypothesis is that there are no firm-specific effects: α1 = α2 = …. = αn –1 = 033. 
The FIXED effects model assumes that the differences between firms are 
permanent.  In contrast, the RANDOM effects model assumes that the firm-specific terms 
are randomly distributed across firms.  In this case Equation (4.3) becomes:  
Yi,t  =  (α + ui) + Σ βk Xk,i,t + εi,t   =  α + Σ βk Xk,i,t + ωi,t,         (4.7) 
ωi,t =  (εi,t + ui)             (4.8) 
Where ui is the random disturbance characterising firm i and is constant through time. 
Under this formulation the disturbance ωi,t is correlated across observations for the same 
firm i.  This means that OLS estimates are no longer efficient.  Instead a FGLS 
transformation is applied where [1 – SQRT(θ)] times the individual firm mean is 
subtracted from each variable (including the constant term)34.  Theta (θ) is defined as 
follows: 
                   VWITH          .       
θ  =   VWITH – T x VBET                                             (4.9) 
  
T is the number of time observations for firm i, and is not necessarily equal for all firms.  
                                                          
33 Refer to the previous footnote for the reason that there are (n-1) restrictions instead of n.  
34 If the variance components, σ2u and σ2ε were known, the Generalised Least Squares (GLS) transformation 




VWITH is the estimate of σ2ε, the variance of the basic disturbance terms, εi,t.  It is 
derived from the Sum of Squared Residuals (RSS) of the FIXED effects specification. 
(The FIXED effect RSS are based on deviations of individual firm/year observations 
from their firm means.)  VBET is the estimate of σ2u, the variance of the firm-specific 
disturbance terms, ui.  It is derived from the difference between the RSS from the 
TOTAL regression and the RSS from the FIXED effects regression.  (The TOTAL RSS 
are based on deviations of individual firm/year observations from the overall means.) 
Thus VBET is the difference between total variation of individual firm/year observations 
from the overall means, and the within group variation of individual firm/year 
observations from their firm means. It hence represents variation due to differences 
between firms.  
At the one extreme, when θ = 1 this implies VBET = 0 so ui is constant and the 
RANDOM effects Equation (4.7) is the same as the TOTAL Equation (4.4).   At the other 
extreme, when θ = 0 this implies VWITH = 0 and all variation across observations are 
due to the random individual effects, ui.  Because the ui's are constant over time, the 
RANDOM effect Equation (4.7) is equivalent to the FIXED effects Equation (4.3).  
Under this scenario the question of whether the firm-specific effects are fixed or random, 
becomes irrelevant, as the firm-specific effects are the only source of variation across 
firms.  Thus the value of theta (θ) indicates whether the TOTAL model should be 
                                                                                                                                                                             




preferred (if θ is closer to one) or whether the FIXED effects model better describes the 
behaviour of the data (if θ is closer to zero).  
Providing the FIXED effects model is preferred to the TOTAL specifications, the 
question is whether the RANDOM model should be preferred to the FIXED effects 
model.  For this purpose, the TSP 4.4 PANEL command generates the Hausman’s Test 
for fixed verses random effects.  Under the FIXED effects specifications there is no need 
to assume that the firm specific effects, αi, are uncorrelated with the other regressors.  
However, under the RANDOM effects specifications the specific effects are random and 
part of the disturbance terms as in Equation (4.8).  Under such specifications, if the firm 
specific effects are correlated with any of the explanatory variables, this would lead to the 
omitted variable problem resulting in the estimated coefficients becoming inconsistent.    
The Hausman Test utilises this difference to test for random verses fixed effects. 
In particular the null hypothesis is of no correlation between the random firm-specific 
effects and any of the explanatory variables. In this case both the OLS estimates from the 
FIXED effects regression and the FGLS estimates from the RANDOM effects regression 
are consistent but the former are inefficient due to autocorrelation in the disturbance 
terms.  Under the alternative hypothesis the OLS estimates from the FIXED effects 
regression are consistent but the FGLS estimates from the RANDOM effects regression 
are inconsistent due to correlation between the disturbance terms and the explanatory 




Based on the above and on the idea that the covariance of an efficient estimator 
with its difference from an inefficient estimator is zero, the Hausman Test is of the 
following form: 
             (bF – bR)2          .       
W  = Var(bF) – Var(bR)                                           (4.10) 
 
Where bF is the estimated coefficient from the FIXED effects model and bR is the 
estimated coefficient from the RANDOM effects model. Under the null hypothesis, W is 
distributed as a χ2(k).  Thus rejection of the test statistic is a rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient estimates from the RANDOM effects model are consistent, 
leading to preference of the FIXED effects model over the RANDOM effects model35.  
 
4.6 Estimation and testing results 
4.6.1  The yearly cross sectional analysis 
As discussed in section 4.5.1, there are four regressions per year for eight years (1992 to 
1999), leading to a total of thirty-two yearly regressions, which are presented in Table 
4.5.  Panel A of Table 4.5 presents the yearly regressions of the form (4.1’) and (4.1’’) 
where the dependent variable is LEVERAGE, that is, total liabilities to total assets.  Panel 
B of Table 4.5 presents the yearly regressions of the form (4.2’) and (4.2’’) where the 
dependent variable LOGLEV, is expressed in logarithmic form.   
                                                          
35 For derivation of the Hausman test see Greene (1997), pg. 632-633. 
253 
Table 4.5 The yearly regressions 1992 - 1999 
Panel A:  Ordinary Least Square regression of LEVERAGE on the determinants of capital 
structure 
 
Regression 1   2   3 4   
YEAR 1999   1999   1998 1998   
No. obs. 21   21   23 23   
Adj. R-2 0.3274   0.3336   0.5571 0.5082   
Variable Estimate  P-value Estimate  P-value Estimate  P-value Estimate  P-value 
C -1.1962  [.187] -0.7877  [.421] -0.7999  [.164] -1.0839  [.122] 
AGEINCOR -0.0018  [.125]    -0.0023 ** [.038]    
AGELIST    -0.0232  [.219]    -0.0199  [.212] 
SIZE 0.0919 * [.051] 0.0748  [.108] 0.0651 ** [.018] 0.0881 *** [.007] 
AVPROFIT -0.5896  [.469]    -0.0513  [.932]    
RESPROF    -0.5766  [.535]    0.1747  [.852] 
GROWTH -0.0322  [.920] 0.0663  [.818] -0.0074  [.980] -0.0080  [.979] 
RISK -0.1028  [.918] 0.1494  [.866] 2.9128 * [.063] 0.4255  [.727] 
ASSETS -0.1643  [.423] -0.2924  [.164] -0.2412 * [.085] -0.3479 ** [.031] 
TXSHIELD -0.6008  [.665]    -0.5434  [.672]    
RESTAX    1.0094  [.710]    0.4418  [.835] 
DEBTORS 0.0573  [.890] -0.0716  [.830] -0.0392  [.825] -0.0890  [.665] 
Regression 5   6 7 8  
YEAR 1997   1997 1996 1996  
No. obs. 24   24 24 24  
Adj. R-2 0.4562   0.5485 0.5104 0.6075  
Variable Estimate  P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate  P-value 
C -0.8751  [.283] -0.7199  [.394] -0.8813  [.344] -0.9173  [.269] 
AGEINCOR -0.0010  [.314]    -0.0010  [.248]    
AGELIST    -0.0180  [.192]    -0.0243  [.104] 
SIZE 0.0749 ** [.044] 0.0730 * [.055] 0.0762 * [.063] 0.0819 ** [.041] 
AVPROFIT -1.1153  [.340]    -0.6198  [.432]    
RESPROF    -0.7117  [.446]    -0.4923  [.437] 
GROWTH 0.0945  [.851] -0.1768  [.582] -0.1894  [.203] -0.4038 ** [.029] 
RISK -0.5925  [.591] -0.6740  [.492] -0.8885  [.552] -0.3511  [.781] 
ASSETS -0.3381 * [.083] -0.4198 ** [.023] -0.2892 * [.080] -0.3440 ** [.049] 
TXSHIELD 2.0581  [.293]    0.7464  [.548]    
RESTAX    1.9727  [.233]    0.7732  [.590] 
DEBTORS -0.3088  [.278] -0.4088 * [.091] -0.2960  [.208] -0.3101 * [.068] 
Regression 9   10 11 12  
YEAR 1995   1995 1994 1994  
No. obs. 22   22 18 18  
Adj. R-2 0.5800   0.6048 0.6638 0.6513  
Variable Estimate  P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate  P-value 
C -0.4224  [.537] -0.3794  [.579] -0.8879  [.203] -0.8475 ** [.031] 
AGEINCOR -0.0006  [.470]    -0.0007  [.600]    
AGELIST    -0.0166  [.404]    -0.0200  [.403] 
SIZE 0.0457  [.171] 0.0504  [.136] 0.0618 ** [.027] 0.0683 *** [.004] 
AVPROFIT -0.6300  [.388]    0.4460  [.761]    
RESPROF    -0.4269  [.490]    0.4925  [.750] 
GROWTH 0.7117 * [.079] 0.3765  [.293] 0.8844 ** [.041] 0.8452 ** [.049] 
RISK 0.5304  [.441] 0.2931  [.772] -0.6338  [.612] -0.8943  [.358] 
ASSETS -0.4815 *** [.002] -0.5279 *** [.004] -0.2135  [.362] -0.3219  [.259] 
TXSHIELD 2.0823 * [.096]    -0.0050  [.997]    
RESTAX    1.8678  [.118]    -0.6039  [.754] 
DEBTORS -0.4515  [.139] -0.5519 * [.068] -0.5587 * [.079] -0.6379 * [.053] 
Regression 13   14 15 16  
YEAR 1993   1993 1992 1992  
No. obs. 17   17 13 13  
Adj. R-2 0.6693   0.5744 0.5134 0.4076  
Variable Estimate  P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate  P-value 
C -0.2836  [.794] -0.6050  [.498] -3.2781  [.150] -1.8766  [.350] 
AGEINCOR -0.0014  [.399]    0.0004  [.829]    
AGELIST    -0.0282  [.297]    -0.0530  [.614] 
SIZE 0.0394  [.335] 0.0550  [.193] 0.1713 * [.087] 0.1299  [.192] 
AVPROFIT 0.2537  [.849]    2.2567  [.553]    
RESPROF    1.0478  [.504]    1.2738  [.788] 
GROWTH 1.1509 ** [.050] 1.0835 * [.067] -0.7615  [.534] -0.2691  [.773] 
RISK -0.9376  [.552] 0.3003  [.851] 2.3683  [.494] 0.8515  [.776] 
ASSETS -0.3941  [.170] -0.4438 * [.097] -0.1483  [.772] -0.4292  [.312] 
TXSHIELD 0.4718  [.774]    0.6054  [.818]    
RESTAX    0.4903  [.826]    1.6193  [.589] 
DEBTORS -0.2718  [.538] -0.6226  [.114] -0.5895  [.320] -0.5115  [.318] 
For details of firms included in the yearly regressions and for variable definitions see Tables 4A.1 and Appendix 4A, respectively;  
No regressions are run for the year 2000 due to insufficient number of observations; Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2);   
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Table 4.5 The yearly regressions 1992 - 1999 
Panel B:  Ordinary Least Square regression of LOGLEV on the determinants of capital 
structure 
 
Regression 1   2 3 4  
YEAR 1999   1999 1998 1998  
No. obs. 21   21 23 23  
Adj. R-2 0.3424   0.3038 0.5522 0.5153  
Variable Estimate  P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate  P-value 
C -5.0843 *** [.006] -4.0399 * [.085] -4.6388 ** [.022] -5.6272 *** [.003] 
AGEINCOR -0.0054  [.213]    -0.0057  [.114]    
AGELIST    -0.0618  [.179]    -0.0423  [.302] 
SIZE 0.2299 *** [.006] 0.1781 * [.081] 0.1801 ** [.045] 0.2357 *** [.006] 
AVPROFIT -1.4362  [.452] -0.8194  [.688] -0.0351  [.984] 0.9470  [.645] 
GROWTH 0.1169  [.899] 0.4778  [.601] 0.1046  [.901] 0.0132  [.989] 
RISK 0.2035  [.922] 0.4322  [.853] 7.3734  [.189] 1.7369  [.579] 
LOGASST -0.0835  [.694] -0.3412  [.139] -0.2729  [.136] -0.4270 ** [.023] 
LOGTAX 0.0869  [.643] 0.1042  [.604] 0.0973  [.587] 0.1018  [.594] 
DEBTORS 0.2131  [.701] -0.2708  [.720] -0.1389  [.784] -0.2703  [.647] 
Regression 5   6 7 8  
YEAR 1997   1997 1996 1996  
No. obs. 24   24 24 24  
Adj. R-2 0.5379   0.5909 0.5225 0.5589  
Variable Estimate  P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate  P-value 
C -5.3480 ** [.044] -4.6364 * [.092] -6.0909 ** [.046] -5.8550 * [.058] 
AGEINCOR -0.0016  [.660]    -0.0030  [.428]    
AGELIST    -0.0681  [.167]    -0.0790  [.174] 
SIZE 0.2628 ** [.038] 0.2330 * [.068] 0.3012 ** [.040] 0.2955 ** [.040] 
AVPROFIT -0.2859  [.934] -0.2182  [.943] -2.0656  [.426] -2.0540  [.368] 
GROWTH -1.4280  [.456] -1.8578  [.311] -0.7291  [.209] -1.2423  [.119] 
RISK -4.0983  [.151] -4.5062 * [.071] -3.0926  [.510] -3.4319  [.513] 
LOGASST -0.4939  [.130] -0.6095 * [.069] -0.4224  [.246] -0.5253  [.180] 
LOGTAX 0.2642  [.237] 0.2071  [.309] 0.2516  [.185] 0.2085  [.245] 
DEBTORS -0.7547  [.421] -0.7825  [.388] -0.9297  [.285] -0.9917  [.191] 
Regression 9   10 11 12  
YEAR 1995   1995 1994 1994  
No. obs. 22   22 18 18  
Adj. R-2 0.6161   0.6072 0.5707 0.5532  
Variable Estimate  P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate  P-value 
C -2.0238  [.239] -2.6905  [.116] -2.6673  [.561] -4.3861  [.249] 
AGEINCOR -0.0024  [.427]    -0.0061  [.404]    
AGELIST    -0.0309  [.619]    -0.1100  [.454] 
SIZE 0.1060  [.157] 0.1330  [.106] 0.1345  [.244] 0.2051 * [.093] 
AVPROFIT -3.8278  [.167] -3.0704  [.163] -5.4700  [.552] -4.0691  [.629] 
GROWTH 2.9375 ** [.025] 2.5687 ** [.047] 3.9750  [.171] 3.2321  [.245] 
RISK 1.1232  [.519] 0.4396  [.852] -2.0868  [.584] -3.5034  [.268] 
LOGASST -0.7258 *** [.001] -0.8172 *** [.001] -0.6989  [.257] -0.9882  [.214] 
LOGTAX 0.5208 ** [.011] 0.4918 ** [.015] 0.4038  [.465] 0.3134  [.543] 
DEBTORS -1.3890  [.113] -1.5694 * [.088] -1.6776  [.244] -2.3113 * [.069] 
Regression 13   14 15 16  
YEAR 1993   1993 1992 1992  
No. obs. 17   17 13 13  
Adj. R-2 0.5975   0.5959 0.4841 0.5046  
Variable Estimate  P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate  P-value 
C -0.7423  [.898] -4.2319  [.280] -20.6027 * [.086] -11.9494  [.328] 
AGEINCOR -0.0087  [.402]    0.0074  [.493]    
AGELIST    -0.1845  [.319]    -0.2450  [.565] 
SIZE 0.0192  [.922] 0.1313  [.430] 0.8390 * [.070] 0.5630  [.201] 
AVPROFIT -3.9601  [.644] -0.6753  [.928] 16.7412  [.377] 7.1418  [.700] 
GROWTH 5.5594  [.129] 4.9331  [.164] -8.0389  [.222] -4.7486  [.402] 
RISK -3.3665  [.525] 4.2169  [.327] 25.3146  [.167] 11.9912  [.390] 
LOGASST -1.3260 * [.093] -1.2448  [.112] -0.5249  [.663] -0.8455  [.555] 
LOGTAX 0.4181  [.382] 0.2669  [.493] 0.0426  [.942] 0.3605  [.677] 
DEBTORS -1.4131  [.538] -3.3386 ** [.030] -4.7896  [.177] -2.4252  [.481] 
For details of firms included in the yearly regressions and for variable definitions see Tables 4A.1 and Appendix 4A, 
respectively;  
No regressions are run for the year 2000 due to insufficient number of observations; Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-
consistent (HCTYPE=2);   




As shown in Table 4.5 the adjusted R-Squared values are relatively high for cross 
section regressions, and vary from about 30 percent to nearly 70 percent.  Further, 
excluding three explanatory variables (profitability, growth and risk) the estimated 
coefficients, including the constant, are in most cases consistently signed.  There is, 
however, problem with the significance of variables and, as noted in Section 4.5.1, low 
degrees of freedom cast doubt on the validity of these results.  Still, there are a number of 
observations worth noting with reference to Table 4.5, and these are mentioned here.   
Studying Table 4.5, the intercept, C, is consistently negatively signed in both 
Panel A when the dependent variable is LEVERAGE, and in Panel B when the dependent 
variable is LOGLEV.  It is, however, mostly insignificant.  In Panel A it is significant at 
the 5 percent significance level in only one of sixteen regressions, while in Panel B it 
appears to be more important, being significant in just over half of the yearly regressions.  
Although no prediction was made regarding the sign of the intercept, a negative sign is 
consistent with the results in Hussain (1997)36.  It is inconsistent, however, with other 
empirical results including Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Alderson and Betker (1995), 
and Jordan, Lowe and Taylor (1998). 
Similarly, the variables that alternatively represent the age of the firm, 
AGEINCOR and AGELIST, generally have negative estimated coefficients but appear 
mostly insignificant.  The estimated coefficient on age since incorporation, AGEINCOR, 
                                                          
36 Hussain (1997) finds the constant to be negative and significant for both Korea and Malaysia in all but 




is negative in all but two cases although it is significant at the 5 percent significance level 
in only one of these cases.   The estimated coefficient on age since listing on the 
Mauritius Stock Exchange, AGELIST, is always negative but never significant.  The 
negative sign is consistent with pecking order considerations, as summarised in Table 
4.2. 
Relatively strong results are obtained for SIZE, the variable measuring firm size 
in terms of turnover.  Indeed, consistent with the trade off theory and with control 
considerations as shown in Table 4.2, SIZE is consistently positively linked to the 
dependent variable.  In twelve out of thirty two regressions SIZE is also significant at the 
10 percent level or higher.  These findings are inconsistent with information asymmetries 
and pecking order explanations and with Titman and Wessels (1988).  However they are 
in line with the general findings in Alderson and Betker (1995), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Wiwattanakantang (1999), Jordan, Lowe and Taylor (1998), Hussain (1997) and 
Hirota (1999).   
The estimated coefficient on the firm profitability measure, AVPROFIT, is 
insignificant in all the yearly regressions and is also inconsistently signed.  This apparent 
insignificance and inconsistency persist even when AVPROFIT is replaced by the 
residual, RESPROF, which attempts to deal with the possible effects of near 
multicollinearity.   Based on pecking order theory and on agency theory when the market 
for corporate control is inefficient, Table 4.2 predicts a negative association between 




theory explanation or with agency theory when the market for corporate control is 
efficient.   In any case, the inconsistent relation between profitability and leverage is not 
uncommon in the literature.  For example, in Hussain (1997) the estimated coefficient on 
the profitability measure is positive and significant in the case of Korea, but negative and 
significant in the case of Malaysia.  In contrast, Jordan, Lowe and Taylor (1998) find the 
sign on the estimated coefficients on the profitability variable to be consistently positive, 
although insignificantly so in the FGLS regression.  Other studies including Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wiwattanakantang (1999), and Hirota (1999) 
generally find profitability to be negatively related to leverage.  
Similar to the case for the profitability variable, the sign on the estimated 
coefficient on the firm growth variable, GROWTH, is also inconsistent. GROWTH 
appears significant in only a quarter of the thirty-two yearly regressions although in seven 
out of these eight cases it is positively related to the leverage measure.  A positive link is 
consistent with pecking order and corporate governance theories but inconsistent with the 
trade off and agency theories.  Negative but insignificant relationship between growth 
and leverage is reported in Titman and Wessels (1988) and in Jordan, Lowe and Taylor 
(1998) while Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wiwattanakantang (1999), and Hirota (1999) 
report negative and significant association.  
The third inconsistently signed variable in Table 4.5 is the firm risk variable, 
RISK.  This variable is weakly significant in only two of thirty-two cases, positively 




with this study’s prediction of a negative link between leverage and firm risk based on 
the trade off and agency theories.  However, like in the case of profitability, the failure to 
find strong evidence for the nature of the risk-leverage link, is also reflected in the results 
of other studies.  Specifically, Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) show the estimated 
coefficient on the firm risk variable to be negative and significant while Jordan, Lowe 
and Taylor (1998) show it to be significant but positive. In Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Hirota (1999) evidence concerning risk is generally weak.   
The results are relatively strong for the asset structure of the firm, whether it is 
measured by the ratio of fixed to total assets, ASSETS, or by the logarithmic form of this 
ratio, LOGASST.  The estimated coefficients for both proxies are consistently negatively 
signed and significant in fourteen out of the thirty-two yearly regressions.  This negative 
association between tangibility and debt is inconsistent with the trade off based 
explanations given in Section 4.3.2 as summarised in Table 4.2.  It is also inconsistent 
with the agency rationale according to which leverage will be higher in firms with many 
tangible assets because it is more difficult to engage in risk shifting when tangible assets 
are already in place (Wiwattanakantang, 1999).  Furthermore, these findings are 
inconsistent with the results in Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wiwattanakantang (1999), 
Jordan, Lowe and Taylor (1998) and Hirota (1999).   However, a negative relationship 
between asset structure and leverage, is consistent with the agency-based rationale 
concerning the monitoring role of debt.  Particularly, as noted in Titman and Wessels 




assets tend to employ debt as a monitoring device.  
The non-debt tax shield generally appears to be positively related to the dependent 
variable. This is contrary to the trade off based prediction of Table 4.2, but is in line with 
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) who report a positive (and significant) association 
between the non-debt tax shield and leverage.  However, the results of Table 4.5 also 
indicate that the association between the non-debt tax shield and leverage is weak, which 
is consistent with Alderson and Betker (1995) and Titman and Wessels (1988).   For 
example, TXSHIELD, the ratio of depreciation to total assets, has positive estimated 
coefficients in five out of eight cases but is weakly significant at the 10 percent 
significance level in only one of these cases.  Likewise, RESTAX, the residual from a 
regression of TXSHIELD on the rest of the explanatory variables, has positive estimated 
coefficients in seven out of eight cases but is significant in none.  LOGTAX, the 
logarithmic form of TXSHIELD, shows somewhat stronger results in terms of 
consistency, as it is positively related to LOGLEV across the sixteen regressions in which 
it is included.  It is significant at the 5 percent significance level in only two of these 
regressions thus, like TXSHIELD and RESTAX, LOGTAX also appears unimportant.  
These results are at variance with the negative and significant association between non-
debt tax shields and leverage as arising from the general results in Wiwattanakantang 
(1999) and Hirota (1999). 
Lastly, DEBTORS, measuring the size of net debtors, is negatively related to the 




these cases. These results conflict with the prediction of a positive relationship as 
explained in Section 4.3.2.  The insignificance of most explanatory variables in the yearly 
analysis and the low degrees of freedom in these regressions, call for an alternative 
empirical approach to explain leverage ratios in the sample studied.   Thus attention is 
now turned to the panel data procedure.   
 
4.6.2 Time series cross sectional analysis – the panel data procedure 
 
The results of the cross section yearly analysis, show firm size to be an important 
explanatory variable in the capital structure decisions of non-financial listed firms in 
Mauritius.  The results of the panel data procedure are organised in a structure consistent 
with these findings and are presented in Table 4.6, which is dividend into six Panels A to 
F.  Panels A, B and C give the results of the regressions where the dependent variable is 
LEVERAGE, the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  Panels D, E and F give the 
results from the regressions where the dependent variable, LOGLEV, is in logarithmic 
form.  The panels of Table 4.6 can be further grouped as follows.  In Panels A and D the 
firm size variable is SIZE, which is measured in terms of turnover as in the yearly 
regressions.   In Panels B and E SIZE is substituted for by SIZE2, measuring firm size in 
terms of total assets.  Finally, in Panels C and F the firm size variable is dropped and is 
replaced by two dummies, SMALL and LARGE, representing the largest and the smallest 
firm size observations.  
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Table 4.6  Panel regressions for period 1992 - 2000 
Panel A: Dependent variable is LEVERAGE. Firm size variable is SIZE 
 
MODEL  1  2  3  4  
Firm effects  RANDOM RANDOM  RANDOM RANDOM  
No. obs. 164   164   164   164   
Adj. R-2 0.5725   0.5353   0.5722   0.5354   
LM het. Test 1.3811 [.240]  0.0228 [.880] 1.5363 [.215]  0.0076 [.930]  
Variable Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  
AGEINCOR -0.0011 [.080] *   -0.0011 [.085] *   
AGELIST    -0.0009 [.757]    -0.0008 [.760]  
SIZE 0.0713 [.000] *** 0.0744 [.000] *** 0.0714 [.000] *** 0.0745 [.000] *** 
AVPROFIT -0.4319 [.039] ** -0.3330 [.122]  -0.4187 [.046] ** -0.3204 [.136]  
GROWTH 0.1123 [.004] *** 0.1110 [.005] *** 0.1103 [.005] *** 0.1088 [.006] *** 
RISK -0.0562 [.657]  -0.0653 [.609]      
ARISK      -0.3965 [.391]  -0.4364 [.346]  
ASSETS -0.3157 [.000] *** -0.3168 [.000] *** -0.3202 [.000] *** -0.3215 [.000] *** 
TXSHIELD 0.1284 [.809]  0.2445 [.646]  0.1442 [.786]  0.2600 [.625]  
DEBTORS -0.4545 [.000] *** -0.4816 [.000] *** -0.4570 [.000] *** -0.4836 [.000] *** 
C -0.8289 [.003] *** -0.9472 [.002] *** -0.8312 [.003] *** -0.9480 [.002] *** 
F-test FIXED v TOTAL F(23,132) = 26.8600 [.0000] F(23,132) = 27.8310 [.0000] F(23,132) = 26.9950 [.0000] F(23,132) = 27.9840 [.0000] 
Theta (0=WITHIN,1=TOTAL)  0.0281  0.0272  0.0280  0.0270  
Hausman test CHISQ(8) = 3.8195 [.8730] CHISQ(8) = 8.3388 [.4011] CHISQ(8) = 3.9159 [.8646] CHISQ(8) = 8.2988 [.4048] 
MODEL  5  6  7  8  
Firm effects  RANDOM RANDOM  RANDOM RANDOM  
No. obs. 164   164   164   164   
Adj. R-2 0.6077   0.5733   0.6111   0.5743   
LM het. Test 0.7525 [.386]  0.1588 [.690]  0.9053 [.341]  0.2213 [.638]  
Variable Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  
RESAGE -0.0020 [.001] ***   -0.0019 [.001] ***   
AGELIST    -0.0015 [.580]    -0.0015 [.555]  
SIZE 0.0875 [.000] *** 0.0829 [.000] *** 0.0874 [.000] *** 0.0834 [.000] *** 
RESPROF 0.4458 [.087] * 0.1662 [.515]  0.4013 [.116]  0.1578 [.530]  
GROWTH 0.1432 [.001] *** 0.0854 [.034] ** 0.1355 [.001] *** 0.0809 [.044] ** 
RISK -0.2008 [.113]  -0.1451 [.271]      
ARISK      -0.7674 [.090] * -0.7689 [.103]  
ASSETS -0.3205 [.000] *** -0.3062 [.000] *** -0.3242 [.000] *** -0.3143 [.000] *** 
RESTAX 0.7810 [.292]  1.9229 [.009] *** 0.8322 [.264]  1.9804 [.006] *** 
DEBTORS -0.4970 [.000] *** -0.5255 [.000] *** -0.4919 [.000] *** -0.5241 [.000] *** 
C -1.2339 [.000] *** -1.1401 [.000] *** -1.2351 [.000] *** -1.1460 [.000] *** 
F-test FIXED v TOTAL F(23,132) = 25.9980 [.0000] F(23,132) = 25.5390 [.0000] F(23,132) = 25.9910 [.0000] F(23,132) = 25.8440 [.0000] 
Theta (0=WITHIN,1=TOTAL)  0.0291  0.0296  0.0291  0.0293  
Hausman test CHISQ(8) = 4.9854 [.7591] CHISQ(8) = 7.3171 [.5028] CHISQ(8) = 4.9438 [.7636] CHISQ(8) = 7.3586 [.4985] 
1. For variable definitions see Appendix 4A;  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively;  
2. Unbalanced data: No. of firms = 24; Minimum no. of time observations per firm = 4; Maximum no. of time observations per firm = 9; No. of firm/year observations = 164; See Appendix, Table 4A.1.  
3. Model is either Fixed effects (WITHIN): Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model where the firm individual mean is subtracted from each variable, or Random effects (VARCOMP): Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) model where data is transformed by subtracting [1-SQRT(θ)] 
times the individual firm mean from each variable.  Where Theta (θ) = VWITH / (VWITH + T * VBET) evaluated at TMAX=9.  If θ=1, this corresponds to VBET=0, and variation is due to individual (firm/year) observations.  If θ =0, this corresponds to VWITH=0, and variation is due to 
differences across firms that are constant across time. 
? VWITH is the estimated variance of the basic disturbance terms within individual (firm/year) observations.  It is based on the sum of squared residuals from the WITHIN model, and is computed from the small sample formula. 
? VBET is the estimated variance of the individual-specific disturbance terms and is the difference between VWITH and VTOT:  VBET = VTOT - VWITH    
? VTOT is the estimated variance of the disturbance terms from the TOTAL model, assuming both slope and intercept coefficients are the same. 
4. F-test FIXED versus TOTAL: Ho is that both slope and intercept coefficients are the same across all firms. Ha is that the regression slope coefficients are identical but that the intercepts are not.  
5. Hausman test:  Comaring the fixed effects and the random effects estimators.  Under Ho both OLS and FGLS estimators are consistent but the OLS is inefficient.  Under Ha OLS estimators are consistent but FGLS estimators are not. 
Table 4.6  Panel regressions for period 1992 - 2000 
Panel B: Dependent variable is LEVERAGE. Firm size variable is SIZE2 
 
MODEL  9  10  11   12  
Firm effects  RANDOM  RANDOM  RANDOM   RANDOM  
No. obs. 164   164   164   164   
Adj. R-2 0.6091   0.5168   0.6090   0.5179   
LM het. Test 0.7614 [.383]  2.1093 [.146]  0.8771 [.349]  1.9955 [.158]  
Variable Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  
AGEINCOR -0.0019 [.002] ***   -0.0019 [.002] ***    
AGELIST    -0.0052 [.085] *   -0.0052 [.085] * 
SIZE2 0.0890 [.000] *** 0.1024 [.000] *** 0.0891 [.000] *** 0.1025 [.000] *** 
AVPROFIT -0.1776 [.396]  -0.0999 [.635]  -0.1643 [.433]  -0.0847 [.688]  
GROWTH 0.0799 [.040] ** 0.0744 [.059] * 0.0779 [.045] ** 0.0720 [.068] * 
RISK -0.0489 [.686]  -0.0876 [.474]       
ARISK      -0.3833 [.386]  -0.4927 [.267]  
ASSETS -0.3048 [.000] *** -0.3375 [.000] *** -0.3095 [.000] *** -0.3416 [.000] *** 
TXSHIELD 1.3672 [.010] ** 1.7751 [.002] *** 1.3831 [.009] *** 1.7953 [.002] *** 
DEBTORS -0.4727 [.000] *** -0.5140 [.000] *** -0.4755 [.000] *** -0.5152 [.000] *** 
C -1.2595 [.000] *** -1.5892 [.000] *** -1.2610 [.000] *** -1.5940 [.000] *** 
F-test FIXED v TOTAL F(23,132) = 26.4780 [.0000] F(23,132) = 30.7980 [.0000] F(23,132) = 26.6030 [.0000] F(23,132) =  30.9560 [.0000] 
Theta (0=WITHIN,1=TOTAL)  0.0286  0.0245  0.0284   0.0244  
Hausman test CHISQ(8) = 7.5655 [.4770] CHISQ(8) = 13.0450 [.1103] CHISQ(8) = 7.7290 [.4604] CHISQ(8) =  13.0390 [.1105] 
MODEL  13  14  15   16  
Firm effects  RANDOM RANDOM  RANDOM RANDOM  
No. obs. 164   164   164   164   
Adj. R-2 0.5000   0.4786   0.4965   0.4794   
LM het. Test 0.0035 [.953]  1.1952 [.274]  0.0013 [.971]  1.0451 [.307]  
Variable Estimate P-value Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  
RESAGE -0.0004 [.468]    -0.0004 [.549]     
AGELIST    -0.0035 [.227]    -0.0035 [.233]  
SIZE2 0.0704 [.000] *** 0.0847 [.000] *** 0.0705 [.000] *** 0.0842 [.000] *** 
RESPROF 0.1559 [.560]  0.1083 [.668]  0.1316 [.614]  0.0932 [.708]  
GROWTH 0.0868 [.055] * 0.0586 [.154]  0.0808 [.071] * 0.0554 [.177]  
RISK -0.1312 [.312]  -0.1423 [.268]       
ARISK      -0.6018 [.191]  -0.6576 [.152]  
ASSETS -0.3217 [.000] *** -0.3382 [.000] *** -0.3257 [.000] *** -0.3437 [.000] *** 
RESTAX 1.0583 [.169]  1.4936 [.038] ** 1.1238 [.145]  1.5114 [.033] ** 
DEBTORS -0.5220 [.000] *** -0.5410 [.000] *** -0.5202 [.000] *** -0.5371 [.000] *** 
C -0.9092 [.000] *** -1.1728 [.000] *** -0.9110 [.000] *** -1.1634 [.000] *** 
F-test FIXED v TOTAL F(23,132) = 31.3980 [.0000] F(23,132) = 31.8230 [.0000] F(23,132) = 31.6870 [.0000] F(23,132) =  32.1370 [.0000] 
Theta (0=WITHIN,1=TOTAL)  0.0240  0.0237  0.0238   0.0235  
Hausman test CHISQ(8) = 9.2373 [.3227] CHISQ(8) = 13.0360 [.1106] CHISQ(8) = 9.8133 [.2784] CHISQ(8) = 13.1430 [.1070] 
1. For variable definitions see Appendix 4A;  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively;  
2. Unbalanced data: No. of firms = 24; Minimum no. of time observations per firm = 4; Maximum no. of time observations per firm = 9; No. of firm/year observations = 164; See Appendix, Table 4A.1.  
3. Model is either Fixed effects (WITHIN): Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model where the firm individual mean is subtracted from each variable, or Random effects (VARCOMP): Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) model where data is transformed by subtracting [1-SQRT(θ)] 
times the individual firm mean from each variable.  Where Theta (θ) = VWITH / (VWITH + T * VBET) evaluated at TMAX=9.  If θ=1, this corresponds to VBET=0, and variation is due to individual (firm/year) observations.  If θ =0, this corresponds to VWITH=0, and variation is due to 
differences across firms that are constant across time. 
? VWITH is the estimated variance of the basic disturbance terms within individual (firm/year) observations.  It is based on the sum of squared residuals from the WITHIN model, and is computed from the small sample formula. 
? VBET is the estimated variance of the individual-specific disturbance terms and is the difference between VWITH and VTOT:  VBET = VTOT - VWITH    
? VTOT is the estimated variance of the disturbance terms from the TOTAL model, assuming both slope and intercept coefficients are the same. 
4. F-test FIXED versus TOTAL: Ho is that both slope and intercept coefficients are the same across all firms. Ha is that the regression slope coefficients are identical but that the intercepts are not.  
5. Hausman test:  Comaring the fixed effects and the random effects estimators.  Under Ho both OLS and FGLS estimators are consistent but the OLS is inefficient.  Under Ha OLS estimators are consistent but FGLS estimators are not. 
Table 4.6  Panel regressions for period 1992 - 2000 
Panel C:  Dependent variable is LEVERAGE. Firm size variables are SMALL and LARGE 
 
MODEL  17  18  19  20  
Firm effects  FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED  
No. obs. 164   164   164   164   
Adj. R-2 0.9143   0.9143   0.9147   0.9147   
LM het. Test 0.6475 [.421]  0.6475 [.421]  0.5942 [.441]  0.5942 [.441]  
Variable Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  
AGEINCOR 0.0067 [.018] **   0.0067 [.018] **   
AGELIST    0.0067 [.018] **   0.0067 [.018] ** 
AVPROFIT -0.2124 [.393]  -0.2124 [.393]  -0.1958 [.431]  -0.1958 [.431]  
GROWTH 0.1360 [.001] *** 0.1360 [.001] *** 0.1338 [.001] *** 0.1338 [.001] *** 
RISK -0.0504 [.702]  -0.0504 [.702]      
ARISK      -0.4220 [.378]  -0.4220 [.378]  
ASSETS -0.2388 [.004] *** -0.2388 [.004] *** -0.2456 [.003] *** -0.2456 [.003] *** 
TXSHIELD -0.0330 [.960]  -0.0330 [.960]  0.0023 [.997]  0.0023 [.997]  
DEBTORS -0.5131 [.000] *** -0.5131 [.000] *** -0.5193 [.000] *** -0.5193 [.000] *** 
SMALL -0.0263 [.410]  -0.0263 [.410]  -0.0268 [.400]  -0.0268 [.400]  
LARGE 0.0339 [.174]  0.0339 [.174]  0.0350 [.160]  0.0350 [.160]  
F-test FIXED v TOTAL F(23,131) = 26.0020 [.0000] F(23,131) = 26.8350 [.0000] F(23,131) = 26.1540 [.0000] F(23,131) = 27.0120 [.0000] 
Theta (0=WITHIN,1=TOTAL)  0.0289  0.0280  0.0287  0.0278  
Hausman test CHISQ(9) = 22.7100 [.0069] CHISQ(9) = 23.3440 [.0055] CHISQ(9) = 22.9420 [.0063] CHISQ(9) = 23.3440 [.0055] 
MODEL  21  22  23  24  
Firm effects  FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED  
No. obs. 164   164   164   164   
Adj. R-2 0.9104   0.9142   0.9108   0.9149   
LM het. Test 1.9030 [.168]  1.0989 [.295]  1.8743 [.171]  0.9429 [.332]  
Variable Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  
RESAGE -0.0011 [.189]    -0.0008 [.279]    
AGELIST    0.0073 [.006] ***   0.0071 [.007] *** 
RESPROF 0.3719 [.238]  0.1762 [.546]  0.3099 [.310]  0.1778 [.533]  
GROWTH 0.1646 [.001] *** 0.1346 [.001] *** 0.1530 [.002] *** 0.1311 [.002] *** 
RISK -0.2126 [.132]  -0.0869 [.531]      
ARISK      -0.8374 [.092] * -0.5692 [.249]  
ASSETS -0.3209 [.000] *** -0.2156 [.007] *** -0.3260 [.000] *** -0.2259 [.005] *** 
RESTAX 0.5991 [.533]  0.6582 [.435]  0.7112 [.462]  0.7481 [.366]  
DEBTORS -0.5921 [.000] *** -0.5536 [.000] *** -0.5874 [.000] *** -0.5560 [.000] *** 
SMALL -0.0535 [.090] * -0.0280 [.378]  -0.0525 [.096] * -0.0282 [.373]  
LARGE 0.0677 [.005] *** 0.0360 [.149]  0.0676 [.005] *** 0.0372 [.134]  
F-test FIXED v TOTAL F(23,131) = 22.4590 [.0000] F(23,131) = 24.0570 [.0000] F(23,131) = 22.6030 [.0000] F(23,131) = 24.3140 [.0000] 
Theta (0=WITHIN,1=TOTAL)  0.0335  0.0313  0.0333  0.0309  
Hausman test CHISQ(9) = 16.7490 [.0528] CHISQ(9) = 26.0690 [.0020] CHISQ(9) = 17.4460 [.0422] CHISQ(9) = 26.2560 [.0019] 
1. For variable definitions see Appendix 4A;  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively;  
2. Unbalanced data: No. of firms = 24; Minimum no. of time observations per firm = 4; Maximum no. of time observations per firm = 9; No. of firm/year observations = 164; See Appendix, Table 4A.1.  
3. Model is either Fixed effects (WITHIN): Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model where the firm individual mean is subtracted from each variable, or Random effects (VARCOMP): Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) model where data is transformed by subtracting [1-SQRT(θ)] 
times the individual firm mean from each variable.  Where Theta (θ) = VWITH / (VWITH + T * VBET) evaluated at TMAX=9.  If θ=1, this corresponds to VBET=0, and variation is due to individual (firm/year) observations.  If θ =0, this corresponds to VWITH=0, and variation is due to 
differences across firms that are constant across time. 
? VWITH is the estimated variance of the basic disturbance terms within individual (firm/year) observations.  It is based on the sum of squared residuals from the WITHIN model, and is computed from the small sample formula. 
? VBET is the estimated variance of the individual-specific disturbance terms and is the difference between VWITH and VTOT:  VBET = VTOT - VWITH    
? VTOT is the estimated variance of the disturbance terms from the TOTAL model, assuming both slope and intercept coefficients are the same. 
4. F-test FIXED versus TOTAL: Ho is that both slope and intercept coefficients are the same across all firms. Ha is that the regression slope coefficients are identical but that the intercepts are not.  
5. Hausman test:  Comaring the fixed effects and the random effects estimators.  Under Ho both OLS and FGLS estimators are consistent but the OLS is inefficient.  Under Ha OLS estimators are consistent but FGLS estimators are not. 
Table 4.6  Panel regressions for period 1992 - 2000 
Panel D:  Dependent variable is LOGLEV. Firm size variable is SIZE 
 
MODEL  25  26  27  28  
Firm effects  RANDOM RANDON  RANDOM RANDOM  
No. obs. 164   164   164   164   
Adj. R-2 0.5446   0.5070   0.5438   0.5066   
LM het. Test 15.1260 [.000]  16.4652 [.000]  14.8920 [.000]  16.0746 [.000]  
Variable Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  
AGEINCOR -0.0032 [.199]    -0.0031 [.211]    
AGELIST    0.0088 [.490]    0.0094 [.457]  
SIZE 0.2839 [.000] *** 0.2757 [.000] *** 0.2859 [.000] *** 0.2760 [.000] *** 
AVPROFIT -1.2723 [.186]  -0.5567 [.567]  -1.2004 [.214]  -0.4785 [.622]  
GROWTH 0.6206 [.001] *** 0.6207 [.001] *** 0.6092 [.001] *** 0.6095 [.001] *** 
RISK -0.6618 [.283]  -0.6291 [.312]      
ARISK      -2.6990 [.233]  -2.7207 [.231]  
LOGASST -0.7296 [.000] *** -0.7025 [.000] *** -0.7403 [.000] *** -0.7124 [.000] *** 
LOGTAX 0.0850 [.203]  0.0943 [.158]  0.0868 [.194]  0.0960 [.151]  
DEBTORS -1.9696 [.000] *** -2.0873 [.000] *** -1.9653 [.000] *** -2.0835 [.000] *** 
C -6.9183 [.000] *** -6.9494 [.000] *** -6.9865 [.000] *** -6.9807 [.000] *** 
F-test FIXED v TOTAL F(23,132) = 14.9920 [.0000] F(23,132) = 16.2080 [.0000] F(23,132) = 15.1130 [.0000] F(23,132) = 16.3860 [.0000] 
Theta (0=WITHIN,1=TOTAL)  0.0508  0.0469  0.0504  0.0464  
Hausman test CHISQ(8) = 5.9174 [.6565] CHISQ(8) = 7.4562 [.4883] CHISQ(8) = 5.7102 [.6797] CHISQ(8) = 6.8082 [.5575] 
See previous panels for notes 
 
Panel E -  Dependent variable is LOGLEV. Firm size variable is SIZE2 
 
MODEL  29  30  31  32  
Firm effects  RANDOM RANDOM RANDOM RANDOM  
No. obs. 164   164   164   164   
Adj. R-2 0.5695   0.4904   0.5689   0.4899   
LM het. Test 14.7647 [.000]  17.1127 [.000]  14.5471 [.000]  16.6799 [.000]  
Variable Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  
AGEINCOR -0.0057 [.015] **   -0.0057 [.016] **   
AGELIST    0.0037 [.776]    0.0045 [.729]  
SIZE2 0.3021 [.000] *** 0.2871 [.000] *** 0.3040 [.000] *** 0.2873 [.000] *** 
AVPROFIT -0.4956 [.614]  0.3106 [.753]  -0.4184 [.671]  0.4007 [.685]  
GROWTH 0.5151 [.007] *** 0.5383 [.005] *** 0.5030 [.008] *** 0.5261 [.006] *** 
RISK -0.7020 [.249]  -0.7420 [.229]      
ARISK      -2.8116 [.210]  -3.0576 [.174]  
LOGASST -0.7514 [.000] *** -0.7651 [.000] *** -0.7619 [.000] *** -0.7741 [.000] *** 
LOGTAX 0.2088 [.002] *** 0.2159 [.002] *** 0.2114 [.002] *** 0.2178 [.001] *** 
DEBTORS -2.0645 [.000] *** -2.2489 [.000] *** -2.0584 [.000] *** -2.2407 [.000] *** 
C -6.9290 [.000] *** -6.9386 [.000] *** -6.9934 [.000] *** -6.9738 [.000] *** 
F-test FIXED v TOTAL F(23,132) = 13.8100 [.0000] F(23,132) = 16.4070 [.0000] F(23,132) = 13.8760 [.0000] F(23,132) = 16.5610 [.0000] 
Theta (0=WITHIN,1=TOTAL)  0.0552  0.0463  0.0550  0.0459  
Hausman test CHISQ(8) = 8.5824 [.3787] CHISQ(8) = 12.6870 [.1231] CHISQ(8) = 8.6277 [.3747] CHISQ(8) = 12.2170 [.1418] 
See previous panels for notes 
Table 4.6  Panel regressions for period 1992 - 2000 
Panel F:  Dependent variable is LOGLEV. Firm size variables are SMALL and LARGE 
 
MODEL  33  34  35  36  
Firm effects  FIXED RANDOM FIXED RANDOM  
No. obs. 164   164   164   164   
Adj. R-2 0.8573   0.4315   0.8580   0.4300   
LM het. Test 38.4282 [.000]  18.3321 [.000]  37.8526 [.000]  17.7144 [.000]  
Variable Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  
AGEINCOR 0.0324 [.019] **   0.0326 [.017] **   
AGELIST    0.0214 [.080] *   0.0220 [.069] * 
AVPROFIT -0.2142 [.857]  -0.4844 [.624]  -0.1221 [.918]  -0.3972 [.687]  
GROWTH 0.7105 [.000] *** 0.7268 [.000] *** 0.6987 [.000] *** 0.7138 [.000] *** 
RISK -0.5491 [.394]  -0.6608 [.295]      
ARISK      -2.7070 [.250]  -2.9527 [.199]  
LOGASST -0.6126 [.005] *** -0.7339 [.000] *** -0.6325 [.004] *** -0.7453 [.000] *** 
LOGTAX 0.0757 [.319]  0.1028 [.130]  0.0791 [.297]  0.1047 [.123]  
DEBTORS -2.2982 [.000] *** -2.2145 [.000] *** -2.3120 [.000] *** -2.2140 [.000] *** 
SMALL -0.1026 [.506]  -0.1378 [.284]  -0.1038 [.500]  -0.1372 [.286]  
LARGE 0.2477 [.042] ** 0.3407 [.001] *** 0.2509 [.039] ** 0.3427 [.001] *** 
C    -1.5463 [.000] ***   -1.5742 [.000] *** 
F-test FIXED v TOTAL F(23,131) = 15.3420 [.0000] F(23,131) = 16.4640 [.0000] F(23,131) = 15.4890 [.0000] F(23,131) = 16.6600 [.0000] 
Theta (0=WITHIN,1=TOTAL)  0.0493  0.0459  0.0488  0.0454  
Hausman test CHISQ(9) = 15.9240 [.0685] CHISQ(9) = 13.5360 [.1398] CHISQ(9) = 16.2390 [.0620] CHISQ(9) = 13.3240 [.1485] 
1. For variable definitions see Appendix 4A;  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively;  
2. Unbalanced data: No. of firms = 24; Minimum no. of time observations per firm = 4; Maximum no. of time observations per firm = 9; No. of firm/year observations = 164; See Appendix, Table 4A.1. 
3. Model is either Fixed effects (WITHIN): Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model where the firm individual mean is subtracted from each variable, or Random effects (VARCOMP): Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) model where data is 
transformed by subtracting [1-SQRT(θ)] times the individual firm mean from each variable.  Where Theta (θ) = VWITH / (VWITH + T * VBET) evaluated at TMAX=9.  If θ=1, this corresponds to VBET=0, and variation is due to individual 
(firm/year) observations.  If θ =0, this corresponds to VWITH=0, and variation is due to differences across firms that are constant across time. 
? VWITH is the estimated variance of the basic disturbance terms within individual (firm/year) observations.  It is based on the sum of squared residuals from the WITHIN model, and is computed from the small sample formula. 
? VBET is the estimated variance of the individual-specific disturbance terms and is the difference between VWITH and VTOT:  VBET = VTOT - VWITH    
? VTOT is the estimated variance of the disturbance terms from the TOTAL model, assuming both slope and intercept coefficients are the same. 
4. F-test FIXED versus TOTAL: Ho is that both slope and intercept coefficients are the same across all firms. Ha is that the regression slope coefficients are identical but that the intercepts are not.  
5. Hausman test:  Comaring the fixed effects and the random effects estimators.  Under Ho both OLS and FGLS estimators are consistent but the OLS is inefficient.  Under Ha OLS estimators are consistent but FGLS estimators are not. 
 
 
In Panels A and D of Table 4.6, (when firm size is SIZE), and in Panels B and E 
(when firm size is SIZE2), the Hausman test does not reject in any case, the null 
hypothesis that the FIXED effects estimates are inefficient.  Thus with SIZE and SIZE2 
the Hausman test rules in favour of the RANDOM effects model.   In contrast, in Panel C 
both the F-test of the FIXED effects versus the TOTAL model and the Hausman test of 
the RANDOM effects versus the FIXED effects, select the FIXED effect model.  Choice 
between RANODM effects and FIXED effects models is mixed in Panel F (where, like in 
the case of Panel C, the size variable is dropped and replaced by the dummies SMALL 
and LARGE)37.  
The first observation that emerges from looking at Table 4.6 reinforces the 
findings from the yearly regressions, namely the importance of firm size in determining 
the firm debt ratio.  Throughout Table 4.6 the size variables, SIZE and SIZE2 are always 
highly significant with positively signed estimated coefficients.  Furthermore, the effect 
of the firm size variables could also be the reason that the selected models in Panel C and 
to a lesser extent in Panel F of Table 4.6 is the FIXED effects model, while in the rest of 
the Panels it is always the RANDOM effects model.  Specifically, by omitting an 
important explanatory variable (firm size), the assumption required for the RANDOM 
                                                          
37 Note that the LM test for heteroskedasticity is not rejected in all cases when the dependent variable is 
LEVERAGE (Panels A, B and C of Table 4.6).  In contrast, when the dependent variable is measured in log 
terms, (LOGLEVE), the null of homoskedasticity is always rejected (Panels D, E and F of Table 4.6).  
These results imply that the model based on Equation (4.1) provide more efficient estimates thus focusing 




effects estimates to retain their consistency, is no longer valid38.  
When the firm size variable is dropped, as in Panels C and F of Table 4.6, its 
effect is likely to be reflected in the firm-specific effects.  Indeed, this is borne by the 
fixed effects estimates presented in Table 4.739. As can be seen from Panels A and B of 
Table 4.7, when SIZE/SIZE2 is included in the model specification, the fixed effects 
estimates are negative.  However, in Panel C, when SIZE/SIZE2 is omitted, there is a 
marked increase in the estimated values of the fixed effects, to the extent, in most cases, 
that they turn positive.  Further, the overall means from the BETWEEN model (top raw 
of Table 4.7) also change from negative in Panels A and B, to positive in Panel C, when 
SIZE/SIZE2 is omitted.  Similar conclusions can be drawn when the dependent variable 
is in logarithmic form (LOGLEV) as presented in Panel D of Table 4.740.   
                                                          
38 The assumption required to retain the consistency of the RANDOM effects estimates, as explained in 
Section 4.5.2, is that there is no correlation between the disturbance terms and any of the explanatory 
variables. 
39 The fixed effects estimates in Table 4.7 are obtained from the BETWEEN regression as described in 
Section 4.5.2, and represent the deviation of each firm from the common mean. 
40 Looking at Panel D of Table 4.7, the following observations are noted.  The estimated fixed effects in the 
LOGLEV regressions remain negative when the firm size variables are replaced by the dummies SMALL 
and LARGE, (Models 33 to 36). However, their values are substantially higher compared with the 
regressions where SIZE/SIZE2 are included (Models 25 to 32). Furthermore, as in the LEVERAGE 
regressions, the overall means from the BETWEEN model change from negative to positive when the size 
variables are dropped and the size dummies introduced.  
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Table 4.7  Firm-specific effects (expressed in deviation from the common constant) 
Panel A: Dependent variable is LEVERAGE. Firm size variable is SIZE 
 
 COMPANY NAME model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7 model 8 
 Estimated constant (BETWEEN model) -0.8420 -0.7536 -0.8730 -0.8033 -1.0235 -0.7575 -1.0323 -0.7943 
 Commerce         
1 CMPL -0.7206 -0.6785 -0.7191 -0.6774 -1.4403 -0.8852 -1.4195 -0.9071 
2 COURTS (MAURITIUS) LTD -0.5006 -0.4866 -0.4985 -0.4846 -1.3672 -0.7132 -1.3426 -0.7394 
3 HAPPY WORLD FOODS LTD -0.6981 -0.6443 -0.6996 -0.6463 -1.4803 -0.9054 -1.4591 -0.9335 
4 HAREL MALLAC & CO. LTD -0.7299 -0.6505 -0.7304 -0.6516 -1.4667 -0.9103 -1.4452 -0.9366 
5 IRELAND BLYTH LTD -0.7149 -0.6635 -0.7172 -0.6663 -1.5701 -0.9460 -1.5480 -0.9793 
6 ROGERS & COMPANY LTD -0.5699 -0.4718 -0.5674 -0.4701 -1.3440 -0.7554 -1.3222 -0.7822 
7 SHELL MAURITIUS LTD -0.5797 -0.5774 -0.5842 -0.5819 -1.4607 -0.8674 -1.4372 -0.8974 
 Industry         
8 GAMMA-CIVIC LTD -0.4598 -0.3827 -0.4608 -0.3843 -1.2334 -0.6797 -1.2141 -0.7095 
9 MAURITIUS BREWERIES LTD -0.8287 -0.7516 -0.8284 -0.7519 -1.5825 -1.0470 -1.5613 -1.0719 
10 MCFI -0.7903 -0.7576 -0.7917 -0.7593 -1.5956 -1.0114 -1.5719 -1.0386 
11 MAURITIUS OIL REFINERIES LTD -0.7731 -0.7217 -0.7744 -0.7234 -1.5048 -0.9656 -1.4841 -0.9899 
12 MAURITIUS STATIONERY LTD -0.5219 -0.4682 -0.5232 -0.4699 -1.2960 -0.7368 -1.2715 -0.7615 
13 PLASTIC INDUSTRY (MTIUS) LTD -0.4678 -0.4140 -0.4717 -0.4184 -1.2019 -0.7100 -1.1829 -0.7371 
14 THE UNITED BASALT PRODUCTS LTD -0.7040 -0.6199 -0.7075 -0.6241 -1.4883 -0.9664 -1.4692 -0.9973 
 Leisure & hotels         
15 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS LTD -0.6430 -0.6360 -0.6474 -0.6404 -1.4517 -0.9666 -1.4339 -0.9934 
16 GRAND BAIE HOTEL LTD -0.6058 -0.5731 -0.6062 -0.5738 -1.4704 -0.8760 -1.4365 -0.8959 
17 NEW MAURITIUS HOTELS LTD -0.6148 -0.5400 -0.6131 -0.5390 -1.4750 -0.8406 -1.4442 -0.8668 
18 SUN RESORTS LTD -0.6133 -0.5923 -0.6127 -0.5919 -1.5432 -0.8817 -1.5096 -0.9069 
 Sugar         
19 HAREL FRERES LTD -0.7317 -0.6616 -0.7301 -0.6606 -1.5645 -0.9324 -1.5369 -0.9593 
20 MON DESERT ALMA LTD -1.0866 -0.7082 -1.0814 -0.7060 -1.2945 -0.9321 -1.2915 -0.9562 
21 MON TRESOR & MON DESERT LTD -0.9616 -0.8144 -0.9603 -0.8143 -1.5967 -1.0710 -1.5762 -1.0944 
22 SAVANNAH SUGAR ESTATES LTD -1.0078 -0.7578 -1.0054 -0.7575 -1.4745 -0.9972 -1.4620 -1.0239 
23 THE MOUNT SUGAR ESTATES LTD -0.9430 -0.7631 -0.9393 -0.7609 -1.5034 -0.9806 -1.4867 -1.0043 
 Transport         
24 AIR MAURITIUS LTD -0.3861 -0.3230 -0.3857 -0.3231 -1.2866 -0.6056 -1.2615 -0.6399 
 Explanatory variables in the Model:         
  AGEINCOR AGELIST AGEINCOR AGELIST RESAGE AGELIST RESAGE AGELIST 
  SIZE SIZE SIZE SIZE SIZE SIZE SIZE SIZE 
  AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT RESPROF RESPROF RESPROF RESPROF 
  GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH 
  RISK RISK ARISK ARISK RISK RISK ARISK ARISK 
  ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS 
  TXSHIELD TXSHIELD TXSHIELD TXSHIELD RESTAX RESTAX RESTAX RESTAX 
  DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS 
For number of yearly observations per firm and for variable definitions see Tables 4A.1 and Appendix 4A; For Models specifications see Table 4.6.  
The fixed effects estimates are obtained from the BETWEEN regression and represent the deviation of the ith firm from the common mean (the constant in the BETWEEN regression). 
The BETWEEN model is an OLS regression of the mean dependent variable of each firm on a constant and the means explanatory variables for each firm. 
Table 4.7  Firm-specific effects (expressed in deviation from the common constant) 
Panel B: Dependent variable is LEVERAGE. Firm size variable is SIZE2 
 
 COMPANY NAME model 9 model 10 model 11 model 12 model 13 model 14 model 15 model 16 
 Estimated constant (BETWEEN model) -1.2156 -1.0677 -1.2174 -1.1087 -0.6472 -0.4865 -0.7175 -0.5651 
 Commerce         
1 CMPL -2.3059 -2.5022 -2.2945 -2.4877 -1.2095 -1.9278 -1.1904 -1.8937 
2 COURTS (MAURITIUS) LTD -2.4662 -2.5316 -2.4508 -2.5152 -1.1040 -1.9334 -1.0829 -1.8968 
3 HAPPY WORLD FOODS LTD -2.4547 -2.7055 -2.4440 -2.6909 -1.2520 -2.0763 -1.2347 -2.0383 
4 HAREL MALLAC & CO. LTD -2.3177 -2.6884 -2.3087 -2.6737 -1.2777 -2.0818 -1.2604 -2.0443 
5 IRELAND BLYTH LTD -2.6536 -2.8935 -2.6418 -2.8780 -1.3277 -2.2274 -1.3114 -2.1881 
6 ROGERS & COMPANY LTD -2.2589 -2.7168 -2.2474 -2.6982 -1.1571 -2.0479 -1.1365 -2.0042 
7 SHELL MAURITIUS LTD -2.6163 -2.6272 -2.6039 -2.6147 -1.1683 -1.9841 -1.1523 -1.9466 
 Industry         
8 GAMMA-CIVIC LTD -2.1178 -2.4775 -2.1090 -2.4632 -1.0318 -1.8526 -1.0167 -1.8161 
9 MAURITIUS BREWERIES LTD -2.4414 -2.8012 -2.4320 -2.7862 -1.3874 -2.1826 -1.3696 -2.1436 
10 MCFI -2.5949 -2.7475 -2.5831 -2.7334 -1.3530 -2.1401 -1.3362 -2.1040 
11 MAURITIUS OIL REFINERIES LTD -2.3813 -2.6212 -2.3719 -2.6080 -1.2804 -2.0258 -1.2632 -1.9902 
12 MAURITIUS STATIONERY LTD -2.1633 -2.4141 -2.1544 -2.4012 -1.0919 -1.8436 -1.0753 -1.8083 
13 PLASTIC INDUSTRY (MTIUS) LTD -2.0394 -2.2901 -2.0327 -2.2796 -0.9897 -1.7118 -0.9773 -1.6792 
14 THE UNITED BASALT PRODUCTS LTD -2.3123 -2.7048 -2.3069 -2.6933 -1.2946 -2.0863 -1.2825 -2.0509 
 Leisure & hotels         
15 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS LTD -2.4654 -2.4981 -2.4555 -2.4877 -1.1610 -1.8704 -1.1479 -1.8359 
16 GRAND BAIE HOTEL LTD -2.4665 -2.6192 -2.4545 -2.6048 -1.2717 -2.0608 -1.2505 -2.0195 
17 NEW MAURITIUS HOTELS LTD -2.4677 -2.8165 -2.4549 -2.7984 -1.2988 -2.1949 -1.2781 -2.1513 
18 SUN RESORTS LTD -2.6889 -2.7871 -2.6734 -2.7700 -1.3090 -2.1761 -1.2876 -2.1336 
 Sugar         
19 HAREL FRERES LTD -2.5040 -2.8311 -2.4922 -2.8143 -1.3753 -2.2274 -1.3560 -2.1881 
20 MON DESERT ALMA LTD -1.0500 -2.8161 -1.0603 -2.7992 -1.4218 -2.2147 -1.4073 -2.1766 
21 MON TRESOR & MON DESERT LTD -2.1744 -2.8613 -2.1702 -2.8465 -1.4904 -2.2788 -1.4722 -2.2406 
22 SAVANNAH SUGAR ESTATES LTD -1.7105 -2.8771 -1.7130 -2.8615 -1.4708 -2.2856 -1.4556 -2.2488 
23 THE MOUNT SUGAR ESTATES LTD -1.9378 -2.7773 -1.9350 -2.7615 -1.4323 -2.2124 -1.4142 -2.1768 
 Transport         
24 AIR MAURITIUS LTD -2.3887 -2.6831 -2.3752 -2.6651 -1.0632 -2.0162 -1.0451 -1.9756 
 Explanatory variables in the Model:         
  AGEINCOR AGELIST AGEINCOR AGELIST RESAGE AGELIST RESAGE AGELIST 
  SIZE2 SIZE2 SIZE2 SIZE2 SIZE2 SIZE2 SIZE2 SIZE2 
  AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT RESPROF RESPROF RESPROF RESPROF 
  GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH 
  RISK RISK ARISK ARISK RISK RISK ARISK ARISK 
  ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS 
  TXSHIELD TXSHIELD TXSHIELD TXSHIELD RESTAX RESTAX RESTAX RESTAX 
  DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS 
For number of yearly observations per firm and for variable definitions see Tables 4A.1 and Appendix 4A; For Models specifications see Table 4.6.  
The fixed effects estimates are obtained from the BETWEEN regression and represent the deviation of the ith firm from the common mean (the constant in the BETWEEN regression). 
The BETWEEN model is an OLS regression of the mean dependent variable of each firm on a constant and the means explanatory variables for each firm. 
Table 4.7  Firm-specific effects (expressed in deviation from the common constant) 
Panel C: Dependent variable is LEVERAGE. Firm size variables are the dummies SMALL and LARGE 
 
 COMPANY NAME model 17 model 18 model 19 model 20 model 21 model 22 model 23 model 24 
 Estimated constant (BETWEEN model) 0.4364 0.4412 0.3548 0.3535 0.5201 0.5974 0.4454 0.5161 
 Commerce         
1 CMPL 0.2248 0.3463 0.2297 0.3501 0.4706 0.3366 0.4696 0.3459 
2 COURTS (MAURITIUS) LTD 0.5559 0.5964 0.5608 0.6010 0.6363 0.5858 0.6385 0.5934 
3 HAPPY WORLD FOODS LTD 0.2905 0.4456 0.2910 0.4449 0.4694 0.4149 0.4672 0.4198 
4 HAREL MALLAC & CO. LTD 0.1870 0.4163 0.1899 0.4173 0.4682 0.3833 0.4669 0.3895 
5 IRELAND BLYTH LTD 0.3406 0.4890 0.3399 0.4871 0.4852 0.4588 0.4816 0.4605 
6 ROGERS & COMPANY LTD 0.4218 0.7051 0.4275 0.7084 0.7641 0.6714 0.7612 0.6800 
7 SHELL MAURITIUS LTD 0.5163 0.5230 0.5124 0.5191 0.5250 0.4747 0.5235 0.4779 
 Industry         
8 GAMMA-CIVIC LTD 0.4711 0.6937 0.4736 0.6943 0.7210 0.6490 0.7167 0.6525 
9 MAURITIUS BREWERIES LTD 0.1056 0.3283 0.1095 0.3302 0.3851 0.2758 0.3834 0.2838 
10 MCFI 0.2138 0.3083 0.2150 0.3086 0.3690 0.2808 0.3691 0.2862 
11 MAURITIUS OIL REFINERIES LTD 0.1706 0.3190 0.1721 0.3193 0.3975 0.2879 0.3959 0.2952 
12 MAURITIUS STATIONERY LTD 0.3916 0.5468 0.3937 0.5475 0.6141 0.5003 0.6153 0.5062 
13 PLASTIC INDUSTRY (MTIUS) LTD 0.4028 0.5579 0.4014 0.5553 0.5713 0.4983 0.5678 0.5005 
14 THE UNITED BASALT PRODUCTS LTD 0.1869 0.4298 0.1868 0.4276 0.4498 0.3510 0.4444 0.3526 
 Leisure & hotels         
15 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS LTD 0.3858 0.4060 0.3833 0.4033 0.4458 0.3320 0.4404 0.3371 
16 GRAND BAIE HOTEL LTD 0.3573 0.4517 0.3597 0.4533 0.4689 0.3755 0.4796 0.3855 
17 NEW MAURITIUS HOTELS LTD 0.3399 0.5558 0.3442 0.5582 0.5511 0.5046 0.5569 0.5111 
18 SUN RESORTS LTD 0.4363 0.4970 0.4386 0.4988 0.5000 0.4473 0.5085 0.4546 
 Sugar         
19 HAREL FRERES LTD 0.2153 0.4177 0.2204 0.4210 0.4649 0.3830 0.4681 0.3892 
20 MON DESERT ALMA LTD -0.7606 0.3324 -0.7464 0.3371 0.5240 0.3164 0.5064 0.3243 
21 MON TRESOR & MON DESERT LTD -0.2054 0.2197 -0.1995 0.2219 0.3051 0.1778 0.3034 0.1859 
22 SAVANNAH SUGAR ESTATES LTD -0.4388 0.2831 -0.4297 0.2859 0.4003 0.2593 0.3908 0.2647 
23 THE MOUNT SUGAR ESTATES LTD -0.2578 0.2616 -0.2481 0.2670 0.3934 0.2465 0.3883 0.2543 
 Transport         
24 AIR MAURITIUS LTD 0.6829 0.8651 0.6861 0.8667 0.8769 0.8435 0.8752 0.8457 
 Explanatory variables in the Model:         
  AGEINCOR AGELIST AGEINCOR AGELIST RESAGE AGELIST RESAGE AGELIST 
  AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT RESPROF RESPROF RESPROF RESPROF 
  GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH 
  RISK RISK ARISK ARISK RISK RISK ARISK ARISK 
  ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS ASSETS 
  TXSHIELD TXSHIELD TXSHIELD TXSHIELD RESTAX RESTAX RESTAX RESTAX 
  DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS 
  SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL 
  LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE 
For number of yearly observations per firm and for variable definitions see Tables 4A.1 and Appendix 4A; For Models specifications see Table 4.6.  
The fixed effects estimates are obtained from the BETWEEN regression and represent the deviation of the ith firm from the common mean (the constant in the BETWEEN regression). 
The BETWEEN model is an OLS regression of the mean dependent variable of each firm on a constant and the means explanatory variables for each firm. 
Table 4.7  Firm-specific effects (expressed in deviation from the common constant) 
Panel D: Dependent variable is LOGLEV 
 
  Firm size variable is SIZE Firm size variable is SIZE2 Firm size variables are SMALL and LARGE 
 COMPANY NAME model 25 model 26 model 27 model 28 model 29 model 30 model 31 model 32 model 33 model 34 model 35 model 36 
 Estimated constant (BETWEEN model) -4.4322 -4.9094 -4.6033 -5.2459 -5.1417 -5.5084 -5.2508 -5.7922 0.4932 0.4593 0.4286 0.3489 
 Commerce             
1 CMPL -7.5538 -7.3719 -7.5470 -7.3554 -10.2821 -10.5967 -10.1817 -10.4672 -2.3109 -1.7282 -2.3269 -1.7406 
2 COURTS (MAURITIUS) LTD -7.3141 -7.2535 -7.3123 -7.2484 -10.8917 -10.9965 -10.7690 -10.8642 -1.4151 -1.2208 -1.4447 -1.2493 
3 HAPPY WORLD FOODS LTD -7.7950 -7.5626 -7.7967 -7.5518 -10.8660 -11.2679 -10.7603 -11.1251 -2.3295 -1.5849 -2.3616 -1.6124 
4 HAREL MALLAC & CO. LTD -7.9661 -7.6225 -7.9759 -7.6138 -10.7744 -11.3686 -10.6913 -11.2305 -2.8147 -1.7141 -2.8470 -1.7395 
5 IRELAND BLYTH LTD -8.3265 -8.1042 -8.3309 -8.0966 -11.7991 -12.1836 -11.6827 -12.0316 -2.5248 -1.8126 -2.5645 -1.8479 
6 ROGERS & COMPANY LTD -7.9876 -7.5631 -7.9851 -7.5378 -10.9160 -11.6501 -10.8189 -11.4849 -2.4835 -1.1238 -2.5051 -1.1370 
7 SHELL MAURITIUS LTD -7.8455 -7.8354 -7.8453 -7.8346 -11.4006 -11.4181 -11.2682 -11.2841 -1.8621 -1.8297 -1.9038 -1.8712 
 Industry             
8 GAMMA-CIVIC LTD -7.2994 -6.9659 -7.3080 -6.9566 -10.1995 -10.7762 -10.1141 -10.6375 -2.0844 -1.0161 -2.1152 -1.0403 
9 MAURITIUS BREWERIES LTD -8.2392 -7.9057 -8.2414 -7.8900 -11.0321 -11.6089 -10.9435 -11.4669 -3.0054 -1.9371 -3.0289 -1.9539 
10 MCFI -7.9932 -7.8517 -7.9896 -7.8405 -11.1918 -11.4365 -11.0764 -11.2984 -2.4083 -1.9551 -2.4338 -1.9778 
11 MAURITIUS OIL REFINERIES LTD -7.9230 -7.5631 -7.9263 -7.6920 -10.6721 -11.0566 -10.5786 -10.9275 -2.6590 -1.9468 -2.6880 -1.9714 
12 MAURITIUS STATIONERY LTD -7.0105 -7.8354 -7.0166 -6.7717 -9.9767 -10.3786 -9.8868 -10.2515 -1.9258 -1.1813 -1.9543 -1.2051 
13 PLASTIC INDUSTRY (MTIUS) LTD -7.0950 -6.9659 -7.1083 -6.8634 -9.7498 -10.1518 -9.6707 -10.0355 -2.2706 -1.5260 -2.3085 -1.5593 
14 THE UNITED BASALT PRODUCTS LTD -7.7978 -7.9057 -7.8187 -7.4353 -10.5517 -11.1808 -10.4848 -11.0557 -2.7955 -1.6300 -2.8377 -1.6650 
 Leisure & hotels             
15 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS LTD -7.4709 -7.8517 -7.4675 -7.4356 -10.3353 -10.3878 -10.2210 -10.2685 -1.7793 -1.6822 -1.8092 -1.7114 
16 GRAND BAIE HOTEL LTD -7.3085 -7.1670 -7.3038 -7.1547 -10.8352 -11.0798 -10.7182 -10.9402 -1.9461 -1.4929 -1.9681 -1.5121 
17 NEW MAURITIUS HOTELS LTD -7.5214 -7.1980 -7.5137 -7.1729 -11.0419 -11.6012 -10.9263 -11.4338 -2.2254 -1.1895 -2.2441 -1.2017 
18 SUN RESORTS LTD -7.4739 -7.3829 -7.4572 -7.3614 -11.3915 -11.5488 -11.2467 -11.3894 -1.6883 -1.3970 -1.7056 -1.4124 
 Sugar             
19 HAREL FRERES LTD -7.7451 -7.4419 -7.7420 -7.4225 -11.0790 -11.6033 -10.9746 -11.4504 -2.4449 -1.4737 -2.4641 -1.4869 
20 MON DESERT ALMA LTD -9.1891 -7.5518 -9.2567 -7.5314 -8.7927 -11.6240 -8.9065 -11.4757 -7.0142 -1.7697 -7.0556 -1.7787 
21 MON TRESOR & MON DESERT LTD -9.2720 -8.6353 -9.2944 -8.6235 -11.3879 -12.4890 -11.3526 -12.3518 -4.9368 -2.8973 -4.9695 -2.9174 
22 SAVANNAH SUGAR ESTATES LTD -8.9398 -7.8584 -8.9856 -7.8460 -10.0838 -11.9538 -10.1150 -11.8119 -5.5368 -2.0729 -5.5767 -2.0913 
23 THE MOUNT SUGAR ESTATES LTD -8.9887 -8.2105 -9.0137 -8.1937 -10.6826 -12.0283 -10.6704 -11.8915 -5.0275 -2.5348 -5.0531 -2.5449 
 Transport             
24 AIR MAURITIUS LTD -7.2571 -6.9842 -7.2537 -6.9662 -10.9898 -11.4617 -10.8672 -11.2954 -1.3560 -0.4819 -1.3824 -0.5029 
 Explanatory variables in the Model:             
  AGEINCOR AGELIST AGEINCOR AGELIST AGEINCOR AGELIST AGEINCOR AGELIST AGEINCOR AGELIST AGEINCOR AGELIST 
  SIZE SIZE SIZE SIZE SIZE2 SIZE2 SIZE2 SIZE2 AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT 
  AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT AVPROFIT GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH 
  GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH RISK RISK ARISK ARISK 
  RISK RISK ARISK ARISK RISK RISK ARISK ARISK LOGASST LOGASST LOGASST LOGASST 
  LOGASST LOGASST LOGASST LOGASST LOGASST LOGASST LOGASST LOGASST LOGTAX LOGTAX LOGTAX LOGTAX 
  LOGTAX LOGTAX LOGTAX LOGTAX LOGTAX LOGTAX LOGTAX LOGTAX DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS 
  DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS DEBTORS SMALL SMALL SMALL SMALL 
          LARGE LARGE LARGE LARGE 
For number of yearly observations per firm and for variable definitions see Tables 4A.1 and Appendix 4A; For Models specifications see Table 4.6; The fixed effects estimates are obtained from the BETWEEN regression and represent the deviation of 
the ith firm from the common mean (the constant in the BETWEEN regression).; The BETWEEN model is an OLS regression of the mean dependent variable of each firm on a constant and the means explanatory variables for each firm. 
 
 
The change in the fixed effects estimates when SIZE/SIZE2 is dropped is likely to 
be a reflection of the influence of this omitted variable. This is particularly so given the 
strong positive correlation of SIZE/SIZE2 with the dependent variable41.   Further, as can 
be seen from the correlation matrix in Panel B of Table 4.3, the firm size variable, 
SIZE/SIZE2, is correlated with other explanatory variables.  And from their definitions, 
the dummy variables, SMALL and LARGE, are also likely to be correlated with 
SIZE/SIZE2 even if these dummies do not capture the full effects of firm size.  This 
implies correlation between the firm-specific effects and other explanatory variables, 
which does not have serious implications under the FIXED effects model.  
However, under the RANDOM effects model, the firm-specific effects are part of 
the disturbance terms.  In this case correlation between the firm-specific effects and some 
of the explanatory variables means that the estimated coefficients are no longer 
consistent.  This is the reason that the Hausman tests, in Panel C of Table 4.6 (and in two 
out of four cases in Panel F), reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis that the RANDOM effects estimates are inconsistent. This point is reinforced 
by Table 4.8 
 
                                                          
41 See the correlation matrix in Panel B of Table 4.3.  The correlation between LEVERAGE and SIZE is 
0.60, between LEVERAGE and SIZE2 is 0.35, between LOGLEV and SIZE is 0.52, and between 
LOGLEV and SIZE2 is 0.23.   Also refer to the results of the yearly regression in Table 4.5 where 
SIZE/SIZE2 is consistently (and often significantly) positively related to LEVERAGE.   
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Table 4.8 Correlation matrix for residuals and explanatory variables 
Panel A:  Dependent variable is LEVERAGE. Firm size variable is SIZE 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV 
@RESW 1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  
@RESV 0.4063 1.0000 0.3877 1.0000 0.4053 1.0000 0.3871 1.0000 0.4085 1.0000 0.4046 1.0000 0.4103 1.0000 0.4033 1.0000 
SIZE 0.0000 0.0936 0.0000 0.1367 0.0000 0.0951 0.0000 0.1378 0.0000 0.0035 0.0000 0.0734 0.0000 0.0079 0.0000 0.0710 
AGEINCOR 0.0000 -0.0088   0.0000 -0.0089           
RESAGE         0.0000 0.0415   0.0000 0.0217   
AGELIST   0.0000 -0.1521   0.0000 -0.1510   0.0000 -0.1042   0.0000 -0.1048 
AVPROFIT 0.0000 0.0505 0.0000 0.1708 0.0000 0.0479 0.0000 0.1663         
RESPROF         0.0000 -0.0908 0.0000 -0.1116 0.0000 -0.0846 0.0000 -0.1075 
GROWTH 0.0000 0.0120 0.0000 0.0313 0.0000 0.0138 0.0000 0.0328 0.0000 -0.0760 0.0000 0.0057 0.0000 -0.0684 0.0000 0.0085 
RISK 0.0000 0.0466 0.0000 0.0327     0.0000 0.0901 0.0000 0.0729     
ARISK     0.0000 0.0738 0.0000 0.0763     0.0000 0.1041 0.0000 0.1075 
ASSETS 0.0000 -0.1470 0.0000 -0.1971 0.0000 -0.1459 0.0000 -0.1953 0.0000 -0.1833 0.0000 -0.2134 0.0000 -0.1795 0.0000 -0.2075 
TXSHIELD 0.0000 0.0557 0.0000 0.1073 0.0000 0.0491 0.0000 0.1000         
RESTAX         0.0000 0.1290 0.0000 0.0704 0.0000 0.1263 0.0000 0.0624 
DEBTORS 0.0000 0.1663 0.0000 0.1194 0.0000 0.1715 0.0000 0.1252 0.0000 0.1161 0.0000 0.1744 0.0000 0.1127 0.0000 0.1748 
 
Panel B:  Dependent variable is LEVERAGE. Firm size variable is SIZE2 
 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
 @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV 
@RESW 1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  
@RESV 0.4067 1.0000 0.3658 1.0000 0.4059 1.0000 0.3656 1.0000 0.3615 1.0000 0.3557 1.0000 0.3595 1.0000 0.3551 1.0000 
SIZE2 0.0000 -0.0387 0.0000 -0.1934 0.0000 -0.0348 0.0000 -0.1900 0.0000 -0.0549 0.0000 -0.1692 0.0000 -0.0538 0.0000 -0.1651 
AGEINCOR 0.0000 0.0443   0.0000 0.0446           
RESAGE         0.0000 -0.2340   0.0000 -0.2451   
AGELIST   0.0000 -0.1538   0.0000 -0.1531   0.0000 -0.1782   0.0000 -0.1805 
AVPROFIT 0.0000 -0.0165 0.0000 0.2145 0.0000 -0.0197 0.0000 0.2104         
RESPROF         0.0000 -0.0961 0.0000 -0.0982 0.0000 -0.0927 0.0000 -0.0938 
GROWTH 0.0000 -0.0844 0.0000 -0.0577 0.0000 -0.0826 0.0000 -0.0566 0.0000 -0.0593 0.0000 -0.0740 0.0000 -0.0542 0.0000 -0.0706 
RISK 0.0000 0.0894 0.0000 0.0553     0.0000 0.0565 0.0000 0.0522     
ARISK     0.0000 0.1071 0.0000 0.0985     0.0000 0.1035 0.0000 0.0977 
ASSETS 0.0000 -0.1889 0.0000 -0.2353 0.0000 -0.1879 0.0000 -0.2336 0.0000 -0.2798 0.0000 -0.2597 0.0000 -0.2767 0.0000 -0.2556 
TXSHIELD 0.0000 0.1017 0.0000 0.2077 0.0000 0.0947 0.0000 0.2009         
RESTAX         0.0000 0.1430 0.0000 0.1104 0.0000 0.1376 0.0000 0.1073 
DEBTORS 0.0000 0.1035 0.0000 -0.0036 0.0000 0.1094 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 -0.0415 0.0000 -0.0604 0.0000 -0.0414 0.0000 -0.0621 
The series @RESW and @RESV are the residuals from the FIXED effects and RANDOM  effects models respectively. Other variables are defined in the Appendix 4A. 
For Models specifications see Table 4.6. 
Table 4.8 Correlation matrix for residuals and explanatory variables 
Panel C:  Dependent variable is LEVERAGE. Firm size variables are SMALL and LARGE 
 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
 @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV 
@RESW 1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  
@RESV 0.3716 1.0000 0.3398 1.0000 0.3704 1.0000 0.3390 1.0000 0.3882 1.0000 0.3491 1.0000 0.3876 1.0000 0.3484 1.0000 
SIZE 0.0233 0.4098 0.0233 0.4742 0.0232 0.4106 0.0232 0.4745 0.0631 0.4320 0.0247 0.4811 0.0621 0.4355 0.0255 0.4817 
AGEINCOR 0.0000 -0.0747   0.0000 -0.0761           
RESAGE         0.0000 -0.0739   0.0000 -0.0908   
AGELIST   0.0000 -0.1650   0.0000 -0.1637   0.0000 -0.1387   0.0000 -0.1387 
AVPROFIT 0.0000 0.0504 0.0000 0.1374 0.0000 0.0484 0.0000 0.1330         
RESPROF         0.0000 -0.1097 0.0000 -0.1148 0.0000 -0.1038 0.0000 -0.1121 
GROWTH 0.0000 0.0569 0.0000 0.0716 0.0000 0.0584 0.0000 0.0730 0.0000 0.0045 0.0000 0.0588 0.0000 0.0117 0.0000 0.0615 
RISK 0.0000 0.0506 0.0000 0.0445     0.0000 0.0867 0.0000 0.0697     
ARISK     0.0000 0.0923 0.0000 0.1012     0.0000 0.1236 0.0000 0.1225 
ASSETS 0.0000 -0.1610 0.0000 -0.2423 0.0000 -0.1598 0.0000 -0.2407 0.0000 -0.2067 0.0000 -0.2595 0.0000 -0.2034 0.0000 -0.2560 
TXSHIELD 0.0000 0.0243 0.0000 0.0654 0.0000 0.0187 0.0000 0.0584         
RESTAX         0.0000 0.1572 0.0000 0.1447 0.0000 0.1540 0.0000 0.1381 
DEBTORS 0.0000 0.1934 0.0000 0.1523 0.0000 0.1974 0.0000 0.1583 0.0000 0.1857 0.0000 0.1928 0.0000 0.1836 0.0000 0.1950 
SMALL 0.0000 -0.0441 0.0000 -0.0552 0.0000 -0.0430 0.0000 -0.0544 0.0000 -0.0279 0.0000 -0.0347 0.0000 -0.0269 0.0000 -0.0342 
LARGE 0.0000 0.3559 0.0000 0.4293 0.0000 0.3563 0.0000 0.4290 0.0000 0.3590 0.0000 0.4373 0.0000 0.3639 0.0000 0.4376 
 
Panel D: Dependent variable is LOGLEV 
 
 Firm size variable is SIZE Firm size variable is SIZE2 Firm size variables are SMALL and LARGE 
 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 
 @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV @RESW @RESV 
@RESW 1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  
@RESV 0.5089 1.0000 0.4907 1.0000 0.5074 1.0000 0.4897 1.0000 0.5186 1.0000 0.4774 1.0000 0.5178 1.0000 0.4768 1.0000 0.4902 1.0000 0.4610 1.0000 0.4882 1.0000 0.4595 1.0000 
SIZE/SIZE2 0.0000 -0.0829 0.0000 -0.0036 0.0000 -0.0846 0.0000 -0.0023 0.0000 -0.1519 0.0000 -0.1415 0.0000 -0.1531 0.0000 -0.1383 0.0220 0.2207 0.0220 0.3053 0.0217 0.2203 0.0217 0.3060 
AGEINCOR 0.0000 -0.0326   0.0000 -0.0343   0.0000 -0.0183   0.0000 -0.0200   0.0000 -0.0687   0.0000 -0.0714   
AGELIST   0.0000 -0.1386   0.0000 -0.1396   0.0000 -0.1644   0.0000 -0.1659   0.0000 -0.1450   0.0000 -0.1453 
AVPROFIT 0.0000 0.0235 0.0000 0.0898 0.0000 0.0224 0.0000 0.0860 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.1358 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.1323 0.0000 0.0145 0.0000 0.0697 0.0000 0.0136 0.0000 0.0654 
GROWTH 0.0000 -0.0601 0.0000 -0.0404 0.0000 -0.0593 0.0000 -0.0394 0.0000 -0.1331 0.0000 -0.0901 0.0000 -0.1327 0.0000 -0.0892 0.0000 -0.0174 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 -0.0163 0.0000 0.0042 
RISK 0.0000 -0.0381 0.0000 -0.0383     0.0000 -0.0048 0.0000 -0.0189     0.0000 -0.0249 0.0000 -0.0171     
ARISK     0.0000 -0.0093 0.0000 0.0041     0.0000 0.0193 0.0000 0.0275     0.0000 0.0186 0.0000 0.0399 
LOGASST 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 -0.0661 0.0000 0.0128 0.0000 -0.0616 0.0000 -0.0145 0.0000 -0.1078 0.0000 -0.0093 0.0000 -0.1033 0.0000 -0.0119 0.0000 -0.1180 0.0000 -0.0068 0.0000 -0.1138 
LOGTAX 0.0000 0.1328 0.0000 0.1630 0.0000 0.1314 0.0000 0.1596 0.0000 0.2031 0.0000 0.2586 0.0000 0.2023 0.0000 0.2560 0.0000 0.1190 0.0000 0.1406 0.0000 0.1178 0.0000 0.1365 
DEBTORS 0.0000 0.0733 0.0000 0.0608 0.0000 0.0718 0.0000 0.0614 0.0000 0.0172 0.0000 -0.0189 0.0000 0.0149 0.0000 -0.0193 0.0000 0.1252 0.0000 0.1199 0.0000 0.1239 0.0000 0.1217 
SMALL                 0.0000 -0.0164 0.0000 -0.0394 0.0000 -0.0146 0.0000 -0.0391 
LARGE                 0.0000 0.1280 0.0000 0.2238 0.0000 0.1274 0.0000 0.2241 
The series @RESW and @RESV are the residuals from the FIXED effects and RANDOM  effects models respectively. Other variables are defined in the Appendix 4A. 




Table 4.8 is split into four Panels and presents the correlation matrix of the 
explanatory variables and the residuals from both the FIXED effects and RANDOM 
effects models.  Panels A, B and C of Table 4.8 relate to the regressions when the 
dependent variable is LEVERAGE.   In Panel A and in Panel B the firm size variable is 
measured by SIZE and SIZE2 respectively, while in Panel C SMALL and LARGE 
replace the firm size variable.  Panel D contains all the alternative firm size specification 
when the dependent variable is LOGLEV, the log form of LEVERAGE.   
In panels A and B of Table 4.8 there does not appear to be a problem of 
correlation between the residuals obtained from the FIXED effects and RANDOM effects 
regressions and any of the explanatory variables. Indeed, in both these Panels (which 
include the firm size variable SIZE/SIZE2) none of the pair-wise correlation coefficient 
reaches the value of 0.30.  This holds true also for Models 25 to 32 of Panel D, which 
include the firm size variable SIZE/SIZE2 in the LOGLEV regressions.  
Panel C of Table 4.8 and Models 33 to 36 of Panel D, contain the pair-wise 
correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables and the residuals obtained from 
the regressions that omit SIZE/SIZE2.  As can be seen from Panel C, when the 
RANDOM effects model is used, this results in high correlation coefficients (of above 
0.30) between the residuals and the dummy variable, LARGE.  Moreover, the omitted 
variable, SIZE, is now highly correlated with @RESV, the residuals from the RANDOM 




variable problem42.  
Aside from the firm size variable, SIZE/SIZE2, the panel procedure results for the 
other explanatory variables that are included in Table 4.6, can be summarised as follows.  
The intercept throughout Table 4.6, is consistently negatively signed and significant at 
the 1 percent significance level. This is consistent with the results of the yearly analysis.  
The panel procedure produces stronger evidence, compared with the yearly 
analysis, in support of the notion that the firm age (since incorporation) is an important 
determinant of its capital structure.  In Panels A, B, D and E of Table 4.6, when 
combined with SIZE/SIZE2, the estimated coefficients of AGEINCOR are consistently 
negatively signed. This is the same as in the yearly analysis of Table 4.5, only now 
AGEINCOR appears significant in six out of eight cases43.  In contrast, in Panels C and F 
of Table 4.6, when SIZE/SIZE2 is replaced by the SMALL and LARGE dummies, the 
estimated coefficients on AGEINCOR become positive and significant at the 5 percent 
significant level.  As mentioned above, however, this could be a reflection of the 
influence of the omitted size variable.  Indeed, the alternative age variable, AGELIST, 
measuring age since listing on the Mauritius Stock Exchange, is also positively and 
significantly related to the dependent variable in all the regressions that include SMALL 
                                                          
42 Evidence of omitted variable problem when SIZE/SIZE2 is omitted is weaker in Panel D of Table 4.8 
when the dependent variable is LOGLEV.   
43 Compared with the yearly analysis of Table 4.5, where it is significant in only one out of sixteen 




and LARGE.   
The LEVERAGE regressions in Panels A, B, and C of Table 4.6 also replace the 
age since incorporation variable, AGEINCOR, by the alternative measure, RESAGE (the 
residuals from a regression of AGEINCOR on the rest of the explanatory variables).  
Also here, the estimated coefficients on RESAGE are consistently negative in the 
SIZE/SIZE2 regressions (Panels A and B) and also significant in half of the cases.  
However, unlike in the case of both AGEINCOR and AGELIST, the estimated 
coefficients on RESAGE remain negative, although insignificant, when SMALL and 
LARGE replace SIZE/SIZE2 in Panel C of Table 4.6.  This could be interpreted as 
evidence that using RESAGE has succeeded in eliminating the correlation between the 
size and age variables.  This implies that, compared with AGEINCOR, the estimated 
coefficients of the age variable, RESAGE, better reflect the separate influence of firm age 
since incorporation, on its capital structure.  
The firm age since listing on the official market, AGELIST, appears to be less 
important and its relation with the dependent variable less clear compared with 
AGEINCOR.  When SIZE/SIZE2 is included, AGELIST is consistently negatively 
related to LEVERAGE (Panels A and B of Table 4.6) but weakly significant in only two 
out of eight regressions.  In the LOGLEV regressions that include SIZE/SIZE2 (Panels D 
and E of Table 4.6), the estimated coefficients on AGELIST become insignificant and 
positive.   




determining capital structure and thus the nature of the relationship between leverage and 
profitability is unclear from the panel data procedure.  The estimated coefficients on 
AVPROFIT, in Table 4.6, are negatively signed in twenty-two out of twenty-four 
regressions.  However, AVPROFIT appear significant at the 5 percent significance level 
in only two cases. Further, when AVPROFIT is replaced by RESPROF, the residuals 
from a regression of AVPROFIT on the rest of the explanatory variables, the sign on the 
estimated coefficients become positive and in one case also weakly significant.   
GROWTH, the variable measuring the firm growth potential is positively related 
to the dependent variable under all specifications.  It also appears to be an important 
determinant of the firm capital-structure decision, as it is significant in all but two of the 
thirty-six regressions of Table 4.6.  This is in contrast to the findings from the yearly 
analysis of Table 4.5, where GROWTH is shown to be inconsistently signed and largely 
insignificant.  These findings reinforce the strong evidence, as reflected in the positive 
sign of the estimated coefficients of the firm size variables, in support of the importance 
of control considerations.  
The firm risk measure (obtained from the residuals in a regression of daily prices 
on time) is consistently negatively related to the dependent variable as predicted. This 
result holds whether risk is measured by RISK (the mean of the absolute residuals) or by 
ARISK (the mean of the squared residuals).  This contrasts with the results of the yearly 
analysis where the nature of the relationship between leverage and risk could not be 




leverage.  RISK is always insignificant in Table 4.6, while ARISK is significant in only 
two of eighteen regressions in which it is included.    
ASSETS, the variable measuring the firm asset structure, is negatively and highly 
significantly related to the dependent variable in all the models of Table 4.6.  This is 
consistent with the results of the yearly analysis, and with the agency theory rationale 
under which debt is a monitoring device used when assets are difficult to monitor.  It is, 
however, inconsistent with the trade off theory and with an alternative agency 
explanation as detailed in Table 4.2.  
Also inconsistent with expectations is the negative sign on the estimated 
coefficient of the variable measuring the non-debt tax shield.  This variable is 
alternatively measured by TXSHIELD (the ratio of depreciation to assets), RESTAX (the 
residual from the TXSHIELD auxiliary regression) and by LOGTAX (the logarithmic 
transformation).  Regardless of the proxy used, the non-debt tax shield is positively 
related to the dependent variable in thirty-four out of thirty-six cases.  However, similar 
to the findings from the yearly analysis, it is significant in only third of all regressions.  
The panel data procedure lends strong support for the notion that DEBTORS is 
negatively and significantly related to the dependent variable. Under all the specifications 
of Table 4.6, DEBTORS appear highly significant at the 1 percent significance level with 
negatively signed estimated coefficients.  This is opposite to the prediction of Section 
4.3.2. 




Table 4.6, are respectively negatively and positively related to the dependent variable.  
However, SMALL is weakly significant in only two out of twelve regressions, while 
LARGE appears more important, being significant in half of the twelve regressions in 
which it is included.   For the benefit of clarity, Table 4.9 summarises the main results of 
both the yearly analysis and the panel procedure, while conclusions are discussed next.   
 
4.7  Conclusions and promising research ideas  
As emerges from Table 4.9 the results, in particular from the panel data procedure, seem 
to support the predictions44.  It is illustrated that the factors previously found to be 
important in determining the capital structures of firms in other countries, have similar 
influence on the capital structures of non-financial, listed Mauritian firms. The main 
conclusions are as follows. 
The age of the firm since incorporation appears more important to the capital 
structure decision than age since listing on the Mauritius Stock Exchange.  This can be 
expected considering the recent origin, small size, high volatility and lack of 
sophistication of the Exchange. Consistent with pecking order theory the empirical results 
indicate that as firms mature, information problems are reduced, allowing firms to 
increase their reliance on the capital market for equity.   
                                                          
44 As the panel data procedure is deemed more robust compared with the yearly analysis, it is the results 








Estimated coefficient from the yearly regressions Estimated coefficients from the panel procedure 
CONSTANT (?) • Consistently negative.  In the LOGLEV regression 
it is also significant in 9 out of 16 cases. 
• Consistently negative and highly significant at the 1 
percent significance level 















• Excluding 2 cases, it is always negative regardless 
of whether the dependent variable is LEVERAGE 
or LOGLEV.  It is, however, only significantly 
negative in one case.  
 
• Not included 
 
 
• Consistently negative but never significant 
 
• When combined with SIZE/SIZE2 it is consistently 
negative and significantly so in 6 out of 8 cases.   
• When combined with SMALL & LARGE it is 
consistently positive and significant. 
 
• Consistently negative. Highly significant in 2 of 6 
cases. 
 
• In the LEVERAGE regressions it is negative when 
combined with SIZE/SIZE2 but significant in only 2 of 
8 regressions. 
• When combined with SIZE/SIZE2 in the LOGLEV 
regressions it is consistently insignificantly positive. 
• When combined with SMALL & LARGE it is 
consistently positive and significant regardless of the 
dependent variable.  















• Consistently positive but insignificant in 12 out 
of 32 cases.  (Only SIZE is included) 
 
• Not included 
 
 
• Not included 
 
• Consistently positive and highly significant at the 1 
percent significance level. 
 
• Consistently negative.  Weakly significant in 2 of 12 
cases 
 
• Consistently positive.  
• When the dependent variable is LOGLEV it is 
consistently significant.  In the rest of the cases it is 




















• Never significant and inconsistently signed. 
 
• In the LEVERAGE regressions it is consistently 
negative and significant in 2 out of 12 cases. 
• In the LOGLEV regressions it is negative in 10 out of 
12 cases but never significant 
 
• Consistently positive but weakly significant in only 1 









• Inconsistently signed. 
• Significant in 8 out of 32 cases and in 1 out of 
these 8 cases it is positively signed. 
 
• Consistently positive and significant in all but 2 out 









• Inconsistently signed. 
• Weakly significant in only 2 out of 32 cases.  
• Only RISK is included 
 
• Consistently negative 











• Consistently negative. 
• Significant in 14 out of 32 regressions 
 
 














• Positive in 5 out of 8 cases, and weakly 
significant in 1 case out of these 5. 
 
• Positive in 7 out of 8 cases, but never 
significant. 
 




• Positive in 10 out of 12 cases. In 4 out of these 10 it 
is also significant 
 
• Consistently positive.  Significant in only 4 out of 12 
cases. 
 
• Consistently positive.  Highly significant in 4 out of 
12 cases.   
DEBTORS (+) 
 
• Negative in 30 out of 32 cases and significantly 
so in 8. 
• Consistently negative and highly significant. 
For variable definitions see Appendix 4A; The indicated sign in the second column refers to the most likely sign as predicted in Table 4.2; The terms 




Perhaps the single most unambiguous finding of this study in that size matters in 
firms’ capital structure decisions.  Indeed, in line with the trade off theory and control 
considerations, leverage tends to increase with size. Likewise, the strong and positive 
association between growth and leverage may be explained in terms of control 
considerations as noted in Jordan Lowe and Taylor (1998).  Accordingly, the fairly 
concentrated nature of the ownership structure of Mauritian firms, and the predominance 
of family ownership, may explain the reluctance of growing firms to fund expansion by 
dilution of control.   Alternatively, the strong and positive impact of growth on the level 
of debt may be explained in terms of pecking order theory.  Particularly it appears that 
growing firms with needs for funds prefer debt to external equity, possibly due to debt 
being less subject to mispricing.  All the same, it has to be noted that according to agency 
theory, growth increases the potential for debt holders’ wealth expropriation by managers 
on behalf of owners.  This, however, may be less applicable in the Mauritian case 
because in that environment debt comes mainly in the form of loans rather than debenture 
securities.  It could thus be argued that close relationship with lenders reduce the scope 
for debt/equity conflicts.   
Thus common to both firm size and firm growth is that the strong positive results 
for each of these variables support control consideration.  However, although positive 
sign on growth is consistent with both pecking order and control considerations, the 
findings for the size variable are consistent with the latter but inconsistent with the 




capital market due to reduced information problems.  Particularly in the case of 
Mauritius, where the capital market is dominated by equity securities, this should result 
in less borrowings by large firms.  Similarly, the positive sign on the size variable is 
consistent with both the trade off theory and control considerations.  However, if the 
trade off theory is valid, than growth should be negatively related to debt.  Thus the 
combination of strong positive signs on the estimated coefficients of both size and growth 
distinguishes the importance of control considerations over competing capital structure 
theories.   
The impacts of profitability and risk on the capital structure decision are not very 
strong.  Nonetheless, the negative association between profitability and leverage is 
consistent with the pecking order notion that firms with sufficient internal funds tend to 
avoid external debt.  Risk also tends to be negatively correlated with debt levels of firms 
and this is in line with trade off and agency considerations. 
The strong and negative association between asset structure and leverage is 
consistent with the agency theory explanation that firms with many intangible assets, that 
are more difficult to monitor, tend to use debt for that purpose.  However this negative 
link contradicts the positive prediction based on the trade off theory.  Similarly the 
positive association between the non-debt tax shield and leverage, is inconsistent with the 
trade off based prediction for a negative association.  These contradicting results for the 




another and not necessarily inconsistent with the trade off theory45.   
Finally, the strong and negative association between the ratio of net debtors to 
leverage is inconsistent with expectations, but may be due to the way in which the 
dependent variable is measured46.  All in all and in the context of Mauritian firms it may 
be generalised that pecking order, trade off, agency and control considerations all play an 
important role in determining capital structure decisions.   
First, the importance of maintaining control through debt financing as opposed to 
external equity is strongly supported by the results for size and age.  Second, the pecking 
order theory is strongly supported by the results for firm age and growth, and weakly 
supported by the results for profitability.  Third, the trade off theory is strongly supported 
                                                          
45 The non-debt tax shield proxy, namely the ratio of depreciation to total assets, and the asset structure 
proxy, namely the ratio of fixed to total assets, are closely related.  It is plausible, therefore, that blurring in 
what they are supposed to represent is the cause for the perverse signs on their estimated coefficients.  Put 
differently, it is possible that the ratio of depreciation to total assets is a measure of the tangibility of assets 
and thus the positive association between this variable and the debt level is as predicted by the trade off 
theory.  Similarly if the ratio of fixed to total assets, represents the availability of yearly tax allowances or 
other investment related tax brakes, then the negative correlation between this variable and leverage is also 
consistent with the trade off theory.   In short, the perverse signs on the asset structure and the non-debt tax 
shield variables may be due to measurement problems and not inconsistent with the trade off theory.  
46 The dependent variable is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and therefore the 
nominator includes the value of creditors.   However, while the value of creditors is added to the nominator 
of the dependent variable, it is deducted from the nominator of DEBTORS.  Thus the negative association 
between leverage and net debtors may be driven by measurement problems and in particular by the 
opposite treatment of creditors.  In retrospect a gross measure of the level of debtors would probably serve 




by the results for size, and weakly supported by the results for risk.  Forth, agency theory 
and the monitoring role of debt are strongly supported by the results for the asset 
structure, although there is also some evidence to support agency behaviour when the 
market for corporate control is inefficient.  In particular the tendency by management to 
avoid the disciplinary role of debt is weakly supported by the profitability variable.  
Similarly, the tendency of owners to engage in wealth expropriation from debt holders, is 
weakly supported by the results for the risk variable.   
In terms of promising research ideas, the question of whether the asset structure 
variable represents tangibility, or is a proxy for the availability of non-debt tax shield, 
clearly calls for further investigations. Similarly, more research is required to determine 
the role and importance of the contentious variables including the non-debt tax shield, 
debtors, profitability, and risk. Possible approaches to investigating these issues could be 
to use alternative measures to proxy for these variables or to undertake cross-country 
comparisons as in Rajan and Zingales (1995) or Booth Aivazian Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2001).   
Another promising research idea is to investigate capital structure decisions of 
unlisted as opposed to quoted companies.  In the context of Mauritius this approach 
should achieve two important goals.  First the population of non-quoted companies 
dominate those that are quoted on the official list, thus understanding how non-quoted 
companies in this environment take their capital structure decisions is important.  Second, 




population of listed companies and the fact that this population is not representative of 
the economy as a whole.       
Other extensions to this study could allow for interaction terms, industry 
classifications, or the addition of explanatory variables such as dividends or ownership 
structure.  Furthermore, additional research could also help to distinguish the impact of 
group affiliation on the capital structure decision.  Indeed, it could be argued that 
business groups theories have been neglected by researches particularly given their 
dominant role in many business environments.   This last issue is taken up in Chapter 6.  
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LEVERAGE (Long term liabilities+ Short term liabilities)/ Total assets 
  





AGEINCOR Number of years since the year of incroporation (YEAR - Year of incorporation) 
  
RESAGE The residuals from a regression of AGEINCOR on a constant, and the rest of the 
explanatory variables: SIZE, SIZE2, AVPROFIT, GROWTH, RISK, ARISK, ASSETS, 
TXSHIELD, DEBTORS. 
  





SIZE Natural Log (Turnover) 
  
SIZE2 Natural Log (Total assets) 
  
SMALL A dummy variable to represent the smallest firms with SIZE [LN (Turnover)] value that 
falls in the first quarter of the sample SIZE distribution.   SMALL = 1 if SIZE  < 1st 
quartile value (19.3139). 
  
LARGE A dummy variable to represent the largest firms with SIZE [LN (Turnover)] value that 
falls in the forth quarter of the sample SIZE distribution.   LARGE = 1 if SIZE  > 3st 





AVPROFIT Average of [(PROFIT,t),(PROFIT,t-1),(PROFIT,t-2)].  
  
PROFIT Profit Before Interest & Exceptional Items (PBIEI) / Total assets 
  
RESPROF The residuals from a regression of AVPROFIT on a constant, and the rest of the 
explanatory variables: AGEINCOR, AGELIST, SIZE, SIZE2, GROWTH, RISK, 







GROWTH Rate of annual growth in assets over current and past 2 years. Defined as:   





RISK The mean of the absolute values of the residuals obtained from yearly regressions for 
each firm, i, of the form: Natural Log of (Daily adj. Price) on a constant and time 
  
ARISK Alternative measure of risk: The mean of the squared values of the residuals obtained 
from yearly regressions for each firm, i, of the form: Natural Log of (Daily adj. Price) on 
a constant and time 
  
A note on the auxiliary price regressions used to obtain RISK/ARISK: 
 
The price regressions were run for each of the 24 firms in each of the 9 years from 1992 to 2000. However, 
only 192 regressions were run because in 24 firm/year cases no daily price data was available. These 24 
cases include: 10 firms in 1992; 7 firms in 1993; 5 firms in 1994; 2 firms in 1995. For the 192 regressions, 
the number of daily price observations per regression varies from 10 (one firm in 1994) to 250 (all firms in 
1999).  The average no. of observations per regression is 147 and the median is 146. Finally, as the year 
2000 was not over when the data was collected, the no. of observations for each of the 24 regressions for 





ASSETS FIXED ASSETS /  TOTAL ASSETS 
  




TXSHIELD DEPRECIATION /  TOTAL ASSETS 
  
RESTAX The residuals from a regression of TXSHIELD on a constant and the rest of the 
explanatory variables: AGEINCOR, AGELIST, SIZE, SIZE2, AVPROFIT, GROWTH, 
RISK, ARISK, ASSETS, DEBTORS. 
  








financial assets + inventories + other assets + investments  + fixed assets =  liabilities 
(short & long term) + deferred profit + reserves (capital & revenue) + shareholders 
equity (ordinary & preference) 
 Table 4A.1  List of the companies constituting the sample 
 













 Commerce      
1 CMPL 1992 - 1999 8 JUNE 2000  
2 COURTS (MAURITIUS) LTD 1992 - 2000 9 MARCH   
3 HAPPY WORLD FOODS LTD 1996 - 1999 4 JUNE 2000 1992 - 1995 
4 HAREL MALLAC & CO. LTD 1992 - 1999 8 DECEMBER 2000  
5 IRELAND BLYTH LTD 1995 - 1999 5 DECEMBER 2000 1992 - 1994 
6 ROGERS & COMPANY LTD 1992 - 1999 8 SEPTEMBER 2000  
7 SHELL MAURITIUS LTD 1993 - 1999 7 DECEMBER 1990, 2000  
 Industry      
8 GAMMA-CIVIC LTD 1995 - 1999 5 JUNE 1990 - 1992, 2000  
9 MAURITIUS BREWERIES LTD 1993 - 1999 7 JUNE 1990, 2000 1992 
10 MCFI (Mauritius Chemical & Fertilizer Industry Ltd) 1992 - 1999 8 JUNE 2000  
11 MAURITIUS OIL REFINERIES LTD (MOROIL) 1992 - 1998 7 JUNE 1999, 2000  
12 MAURITIUS STATIONERY LTD 1992 - 1999 8 JUNE 2000  
13 PLASTIC INDUSTRY (MTIUS) LTD 1993 - 1997 5 JUNE 1998 - 2000 1992 
14 THE UNITED BASALT PRODUCTS LTD 1992 - 1999 8 JUNE 2000  
 Leisure & hotels      
15 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS LTD 1994 - 1999 6 JUNE 1990, 2000 1992, 1993 
16 GRAND BAIE HOTEL LTD 1995 - 1999 5 SEPTEMBER 2000 1992 - 1994 
17 NEW MAURITIUS HOTELS LTD 1996 - 1999 4 SEPTEMBER 2000 1992 - 1995 
18 SUN RESORTS LTD 1993 - 1999 7 DECEMBER 2000 1992 
 Sugar      
19 HAREL FRERES LTD 1992 - 1999 8 DECEMBER 2000  
20 MON DESERT ALMA LTD 1992 - 1999 8 DECEMBER 2000  
21 MON TRESOR & MON DESERT LTD 1992 - 1999 8 MARCH 2000  
22 SAVANNAH SUGAR ESTATES LTD 1992 - 1998 7 DECEMBER 1999, 2000  
23 THE MOUNT SUGAR ESTATES LTD 1992 - 1999 8 DECEMBER 2000  
 Transport      
24 AIR MAURITIUS LTD 1995 - 2000 6 MARCH 1990 - 1992 1992 - 1994 
 TOTAL OBSERVATIONS: 164    
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 Table 4A.2  Variable means for each individual firm for the period 1992 – 2000.   
Panel A: Dependent variable and age 
 





listing LEVERAGE LOGLEV AGEINCOR RESAGE AGELIST 
 Commerce       
1 CMPL 1973 1991 0.2154 -1.5482 22.50 -22.7044 4.50 
2 COURTS (MAURITIUS) LTD 1984 1990 0.4301 -0.8943 12.00 -17.5198 6.00 
3 HAPPY WORLD FOODS LTD 1973 1996 0.3924 -0.9448 24.50 13.9283 1.50 
4 HAREL MALLAC & CO. LTD 1956 1990 0.4071 -0.9123 39.50 7.3290 5.50 
5 IRELAND BLYTH LTD 1972 1994 0.5699 -0.5625 25.00 -4.2642 3.00 
 6* ROGERS & COMPANY LTD 1948 1990 0.6809 -0.3846 47.50 22.9309 5.50 
7 SHELL MAURITIUS LTD 1990 1991 0.6100 -0.4991 6.00 10.6370 5.00 
 Industry        
8 GAMMA-CIVIC LTD 1961 1994 0.6206 -0.4941 36.00 -8.6584 3.00 
9 MAURITIUS BREWERIES LTD 1960 1993 0.1868 -1.7077 36.00 11.6619 3.00 
10 MCFI 1975 1989 0.2855 -1.2625 20.50 -14.1203 6.50 
11 MAURITIUS OIL REFINERIES LTD 1968 1990 0.3047 -1.2187 27.00 7.5075 5.00 
12 MAURITIUS STATIONERY LTD 1966 1989 0.4416 -0.8219 29.50 -15.1294 6.50 
13 PLASTIC INDUSTRY (MTIUS) LTD 1970 1993 0.5761 -0.5664 25.00 -13.9190 2.00 
14 THE UNITED BASALT PRODUCTS LTD 1953 1989 0.3659 -1.0208 42.50 -1.4861 6.50 
 Leisure & hotels        
15 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS LTD 1991 1994 0.2833 -1.2664 5.50 13.3375 2.50 
16 GRAND BAIE HOTEL LTD 1981 1995 0.2713 -1.3787 16.00 -4.9413 2.00 
 17* NEW MAURITIUS HOTELS LTD 1964 1996 0.4184 -0.8781 33.50 -23.5656 1.50 
 18* SUN RESORTS LTD 1983 1992 0.4116 -0.8948 13.00 -29.9301 4.00 
 Sugar        
19 HAREL FRERES LTD 1960 1990 0.2904 -1.2669 35.50 -38.4345 5.50 
20 MON DESERT ALMA LTD 1827 1989 0.1872 -1.7368 168.50 70.5409 6.50 
 21* MON TRESOR & MON DESERT LTD 1926 1989 0.1151 -2.5681 69.50 24.6462 6.50 
22 SAVANNAH SUGAR ESTATES LTD 1882 1989 0.1498 -1.9794 113.00 26.8789 6.00 
23 THE MOUNT SUGAR ESTATES LTD 1913 1990 0.0705 -2.7253 82.50 -3.7558 5.50 
 Transport        
 24* AIR MAURITIUS LTD 1967 1994 0.7045 -0.3579 30.50 -25.1171 3.50 
For the years included in the calculations of means and for variable definitions see Table 4A.1 and Appendix 4A, respectively. 
Unbalanced data:  No. of firms = 24; Minimum no. of time observations per firm = 4; Maximum no. of time observations per firm = 9; No. of firm/year observations = 164. 
* indicates a company on the list of top 7 on the Official Market by market capitalisation as at 31 October 2000. 
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 Table 4A.2  Variable means for each individual firm for the period 1992 – 2000.   
Panel B: Size, profitability and growth 
 
  Firm size Size  dummies Firm profitability Firm growth 
 COMPANY NAME SIZE SIZE2 SMALL LARGE AVPROFIT RESPROF GROWTH 
 Commerce        
1 CMPL 18.7040 18.5723 1.0000 0.0000 0.0302 -0.0574 0.0219 
2 COURTS (MAURITIUS) LTD 20.3390 20.7351 0.0000 0.3333 0.1248 0.0061 0.1825 
3 HAPPY WORLD FOODS LTD 20.7136 20.4858 0.0000 0.7500 0.1164 -0.0069 0.2668 
4 HAREL MALLAC & CO. LTD 20.0350 20.2785 0.0000 0.0000 0.1047 0.0074 0.1235 
5 IRELAND BLYTH LTD 21.9915 22.0121 0.0000 1.0000 0.0622 -0.0202 0.1249 
 6* ROGERS & COMPANY LTD 22.6430 22.6798 0.0000 1.0000 0.0847 0.0104 0.1459 
7 SHELL MAURITIUS LTD 21.3543 20.5452 0.0000 1.0000 0.1245 0.0305 0.0574 
 Industry        
8 GAMMA-CIVIC LTD 20.0842 20.2460 0.0000 0.0000 0.0976 -0.0330 0.2375 
9 MAURITIUS BREWERIES LTD 20.2539 20.1211 0.0000 0.0000 0.1335 0.0110 0.1907 
10 MCFI 20.0703 20.0345 0.0000 0.0000 0.0708 -0.0302 0.0771 
11 MAURITIUS OIL REFINERIES LTD 19.5864 19.2563 0.1429 0.0000 0.0907 -0.0062 0.1392 
12 MAURITIUS STATIONERY LTD 18.9103 19.3511 0.7500 0.0000 0.1136 0.0122 0.1089 
13 PLASTIC INDUSTRY (MTIUS) LTD 17.7641 17.5585 1.0000 0.0000 0.1188 -0.0136 0.0439 
14 THE UNITED BASALT PRODUCTS LTD 19.9517 19.9910 0.0000 0.0000 0.1409 0.0290 0.0880 
 Leisure & hotels        
15 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS LTD 19.6644 17.9346 0.0000 0.0000 0.1630 0.0033 0.0531 
16 GRAND BAIE HOTEL LTD 19.1458 20.0437 0.6000 0.0000 0.2163 0.0936 0.2988 
 17* NEW MAURITIUS HOTELS LTD 21.0292 22.2479 0.0000 1.0000 0.0977 -0.0036 0.2689 
 18* SUN RESORTS LTD 21.0284 21.9201 0.0000 0.8571 0.1039 0.0100 0.2278 
 Sugar        
19 HAREL FRERES LTD 20.4042 21.5987 0.0000 0.2500 0.0493 -0.0291 0.1589 
20 MON DESERT ALMA LTD 19.4766 21.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0059 -0.0039 0.0624 
 21* MON TRESOR & MON DESERT LTD 19.8110 20.7479 0.0000 0.2500 0.1192 0.0411 0.2980 
22 SAVANNAH SUGAR ESTATES LTD 19.4734 20.9903 0.0000 0.0000 0.0448 0.0053 0.1005 
23 THE MOUNT SUGAR ESTATES LTD 18.6819 20.1255 1.0000 0.0000 0.0398 -0.0163 0.1257 
 Transport        
 24* AIR MAURITIUS LTD 22.4804 23.3031 0.0000 1.0000 0.0603 -0.0374 0.1857 
For the years included in the calculations of means and for variable definitions see Table 4A.1 and Appendix 4A, respectively. 
Unbalanced data:  No. of firms = 24; Minimum no. of time observations per firm = 4; Maximum no. of time observations per firm = 9; No. of firm/year observations = 164. 
* indicates a company on the list of top 7 on the Official Market by market capitalisation as at 31 October 2000. 
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 Table 4A.2  Variable means for each individual firm for the period 1992 – 2000.   
Panel C: Risk, asset structure, non-debt tax shield and net debtors 
 
  Firm risk Asset structure Non-debt tax shield Net debtors 
 COMPANY NAME RISK ARISK ASSETS LOGASST TXSHIELD RESTAX LOGTAX DEBTORS 
 Commerce         
1 CMPL 0.0675 0.0076 0.8220 -0.1966 0.0308 -0.0160 -3.5073 -0.1349 
2 COURTS (MAURITIUS) LTD 0.1011 0.0203 0.1667 -1.8067 0.0117 -0.0118 -4.4665 0.3334 
3 HAPPY WORLD FOODS LTD 0.0442 0.0031 0.5420 -0.6218 0.0322 -0.0141 -3.4407 -0.0631 
4 HAREL MALLAC & CO. LTD 0.0677 0.0116 0.3582 -1.0290 0.0346 -0.0065 -3.3676 -0.0958 
5 IRELAND BLYTH LTD 0.0672 0.0075 0.3909 -0.9400 0.0365 -0.0006 -3.3112 -0.2356 
 6* ROGERS & COMPANY LTD 0.0918 0.0178 0.5549 -0.6172 0.0307 -0.0073 -3.7487 -0.0801 
7 SHELL MAURITIUS LTD 0.0532 0.0046 0.4508 -0.8006 0.0506 -0.0157 -2.9880 -0.2924 
 Industry         
8 GAMMA-CIVIC LTD 0.0689 0.0096 0.4842 -0.7404 0.0629 0.0250 -2.7889 -0.0315 
9 MAURITIUS BREWERIES LTD 0.0624 0.0092 0.7241 -0.3232 0.0547 0.0046 -2.9265 -0.0362 
10 MCFI 0.0416 0.0046 0.4857 -0.7332 0.0418 -0.0021 -3.1777 -0.1118 
11 MAURITIUS OIL REFINERIES LTD 0.0571 0.0056 0.6343 -0.4592 0.0379 -0.0184 -3.2824 -0.2175 
12 MAURITIUS STATIONERY LTD 0.0439 0.0034 0.6232 -0.4768 0.0427 0.0019 -3.1735 -0.0631 
13 PLASTIC INDUSTRY (MTIUS) LTD 0.0654 0.0086 0.4690 -0.7595 0.0813 0.0197 -2.5222 -0.3278 
14 THE UNITED BASALT PRODUCTS LTD 0.0604 0.0064 0.5174 -0.6598 0.0900 0.0370 -2.4104 -0.0774 
 Leisure & hotels         
15 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS LTD 0.0441 0.0035 0.7926 -0.2483 0.1099 0.0161 -2.2105 -0.1616 
16 GRAND BAIE HOTEL LTD 0.0354 0.0021 0.9112 -0.0942 0.0192 -0.0153 -4.0188 -0.0918 
 17* NEW MAURITIUS HOTELS LTD 0.0368 0.0024 0.9110 -0.0933 0.0208 0.0096 -3.8821 -0.0443 
 18* SUN RESORTS LTD 0.0394 0.0027 0.8586 -0.1529 0.0175 -0.0021 -4.0640 -0.1116 
 Sugar         
19 HAREL FRERES LTD 0.0533 0.0048 0.7801 -0.2493 0.0241 0.0130 -3.7573 -0.0111 
20 MON DESERT ALMA LTD 0.0638 0.0071 0.7406 -0.3024 0.0191 -0.0037 -3.9803 0.0302 
 21* MON TRESOR & MON DESERT LTD 0.0556 0.0050 0.6856 -0.3914 0.0164 -0.0128 -4.1718 0.0099 
22 SAVANNAH SUGAR ESTATES LTD 0.0576 0.0047 0.6024 -0.5149 0.0171 0.0003 -4.0831 0.0597 
23 THE MOUNT SUGAR ESTATES LTD 0.0784 0.0094 0.6929 -0.3763 0.0107 -0.0030 -4.6396 0.0796 
 Transport         
 24* AIR MAURITIUS LTD 0.0435 0.0035 0.4665 -0.7663 0.0244 0.0164 -3.7180 0.2263 
For the years included in the calculations of means and for variable definitions see Table 4A.1 and Appendix 4A, respectively. 
Unbalanced data:  No. of firms = 24; Minimum no. of time observations per firm = 4; Maximum no. of time observations per firm = 9; No. of firm/year observations = 164. 
* indicates a company on the list of top 7 on the Official Market by market capitalisation as at 31 October 2000. 
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5.1  Introduction 
Business-groups are a common feature of the Indian business environment as they are in 
many other emerging markets.  Many of these groups started as a family business where 
the family has maintained controlling interests even after the business has gone public.  
Various explanations for the business group phenomenon in emerging markets have been 
suggested by various studies, some of which will be subsequently mentioned.  A common 
explanation is that the business group structure, which typically includes firms in a wide 
variety of industries, has evolved in emerging markets to mitigate informational problems 
and other market imperfections that characterise these markets.    
This chapter investigates the effect of group affiliation on the firm’s dividend 
policy within an emerging market context.  Pecking order and the transaction cost theory 
of dividend suggest that as internal funds are cheaper than external funds, a firm that 
depends more heavily on the latter will adopt a low payout policy.  The gap between 
external and internal finance is expected to be particularly wide in emerging markets due 
to information asymmetry and other market imperfections.  Hence dependency on 
external finance should be particularly important in determining the payout policies of 
firms in these markets.    
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However, it is often argued that the group structure can narrow the gap between 
the cost of using external and internal finance.  For instance, costly external finance may 
be the result of an underdeveloped financial sector, which is unable to fulfil its traditional 
monitoring role.  Here the group’s headquarters may be well positioned to monitor 
member firms and to generate information thus substituting for inadequate financial 
intermediaries.  The group may also be able to create internal markets, to save 
underwriting fees, or to secure the availability of external finance through its access to 
bureaucrats.   Subsequently, it is hypothesised that group-affiliated firms are relatively 
less dependent on formal capital markets. Their dividend policies are thus less sensitive 
to investment needs, access to formal capital markets or to flotation cost.   Instead, the 
dividend policies of group-affiliated firms are likely to be determined by the preferences 
of the controlling entity and by the cash needs of other group-members.  
The contribution of this chapter is therefore threefold.  First, this is one of the few 
empirical works that examines dividend policy decisions in the context of business 
groups. Specifically, the paper synthesises the theory on business groups with the 
transaction cost theory of dividend.  Existing studies of business groups in industrial as 
well as emerging markets have mainly focused on the effects of group affiliation on 
firms’ performance and value.  Thus, by focusing on the dividend policies of group-
affiliated firms, this chapter offers a different perspective on the implications of the 
business group phenomenon.  Second, the chapter adds empirical evidence to the 
dividend policy literature, and in particular to the literature on the transaction cost theory 
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of dividend, in the context of an emerging market.  This contribution may be valuable 
given that most empirical studies of these issues are from developed markets.  Third, the 
chapter contributes to the literature on business groups by looking at business groups in 
India (or business houses, as they are locally known), which constitute a very active and 
important part in the Indian business environment.  Indeed, the business group structure 
in India is that important that ignoring this phenomenon is practically inconceivable.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 5.2 begins with a brief review of 
the transaction cost theory of dividend, followed by a review of some studies on business 
groups in general and in emerging markets and India in particular.  Section 5.3 describes 
the model and presents the predictions, while Section 5.4 describes the sample and group 
size and diversification measures.  Section 5.5 presents a comparative analysis of the 
payout behaviour of independent firms and firms that are affiliated with groups at various 
levels of diversification, and reports the results from multivariate testing and estimation.  
The conclusions are offered in Section 5.6.  
 
5.2  A selective review of literature 
5.2.1  The transaction cost theory of dividend 
The literature on dividend policy is mainly concerned with explaining observations on the 
dividend practices of firms.  For example Lintner (1956) observes that dividend policy is 
important to managers and that the market reacts positively to dividend increase 
announcements and negatively to decreases.   Two important theories to explain these 
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observations include the signalling and agency theories of dividend.  The signalling 
theory of dividend emphasises the role of dividend in conveying information about the 
prospects of the firm.  The agency theory of dividend emphasises the role of dividend in 
controlling agency behaviour.  In both cases dividend reduce information or agency 
problems but the limitation of using dividend for these purposes is the firm dependency 
on external finance. 
In the signalling models of Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) it is 
assumed that there is preference for internal finance and that dependency on external 
finance partly explains firms’ dividend policies.  What distinguishes between good and 
bad quality firms is that in the case of the former the gain from high dividend more than 
offset the associated cost.  In Bhattacharya (1979) frictionless access to extra external 
financing is assumed to be unavailable, and the cost of paying high dividend is the issue 
cost of having to resort to outside financing to meet the dividend commitment.   Thus 
dependency on external finance is determined by the flotation cost of raising external 
finance, which implies that firms that face lower issue costs are able to use more 
signalling.  In Miller and Rock (1985) the cost of paying high dividend is the need to cut 
planned investment.  Hence in Miller and Rock (1985) dependency on external finance, 
and thus the firm’s dividend policy, are partly determined by the need for funds for 
expansion. 
Moreover, dependency on external finance explicitly enters the dividend model in 
a number of studies.  For example, in the cost minimisation model of Rozeff (1982), the 
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optimal payout ratio is at the level that minimises the sum of agency costs and the cost of 
raising external finance.   Similarly in Higgins (1972) the optimal payout ratio is at the 
level that minimises the sum of the cost of holding idle resources and the cost of issuing 
external finance.  Hence as is implied in the signalling theories of Bhattacharya (1979) 
and Miller and Rock (1985), the optimal dividend policy in Rozeff (1982) and in Higgins 
(1972) is explicitly modelled as an inverse function of dependency on external finance.   
This inverse relationship between dependency on external finance and the firm’s 
dividend policy is referred to as the transaction cost theory of dividend.  In Rozeff 
(1982), dependency on external finance is measured in terms of growth prospects and 
firm’s risk.  Other possible proxies for dependency on external finance include issue 
costs, ease of access to capital markets and the availability of surplus cash.  However, 
regardless of how dependency on external finance is measured, the transaction cost 
theory of dividend is partly based on pecking order theory, information asymmetry and 
other market imperfections.   This is the reason that the transaction cost theory should 
explain particularly well the dividend policies of firms that rely on capital markets that 
are characterised by distortions and imperfections.  Indeed, these are the characteristics of 
many capital markets in emerging economies.  
Capital markets in emerging economies are often differentiated from their 
counterparts in developed economies partly in terms of their effectiveness in fulfilling 
their intended functions.  Failure in the case of the former is often attributed to high risk 
due to political and social instability, high transaction costs, lack of liquidity, and 
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asymmetric information and agency problems.   These problems are typically caused by 
lack of adequate disclosure, inappropriate trading systems, weak and erratic regulations 
and under-developed financial intermediaries that in efficient markets provide monitoring 
and market for corporate control.   
Indeed, Kumar and Tsetsekos (1999) argue that the institutional infrastructure of 
emerging markets tend to be inferior to that in developed markets in terms of the legal, 
technological and regulatory framework.  A comparative analysis finds the financial and 
corporate sectors in emerging markets to be substantially less developed compared with 
those in developed markets.  It is suggested that this can be partly explained by their 
more recent origins.   Similarly, Glen, Karmokolias, Miller and Shah (1995), note that the 
dividend levels in developing countries are substantially lower compared with developed 
countries.  It is suggested that the lower dividend level could be a reflection of less 
efficient markets, leading to greater reliance on internal finance.  The study also finds 
evidence in a group of developing countries of a positive relationship between payout 
rates and the fraction of total investment that is financed by retained earnings.   This is 
taken as another indication of a relationship in developing countries between dividend 
policy and the gap between external and internal finance1.  
Consistent with the above discussion and particularly with Glen, Karmokolias, 
Miller and Shah (1995) the dividend policies of firms in emerging markets should be 
                                                          
1 Appendix 5A, Note (1) presents further details on the study by Kumar and Tsetsekos (1999), while Note 
(2) has details on the study by Glen, Karmokolias, Miller and Shah (1995). 
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particularly sensitive to dependency on external finance.  Thus the first hypothesis in this 
study is that a transaction cost model of dividend should have a good fit when applied to 
firms from an emerging market.  However, the business environment of many emerging 
economies are characterised by business groups, hence it is important to understand this 
organisational structure and its implications for the first hypothesis.   
 
5.2.2  Business group theories 
From corporations’ point of view, one important function of the capital market is to 
provide a source of capital. As noted in Glen (1994), this is particularly important in 
emerging markets as often these are characterised by shortage of capital.  Hence 
ineffective capital markets are particularly critical in environments where they are most 
likely to be found, and this is often stated as the reason for one feature common to these 
environments, namely the business group.   
A business group is a collection of independent firms from various industries that 
are linked together either formally or informally.  A formal link is achieved through cross 
shareholding where firms in the group hold the shares of other members. An informal 
link may include family or other social ties such as religion or ethnicity, or where firms in 
the group share common directors.  This definition is based on the definition in 
Granovetter (1995), but draws from various other studies as is highlighted in the 
following discussion.    
Granovetter (1995) proposes that the link between firms in a business group is 
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stable but at the intermediate level.  Thus each individual firm in the group is an 
independent legal entity with a separate management and board of directors.  It is noted 
that most American conglomerates do not fall into the business group category.  This is 
because subsidiaries are acquired on financial grounds thus the typical American 
conglomerate structure is unstable and the link among subsidiaries is weak.   It is further 
noted, however, that other conglomerates, such as the Korean chaebol, can be classified 
as business groups because stable operational and social links are formed among all 
member firms.  
Leff (1976) is one of the first studies to analyse the role of business groups, in 
mitigating capital market distortions.  It is argued that the group structure provides a 
mechanism for pooling and mobilising managerial talent and technical knowledge, and 
that group diversification increases the flow of information thus reducing risk.  Moreover, 
Leff (1976) argues that the group structure provides an efficient internal capital market, 
which is possible due to the group’s superior access to resources.   This access is 
achieved through the large proportions of corporate shares, which groups in emerging 
markets typically hold and which entitle them to large proportions of corporate profits.   
Further, groups’ returns tend to be relatively high due to their monopoly power, and they 
also have access to large parts of private savings as they are typically connected to 
wealthy families. 
Thus according to Leff (1976) the group structure performs the functions of a 
capital market when the capital market is distorted, as is often the case in emerging 
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markets.  This theory referred to as the market failure theory, and although not the only 
theory to explain the business group phenomenon, it is the more popular reason cited in 
the literature. However, before expanding further on the market failure theory it is worth 
mentioning some of the competing views on the economic problems that have led to the 
creation of business groups.  
Guillen (2000) discusses four theories to explain the importance of business 
groups in emerging markets including market failure, social structure, state autonomy, 
and the resource-based view. The first theory is the market failure theory, which, as 
mentioned above, explains the importance of business groups by the absence of well-
functioning markets. The second theory is the social structure theory, which suggests that 
business organisations tend to correspond to the social structure in which they operate. 
Thus the business group organisation is typical of an autocratic social structure.  
The third theory suggested by Guillen (2000) is the state autonomy theory which 
relates business groups to the level of autonomy of states and to the level of corruption. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000b) refers to this theory as political economy or the rent-seeking 
view2.  Accordingly business groups seek economic rent through exchanging bribes and 
political support in exchange for favours such as escaping curbing regulations.  Further, 
                                                          
2 Brealey and Myers (2000) explain the concept of economic rent as profits in excess of the competitive 
level which when discounted give the Net Present Value of a project.  It is explained that when an industry 
settles into long-run competitive equilibrium, its assets are expected to earn their opportunity cost of 
capital.  Profits that more than cover the opportunity cost after the firm has settled into long-run 
competitive equilibrium, may arise if the firm has monopoly or market power.   
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Khanna and Palepu (2000b) note that favours are rare and costly since the risk to 
bureaucrats of getting caught increases with the number of favours granted.  Diversified 
groups are the main recipients of these favours because they have greater opportunities to 
benefits from them.    
The fourth theory suggested by Guillen (2000) is the resource-based view which 
explains the importance of the business group structure in terms of access to resources. In 
particular the resource-based view suggests that some entrepreneurs and firms posses the 
skills required for repeated entry into new industries.  These skills become valuable when 
government policy make access to resources difficult, such as when foreign trade and 
investment policies are asymmetric. In such circumstances, those possessing the skills 
required for repeated entry into new industries will employ these valuable assets, leading 
to the creation of the business group.   
Utilising data on the top ten business groups from nine emerging markets, Guillen 
(2000) finds strong support for the resource-based view.  Further though weaker support 
is also reported for the role of corruption (political economy theory) in explaining the 
importance of business groups.  The results for the other theories, including the market 
failure theory and the social structure theory, are significant but bear the opposite sign to 
that predicted3.  
In spite of the rejection in Guillen (2000) of the market failure theory, the idea in 
                                                          
3 Appendix 5A, Note (3) gives details on the empirical procedure and results of Guillen (2000).  
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Leff (1976) that the group structure mitigates capital market failures by forming internal 
capital market is supported by other studies.  Particular attention has been paid to the 
value of diversified business groups in emerging markets.  For example, Chang and Choi 
(1988) point to the importance of the Korean business group, the chaebol, in improving 
the performance of affiliated firms.  The chaebol structure consists of legally independent 
firms that are often owned and controlled by a single family, where the top groups are 
typically integrated both vertically and horizontally. Chang and Choi (1988) show that 
firms that are affiliated with these top groups can increase their profits.  This is explained 
by the ability of the group structure to overcome market distortions, such as high 
government intervention policies.  It is suggested that the horizontally integrated group 
can create a pool of funds from affiliated firms and reallocate these funds according to 
investment opportunities.  This can be valuable when investment opportunities arise in an 
area considered by government to be of low priority, leading to difficulties in accessing 
formal capital markets4. 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999) propose that when external markets are 
distorted the combination of group-affiliation and firm-level diversification offers the 
lowest cost method of obtaining resources.  They find that diversification, in high-income 
                                                          
4 Chang and Choi (1988) also point to the importance of vertical integration, a strategy which the top 
groups typically adopt, as a means of controlling inefficiencies in intermediate markets. Particularly, by 
integrating up and down the production and distribution stages, the group can avoid the problem, which is 
common in developing countries, when the market for intermediate goods is controlled by monopolies or 
oligopolies.  Further details for the Chang and Choi (1988) study are given in Appendix 5A, Note (4).  
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economies, has an adverse effect on excess value as the cost of diversification exceeds its 
benefit. This may be due to efficient intermediaries that reduce information and 
contracting problems thus reduce transaction costs for products, labour, and capital. 
However, it is found that diversification in low-income economies has a positive effect 
on excess value and this positive effect is particularly strong for group-affiliated firms5.   
The benefits from diversification in emerging markets is also the subject of 
Khanna and Palepu (2000b), who look at the case of Chile over the period 1988 to 1996.  
In particular the study seeks to distinguish between benefits that are due to affiliation 
with a diversified group, and benefits from group affiliation that are non-diversification-
related.   It is noted that non-diversification related benefits from group affiliation could 
be due to social links amongst member firms.  Such links reduce transaction costs by 
encouraging information dissemination among group firms, and by providing low cost 
mechanism for resolving disputes and solving contracting problems.  Indeed, after group-
diversification is controlled for, Khanna and Palepu (2000b) find evidence of non-
diversification related benefits from group affiliation.    
Further, consistent with Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999) diversification 
is also found to be important, with a curvilinear relationship between firm performance 
and the level of group diversification.  Khanna and Palepu (2000b) suggest that once 
group diversification exceeds a threshold level, the mainly fixed costs that are associated 
                                                          
5 Appendix 5A, Note (5) contains further details on the study by Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999).  
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with diversification are more than offset by the benefits obtained.  Particularly, once 
diversification exceeds a threshold level the group is able to enjoy a stable collective cash 
flow and an internal managerial labour market to meet the needs of the group.  
Alternatively the curvilinear relationship between firm performance and the level of 
group diversification is explained in terms of political economy or the ability of well 
diversified groups to accrue economic rents.    
Khanna and Palepu (2000b) further assess the extent to which group affiliation 
effects change over time as the institutional context changes.  It is hypothesised that 
liberalisation programmes and the introduction of democracy in Chile in 1990 should 
gradually bring about changes that reduce the benefits of group affiliation.  These 
changes include more free flow of information, better enforcement of contracts and the 
gradual emergence of efficient intermediaries in the economy.   Indeed it is found that the 
group diversification threshold above which firm performance increases, rises over time.  
Further, there is also evidence that non-diversification related benefits from group 
affiliation tend to diminish over time6.    
There are two important points that emerge from Khanna and Palepu’s (2000b) 
study of Chilean business groups.  First, it is shown that benefits from group affiliation 
tend to diminish over time, ant it is suggested that this is due to the gradual change in the 
institutional context, which alters the value-creating potential of business groups.  Indeed, 
                                                          
6 Details of the empirical procedures and results in Khanna and Palepu (2000b) are given in Appendix 5A, 
Note (6).  
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Khanna and Palepu (1999) note that this process is not unique to Chile, but typical of 
emerging markets.  Second, Khanna and Palepu (2000b) show that there is curvilinear 
relationship between firm performance and the level of group diversification which is due 
to trade off between costs and benefits of group affiliation.  Indeed, attention is drawn to 
some costs that may be associated with group affiliation.  These include costs that arise 
from inefficient decisions by groups, which persist due to ineffective governance 
mechanism, and the costs of creating co-ordinating mechanism between member firms.  
Further, it is noted that obtaining favours from bureaucrats is costly as are the additional 
conflicts of interests that arise between minority and controlling shareholders. 
The last point, namely conflicts of interests within business groups is also 
addressed in Khanna (2000), who reviews the theoretical and empirical work on the role 
of business groups in emerging markets.  Specifically, Khanna (2000) acknowledges that 
group affiliation enhances value due to the ability of the group structure to substitute for 
missing formal institutions.  However, it is also acknowledged that the group structure 
can reduce value through the potential for minority shareholders’ exploitation.  In 
particular, even though group-affiliation may contribute to firm’s efficiency, the risk for 
minority shareholders is that the gains will not accrue to them. Hence the presence of a 
controlling shareholder leads to conflicts of interests between controlling and minority 
shareholders and results in a discount in the value of the firm.  These two conflicting 
implications of group affiliation for firms are also investigated in Khanna and Palepu 
(2000a) in the special case of the Indian business houses.  
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Khanna and Palepu (2000a) start by pointing to some of the benefits, of being 
affiliated with an Indian business house.  It is suggested that the group structure may help 
reducing labour market problems such as lack of skilled workforce, achieve access to 
foreign technology, and create reputation.  Specifically, group reputation can be created 
based on the group’s track record for efficient allocation of capital, which is due to the 
group having access to more information or being able to shift resources amongst firms.  
Reputation may also relate to the ability of the controlling entity to effectively monitor 
and influence the behaviour of the management teams of member firms (as in the context 
of Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  Further, reputation may be created from the group’s 
preferential access to bureaucrats, which can make member firms attractive to domestic 
and international investors.  Indeed, establishing reputation can be extremely valuable as 
it reduces information problems and enhances access to the investment community, and 
in particular to international investors7. 
However, Khanna and Palepu (2000a) also note some costs that may be 
associated with group affiliation.  For example, the potential for conflicts of interests 
between controlling and minority shareholders in group-affiliated firms may harm the 
                                                          
7 Indeed, examining 1996 Indian data, Khanna and Palepu (2000a) find that international analysts 
collectively covered 180 group-affiliated firms but only 70 non-group affiliated firms. Further, a Tobit 
analysis of the number of analysts covering a given firm, on firm size and group affiliation shows both to 
be positively and significantly (at the 1 percent level) correlated with the dependent variable. Thus groups 
are relatively good at attracting international analysts and this in turn can further reduce information 
problems. 
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reputation of these firms.  Such conflicts may arise if the controlling entity pursue 
objectives other than shareholder wealth maximisation, such as investment in 
unprofitable projects due to family or group wide considerations. Similarly, the 
controlling family may push for management compensation schemes or management 
selection procedures that are inefficient8. Moreover, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) 
question the value of a large shareholder in disciplining management9.  
The empirical results in Khanna and Palepu (2000a) for India are consistent with 
the results in Khanna and Palepu (2000b) for Chile, and with the idea that there are both 
benefits and costs related to being a member of a group.  In particular the results point to 
a quadratic relationship between firm performance and the diversification level of the 
group with which the firm is affiliated.  At low level of group diversification, group 
affiliation has a negative effect on the performance of the firm.  However, this 
relationship reverses once group diversification reaches a certain level.  The findings 
suggest that affiliation with one of the most diversified Indian business houses add value.  
                                                          
8 Maman (1999) also points to possible conflicts of interest that may arise within business groups.  Such 
conflicts can arise between the wish of member firms on the one hand, to maintain autonomy, and the need 
of the controlling entity on the other hand, to monitor the separate firms, provide long-term planning for the 
group as a whole, and allocate resources within the group. 
9 DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) study the case of a NYSE-listed firm, the Times Mirror Company (TM), 
which has been controlled by the Chandler family for 100 years.  The study focuses on the period between 
1980 and 1995, a period in which TM had experienced poor operating performance.  It is concluded that 
the presence of a large block shareholder (the Chandler family) did not act as an effective device for 
disciplining management.  A possible reason is stated as the personal ties that have developed between the 
management team at TM and the Chandler family.  
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In accordance with the market failure theory, this value is achieved by substituting for 
missing institutions and overcoming informational inefficiencies.  Alternatively, in line 
with political economy, highly diversified business groups can create value through 
superior access to bureaucrats in an economy characterised by high level of government 
intervention and corruption10.   
Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) attempt to distinguish between these two theories, 
namely market failure and political economy, by studying the reaction of two of India’s 
largest business houses following the country’s 1991 policy reforms.   The Indian 1991 
reforms were designed to move the economy from a planned to a market model.  The 
idea is that an immediate and strong reaction by business groups to the introduction of the 
reforms implies that the original role of the group structure was to distort policy rather 
than to mitigate informational problems. The reasoning behind this idea is as follows.   
The Indian economic reforms sought to address both the distortions caused by 
government intervention policies and the distortions caused by informational problems.   
However, while intervention policies can quickly be changed, informational problems 
require more time.   Indeed, intervention policies such as the licensing system and price 
and competition controls were lifted, leading to an immediate downward impact on the 
ability of well connected groups to distort policy through preferential access to 
bureaucrats.  This implies that if the reason for the presence of the group structure is to 
                                                          
10 Details from the Khanna and Palepu (2000a) study are presented in Appendix 5A, Note (8).  
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distort policy, the reaction by groups to the 1991 reforms should be immediate and 
radical.  In contrast, the study notes that problems concerning enforcement of disclosure 
rules, liquidity and settlement of trades have not completely been eliminated immediately 
following the introduction of the reforms. This implies that if the reason, for the 
development of the group structure, is informational imperfections then groups would not 
react immediately to the introduction of the reforms. 
Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) find evidence in support of the political economy 
theory, which they term the policy distortion explanation for the group structure.  In 
particular the introduction of the Indian reforms resulted in the initiation of restructuring 
plans by Ballarpur Industries Limited (BILT) and RPG Enterprises, the two groups 
studied.  The restructuring included reduction in group’s diversity and entry into new 
sectors where access to bureaucrats could still offer value.  These sectors include the 
power generation and telecommunications where permits requirements were not lifted.  
Thus while the emphasis in the literature is on the market failure theory of 
business groups, Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) rule in favour of the political economy 
theory in the case of India11.  This chapter draws no distinction between the various 
theories of business groups in emerging markets, but instead the focus is on these two 
theories.   Explicitly, it is the market failure and political economy theories of business 
groups together that form the basis for the hypothesised impact of group affiliation on the 
                                                          
11 Key findings and conclusions from empirical and theoretical studies of business groups, including those 
mentioned in Section 5.2.2 are summarised in Table 6.1 of Chapter 6.   
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firm’s dividend decision.   This hypothesis is now clarified.  
The studies reviewed in Section 5.2.1 suggest that using the capital market to 
obtain funds in an emerging market can be problematic due to various distortions.  
However, as discussed in this section, within emerging markets, group-affiliated firms 
may have better access to finance.  The group may enhance profitability, ease 
information problems, create reputation, form internal markets, improve access to 
government grants or subsidies or distort other policies through preferential access to 
bureaucrats.  The second hypothesis12 is therefore that the dividend policies of group-
affiliated firms are less sensitive to transaction costs that relate to raising external finance 
in the formal capital market.   
Thus, as noted in the introduction, the third contribution of this study is the 
linking of the transaction cost theory of dividend with business group theory.  The idea is 
to utilise the differences between independent and group affiliated firms in India to better 
understand the validity of the transaction cost theory of dividends13.  The reason for 
                                                          
12 The first hypothesis is laid out at the end of Section 5.2.1 and predicts that a transaction cost model of 
dividend should fit particularly well to firms from an emerging market. 
13 This is in the spirit of Dewenter and Warther (1998), who assess the signalling theory of dividend by 
comparing the dividend policies of US firms with the policies of Japanese firms.  The hypothesis there is 
that in Japan, and in particular within the Japanese keiretsu structure, there are less information problems 
hence less need for the dividend-signalling device.  Instead, due to equity cross holding among members of 
a group, dividend policy can be used to distribute cash among member firms.  Indeed using various 
methodologies, including an event study, logit analysis and the Lintner model, Dewenter and Warther 
(1998), find that keiretsu members experience smaller price reactions to dividend change announcements 
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choosing India is firstly because it is an emerging market, and secondly because the 
Indian business houses lend themselves particularly well to empirical investigation.  A 
description of Indian business houses, and an explanation of why they lend themselves to 
empirical investigation, is given in Khanna and Palepu (2000a) as follows.  
First, the Indian business environment is characterised by containing several 
hundreds business houses but where firms are typically associated with only one group.  
Thus the sample size of group affiliated firms is expected to be large with no ambiguity 
as to group affiliation14.  Second, while Indian firms are commonly focused, the large 
business houses are usually well diversified.   This means that the impact of group 
diversification on the dividend decision can be investigated.  Third, business houses 
dominate the Indian private sector, which also provide good rationale for investigating 
their behaviour.  Indeed, Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) note that at the end of 1980 the 
top 20 business houses accounted for about 60 percent of the total Indian private sector 
industrial assets.  It is further noted that more recently, in 1993, group-affiliated firms 
accounted for 89 percent of total sales and assets of listed Private Sector Indian 
companies.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
and that their dividends are more responsive to earnings changes.  Appendix 5A, Note (9), contains further 
details on the study by Dewenter and Warther (1998).   
14 One caveat however, with regards the classification of firms into groups is that the Indian Business 
House is not an organisational structure that is legally recognised.  For example, groups are not obliged to 
produce group-accounts and thus group affiliation in this study is based on the classification system 
provided by the database used. 
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Other important features of the Indian business houses include the nature of the 
link between member firms. Green, Murinde and Suppakitjarak (2001) note that direct 
financial relationship between firms in Indian business houses does not appear to be 
important.  Indeed it is reported that investments by group-affiliated firms in shares and 
debentures of other group members, as well as inter-group liabilities, are negligible.  
Instead, Khanna and Palepu (2000a) observe that the link between firms in Indian groups 
is typically the significant block of shares held by the family associated with the group as 
well as common board members across the different firms in the group15.  Granovetter 
(1995) further notes that the Indian business houses are characterised by multiple sources 
of social links among member firms including family, caste, religion, language ethnicity 
and region.  Indeed, it is suggested that this multiple bases of solidarity are one of the 
sources of strength of the Indian business houses16.   
                                                          
15 With reference to the family orientation of business groups in India, Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) state 
that of the top 20 business houses at the end of 1980, more than 75 percent were family-controlled.   With 
reference to the common board membership, the role of common directors across group-affiliated firms is 
investigated in Maman (1999), in the context of Israel.  It is suggested that in societies where the business 
group structure is the dominant form of organisation, common directorship is one of the means to co-
ordinate and control firms in the group.  Through shared directorship the group diffuses information across 
affiliated firms, maintains its unity, and promotes transactions between member firms.  For further details 
refer to Appendix 5A, Note (7). 
16 Granovetter (1995) suggests that the basis of solidarity of the group may also be its weakness.  For 
example, business groups that are bound by immigrant ethnicity are always vulnerable to hostility from the 
native community.  For that reason, business groups may try to link with powerful groups in the 
government or military, or to create multiple bases of solidarity.   
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Thus, having established the importance of the business houses in the Indian 
context, and their suitability for empirical investigation, the next task is to construct the 
model.  In particular, given the two hypotheses to be investigated, the model should link 
dependency on external finance, to the firm’s payout ratio while allowing for a distinction 
between group affiliated and independent firms. 
 
5.3  The model 
The first hypothesis, as articulated at the end of Section 5.2.1, is based on the idea that 
the gap between external and internal finance is typically high in emerging markets.  
Hence the need for funds, access to capital markets, and the cost of raising external 
finance in the capital markets are particularly important determinants of the dividend 
policies of firms operating in emerging markets.  The transaction cost model of dividend 
is formulated as follows: 
PAYOUTi = α  + β 1 GROW i + β 2 REPUT i + β 3 FLOAT i + β 4 FCF i  + ε i                        (5.1) 
Where PAYOUT is the dividend payout ratio; GROW is a measure of the rate of 
expansion; REPUT is a proxy for the ease of access to the capital market achieved 
through reputation; FLOAT is a proxy for flotation cost; and FCF is free cash flow.   
These variables are defined in Appendix 5B. 
As described in Appendix 5B the dependent variable, PAYOUT, is measured as 
the ratio of dividend to Profit Before Depreciation, Interest and Tax (PBDIT).  The use of 
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PBDIT in place of the more common measure of profit after tax is to ensure firms that 
pay dividend when their net profit is negative are not excluded.  The RHS variables in 
Equation (5.1) measure dependency on, access to and the cost of raising external finance 
in the capital markets.  The first three explanatory variables namely growth, reputation, 
and floatation cost, are measured by alternative proxies as is now explained.   
The rate of growth of the firm is measured by four proxies denoted GROW1 to 
GROW4.  GROW1 represents past growth and is defined as the average annual growth in 
sales over the previous five-year period.  The remaining three growth proxies, GROW2 
to GROW4 measure growth expectations in terms of R&D expenditure, PE ratio and the 
market to book ratio respectively.   Growing firms require more funds for investment, and 
as external finance is more expensive than internal finance, growing firms establish lower 
dividend policies. The direction of the relationship between the rate of growth and the 
payout ratio is therefore expected to be negative.  Alternatively, however, it could be 
argued that for signalling purposes growing firms opt for high dividend to signal these 
opportunities, leading to a positive association between growth and payout.   
The ease of access to the capital market is measured in terms of firm’s reputation, 
which is represented by the firm size and age.  REPUT1 and REPUT2 measure firm size 
in terms of book value of assets and market capitalisation respectively.  REPUT3 
measures reputation in terms of the age of the firm.  A positive association between 
payout and reputation is predicted because firms with better access to the capital market 
rely less on internal funds.    
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The flotation cost faced by a firm when raising funds in the capital market is 
measured by two proxies, FLOAT1 and FLOAT2.   FLOAT1 is the standard deviation of 
the stock’s daily rate of return over the year.  In line with Crutchley and Hansen (1989) 
firms with larger standard deviation of returns are assumed to face higher flotation cost 
due to higher underwriting risk premiums17.   FLOAT2 is an inverse measure of liquidity, 
which is based on relative trading days.  It is defined as 1 minus the ratio of the days the 
company’s stock traded on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) to the number of days 
that trading took place on the exchange during the year.  Both FLOAT1 and FLOAT2 are 
expected to be inversely related to the payout ratio because the cost of raising external 
finance is expected to have a negative impact on the payout ratio.   
Free cash flow, FCF, is calculated as the closing cash balance before dividends, 
scaled by total assets.  It is the surplus cash that is not required for operations or for 
investments, and is expected to be positively related to the payout ratio because it 
represents the net cash flow available for dividends.   It can also be argued that by using 
free cash flow to pay dividends, the firm saves the costs of holding idle funds and the 
                                                          
17 Crutchley and Hansen (1989) assume that flotation cost have the following structure:  (flotation cost)  = 
α + β (rate of return standard deviation for the firm’s common stock) + γ (the amount of capital raised).   
It is noted that there is economies of scale in flotation cost in the sense that underwriting fees per $1 raised 
decrease with the size of the issue.   More relevant to the approach in this study, it is noted that firms with 
larger rate of return standard deviation pay higher floatation cost.  Crutchley and Hansen (1989) interpret 
this as indicating that riskier firms pay higher underwriting risk premiums.   Of course, how to proxy for 
firm’s risk is a debatable issue, and as an alternative to the rate of return standard deviation other measure 
such as the average variance obtained from a GARCH model of volatility could have been used.  
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agency costs associated with free cash flow.   
Table 5.1 summarises the discussion above.  Particularly the table presents the 
predicted signs on the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables of Equation 
(5.1), that is before group-affiliation is considered. 
 
 
Table 5.1  The predicted association between the payout ratio and the explanatory variables 
 
Name Description Predicted sign 
GROW1 Past growth.  Average annual growth in sales over past five years. (-) 
GROW2 Growth expectations.  Ratio of R&D expenditure to sales.  (-) 
GROW3 Growth expectations.  Price to earnings ratio.   (-) 
GROW4 Growth expectations.  Market to book ratio.   (-) 
REPUT1 Firm size.  Log of total assets. (+) 
REPUT2 Firm size.  Log of market capitalisation. (+) 
REPUT3 Firm age.  Log of number of years since incorporation. (+) 
FLOAT1 Standard deviation of the stock’s daily returns over the year. (-) 
FLOAT2 1 -  the ratio of relative trading days of the stock on the stock exchange (-) 
FCF Free cash flow after paying for future investments but before dividends (+) 
Variable definitions are given in Appendix 5B.  
 
 
The predictions of Table 5.1 and the transaction cost model of Equation (5.1) 
assume that the dividend decision can be expressed as a function of dependency on 
external finance.  This is in line with the first hypothesis as stated at the end of Section 
5.2.1.  The second hypothesis, articulated at the end of Section 5.2.2, is that group 
affiliation mitigates formal markets’ imperfections and makes dependency on external 
finance a less important determinant of the firm’s dividend policy.  To test the impact of 
group affiliation on the payout decision, the transaction cost dividend model of Equation 
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(5.1) is augmented as follows:                
(5.2) 
PAYOUTi = α  + α1 GPi   + β1 GROWi + β2 REPUTi + β3 FLOATi + β4 FCFi                  
            + γ1 (GP GROW)i + γ2 (GP REPUT )i + γ3 (GP FLOAT)i + γ4  (GP FCF)i  + ε i                     
Where GP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is group-affiliated and 0 
otherwise, and the rest of the variables are as defined above.  A full definition of each 
variable is given in Appendix 5B while a list of the 375 Indian business houses is given 
in Appendix 5C. 
By including a group dummy, GP, the extended model of Equation (5.2) allows 
for the constant in the model to differ when the firm is group-affiliated.  Furthermore, the 
extended model also allows for interaction terms between the group dummy variable and 
each of the other explanatory variables.  In line with the second hypothesis, the 
expectation is that group-affiliation reduces reliance on formal markets. The estimated 
coefficients on all the interaction terms, excluding the free cash flow interaction term, are 
therefore predicted to have opposite signs to that on the explanatory variable on their 
own.  These predictions are explained in more detail below.   
The direction of the relationship between the rate of growth and the payout ratio is 
predicted in Table 5.1 to be negative.   However, if groups are able to create internal 
markets, then the relationship between growth and payout in the case of group-affiliated 
firms should be weaker.  This implies positive estimated coefficients on the interaction 
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terms of the group-affiliation dummy and the growth variables, GROW1-GROW4.  
Table 5.1 predicts a positive association between payout and the ease of access to 
the capital market as measured by REPUT1-REPUT3.   However, in the case of group-
affiliated firms the association between the firm’s reputation and its payout ratio is 
predicted to be weaker. The reason is that group-affiliated firms can rely on group 
reputation rather than on their own reputation.  Hence negative signs are expected on the 
estimated coefficients of the interaction terms of the group-affiliated dummy and the 
reputation variables, REPUT1-REPUT3.  
The flotation cost variables FLOAT1 and FLOAT2 are predicted in Table 5.1 to 
be inversely related to the payout ratio. In the case of group-affiliated firms this 
relationship is predicted to be weaker because the group may be able to enjoy lower 
flotation costs.  For example, instead of the underwritten public offer, the firm may find it 
more attractive to raise funds by direct offering to its dominant shareholders being the 
group headquarters and member firms.  This would result in substantial savings as noted 
in Smith (1977) and in Hansen and Pinkerton (1982)18.  Thus with respect to the 
                                                          
18 Hansen and Pinkerton (1982) note that the equity financing paradox, of why firms choose underwriting 
public offering over the cheaper method of non-underwritten direct offering, could be explained in terms of 
ownership structure.  They identify all US direct offerings from the SEC Registered Offering Statistic tapes 
for the period January 1971 through December 1979, totalling 54 direct offers.  It is then illustrated that the 
13 largest direct offerings in their sample, are the equity issues of subsidiaries of American Telephone and 
Telegraph (ATT).  It is noted that at levels of high control the direct offer amounts to passing a cheque 
from the dominant stockholder to the issuing firm, at very low flotation cost.   If this observation is applied 
to the case of group-affiliated firms in India, then it implies that these firms should use the direct offering 
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interaction terms of the group-affiliation dummy and the flotation variables, FLOAT1, 
and FLOAT2, the prediction is of positively signed estimated coefficients.   
Free cash flow is expected to be positively related to the payout ratio.  For group-
affiliated firms, the free cash flow measure includes intra-group flows.  If details of intra-
group cash flows (such as dividend) were available separately, this could be deducted in 
arriving at the surplus cash figure.  Such separation of group and non-group cash flows 
would facilitate testing of the extent to which the dividend decision of group-affiliated 
firms is insensitive to free cash availability due to cash provided by the group.  However, 
this data is not available, thus there appears to be no strong justification for predicting 
that group-affiliated firms would be less sensitive to free cash flow.   No prediction is 
therefore made regarding the direction of the relationship between the payout ratio and 
the interaction term of the free cash flow and the group-affiliation dummy.  
Equation (5.2) include the transaction cost variables, a group-affiliation dummy 
variable, and group-affiliation interaction terms.  This extended model is applied to data 
from an emerging market, India, which is assumed to offer a good environment for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
route, saving underwriting fees and obtaining finance at competitive rates.  It may also be reasonable to 
argue that flotation expenses to various government agencies should be lower for group-affiliated firms if 
the group exercises its preferential access to bureaucrats.  However, both the notion that group-affiliated 
firms will opt for non-underwritten direct offering, and the notion that these firms may enjoy lower 
flotation fees to government agencies are merely hypotheses that require further investigation.  In any 
event, for the purpose of this study, and based on these assumptions, the prediction is that flotation cost 
considerations are less likely to influence the dividend decision of group-affiliated firms.   
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testing the impact of business groups19.   The next stage is the empirical procedure, which 
begins with a description of the sample and the construction of group size and 
diversification measures.  
 
 
5.4   The sample and group size and diversification measures  
 
5.4.1  The sample 
The data are retrieved from PROWESS database provided by the Centre for Monitoring 
the Indian Economy (CMIE) and updated to 22 March 2001.   The initial data set 
includes the universe of all quoted and unquoted Indian Private Sector firms available on 
PROWESS, totalling 6,548 firms, and comprising 4,506 independent firms and 2,042 
group affiliated firms.  Thus over 30 percent of all quoted and unquoted Indian Private 
Sector firms that are available on the database are group affiliated.  This reinforces the 
point made earlier about the importance of the business houses in the Indian business 
environment.  The 2,042 group-affiliated firms are used to construct the group size and 
diversification measures as discussed below20.   
                                                          
19 The suitability of the Indian business houses structure to tests of business groups theories is consistent 
with Khanna and Palepu, (2000a) as discussed in Section 5.2.2  
20 Thus the initial data set relates to Indian Private Sector firms, and excludes firms from the Public Sector, 
the Foreign Sector, or any combination thereof.  
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The period studied is the year ending March 2000 which may be criticised as 
unrepresentative and arbitrary.  However, group affiliation, which is at the centre of this 
study, is available on PROWESS only as a data variable at a given point in time.  The use 
of one year is therefore rationalised by the wish to avoid making the assumption that 
group affiliation is stable over time21.   The selection process involved dropping some 
firms as follows.   
Firms, which were dropped from the initial sample of 6,548 Indian Private Sector 
firms, include unlisted firms, financial firms, firms without the required data, and firms 
with a year ending date other than March 2000.  Also dropped were firms with non-
positive PBDIT to ensure the dependent variable is always defined and positive. This 
procedure resulted in a sample of 1,412 firms, which is the basis for most of the empirical 
procedures.  The sample includes 858 independent firms, of which 533 did not pay 
dividend in the year 2000 and 554 group-affiliated firms, of which 232 did not pay 
dividend22.  Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample.  
 
 
                                                          
21 The choice of March as the year ending date is due to the fact that majority of Indian companies have a 
year ending date of March, which corresponds to the Indian tax year ending.  It is also worth noting that, 
although as discussed in Section 5.2.2 the assumption that group affiliation is stable over time may be 
reasonable in the case of India, also Khanna and Palepu (2000a) use a single year.  A list of the Indian 
business houses and their types is given in Appendix 5C.    
22Appendix 5D presents further details on the sample selection procedure.  
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Table 5.2  Summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables for the year ending March 2000. 
Number of observations is 1412 Indian firms.  Variable definitions are given in Appendix 5B 
    













PAYOUT 0.0594 0.0929 0.000 0.831 1.565 
GROW1 0.208 0.407 -0.750 4.185 1.958 
GROW2 0.00184 0.00732 0.000 0.138 3.972 
GROW3 10.303 65.818 -709.780 1440.000 6.388 
GROW4 1.516 8.498 -32.280 237.850 5.606 
REPUT1 4.071 1.579 -0.357 10.288 0.388 
REPUT2 2.427 1.987 -2.813 11.743 0.819 
REPUT3 3.021 0.620 1.792 4.890 0.205 
FLOAT1 0.146 0.467 0.000 15.948 3.204 
FLOAT2 0.402 0.356 0.000 1.000 0.886 
FCF 0.0373 0.0714 -0.700 0.757 1.911 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 PAYOUT GROW1 GROW2 GROW3 GROW4 
PAYOUT 1.000     
GROW1 0.0243 1.000    
GROW2 0.0352 -0.0130 1.000   
GROW3 0.0293 0.0153 0.0683 1.000  
GROW4 0.0452 0.0732 0.0466 0.371 1.000 
REPUT1 0.142 -0.0213 0.129 0.00144 0.111 
REPUT2 0.332 0.0748 0.175 0.169 0.320 
REPUT3 0.147 -0.320 0.0783 -0.0224 -0.00401 
FLOAT1 -0.117 0.0239 -0.0401 -0.154 -0.0137 
FLOAT2 -0.237 -0.0127 -0.165 -0.0329 -0.0858 
FCF 0.295 0.0593 0.0415 0.0987 0.164 
      
 REPUT1 REPUT2 REPUT3 FLOAT1 FLOAT2 
REPUT1 1.000     
REPUT2 0.783 1.000    
REPUT3 0.374 0.237 1.000   
FLOAT1 -0.107 -0.0918 -0.0851 1.000  
FLOAT2 -0.605 -0.601 -0.124 0.171 1.000 
FCF 0.0413 0.254 0.0262 -0.0502 -0.171 
 
Panel C:  Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the explanatory variables 
Details on the VIF procedure are given in Appendix 5E, Note (1). 
Note GROW1 GROW2 GROW3 GROW4 REPUT1 REPUT2 REPUT3 FLOAT1 FLOAT2 FCF 
(a) 1.150 1.045 1.227 1.315 3.574 3.704 1.352 1.066 1.801 1.168 
(b) 1.138 1.037 1.201 1.209 1.898  1.350 1.063 1.721 1.072 
(c) 1.072 1.072 1.072 1.295 1.967 1.227 1.066 1.658 1.082 
(d) 1.082 1.036 1.036 1.196  1.145 1.063 1.103 1.103 
(a) Auxiliary regressions include all the explanatory variables 
(b) Auxiliary regressions exclude REPUT2 
(c) Auxiliary regressions exclude REPUT1 
(d) Auxiliary regressions exclude REPUT1 and REPUT2 
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Table 5.2 is divided into three Panels A to C.  Panel A presents the mean, 
standard deviation minimum, maximum and coefficient of variation for the dependent 
and each of the independent variables. The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the 
standard deviation to the mean. A low value indicates that the variable in question does 
not vary much and might not exhibit any significance if used as an independent variable 
in the regression.  However, as can be seen from Panel A of Table 5.2, the coefficient of 
variation is well over 5% for all the explanatory variables.  
Panel B of Table 5.2 presents the correlation matrix.  Excluding the growth 
variables, all the other explanatory variables bear the expected relationship with the 
payout ratio23.  Correlation amongst the explanatory variables is generally low although 
the reputation variables, REPUT1 and REPUT2, measuring reputation in terms of log of 
assets and log of market capitalisation respectively, appear problematic.  Specifically, the 
correlation between REPUT1 and REPUT2 is as high as 0.78. Similarly the correlation 
between FLOAT2, the inverse measure of liquidity, and both REPUT1 and REPUT2 are 
both above the absolute value of 0.60.  
To assess the degree of multicollinearity present in the sample, the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) for each of the explanatory variables is given in Panel C of Table 
5.224.   As can be seen from the Table, by dropping, either REPUT1, REPUT2, or both, 
the VIF values reduce to below two.  As both REPUT1 and REPUT2 measure reputation 
                                                          
23 Compare Table 5.2 with the predictions summarised in Table 5.1.  
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in terms of size, in the remaining empirical procedures, the former is excluded.  Use of 
the variable REPUT1 is made later as the basis for the weights in the heteroskedastic 
Tobit.     
However, before turning to the multivariate analysis, the nature of the business 
groups represented in the sample, in terms of their size and level of diversification, is 
addressed.  This facilitates the subsequent comparative analysis of the variable of interest, 
the payout ratio, across the various groups.   
 
5.4.2 Group size and diversification measures  
The conclusions from the review of selective literature on business groups (Section 5.2.2) 
suggest that the level of group diversification is important.   In particular in the context of 
India, Khanna and Palepu (2000a) find a quadratic relationship between firm 
performance and the diversification level of the group with which the firm is affiliated.  
In the spirit of Khanna and Palepu (2000a) four measures of group size and 
diversification across industries are constructed.  These measures are based on the entire 
Indian Private Sector group-affiliated firms including both quoted and unquoted firms 
and totalling 2,042 firms25.  The comparative analysis of the variable of interest, the 
payout ratio, across these measures is then assessed.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
24 Appendix 5E, Note (1), presents details on the VIF procedure.  
25 Notes on sample constructions are given in Appendix 5D.  
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The first group measurement is SIZE which measures the size of the group with 
which a firm is affiliated in terms of the number of firms in the group.  The other three 
group measures are diversification measures including COUNT, FOCUS and HERFIND.  
These diversification measures are based on 13 industries and 41 sub-industries as 
classified by CMIE and presented in Appendix 5F.  COUNT measures diversification in 
terms of the number of industries represented in the group.  FOCUS is an inverse 
measure of diversification, or a concentration measure. It is defined as the ratio of the 
group’s sales from the industry with the highest sales to total group’s sales.  Similarly, 
HERFIND is also an inverse diversification measure or a concentration measure.  It is 
based on the Herfindahl concentration value, defined as the ratio of the sum of the 
squares of each industry’s sales, to the squared value of total group’s sales.  Appendix 5B 
gives more detailed definitions of each of the group size and diversification measures 
while Table 5.3 presents summary statistics for these four measures.   
Table 5.3 is divided into three panels and presents statistics on the group size and 
diversification measures.  Panel A presents summary statistics for group-affiliated firms 
in the sample, while Panel B presents the correlation matrix.   Just as a check, Panel C 
presents the group size and diversification values for the 858 independent firms.  As can 
be seen from Panel A of Table 5.3, the number of firms in the group varies from a low of 
only two firms to a maximum of 110 for the top business house26.  In the rest of the 
empirical procedures, the count of industries represented in the group, COUNT, is 
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selected to represent the nature of the group with which a firm is affiliated.  This is for 
the reasons explained below.  
 
Table 5.3  Size and diversification measures of Indian business houses, year 2000.  
 
Panel A:  Summary statistics for the sample of group-affiliated firms  
(Missing values for series:  FOCUS: 48,  HERFIND: 48  Number of observations: 554 – 48 = 506) 
    Mean    Std. Dev Min    Max  Median   1st Qrt     3rd Qrt   IQ range 
 SIZE     22.445      32.339       2.000    110.000     8.000      4.000       20.000      16.000  
 COUNT      8.142         7.296       1.000      24.000     5.000      3.000       11.000        8.000  
 FOCUS        0.669        0.254       0.227        1.000     0.691      0.463         0.931        0.468  
HERFIND       0.574        0.288       0.131        1.000     0.532      0.355         0.871        0.516  
 
Panel B:  Correlation Matrix between the group size and diversification measures for 506 group 
affiliated firms 
               SIZE         COUNT         FOCUS       HERFIND  
 SIZE             1.000                                            
 COUNT            0.935          1.000                              
 FOCUS           -0.702        -0.786         1.000                
 HERFIND         -0.674        -0.780         0.983          1.000 
 
Panel C:  Descriptive statistics for group size and diversification measures. Values for non-group 
affiliated firms (Number of observations: 858) 
            Mean       Std Dev       Minimum       Maximum  
 SIZE             1.000         0.000         1.000         1.000  
 COUNT           1.000         0.000          1.000         1.000  
 FOCUS            1.000         0.000         1.000         1.000  
 HERFIND          1.000        0.000         1.000         1.000  
SIZE = Group size, measured in terms of the number of firms in the group. 
COUNT = Group diversification, measured in terms of the number of industries represented in the group.    
FOCUS = Group diversification, measured as the ratio of the sales generated from the industry with the highest sales to total group’s 
sales. 
HERFIND = Group diversification, measured as the ratio of the sum of squares of each industry’s sales to the squared value of total 
group’s sales.    
 
COUNT is the measure selected in Khanna and Palepu (2000a), and as can be 
seen from the correlation matrix of Panel B of Table 5.3, it is highly correlated with all 
the other measures.  COUNT is also a superior measure of diversification compared with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
26 The top business house is the Tata group.  A list of all Indian business houses is given in Appendix 5C.  
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FOCUS and HERFIND because it is based on all member firms rather than only those 
with sales data and year ending March 2000.  Further, the use of either FOCUS or 
HERFIND results in a loss of 48 group-affiliated firms due to lack of sufficient group 
sales data. With COUNT as a measure of firm diversification, the number of group 
affiliated firms in the sample is 554, and the next stage is a comparative analysis of the 
payout ratios across independent and group affiliated firms.  
 
5.4.3   Comparative analysis of the payout ratios across groups 
Based on the statistics of Table 5.3, two group affiliation dummies, DG and HD are 
derived from the diversification measure, COUNT, and are precisely defined in Appendix 
5B.  DG is a group affiliation dummy that indicates affiliation with a diversified group, 
which is diversified over more than 4 industries. HD is a group affiliation dummy that 
indicates affiliation with a highly diversified group, which is diversified over more than 
11 industries.27  Table 5.4 presents the comparative analysis of the payout ratio across 
independent and group-affiliated firms at various levels of diversification.  Panel A of 
                                                          
27 The classification of groups into diversified and highly diversified is based partly on the descriptive 
statistics of Panel A, Table 5.3, and partly on the classification in Khanna and Palepu (2000a).  The 
threshold of 4 industries after which the group is classified as diversified is consistent both with the median 
of COUNT (5) reported in Panel A, Table 5.3, and with the intermediate diversified category in Khanna 
and Palepu (2000a) of groups with between 5 and 7 industries.  The threshold of 11 industries after which 
the group is classified as highly diversified is consistent with the 3rd quartile value (11) for the distribution 
of COUNT as reported in Panel A, Table 5.3.  It is also similar to the categorisation in Khanna and Palepu 
(2000a) of groups with over 7 industries as most diversified groups.  
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Table 5.4 presents the mean and median payout values across the sub-samples of firms 
affiliated with the various groups.  Panel B and Panel C of Table 5.4 present parametric 
and non-parametric tests of the difference in payout ratios across the sub samples.   
 
Table 5.4  Payout ratios across independent and group affiliated Indian firms.  
Year ending March 2000 
 
Panel A:  Comparative analysis of the payout ratio, PAYOUT, across group-affiliation categories. 








Observations 1412 858 554 273 116 
Mean 0.0594 0.0520 0.0707 0.0783 0.0934 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.0447 0.0547 0.0828 
Std. Dev. 0.0929 0.0892 0.0973 0.0951 0.0926 
Variance 0.00863 0.00796 0.00946 0.00905 0.00857 
COUNT = Group diversification, measured in terms of the number of industries represented in the group.      
 
Panel B:  Tests for the difference in payout ratios between non-group affiliated firms and group-
affiliated firms.  (Tests that assume that the samples have been drawn from a normal population) 
Non-affiliated firms (858 observations) versus firms affiliated with:  
All groups [554 firms] Diversified [273 firms] Highly diversified [116 firms] 
 
H0: σ21=σ22=σ2 
H1: σ21 ≠ σ22 
 
F (553,857)=1.188804** 
Upper tail area .01193 
 
F (272,857)=1.137151 
Upper tail area .09069 
 
F (115,857)=1.076326 
Upper tail area .28639 
Assume:σ21=σ22
H0: μ1=μ2 
H1: μ1 ≠ μ2
 
t (1410)=3.708863*** 
Two-tailed area .00022 
 
t (1129)=4.162722*** 
Two-tailed area .00003 
 
t (972)=4.663449*** 
Two-tailed area .00000 
Assume:σ21≠σ22
H0: μ1=μ2 
H1: μ1 ≠ μ2
 
t (1108)=3.640564*** 
Two-tailed area .00028 
 
t (436)=4.026642*** 
Two-tailed area .00007 
 
t (146)=4.534498*** 
Two-tailed area .00001 
Significance levels based on two tail tests: **-significant at 5% level, ***-significant at 1% level.  
Degree of freedoms are given in parentheses.  
Test details are given in Appendix 5E, note (2) 
The subscript 1 denotes the group-affiliated sample while the subscript 2 denotes the non-group affiliated sample.  
 
Panel C:  Non-parametric tests for the difference in payout ratios between non-group affiliated firms 
and group-affiliated firms. 
 




Diversified  groups (COUNT>4) 
[273 observations] 
Highly diversified (COUNT>11) 
[116 observations] 




Standardised U=-5.5970*** Standardised U=-5.6275*** Standardised U=-5.5695*** 
 
***-significant at 1% level 
Test details are given in Appendix 5E, note (2) 
Median test: Critical value for χ2(1) with upper tail area of 1% is 6.63. Therefore in all cases can reject the null of no association between group-affiliation 
and payout ratios in favour of some association.  
Mann-Whitney U test: The rank sum is calculated for the group-affiliated sample.  Critical value for Z with two tailed area of 1% is |2.575829|.  
Therefore in all cases can reject the null of no difference in the payout ratios of group-affiliated and non group-affiliated firms at the 1% 
significance level in favour of the alternative of a difference.  
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 Two important observations are noted when looking at Table 5.4.  The first is that 
there appear to be a significant difference in the payout ratios of independent and group-
affiliated firms.  In particular, as can be seen from Panel A of Table 5.4, both the mean 
and the median payout ratios are higher for group-affiliated firms compared with 
independent firms.  Further both the mean and median increase with the level of group-
diversification.  Panels B and C of Table 5.4 show these differences to be significant.  
This observation is consistent with the second hypothesis put forward at the end of 
Section 5.2.2.  This is the hypothesis that group affiliation mitigates formal markets’ 
imperfections thus creating a substantial difference between the dividend policies of 
independent and group-affiliated firms.  
The second observation is that there is a high proportion of firms that did not pay 
any dividend during the year.  Indeed the median payout ratio for the full sample is zero, 
which implies that about half of all firms did not pay dividend (as the payout ratio is 
never negative by construction).   This is also evident from the sample description of 
Appendix 5D, where it is shown that over 62 percent of independent firms and nearly 42 
percent of group-affiliated firms did not pay dividend.  Further, because the overall 
median is zero, the median test of Table 5.4, Panel C is also a test for the association 
between group-affiliation and the decision of whether or not to pay dividends. The 
rejection of the test therefore also indicates that there is an association between this 
decision and whether or not the firm is group affiliated.   
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The implication of the observation, that high proportion of firms did not pay 
dividend during the year, is that the dividend decision may in practice consist of two 
separate decisions.  The first decision being whether or not to pay dividend and, 
providing the decision was to pay, the second decision is regarding the payout level.  
Another implication of the observation that the probability of a zero payout is 
substantially greater than zero, is that the distribution that applies to the variable of 
interest is a mixture of discrete and continuous distributions.  The dependent variable, 
PAYOUT, should therefore be treated as a limited random variable.  
In light of the above, the empirical procedure in the next Section will proceed as 
follows. In the first stage a binary choice model for the decision of whether or not to pay 
dividend will be considered.  In the second and third stages dividend models that allow 
for a limited dependent variable will be tested.  In all stages, however, the underlying 
model is the transaction cost dividend model as presented in Equations (5.1) and (5.2) of 
Section 5.3. 
 
5.5   Multivariate testing and results  
The empirical procedure is divided into three sub sections.  The first part consists of tests 
on the dividend decision using binary choice models, namely Probit and Logit models.  
The second and third parts address the payout level decision using limited dependent 
variable models.  In the second sub section the censored regression model, the Tobit 
model, is utilised while in the last sub section a Sample Selection model is tested.  
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 5.5.1 Binary choice models for the dividend decision 
In the binary choice model the value of the dependent variable is limited to two values, 1 
if the decision was to pay dividend and 0 if the decision was not to pay.  Thus the 
dependent variable is the probability of the firm deciding to pay dividend conditional on 
the information set specified by the RHS variables.   
In this study two binary choice models were experimented with, namely the 
Probit and the Logit model, to give the results presented in Table 5.5.  The Probit model 
is appropriate when the error terms in the latent variable follow a normal distribution, 
while the Logit is the appropriate model when these errors follow a logistic distribution.  
In any case, as expected, once the Logit estimated coefficients are adjusted they give very 
similar results to the Probit model estimation.   The full Logit models are therefore not 
reported, although Column (7) of Table 5.5 reports the estimated coefficients obtained 
from the Logit model and adjusted so that they are comparable with the Probit estimated 
coefficients.  Furthermore, McFadden’s R-squared for both the Probit and Logit models 
are calculated and reported in Table 5.528. 
 
                                                          
28 The MaFadden’s R-squared is defined as 1 – (Log Lunrestricted / Log Lrestricted). The unrestricted log 
likelihood (Log Lunrestricted) is the log likelihood from the regression reported. The restricted log 
likelihood (Log Lrestricted) is the log likelihood when the restriction that all of the β coefficients are zero, 
is imposed.  
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Table 5.5  Probit analysis for Private Sector Indian firms for the year ending March 2000 
 
Panel A:  The full sample 
 
Probit Estimation: All firms R-squared = 0.421031 
Dependent variable: PAYOUT Scaled R-squared = 0.457705 
Number of observations = 1412 McFadden’s R-squared = 0.35832   [For Logit = 0.36082]  
Number of positive obs. = 647  Schwarz B.I.C. = 664.751 
Mean of dep. var. =0 .458215 Log likelihood = -624.861 
Sum of squared residuals = 202.989 LR (zero slopes) = 697.852 [.000] 
Fraction of Correct Predictions =    0.790368 LR (omitted variables, χ29)* = 5.921508 [.74775] 












coefficients **  
Scaled Logit estimates 
(multiplied by  0.625) 
C   -2.279 0.285 -8.006 [.000] -0.571 -2.414 
GROW1 0.399 0.114 3.497 [.000] 0.100 0.438 
GROW2  -13.321 6.498 -2.050 [.040] -3.338 -14.905 
REPUT2  0.313 0.035 8.945 [.000] 0.078 0.331 
REPUT3  0.643 0.083 7.714 [.000] 0.161 0.688 
FLOAT1  -4.175 0.588 -7.095 [.000] -1.046 -4.734 
FLOAT2   -0.411 0.140 -2.935 [.003] -0.103 -0.466 
FCF     3.593 0.656 5.476 [.000] 0.900 4.430 
GP GROW1  0.750 0.312 2.403 [.016] 0.188 0.887 
GP GROW3  0.008 0.003 3.045 [.002] 0.002 0.009 
GP REPUT3  -0.141 0.033 -4.320 [.000] -0.035 -0.158 
Standard Errors computed from analytic second derivatives (Newton).  In TSP4.5 this is the default method of calculating standard errors for PROBIT, 
and LOGIT;  * The omitted variables include: GROW3, GROW4, GP, and the interaction terms: (GP GROW2), (GP GROW3), (GP REPUT2), (GP 
FLOAT1), (GP FLOAT2), (GP FCF); **marginal effects 
 
Panel B:  Non group-affiliated firms 
 
Probit estimation: Independent firms R-squared = 0.398278 
Dependent variable: PAYOUT Scaled R-squared = 0.429300 
Number of observations = 858 McFadden’s R-squared = 0.34472   [For Logit = 0.34765]  
Number of positive obs. = 325   Schwarz B.I.C. = 400.038 
Mean of dep. var. = 0.378788 Log likelihood = -373.020 
Sum of squared residuals = 121.502  LR (zero slopes) = 392.471 [.000] 
Fraction of Correct Predictions =    0.780886    LR (omitted variables, χ22) * = 2.248916 [.32483 ] 











Scaled Logit estimates 
(multiplied by 0.625) 
 C        -2.264 0.359 -6.312 [.000] -0.557 -2.421 
GROW1    0.379 0.118 3.223 [.001] 0.093 0.418 
GROW2    -17.451 8.422 -2.072 [.038] -4.289 -19.444 
REPUT2   0.316 0.048 6.643 [.000] 0.078 0.333 
REPUT3   0.626 0.101 6.184 [.000] 0.154 0.667 
FLOAT1   -3.760 0.675 -5.573 [.000] -0.924 -4.156 
FLOAT2   -0.449 0.169 -2.657 [.008] -0.110 -0.493 
FCF      4.078 0.930 4.383 [.000] 1.002 5.498 
Standard Errors computed from analytic second derivatives (Newton).  In TSP4.5 this is the default method of calculating standard errors for PROBIT, 
and LOGIT;  * The omitted variables include: GROW3 and  GROW4; **marginal effects  
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Panel C:  Group-affiliated firms 
 
Probit estimation: Group affiliated firms R-squared = 0.400889 
Dependent variable: PAYOUT Scaled R-squared = 0. .424851 
Number of observations = 554 McFadden’s R-squared = 0.33421  [For Logit = 0.33789]  
Number of positive obs. = 322   Schwarz B.I.C. = 272.889 
Mean of dep. var. = 0.581227 Log likelihood = -250.778 
Sum of squared residuals = 80.8296 LR (zero slopes) = 251.764 [.000] 
Fraction of Correct Predictions =    0.801444 LR (omitted variables, χ23) * =1.546920 [.67148] 











Scaled Logit estimates 
(multiplied by 0.625) 
C    -2.250 0.474 -4.752 [.000] -0.579 -2.302 
GROW1    1.096 0.329 3.329 [.001] 0.282 1.263 
GROW3    0.008 0.003 2.970 [.003] 0.002 0.009 
REPUT2   0.326 0.047 6.975 [.000] 0.084 0.345 
REPUT3   0.475 0.121 3.913 [.000] 0.122 0.493 
FLOAT1   -5.427 1.173 -4.627 [.000] -1.395 -6.736 
FCF      3.112 0.957 3.253 [.001] 0.800 3.418 
Standard Errors computed from analytic second derivatives (Newton).  In TSP4.5 this is the default method of calculating standard errors for PROBIT, 
and LOGIT;  * The omitted variables include: GROW2, GROW4 and FLOAT2; **marginal effects 
 
Thus Table 5.5 is devoted mainly to the results from the Probit estimation, and is 
split into three Panels.  Panel A presents the results for the full sample of 1,412 non-
affiliated and group-affiliated firms, where the underlying model is that presented in 
Equation (5.2).  Specifically, the underlying model for the full sample is the transaction 
cost model of dividends that includes the group affiliation dummy and the interaction 
terms.  Panel B of Table 5.5 presents the Probit results for the sample of 858 non-
affiliated firms, while Panel C is devoted to the sample of 554 group-affiliated firms.  
Thus in Panels B and C, of Table 5.5, the underlying model is that presented in Equation 
(5.1), which excludes the group-affiliation dummy and the interaction terms.   
The empirical approach to the analysis is the general to specific, where 
insignificant coefficients are dropped one by one to give the results presented in Table 
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5.5.  It is noted that the estimated coefficients in column (2) of Table 5.5, reflect the 
impact of changes in the explanatory variables on the probability of the decision to pay 
dividend.  However, for the Probit model they are not quite the marginal effects.   
Instead, the marginal effects, are given in column (6) of Table 5.5 while their derivation 
is given in Appendix 5E, Note (3).  
A number of important points arise from Table 5.5.   The probability of a 
dividend payment appears to be influenced by the variables suggested in the transaction 
cost model of Equation (5.1).  Further, the direction of the relationship is, in general, 
consistent with the expectations of Table 5.1.   For the full sample as well as for the 
independent and group-affiliated sub samples, the probability of a dividend payment 
increases with the level of free cash flow, FCF, and with ease of access to the capital 
market as represented by size (REPUT2) and by age (REPUT3).  However, age appears 
to have a stronger affect for independent firms compared with group-affiliated firms.  
This is evident from the negative interaction term, (GP REPUT3), in the full sample of 
Panel A of Table 5.5.  It is further apparent from the lower estimated coefficient on 
REPUT3 in the group-affiliated sample of Panel C (0.475) compared with that in the 
independent firms’ sample of Panel B (0.626).  
Similarly flotation costs enter all models with a negative estimated coefficients as 
predicted.  There is also some evidence of difference between group-affiliated firms and 
non-affiliated firms with respect to the impact of flotation costs on the dividend payment 
decision.  Indeed, the inverse liquidity measure, FLOAT2, drops out of the model fitted 
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to the group-affiliation sample of Panel C, Table 5.5 while it is significant in the model 
fitted to the non-affiliated sample of Panel B, Table 5.5.   However, this evidence is 
weakened by two observations.  First, there is no evidence of difference between group 
and non-group firms with respect to flotation costs in the full sample of Panel A, Table 
5.5.  Indeed, the two interaction terms of the group dummy and flotation costs drop out of 
the model.  Second, the absolute value of the estimated coefficient on the volatility of 
returns variable, FLOAT1, is higher in the group affiliated model of Panel C (-5.427) 
compared with the independent firms model of Panel B (-3.760).   
The growth variable GROW2, which measures growth expectations in terms of 
R&D expenditure, enters the equations fitted to the full sample of Panel A, and to the 
independent firms’ sample of Panel B, Table 5.5, with large and negative estimated 
coefficients (of -13.321 and -17.451 respectively).   This is consistent with the predictions 
of Table 5.1.  However, the past growth in sales measure, GROW1, enters all the models 
of Table 5.5 with positive estimated coefficients, which is contrary to expectations.  
Similarly, the price to earnings ratio, GROW3, has a positive affect on the probability 
that a group-affiliated firm will decide to pay dividend.  This is apparent from the 
positive estimated coefficient on the interaction term, (GP GROW3), of Panel A, Table 
5.5.  It is also evident from the positive estimated coefficient on GROW3 in Panel C of 
Table 5.5.  The positive impact of the rate of growth, GROW1 and GROW3, on the 
probability of a dividend payment is consistent with the prediction and findings in 
Redding (1997).  Accordingly dividends signal unobservable financial strength by 
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managers with superior information. 
To summarise the binary choice model estimations, it seems that the decision to 
pay dividend in the case of both independent and group-affiliated firms is greatly 
influenced by transaction cost considerations.  There is also evidence to support the view 
that signalling considerations enter the dividend payment decisions of Indian firms.   It 
appears that for both independent and group-affiliated firms, similar influences impact 
the probability of payment and there is no apparent distinction between the two types of 
firms.  The next question is, therefore, whether any difference does exists with regards 
the decision of the dividend level between independent and group-affiliated firms. 
 
5.5.2 Tobit analysis for the payout level decision 
The transaction cost representation of Equation (5.2) models the desired payout level as 
represented by the actual payout level.  However, the actual payout ratio, PAYOUT, of 
Equation (5.2) is limited in its range to non-negative values while the desired payout 
level could, in theory, take any value.  Thus only part of the distribution of the desired 
payout level is observed.  The first stage is therefore to decide on the appropriate 
regression technique for this type of limited distribution.  That is, to choose between a 
truncated regression model and a censored regression model.  
The truncated regression is the appropriate model when the assumption is of a 
truncated distribution. This means that observations on the desired payout ratios are only 
available on part of the total distribution of desired payouts, which are (in this case) at or 
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above the value of zero.  In contrast the censored regression is the appropriate model 
when the assumption is that the desired payout level is observed when it is at or above the 
value of zero.  When the desired payout level is below zero, the exact desired payout 
level is not observed and instead what is observed is an actual payout of zero.   
Based on this difference between the truncated and censored regressions, the 
assumption in this study is of a censored distribution, which is justified as follows.  If the 
underlying distribution of the desired payout level is assumed to be normal, there is no 
explanation for the observation of relatively high frequency of zero payouts29.  This can 
only be explained by assuming that some of these zero actual payouts represent negative 
desired payout levels.  This explanation is consistent with a censored distribution.   
More formally, let PAYOUT* be the unobservable latent variable representing 
the desired payout ratio.  The actual payout ratio, PAYOUT, which is observable, equals 
the latent variable, PAYOUT*, when the latter is greater than zero, and zero otherwise.  
This is the censored (Tobit) specification because some observations on the latent 
variable (typically when the desired payout ratio is non-positive) are not allowed in 
practice.   
When the variable of interest is censored the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
methodology is inappropriate because the error term is biased.  The method used to 
                                                          
29 The relatively high frequency of actual zero payouts is evident from Appendix 5D, which gives details of 
the sample and the fraction of firms that did not pay dividends in the period studied.  Also refer to the 
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estimate Equation (5.2) is therefore the maximum likelihood Tobit model under the 
alternative assumptions of homoskedastic and heteroskedastic normal disturbances.  The 
results, after dropping insignificant variables one by one from Equation (5.2), are given in 
Table 5.6.    
 
Table 5.6 Tobit analysis of the payout level decision for the full sample, year ending March 2000 
 
Dependent variable: PAYOUT Number of positive obs. = 647 
Number of observations = 1412  Fraction of positive obs. = 0.458215 
LR test for heteroskedasticity (χ21) = 191.7288, Upper tail area: .00000 
LR test for omitted variables in the heteroskedastic Tobit (χ26)* = 3.668022, Upper tail area: .72150   
 Homoskedastic Tobit Heteroskedastic Tobit 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic P-value Estimate t-statistic P-value 
C -0.146 -3.768 [.000] -0.181 -4.547 [.000] 
GROW1 0.029 2.366 [.018] 0.024 1.879 [.060] 
GROW2 -2.039 -2.132 [.033] -1.948 -2.278 [.023] 
GROW4 -0.003 -2.932 [.003] -0.003 -4.683 [.000] 
REPUT2 0.021 4.397 [.000] 0.027 6.173 [.000] 
REPUT3 0.052 4.633 [.000] 0.057 4.979 [.000] 
FLOAT1 -0.690 -9.259 [.000] -0.780 -9.782 [.000] 
FLOAT2 -0.043 -2.622 [.009] -0.040 -2.514 [.012] 
FCF 0.518 8.010 [.000] 0.424 7.129 [.000] 
GP 0.074 1.427 [.154] 0.162 3.639 [.000] 
GP GROW2 1.986 1.267 [.205] 2.689 2.289 [.022] 
GP GROW4 0.002 1.805 [.071] 0.002 3.285 [.001] 
GP REPUT2 -0.001 -0.189 [.850] -0.011 -2.406 [.016] 
GP REPUT3 -0.033 -2.141 [.032] -0.049 -3.672 [.000] 
SIGMA 0.140 33.048 [.000]   
LN (σ)   -1.044 -12.985 [.000] 
α   -0.225 -14.194 [.000] 
Schwarz B.I.C. 41.1449  -47.4668   
Log likelihood 9.62446  105.489   
Standard Errors computed from analytic second derivatives (Newton).  In TSP4.5 this is the default method of calculating standard 
errors for TOBIT;  * Omitted variable include: GROW3, (GP GROW1), (GP GROW3), (GP FLOAT1), (GP FLOAT2), and (GP FCF) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
comparative analysis of the payout ratios across independent and group-affiliated firms of Section 5.4.3 and 
to Table 5.4 of that section.  
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The results presented in Table 5.6 require some clarification.  For the 
heteroskedastic Tobit model, the nature of the heteroskedasticity is assumed to be of the 
form:  
                                                   σ2i = σ2 (FIRM SIZE)iγ                                                (5.3) 
Where FIRM SIZE is measured in terms of total assets.  Taking the square root of both 
sides of (5.3), the equation can be expressed as: 
                                        σi = σ (FIRM SIZE)iγ/2  = σ (FIRM SIZE)i α                                         (5.4) 
The idea is to obtained starting values for σ and α and to replace the constant 
sigma in the log likelihood function with the RHS of Equation (5.4).  For this end the 
natural logs of the absolute residuals from the OLS regression are regressed on a constant 
and the natural log of FIRM SIZE.  (It is noted that the log of firm size, that is the log of 
total assets, is the variable REPUT1, described in Appendix 5B).  From this auxiliary 
regression estimates of the natural log of σ and of α are obtained and these form the 
starting values for the heteroskedastic Tobit30.  The starting values for the rest of the 
coefficients in the heteroskedastic Tobit are obtained from the homoskedastic Tobit.      
Table 5.6 reports the LR test for heteroskedasticity. This test is based on the 
difference between the log likelihood from the homoskedastic Tobit (the restricted 
                                                          
30 Taking the natural logs from both sides of Equation (5.4): LN(σi) = LN[σ (FIRM SIZE)iα] = LN(σ) + 
αLN(FIRM SIZEi) = LNσ + α REPUT1i.  Replacing σi by the absolute value of the residual from the OLS 
regression and running the regression on a constant and REPUT1, generates estimated coefficients for 
LN(σ) and for α.  These provide the starting values for the heteroskedastic Tobit.   
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model) and the log likelihood from the heteroskedastic Tobit.  The null is of 
homoskedasticity, which implies that α in Equation (5.4) is insignificantly different from 
zero.  As can be seen from Table 5.6, the null can be rejected at the 1 percent significant 
level.  This implies that the heteroskedastic Tobit should be preferred, which is also 
reinforced by the lower Schwarz criterion reported in Table 5.6.  Thus the following 
analysis is based on the results of the heteroskedastic Tobit. 
According to the results in Table 5.6, the estimate of σ in Equation (5.4) is 0.352 
[exp(-1.044)], and the estimate of σi is given by 0.352 (FIRM SIZE)i -0.225.  As in the 
Probit analysis the sign on the estimated coefficient of GROW1, the past growth 
measured in terms of sales, is positive.  This positive sign, which is contrary to the 
prediction of Table 5.1, is interpreted also here in terms of dividend signalling theory. 
Also consistent with the results of the Probit analysis, free cash flow (FCF) and 
reputation (REPUT2 and REPUT3) are positively related to the payout level.   Further, 
the flotation cost variables, FLOAT1 and FLOAT2, both enter the Tobit model with 
negative estimated coefficients.  The growth expectation measures, GROW2, which 
represents R&D expenditure, and GROW4, which is the market to book ratio, are also 
shown to be negatively and significantly related to the payout level.  All these signs 
match the predictions of Table 5.1, thus as hypothesised, dependency on external finance 
appears to be an important determinant of the dividend policy of firms.  This is the case at 
least before the interaction terms are examined.  
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However, the Tobit analysis of Table 5.6 shows interesting results with regard 
group-affiliation.  In particular, the estimated coefficients on all of the group-affiliation 
interaction terms are generally of the same magnitude but with the opposite sign of the 
estimated coefficients on the individual variables.  This is supportive of the idea that 
while these explanatory variables are good in explaining the payout level in the case of 
independent firms, they do not enter the decision in the case of group-affiliated firms.  
In particular, while the estimated coefficient on GROW2 is -1.948, that on the 
interaction term, (GP GROW2) is 2.689.  For GROW4 the estimated coefficient is             
-0.003, while for the interaction term (GP GROW4) it is 0.002.  For REPUT2 and 
REPUT3 the estimated coefficients are 0.027 and 0.057 respectively, while for the 
interaction terms (GP REPUT2) and (GP REPUT3) the estimates are -0.011 and -0.049 
respectively.  Even the constant, estimated at -0.181 is near enough cancelled by the 
group dummy variable, GP, estimated at 0.162.  These results lend support to the idea 
that the group structure narrows the gap between the cost of external and internal finance 
thus making the payout level decision less sensitive to dependency on the former.   
To summarise, a substantial difference between independent and group affiliated 
firms is evident from the Tobit analysis.  While the payout level decision of independent 
firms appears to be sensitive to all the explanatory variables suggested in Equation (5.1), 
this is not the case for group-affiliated firms.   Indeed, the payout level of group-affiliated 
firms appears insensitive to growth prospects, firm size and age, (GROW2, GROW4, 
REPUT2 and REPUT3).   However, the dividend decision of group-affiliation firms still 
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appears to be positively influenced by free cash flows (FCF), and negatively influenced 
by volatility of returns and lack of liquidity (FLOAT1 and FLOAT2)31.   
Finally, also worth noting is the signalling function of dividend as represented by 
the significant and positive estimated coefficient on the historic growth in sales measure, 
GROW1.  To investigate the matter further, the next sub section generalises the Tobit 
model to allow for selectivity bias.  This is the Sample Selection model.  
 
5.5.3  The Sample Selection model for the payout level decision 
The results from the Probit analysis show that firms follow a decision process that results 
in them either paying or not paying dividend, so that there is self-selection by the firms 
being investigated.  This implies that the observability of the desired payout ratios is non-
                                                          
31 The opposite signs on the interaction terms of the group-affiliation dummy and the variables representing 
growth expectations (GP GROW2, GP GROW4), and ease of access to the capital market (GP REPUT2, 
GP REPUT3) have been predicted in Section 5.3.  The impact of the interaction term between the group-
affiliation dummy and the free cash flow (GP FCF) was not predicted in Section 5.3. Thus the fact that this 
interaction term proved to be unimportant is not inconsistent with predictions.  Group-affiliated firms were 
also predicted in Section 5.3 to be insensitive to flotation cost but this is not supported by the Tobit results 
of Table 5.6.  However, as noted in footnote 17, the prediction of insensitivity of group-affiliation firms to 
flotation cost is based on two assumptions.  These include the assumption that group-affiliated firms will 
opt for non-underwritten direct offering, and the assumption that these firms may enjoy lower flotation fees 
to government agencies through preferential access.  Thus the fact that the interaction terms between the 
group-affiliation dummy and the flotation cost variables drop out of the Tobit model casts doubt on the 
validity of these assumptions.   
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random but is determined by factors that may be correlated with it32.   Specifically, the 
desired payout ratio is observed only for firms for which the explanatory and unobserved 
variables in the binary choice model satisfy the threshold level.  However, as shown in 
the previous sub section, the payout level of independent and to lesser extent group-
affiliated firms is also determined by the same explanatory variables and possibly by the 
same unobserved characteristics.  Thus there is correlation between the disturbance terms 
of the binary choice and payout level models, and this correlation is measured by rho (ρ).  
When ρ is non-zero, estimation of the payout level equation in the selected 
sample where the desired payout ratio is observed would result in biased coefficients.  
The sample selection model connects the binary choice and payout level models by 
estimating the correlation between their disturbances, ρ.   Thus in the sample selection 
model the binary choice model is referred to as the selection equation while the payout 
level model is termed the regression equation. The sample selection procedure also 
estimates sigma, σ, the standard deviation of the regression equation33.    
 
 
                                                          
32 The sample may also be non-random due to the decision to exclude firms with non-positive profit. 
However, as explained in Section 5.3, to reduce this selection bias, profit is defined before depreciation, 
interest and tax. 
33 The variance (and hence σ) from the selection equation is assumed to equal unity because only the sign 
of the latent variable is observed. The dependent is 1 if the decision is to pay dividend and 0 if the decision 
is not to pay.  
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Table 5.7 Sample Selection Estimation for Private Sector Indian firms for the year ending March 2000 
(Probit Dependent variable: PAYOUT,  Regression Dependent variable: PAYOUT) 
 
Sample of non group-affiliated firms Sample of firms affiliated with diversified groups 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations convergence achieved after 5 iterations 
Number of observations = 858 Number of observations = 273 
Number of positive obs. = 325 Number of positive obs. = 169 
Fraction of positive obs. = 0.378788 Fraction of positive obs. = 0.619048 
Schwarz B.I.C. = 85.1252 Schwarz B.I.C. = -42.8173 
Log likelihood = -31.0883 Log likelihood = 76.4741 
LR test for omitted variables (χ25) = 5.992711  
Upper tail area: .30693 
LR test for omitted variables (χ29) = 3.408465  
Upper tail area: .94588 
LR test for heteroskedasticity (χ254) = 61.42171  
Upper tail area: .22743 
LR test for heteroskedasticity (χ254) = 72.97816  
Upper tail area: .04362 
Parameter Estimate     t-statistic P-value Parameter Estimate     t-statistic P-value 
Selection equation parameters: Selection equation parameters: 
C -1.595 -4.821 [.000] C   -1.754 -3.555 [.000] 
GROW1  0.284 2.929 [.003]    
GROW2  -11.325 -2.589 [.010]    
REPUT2  0.186 4.414 [.000] REPUT2  0.213 3.727 [.000] 
REPUT3  0.501 5.395 [.000] REPUT3   0.429 3.951 [.000] 
FLOAT1  -4.231 -6.639 [.000] FLOAT1   -6.576 -3.425 [.001] 
FLOAT2  -0.408 -2.691 [.007]    
FCF     2.901 3.815 [.000] FCF   6.672 3.985 [.000] 
Regression equation parameters: Regression equation parameters: 
C       -0.033 -0.838 [.402] C       0.047 1.811 [.070] 
   GROW1   -0.098 -1.792 [.073] 
GROW4   -0.002 -2.406 [.016] GROW4  0.003 2.861 [.004] 
REPUT2  0.012 2.541 [.011] REPUT2   0.011 2.465 [.014] 
REPUT3  0.025 2.266 [.023]    
FLOAT1   -0.494 -5.324 [.000] FLOAT1   -0.872 -4.280 [.000] 
FLOAT2   -0.034 -1.733 [.083]    
FCF      0.499 6.382 [.000] FCF     0.872 5.541 [.000] 
σ(regression equation)  and ρ(disturbances of selection & regression equations) σ(regression equation)  and ρ(disturbances of selection & regression equations)
SIGMA    0.127 20.079 [.000] SIGMA   0.104 16.828 [.000] 
RHO     0.981 99.563 [.000] RHO     0.981 99.849 [.000] 
Standard Errors computed from analytic second derivatives (Newton).  In TSP4.5 this is the default method of calculating standard 
errors for SAMPSEL (Sample Selection command).  
 
Table 5.7 presents the results of the sample selection estimation for the sub 
sample of independent firms and for the sub sample of firms affiliated with diversified 
groups.  The selection and regression equations that enter the sample selection model are 
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both based on the transaction cost specification of Equation (5.1). Insignificant 
explanatory variables are dropped one by one to give the tested down versions presented 
in Table 5.734.   
As can be seen from the LHS of Table 5.7, the results for the sub sample of 
independent firms are consistent with the Probit, the Tobit and the first hypothesis of this 
study, namely the applicability of the transaction cost model of dividend to firms in India. 
Indeed, all the explanatory variables in the transaction cost model of Equation (5.1) enter 
both the selection and regression equations with the predicted signs.  Further, the null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity is not rejected, and selectivity bias appears to be present 
as represented by the estimated value of ρ.  The logical next step is to apply the sample 
selection model to the sub-sample of group-affiliated firms.   
The results from the application of the sample selection model to the sub sample 
of group-affiliated firms, however, are not reported because the sample selection model 
does not fit well to this sub sample of firms.  For example, the heteroskedasticity test 
rejects the null of homoskedasticity.  Further, the estimated correlation between the 
disturbances of the selection and regression equations, ρ, is given as 1, indicating that the 
selection equation is dominating the model.  Indeed the tested down sample selection 
                                                          
34 Although not reported, the sample selection model was also run on the sub sample of all 554 group-
affiliated firms.  Both the selection and regression equation in this case are given in Equation (5.1) with the 
addition of the two dummy variables for diversified groups (DG) and highly diversified groups (HD).  As 
explained in the next footnote, both DG and HD drop out of the regression equation but remain in the 
selection equation.   
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model for the group-affiliated firms includes 10 explanatory variables for the selection 
equation but only 3 for the regression equation35.      
If more variables are added to the regression equation, this may improve the fit of 
the sample selection model to the sub sample of group-affiliated firms. However, 
consistent with the Tobit results and with the hypothesis put forward, transaction cost 
considerations are generally not important determinants of the payout ratios of group-
affiliated firms.  A search for other explanatory variables, that may explain the payout 
behaviour of group-affiliated firms, is required but this is left for another paper.        
The RHS of Table 5.7 presents the results of fitting the sample selection model to 
the sub sample of firms affiliated with diversified groups. The LR test for the null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected at the 10 percent significant level but not at the 
5 percent level.  The decision of firms affiliated with diversified groups of whether to pay 
dividend appears to be influenced positively by reputation and the availability of free 
cash and negatively by flotation cost.  Further, the payout level decision of these firms 
appears to be influenced by all the explanatory variables in the transaction cost model of 
Equation (5.1).  Indeed, the direction of influence is as predicted in Table 5.1.   
                                                          
35 The variables that enter the selection equation include the following ten variables: the constant; the 
growth variables (GROW1, GROW3 and GROW4); the reputation variables (REPUT2 and REPUT3); the 
floatation cost variable (FLOAT1); the free cash flow variable (FCF); and the two group diversification 
dummies (DG and HD).  The variables that enter the regression equation include the following three 
variables: the reputation variable (REPUT2); the floatation cost variable (FLOAT1); and the free cash flow 
variable (FCF).  
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The apparent good fit of the sample selection model to the sub sample of firms 
affiliated with diversified groups is puzzling.  As discussed in the review of selective 
literature on business groups (Section 5.2.2) the results in a number of studies emphasise 
the importance of group-diversification in determining the value of group affiliation.  
Most relevant is the Khanna and Palepu (2000a) study, which concludes that group-
affiliation initially has an adverse affect on firm’s performance, until a certain threshold 
of group diversification level is achieved.  If the value of the group is positively related to 
its diversification level, than the dividend decisions of firms affiliated with diversified 
groups should display less sensitivity to transaction cost considerations.   
Alternatively it could be argued that the value of affiliation with diversified 
groups comes from their efficiency, for instance in terms of management skills.  It is 
plausible therefore, that the mangers of diversified groups are more aware of the 
changing environment brought about by reform and liberalisation programmes.  Thus, 
firms that are affiliated with diversified groups react to the changing business 
environment by becoming more responsive to market conditions as they are aware of the 
diminishing value of business groups.  This explanation is in the spirit of Ghemawat and 
Khanna (1998) who study the reaction of two of India’s largest business houses following 
the introduction of the 1991 policy reforms (see Section 5.2.2).  
To summarise, implications of the results of the sample selection model are 
mixed.  The results with respects to the sub samples of independent and group-affiliated 
firms appear consistent with expectations and with earlier models.  However, the results 
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for the sub sample of firms affiliated with diversified groups are somewhat puzzling 
although one plausible explanation is offered.   The conclusions from this and the rest of 
the study are summarised next.   
 
5.6   Conclusions and promising research ideas 
This study begins with a brief review of two strands of the corporate finance literature.  
The first strand focuses on the dividend policy puzzle and the theory of dividend, which 
seeks to explain the dividend decision of firms.  The emphasis here is on the transaction 
cost theory of dividend, which explains the dividend decision in terms of pecking order 
and the gap between internal and external finance.  The idea put forward is that 
dependency on external finance and the transaction cost model of dividend should fit 
particularly well to data from an emerging market.     
The second issue addressed is business groups and theories regarding their role, 
particularly in the context of emerging markets.   A main school of thought here is the 
market failure theory pioneered by Leff (1976) which asserts that the role of business 
groups is to mitigate market imperfections.  Another school of thought, which according 
to Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) appears to suit particularly well the Indian case, is the 
political economy theory of business groups.  Based on these two business group theories 
it is hypothesised that the dividend decision of group-affiliated firms should display much 
less sensitivity to transaction cost considerations compared with non-affiliated firms.  
Instead the payout decision of group-affiliated firms is expected to be influenced by the 
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preferences of the controlling entity and by group-wide considerations.  Table 5.8 
summarises the main conclusions from the empirical procedures.  
 
Table 5.8 Summary conclusions from the empirical procedures 
 
Test  Conclusions 
Comparative analysis 
for difference in 
average payout ratios 
across group 
affiliations.  
1. Both the mean and the median payout ratios are higher for group-affiliated firms compared with 
independent firms.   
 
2. Both the mean and median payout ratios increase with the level of group-diversification as measured 
by, COUNT, the number of industries represented in the group.  
Binary choice 
(Probit/Logit) models 
of the dividend 
payment decision. 
 
The model is applied 
to the full sample and 
to the sub samples of 
independent and 
group-affiliated firms. 
The decision to pay dividend in the case of both independent and group-affiliated firms is influenced by 
transaction cost considerations.  The probability of a dividend payment: 
1. Decreases with growth expectations, GROW2 (R&D expenditure) 
2. Increases with ease of access to the capital market as represented by size, REPUT2, and by 
age, REPUT3.   
3. Decreases with flotation costs, FLOAT1 and FLOAT2.  
4. Increases with the level of free cash flow, FCF. 
 
There is also evidence in support of signalling theory. The probability of a dividend payment increases 
with the historic growth in sales measure, GROW1, and in the case of group-affiliated firms, also with the 
price to earnings ratio, GROW3.  
Heteroskedastic Tobit 
model for the payout 
level decision.   
 
The nature of 
heteroskedasticity is 
assumed to be a 
function of firm size as 
measured in terms of 
assets. 
 
The model is applied 
to the full sample with 
interaction terms.  
For independent firms dependency on external finance appears to be an important determinant of the 
payout level.  The payout ratio:   
1. Decreases with growth expectation measures, GROW2 (R&D expenditure), and GROW4, 
(market to book ratio)  
2. Increases with reputation, REPUT2 (size in terms of market value) and REPUT3 (age).  
3. Decreases with flotation cost variables, FLOAT1 and FLAOT2.  
4. Increases with free cash flow, FCF.  
 
For group-affiliated firms the estimated coefficients on the group-affiliation interaction terms cancel the 
effects of:  
1. 
2. 
The growth variables, GROW2 and GROW4.  
The reputation variables REPUT2 and REPUT3  
However, the decision does seem to be influenced by free cash flows, volatility of returns and liquidity 
(FCF, FLOAT1 and FLOAT2) in the predicted direction.    
 
For all firms there is evidence in support of signalling theory as the payout ratio increases with the historic 
growth in sales measure, GROW1. 
Sample selection 
model of the payout 
level decision with 
self-selection. 
 
Model is applied to the 
full sample and to the 
sub samples of 
independent firms, 
group-affiliated firms, 
and firms affiliated 
with diversified groups 
1. For independent firms there is evident of selectivity with all the explanatory variables entering both 
the regression equation and the selection equation with the expected signs. (GROW1 enters the 
selection equation with a positive sign) 
2. For group-affiliated firms the selection equation appear to dominate the regression equation (the 
estimate of ρ, is 1).  
3. For firms affiliated with diversified groups there is evident of selectivity with all but the growth 
variables represented in the selection equation with the predicted signs. All variables are also 
represented in the regression equation with the predicted signs apart of GROW4, which enters with a 
positive sign.  
 
The good fitness of the sample selection model to the sample of firms affiliated with diversified firms is 
puzzling.  According to the hypothesis of Section 5.3, the expectation is that firms affiliated with 
diversified groups are less sensitive to transaction cost considerations. Hence proxies for these 
considerations are not expected to be good at explaining the payout ratio of these firms.   
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As can be seen from Table 5.8, the comparative analysis points to a significant 
difference in the payout behaviour of independent and group-affiliated firms.  Further, 
there appear to be a direct relationship between the level of diversification of the group 
and its payout decision. However, although the payout median test suggests that there is 
an association between the decision to pay dividend and whether the firm is group-
affiliated, this is not supported in the binary choice models.  Indeed, conclusions from the 
Probit analysis are that the decision to pay dividend in the case of both independent and 
group-affiliated firms is influenced by transaction cost considerations.   
The conclusions from the regression models of the payout level decision are 
different to those from the binary choice models.  In particular, the Tobit regression 
points to clear differences in the dividend behaviour of independent and group-affiliated 
firms.   While the payout ratios of independent firms tend to decrease with growth 
prospects and increase with ease of access to the capital market, the payout ratios of 
group-affiliated firms appear insensitive to these factors.  However, the payout ratios of 
all firms tend to decrease with flotation cost and increase with the availability of surplus 
cash.    Similar conclusions also emerge from the sample selection model, although there 
the payout ratios of group-affiliated firms appear to increase with ease of access to the 
capital market as represented by firm size (REPUT2).     
Overall, the study finds support for the hypothesis that group-affiliated firms 
enjoy smaller gap between the cost of external and internal finance and therefore their 
payout ratios are less responsive to dependency on the former.  One puzzling result is the 
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apparent good fit of the sample selection model to the sub sample of firms affiliated with 
diversified groups.  It is possible that this is indicative of efficiency on behalf of 
diversified groups in their responsiveness to the changing Indian business environment. 
Another issue, which is left unanswered, is how should the dividend decisions of group-
affiliated firms be modelled?  These two issues are yet to be explored.   
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Appendix 5A: Notes on the empirical and estimation procedures of previous studies. 
 
(1).  Kumar and Tsetsekos (1999)   
The study utilises IFC data from the 1994 Emerging Stock Markets Factbook. The sample includes 16 developed and 
21 emerging markets. The period studied is the 13 years period from 1980 to 1992.  The ratio of market capitalisation 
to GDP, (MVGDP), is a measure of the relative size of the capital market and is an indicator of financial sector 
development.  The logarithm of the average real market capitalisation per firm, (RMVCO), is a measure of the size of 
the average firm and is an indicator of corporate sector development.  Using comparative analysis the means of both 
MVGDP and RMVCO are found to be significantly lower (at the 1 percent significance level) for the emerging markets 
sample compared with the developing markets sample.  The study proceeds to assess the hypothesis that the 
characteristics of emerging and developed markets are different by way of discriminant and Logit analyses.  Indeed this 
proposition is supported by the results.  Some of the results from the comparative analysis are as follows.  
Variable Developed Emerging F test for difference in mean value 
MVGDP (financial sector) 0.3729 0.1546 16.1800*** 
RMVCO (corporate sector) 5.1568 2.7295 157.8000*** 
 
 
(2).  Glen, Karmokolias, Miller and Shah (1995)  
The study compares the payout ratio for a composite of 25 developing countries followed by the IFC with the payout 
ratio of a global composite index of developed countries. For the developing countries sample, the payout ratio for 
1993 is 66 percent while for the emerging markets sample the payout ratio ranges from 30 to 40 percent for the period 
1986-1994.   The study proceeds to assess the payout rates in a group of 7 developing countries including Turkey, 
Thailand, Malaysia, India, Jordan, Zimbabwe and Pakistan.  This comparison yields a positive relationship between the 
payout rates and the fraction of total investment that retained earnings represented.  It is therefore suggested that in 
countries where firms have sufficient earnings to finance their investments and thus relatively low amounts of finance 
has to be raised externally, dividend rates are higher.  This is consistent with pecking order considerations and with the 
notion that in emerging markets, firms that need capital for investment tend to adopt a conservative payout policy.    
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 (3).  Guillen (2000)   
The study uses cross sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methodology and data on the top ten business groups 
from nine markets, for the year 1995. These countries include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, South 
Korea, Mexico, Spain and Taiwan.  The importance of business groups is regressed on a constant, on the five-year 
lagged proxies for the various theories to explain business groups, and on group ranking dummies.   Results of one 
model are as follows with standard errors in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicating significance at 5, 1 and 0.1 
percent respectively:  
Importance of business group = 15.84  + 0.03 financial market development – 0.09 Power distance 
                                                   (3.33)**  (0.01)**                                            (0.02)*** 
- 5.27 State autonomy  - 0.58 State size  – 0.36 Law & order + 0.88 asymmetry in foreign investment 
 (1.75)**                        (0.16)**              (0.25)                       (0.26)** 
 
R2 = 0.67    F = 9.94*** 
 
Importance of business group (relative to size of the economy) – The dependent variable.  Measured as the ratio of total 
net sales of each group to the country’s GDP. 
Financial market development (-) – Proxy for market failure theory.  Measured as the ratio of stock market 
capitalisation to the country’s GDP. 
Power distance (+) – Proxy for the social structure theory. Measuring the extent to which relationships in the society 
are based on autocratic and paternalistic assumptions.  
State autonomy (+) – Proxy for the state autonomy theory. 
State size (+) – Proxy for the state autonomy theory. 
Law and order (-) – Inverse proxy for level of corruption.  Business groups may benefit from the lack of sound political 
and legal institutions, a strong court system or an orderly succession of power.  
Asymmetry in foreign direct investment (+) – Proxy for the resource based view.  Measured as the absolute difference 
between z-scores for inward and outward stock of foreign direct investment. 
Dummy variables – Included but not reported. Indicate the group’s place in the ranking of the top 10 business groups 
(10th place omitted). 
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 (4).  Chang and Choi (1988)  
The study utilises data on 182 Korean manufacturing firms in the ten years period from 1975 to 1984.  The data is 
subjected to a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) cross sectional regression analysis with firm size (measured in terms of 
average total assets) used as weights.  The model is of the form:  
profit = f(business group structure, control variables). 
Profitability is measured alternatively as the ten-year average profit as a fraction of equity (PE) and as a fraction of total 
assets (PA).  The group structure is represented by three dummy variables that reflect the affiliated group’s level of 
diversification (D1, D2, D3).  The control variables include proxies for firm’s growth (GR), market power (CR, AD, 
DI), risk (VE) and size (LTA). Results show that D1, the dummy representing firms affiliated with the most diversified 
groups, has a significant and positive estimated coefficient with profit rate about 2 percent higher compared with other 
firms.  D2 and D3, the dummies representing firms affiliated with less diversified groups, also have positive estimated 
coefficients but these are lower than in D1, and are not significant. 
PA = 0.158** - 0.004 CR + 0.022 GR + 0.402** AD – 0.013** LTA + 0.011 DI  + 0.0002 VE + 0.018** D1 + 0.003 D2 + 0.001 D3 
Adjusted R2=0.3569,  F=12.100 
Where ** indicates significance at 5 percent level, and the explanatory variables are defined as follows. 
PA (dependent) – Average annual rate of profit after taxes but before interest on total assets for the years 1975-1984. 
CR – 3-firm concentration ratio, the percentage of value of shipment accounted for by the three largest firms in the company’s 
principal industry as of 1977.  
AD – Average advertising intensity, 10 year average ratio of advertising spending to total sales,1975-1984. 
LTA – Log of the ten year average total assets between 1975-1984 
GR – Average rate of growth of sales by the firm, 1975-1984 
DI – Diversification index, one minus the ratio of value of shipment in the industry in which the firm has the highest value of 
shipment to the total value of shipment 
VE – Coefficient of variation of PE where PE is the average annual rate of profit after taxes on owners’ equity for the years 1975-1984   
D1 – A dummy set to one when the firm is affiliated with a type 1 group. Type 1 group is completely vertically integrated and is also 
widely horizontally integrated. The top 4 business groups have this structure. 
D2 - A dummy for type 2 group, which has a multidivisional structure (i.e. it is horizontally integrated).  
D3 – A dummy for type 3 group, which does not have a multidivisional structure.  
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 (5).  Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999)  
The study uses data on 2,187 companies from nine Asian economies: Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.  The time period is 1991 to 1996.  The methodology is 
Ordinary Least Squares, Panel data with 9,326 firm-year observations controlling for fixed time effects. The results of 
one specification of the determinants of excess value, is as follows:  
EXV =   0.4328* +  0.0388 HINCOME  +  0.1190***LINCOME 
                                                          (0.2469)                    (0.0239)                       (0.0336) 
– 0.0805*** (GP DIVER HINCOME) - 0.0093 (NGP DIVER HINCOME) 
(0.0163)                                                     (0.0236) 
+ 0.1689*** (GP DIVER LINCOME) - 0.0034 (NGP DIVER LINCOME) 
(0.0537)                                                (0.0678) 
– 0.0272 OPINC  +  0.3874*** LEV  +  0.0294*** Log(ASSETS) 
                                                        (0.0275)                 (0.0297)                   (0.0037) 
 
Adjusted R2= 0.0331 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * denoting 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance 
respectively. Variable definitions are as follows.  
EXV – The natural logarithm of the ratio of the firm’s actual value to its imputed value. Actual value is the market 
value of common equity plus the book value of debt. The imputed value is the sum of the products of the 
sales in each segment of a firm by the median market-to-sales ratio for each industry in each country.  
HIINCOME – The high-income-country dummy variable equals one if the firm is from Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan, or Japan, and zero otherwise. 
LINCOME – The lower-middle-income-country dummy variable equals one if the firm is from Indonesia, Philippines, 
or Thailand, and zero otherwise.  
GP – A dummy variable equals one if the firm is a member of a corporate group, and zero otherwise. 
NGP – A dummy variable equals one is the firm is non-group-affiliated, and zero otherwise. 
DIVER – A dummy variable, which equals one if the firm has multiple segments, and zero otherwise.  
OPINC – A control variable for the effects of short-term profitability.  Measured as operating income over sales.  
LEV – A control variable for leverage. Measured as total debt to assets. 
Log(ASSETS) – A control variable for firm size. Measured as the natural logarithm of firm assets. 
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 (6).  Khanna and Palepu (2000b)  
The data set includes 114 public firms in Chile for the period 1988 to 1996.  34 of the firms are group affiliated while 
80 are unaffiliated.  Year by year as well as panel analyses were undertaken where Return On Assets (ROA) is 
regressed on firm size, group membership, group diversification and group diversification squared.  The dependent 
variable, ROA is measured as ROA = [net income + interest X (1-tax rate)] / total assets.  Results for the years 1988 
and 1996, using OLS and including industry dummies, are as follows with t-ratios that are based on heteroskedasticy-
consistent standard errors in parentheses.  (****, ***, ** and * denoting  0.1, 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance 
respectively): 
ROA (1988) = 0.010*** (log of sales)  + 0.138** (group membership dummy) 
(3.093)                              (2.082) 
– 0.010 (group size in terms of number of firms) 
(-0.874) 
- 0.034* (group diversification in terms of number of industries) 
(-1.775) 
+ 0.003*** (group diversification squared) – 0.126** 
(2.965)                                                          (-2.350) 
 
F = 13.69****,  R-Squred = 0.275,    
Threshold above which group diversification creates value = 10.2 industries 
 
ROA (1996) = 0.009**** (log of sales)  + 0.041 (group membership dummy) 
(3.386) (1.032) 
+ 0.004 (group size in terms of number of firms) 
(1.344) 
- 0.034** (group diversification in terms of number of industries) 
(-2.614) 
+ 0.002**** (group diversification squared) – 0.066 
(3.401)                                                         (-1.582) 
 
F = 13.26****,   R-Squred = 0.292,    




(7).  Maman (1999)  
Maman (1999) investigates the role of common directors across group affiliated firms by looking at four of the most 
dominant business groups in Israel.  The study carries a comparative analysis that spans the fourteen-year period from 
1974 to 1987, and includes 33 group-affiliated firms and 30 independent firms.  Common to all 63 firms, however, is 
that each has at least one director that is also a board member in at least one other firm in the sample in every year of 
the study.  Directorship ties within a group are measured as the proportion of internal ties out of all of the group’s ties 
with other firms in the sample.  Maman (1999) finds that substantial proportion of directorship ties is within business 
groups.  In particular in the case of the industrial groups, Koor and ICI, on average 84 and 75 percent respectively of 
total directorship ties were within the group.   In the case of the cross sector groups, IDB and Clal, internal directorship 
ties within the group were lower although still substantial at an average of 56 and 49 percent respectively.  The study 
concludes that common directorship is one of the means to co-ordinate and control firms in the group.  
 
(8).  Khanna and Palepu (2000a)  
The study utilises data on 1,308 Indian private sector firms traded on the Bombay Stock Exchange for the year 1993. 
The empirical methodology is an OLS regression analysis of firm performance on group affiliation and control 
variables. Proxies for performance include Tobin’s Q and Return On Assets. The standard errors, reported in 
parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity and allow for correlation among firms from the same group.  Results 
for one specification for the Tobin’s Q regression are as follows with  ***, **, * denoting significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels respectively: 
Tobin’s Q = 1.2863*** +  0.0210 Log of sales  –  0.0050*** Age+  0.0062 Least diversified group dummy 
(0.0797)       (0.0219)                         (0.0016)                                           (0.0674) 
- 0.1491 Intermediate diversified group dummy+  0.2941*** Most diversified group dummy  +  Industry dummies 
(0.1010)                                                    (0.1104) 
 
R-squared = 0.0560,  F-statistic = 5.0100*** 
Tobin’s Q – (market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt) / (book value of assets) 
Group diversification dummies – group diversification is measured in terms of the number of industries in the group. The least 
diversified group dummy captures membership of groups with 1-4 industries. The intermediate diversified group dummy 
captures membership of groups with 5-7 industries. The most diversified group dummy captures membership of groups 
with over 7 industries.  
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 (9).  Dewenter and Warther (1998)  
As addition to the main procedures the study also estimates the Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model (without the 
constant term).  The model is estimated for each of 313 US firms and 180 Japanese firms with at least five years of 
non-zero dividend and earnings, in the period 1982 to 1993.  The Japanese sample is divided into independent firms, 
hybrid structure firms and group-affiliated (Keiretsu) firms.  The prediction is that the speed of adjustment coefficient 
for the Keiretsu sample should be higher compared with the US and independent Japanese samples.  This prediction is 
rationalised by assuming less information problems in the case of Keiretsu members.  Indeed, it is found that the 
median speed of adjustment for the Keiretsu sample, (0.117), is significantly higher than the medians for both the US 
sample (0.055) and the independent Japanese sample (0.021).  
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Appendix 5B:  Variable definitions 
PAYOUT - The ratio of dividends to Profit Before Depreciation, Interest and Tax (PBDIT). 
GROW – A measure of the rate of expansion.   Alternative measures include the following:  
(1).  GROW1 – A historic measures of growth. Defined as the average annual growth in sales over the 
previous five-year period.  GROW1 = (Sales2000 / Sales1995)1/5 -1 
(2).  GROW2 – Measures growth expectations as the ratio of R&D expense to sales.   
(3).  GROW3 – Measures growth expectations as the price to earnings (PE) ratio.  GROW3 = Closing price 
to Earnings Per Share (EPS). 
(4).  GROW4 – Measures growth expectations as the market to book ratio, which is defined as closing price 
to book value per share. Book value per share is book equity divided by the number of outstanding 
equity shares.   
REPUT – A measure of the ease of access to the capital market achieved through reputation.  Alternative measures 
include the following: 
(1).  REPUT1 – The size of the firm, measured as the log of the book value of total assets. 
(2). REPUT2 – The size of the firm, measured as the log of the market capitalisation. 
(3). REPUT3 – The age of the firm measured as log of the number of years since incorporation.  
FLOAT – The flotation cost faced by a firm when raising capital in the capital market.  Alternative proxies include: 
(1).  FLOAT1 - Flotation costs as measured by the standard deviation of the stock’s daily rate of return over 
the year.  In line with Crutchley and Hansen (1989) firms with larger standard deviation of returns 
are assumed to pay higher flotation cost due to higher underwriting risk premiums.  The rate of 
return on day t is defined as: rt = (pt + g) / pt-1.   Where pt is the closing price on day t, and g is the 
gains arising out of dividends or a bonus issue or a rights issue. 
 (2).  FLOAT2 – A proxy for flotation costs which is based on the relative trading days during the year 
ending 31 March 2000.  Measured as 1 minus the ratio of the days the company’s stock traded on 
the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) to the number of days that trading took place on the BSE in the 
period.  
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FCF – The Free Cash Flow is the net cash flow available for dividends after paying for future investment.  FCF = 
(Closing cash balance + Cash outflow on account of dividend paid) / Total assets 
GROUP AFFILIATION DUMMIES – The following three measures are used to capture the nature of the business 
group with which a firm is affiliated.  Most of the empirical analysis is based on the first measure, while the 
second and third measures were constructed based on group diversification measures as detailed below:   
(1).  GP – Group affiliation dummy that is set to one if the firm is a member of a business group and zero 
otherwise.  The classification of firms into groups is based on the classification system of the 
Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE).  The CMIE classification system is based on a 
continuous monitoring of the company’s announcements and on qualitative understanding Indian 
business environment. Appendix 5C lists the name of all the Private Indian Business Houses 
(business groups) and their types.   
(2). DG – Group affiliation dummy that indicates affiliation with a diversified group. A diversified group is 
defined as a group with above sample median diversification value.  The diversification measure is 
the number of product lines represented in the group, COUNT.  DG is set to 1 when the firm is 
affiliated with a group that is diversified over more than 4 product lines and 0 otherwise.  
(3). HD - Group affiliation dummy that indicates affiliation with a highly diversified group. A highly 
diversified group is defined as a group that falls in the 4th quartile of the sample diversification 
distribution. The diversification measure is the number of product lines represented in the group, 
COUNT.  HD is set to 1 when the firm is affiliated with a group that is diversified over more than 
11 product lines and 0 otherwise. 
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GROUP SIZE AND DIVERSIFICATION MEASURES - The following variables measure the size and 
diversification levels of the group with which a firm is associated.  For non-affiliated firm each of the four 
following measures is set to unity.  While the first measure is in terms of group’s size, the remaining three 
measures are based on the level of group’s diversification.  The industry classification system, which 
determines the latter three variables, is based on CMIE industry classification system and is given in 
Appendix 4F.  
(1). SIZE – Group size in terms of number of member firms in the group. All firms that are listed on 
PROWESS as associated with the group are counted regardless of whether they are listed on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange.           
(2). COUNT – Group diversification in terms of number of industries represented in the group. All firms that 
are listed on PROWESS as associated with the group are counted regardless of whether they are 
listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange.                    
(3).  FOCUS – Group concentration level.  Calculated as the ratio of group’s sales from the industry with the 
highest sales to total group’s sales. Thus FOCUS is defined as: MAX Sjg / Sg.  Where Sjg = Sales 
generated by group g from industry j; and Sg is total sales generated by group g.   Only firms with 
year ending March 2000 and available sales data are included in the calculation. However, for 
groups where less than two such observations are available, FOCUS is set to a missing value.  
(4). HERFIND – The Herfindahl concentration value calculated as the ratio of the sum of the squares of each 
industry’s sales to the squared value of total group’s sales. Thus HERFIND is defined as: ΣS2jg / 
S2g.  Where Sjg = Sales generated by group g from industry j; and Sg is total sales generated by 
group g.   Only firms with year ending March 2000 and available sales data are included in the 
calculation.  However, for groups where less than two such observations are available, HERFIND 
is set to a missing value.  
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Appendix 5C:  List of Indian business houses and their type 
Code Group type Group name
0  Independent  Private (Indian) 
1  Top 50 BH   Tata Group 
2  Top 50 BH   Birla Group 
3  Top 50 BH   Reliance Group [Ambani] 
4  Top 50 BH   Thapar Group 
5  Top 50 BH   J.K. Singhania Group 
6  Top 50 BH   RPG Enterprises Group 
7  Top 50 BH   Bajaj Group 
8  Top 50 BH   Modi Group 
9  Top 50 BH   Larsen & Toubro Group 
10  Top 50 BH   T.V.S. Iyengar Group 
11  Top 50 BH   Mafatlal Group 
12  Top 50 BH   Shriram Group 
13  Top 50 BH   Mahindra & Mahindra Group 
14  Top 50 BH   Chidambaram M.A. Group 
15  Top 50 BH   Kirloskar Group 
16  Top 50 BH   UB Group 
17  Top 50 BH   Escorts Group 
18  Top 50 BH   Om Prakash Jindal Group 
19  Top 50 BH   Murugappa Chettiar Group 
20  Top 50 BH   Wadia (Bombay Dyeing) Group 
21  Top 50 BH   Essar (Ruia) Group 
22  Top 50 BH   Bangur Group 
23  Top 50 BH   Goenka G.P. (Duncans) Group 
24  Top 50 BH   Videocon Group 
25  Top 50 BH   Piramal Group 
26  Top 50 BH   MRF Group 
27  Top 50 BH   Walchand Group
28  Top 50 BH   B P L Group 
29  Top 50 BH   Lalbhai Group 
30  Top 50 BH   Usha Rectifier Group 
31  Top 50 BH   Amalgamation Group 
32  Top 50 BH   Hero (Munjals) Group 
33  Top 50 BH   Williamson Magor Group 
34  Top 50 BH   BSES Group 
35  Top 50 BH   Nagarjuna Group 
36  Top 50 BH   Lakshmi Group [Naidu G.V.] 
37  Top 50 BH   Dalmia Group 
38  Top 50 BH   Firodia Group 
39  Top 50 BH   Kalyani (Bharat Forge) Group 
40  Top 50 BH   HCL Group 
41  Top 50 BH   Raunaq Singh Group 
42  Top 50 BH   Godrej Group 
43  Top 50 BH   Ruchi Group 
44  Top 50 BH   WIPRO Group 
45  Top 50 BH   Balaji (Reddy) Group 
46  Top 50 BH   Vardhman Group 
47  Top 50 BH   Finolex (Chhabria P.P.) Group 
48  Top 50 BH   Lloyd Steel Group 
49  Top 50 BH   Ranbaxy Group 




Code Group type Group name
51  Large BH  Adani Group 
52  Large BH  Ador Group (Advani Oerlikon) 
53  Large BH  Alembic Group 
54  Large BH  Allana Group 
55  Large BH  Alpine Group 
56  Large BH  Amrit Banaspati Group 
57  Large BH  Andhra Sugar Group 
58  Large BH  Apple Inds. Group 
59  Large BH  Asian Paints Group 
60  Large BH  Atlas Cycle Group 
61  Large BH  Batliboi Group 
62  Large BH  Bharat Modi Group 
63  Large BH  Bharatia Group 
64  Large BH  Chowgule Group 
65  Large BH  CIPLA Group 
66  Large BH  Dabur Group 
67  Large BH  DCL Group 
68  Large BH  Dewan Group 
69  Large BH  Dr. Reddy's Group 
70  Large BH  Eicher Group 
71  Large BH  Elgi Group 
72  Large BH  Enkay Group 
73  Large BH  Excel Industries Group 
74  Large BH  FACOR Group 
75  Large BH  Flex Group 
76  Large BH  Garden Vareli Group 
77  Large BH  Garware Group 
78  Large BH  GE Shipping Group 
79  Large BH  Ghia Group 
80  Large BH  Goenka S.P. Group 
81  Large BH  Gujarat Ambuja Cement Group 
82  Large BH  HAMCO Group 
83  Large BH  Hindusthan Devl. Group 
84  Large BH  IFB Group 
85  Large BH  India Cement Group 
86  Large BH  Indian Seamless Tubes Group 
87  Large BH  Jain Shudh Group 
88  Large BH  Jaiprakash Group 
89  Large BH  Jatia Group 
90  Large BH  Kanoria Group 
91  Large BH  KCP Group 
92  Large BH  Khatau Group 
93  Large BH  Kilachand Group 
94  Large BH  Krishna Group 
95  Large BH  Lakhanpal Group 
96  Large BH  Lala Vidyasagar Oswal 
97  Large BH  Lohia Machines Group 
98  Large BH  Lupin Group 
99  Large BH  Maharashtra Seamless [Jindal B.] 
100  Large BH  Mardia Rasiklal Group 
101  Large BH  Mehta C.K. Group 
102  Large BH  Mesco Group 




Code Group type Group name
104  Large BH  Modern Group 
105  Large BH  Nava Bharat Group 
106  Large BH  NEPC Group 
107  Large BH  NICCO Group 
108  Large BH  Nirma Group 
109  Large BH  Oberoi M.S. Group 
110  Large BH  Onida Group 
111  Large BH  Oswal Agro Group 
112  Large BH  OWM Group 
113  Large BH  Pai (Manipal) Group 
114  Large BH  Parasrampuria Group 
115  Large BH  Parekh Group 
116  Large BH  Parijat Group 
117  Large BH  Pentafour Group 
118  Large BH  Pertech Computers Group 
119  Large BH  Prakash (Surya Roshni) Group 
120  Large BH  Priyadarshini Group 
121  Large BH  Punjab Tractor Group 
122  Large BH  R.M. Gokuldas Group 
123  Large BH  Raasi Group 
124  Large BH  Raheja Rajan Group 
125  Large BH  Rajju Shroff Group 
126  Large BH  Ramco Group [Madras Cements] 
127  Large BH  Rane Group 
128  Large BH  Sahu Jain (Times of India) Group 
129  Large BH  Sakthi Group 
130  Large BH  Samtel Group 
131  Large BH  Sanghi Polyester Group 
132  Large BH  Sanmar Group [Chemplast Group] 
133  Large BH  Sarabhai Group 
134  Large BH  Saraswati Indl. Syndicate Group 
135  Large BH  Shapoorji Pallonji Group 
136  Large BH  Shri Ishar [Indore Steel Group] 
137  Large BH  Shriyans Prasad Jain Group 
138  Large BH  Siyaram Poddar Group 
139  Large BH  SM Dyechem Group 
140  Large BH  Somany Enterprises Group 
141  Large BH  Sterlite Inds. Group 
142  Large BH  Taparia Group 
143  Large BH  TCI-Bhoruka Group 
144  Large BH  Thapar Agro (Ludhiana) Group 
145  Large BH  Thermax Group 
146  Large BH  Torrent Group 
147  Large BH  Triveni Group 




Code Group type Group name
149  Other BH  A.V. Thomas Group 
150  Other BH  Adhunik Group 
151  Other BH  Agarwal D.N. (Triveni Sheet) Group 
152  Other BH  Ajmera Group 
153  Other BH  Alchemie Group 
154  Other BH  Alsa Marine Group 
155  Other BH  Ambuja (Bihar) Group 
156  Other BH  Amforge Group 
157  Other BH  Amtek Group 
158  Other BH  Anand D.C. Group 
159  Other BH  Ansal Group 
160  Other BH  Apar Group 
161  Other BH  Apeejay Group 
162  Other BH  Apollo Earthmovers Group 
163  Other BH  Apollo Hospitals Group 
164  Other BH  Apte Group 
165  Other BH  Arihant Group 
166  Other BH  Aruna Sugars Group 
167  Other BH  Arya (Blue Blends) Group 
168  Other BH  Ashok (Kadakia) Group 
169  Other BH  Aspinwall Group 
170  Other BH  Atul Glass Group 
171  Other BH  ATV Group 
172  Other BH  Autoriders Group 
173  Other BH  AVI Group 
174  Other BH  Bajoria B.P./K.K. Group 
175  Other BH  Bajoria U.S. Group 
176  Other BH  Bala Techno Group 
178  Other BH  Balsara Group 
179  Other BH  Banswara Group 
180  Other BH  BEC Group 
181  Other BH  Berlia Group 
182  Other BH  Bhai Mohan Singh Group 
183  Other BH  Bharat Vijay Mills Group 
184  Other BH  Bharti Telecom Group 
185  Other BH  Bhupendra Group 
186  Other BH  Bhuva Group 
187  Other BH  Binani Group 
188  Other BH  Borosil Group (Kheruka) Group 
189  Other BH  Butterfly Group 
190  Other BH  Capital Trust Group 
191  Other BH  CDR Group 
192  Other BH  Chemfab Alkalies Group 
193  Other BH  Chemox Chemicals Group 
194  Other BH  Chokhani Group 
195  Other BH  CIFFCO Group 
196  Other BH  Continental Group 
197  Other BH  Core Lab. Group 
199  Other BH  Credit Capital Venture Group 
200  Other BH  Dalal Street Journal Group 
201  Other BH  Daudayal Group 
202  Other BH  Delhi Flour Mills Group 




Code Group type Group name
204  Other BH  Dera Group 
205  Other BH  Devidayal Group 
206  Other BH  Dhanuka P.L. Group 
207  Other BH  Dhanuka S.L./C.K. Group 
208  Other BH  Dharani Group 
209  Other BH  Dhillon Group 
210  Other BH  DLF Group 
211  Other BH  Dugar Group 
212  Other BH  Dugar Tarachand Group 
213  Other BH  Easun Group 
214  Other BH  Elecon Group 
215  Other BH  Esquire Group 
216  Other BH  Essel Packaging Group 
217  Other BH  Fedders Lloyd Group 
218  Other BH  Gadgil Western Group 
219  Other BH  Gajra Group 
220  Other BH  Ganesh Benzoplast Group 
221  Other BH  Gannon Dunkerly Group 
222  Other BH  Goenka J.P. Group 
223  Other BH  Goldstar Group 
224  Other BH  Grauer & Weil Group 
225  Other BH  GTN Group 
226  Other BH  Gujarat Ambuja Proteins Group 
227  Other BH  Gujarat Inject Group 
228  Other BH  Gujarat Steel Tubes Group 
229  Other BH  Gupta Carpet Group 
230  Other BH  GVK Reddy (Novopan) Group 
231  Other BH  Hada Group 
232  Other BH  HB Group 
233  Other BH  Himadri Group 
234  Other BH  Himatsingka Group 
235  Other BH  Hitkari Group 
236  Other BH  IMFA Group 
237  Other BH  Inox Group 
238  Other BH  Ipca Laboratories Group 
239  Other BH  J.M. Financial Group 
240  Other BH  Jagsonpal Group 
241  Other BH  Jain Pipe Group 
242  Other BH  Jalan M.L. Group 
243  Other BH  Jalan Sushil Group 
244  Other BH  Jardine Henderson Group 
245  Other BH  Jayant Dalal Group 
246  Other BH  Jaysynth Group 
247  Other BH  Jenson & Nicholson Group 
247  Other BH  Jenson & Nicholson Group 
248  Other BH  Jindal (Ahmedabad) Group 
249  Other BH  Jiwrajka Group 
250  Other BH  Jyoti Group 
251  Other BH  K.G. Group 
252  Other BH  Kajaria Ceramics Group 
253  Other BH  Kalpataru Group 
254  Other BH  Kedia V. Group 




Code Group type Group name
256  Other BH  Khandelwal Group 
257  Other BH  Khoday Group 
258  Other BH  Killick Nixon Group 
259  Other BH  Kongarar Group 
260  Other BH  Kothari D.C./Pradeep Group 
261  Other BH  Kothari H.C./Bhadrashyam Group 
262  Other BH  Kothari M.M (Guwahati) Group 
263  Other BH  Kothari Products Group 
264  Other BH  Krystal Group 
265  Other BH  KT Group (Keshavlal Talakchand) 
266  Other BH  Lahoti Group 
267  Other BH  Lamina Group 
268  Other BH  Lan Eseda Group 
269  Other BH  Libra Group 
270  Other BH  Mahendra Khatau Group 
271  Other BH  Malhotra Steel Group 
272  Other BH  Mardia Extrusions Group 
273  Other BH  Marson's Group 
274  Other BH  Maxworth Orchards Group 
275  Other BH  Menon (Kolhapur) Group 
276  Other BH  Metrochem Group 
277  Other BH  Mikado Textile Group 
278  Other BH  Mohan Meakin Group 
279  Other BH  Monnet Group 
280  Other BH  Motwani Group 
281  Other BH  Nachammai Group 
282  Other BH  Namaste Exports Group 
283  Other BH  Nath Group 
284  Other BH  NCL Group 
285  Other BH  NECO Group 
286  Other BH  Neterwala Group 
287  Other BH  OEN Group 
288  Other BH  Orind Group 
289  Other BH  Oswal Spg. Group 
290  Other BH  Paam Pharmaceuticals Group 
291  Other BH  Parekh Platinum Group 
292  Other BH  Parle Products Group 
293  Other BH  Partap Group 
294  Other BH  Patel J.V. Group [New Std. Engg.] 
295  Other BH  Patel Roadways Group 
296  Other BH  Patodia D.N. Group 
297  Other BH  Patodia Eurotex [PBM Polytex Group] 
298  Other BH  Pearl Pet Group 
299  Other BH  Peerless Group 
300  Other BH  Pennar Group 
301  Other BH  Pioneer Group 
302  Other BH  Poddar Bros. (Calcutta) Group 
303  Other BH  Poddar S K Group 
304  Other BH  Polar Group 
305  Other BH  Prabhu Steel Group 
306  Other BH  Pressman Group 
307  Other BH  Prudential Capital Markets Group 




Code Group type Group name
309  Other BH  Raghu Mody Group [Rasoi Group] 
310  Other BH  Rajgarhia Group 
311  Other BH  Ram Jhunjhunwala Group 
312  Other BH  Rama Group 
313  Other BH  Ramgopal Group 
314  Other BH  Rathi P.C./R.C. Group 
315  Other BH  Reddy Obul Group 
316  Other BH  Remi Group 
317  Other BH  Rinki Group 
318  Other BH  Rohit Group 
319  Other BH  S. Kumars Group 
320  Other BH  Samsons Group 
321  Other BH  Sandur Manganese Group 
322  Other BH  Santogen Group 
323  Other BH  Satya Group 
324  Other BH  Savita Chemicals Group 
325  Other BH  Sayaji Hotels Group 
326  Other BH  Seshasayee Group 
327  Other BH  Shreyans Group 
328  Other BH  Shri Dinesh Mills Group 
329  Other BH  Shriram Transport Group 
330  Other BH  Simplex (Mundhra) Group 
331  Other BH  Singhal Swaroop Ispat Group 
332  Other BH  SOL Group 
333  Other BH  Somani B.D. Group 
334  Other BH  Sona Group 
335  Other BH  Spartek Ceramics Group 
336  Other BH  Square D Group 
337  Other BH  Star Group 
338  Other BH  Steel Strips Group 
339  Other BH  Steel Tubes of India Group 
340  Other BH  Sterling Holiday Resorts Group 
341  Other BH  Stovec Industries Group 
342  Other BH  Sujana Group 
343  Other BH  Sun Pharmaceutical Group 
344  Other BH  Suraj Vanaspati Group 
345  Other BH  Suresh Sharma Group 
346  Other BH  Suryalakshmi Group 
347  Other BH  T.T.K. Group 
348  Other BH  Tai Group 
349  Other BH  Tainwala Group 
350  Other BH  Talwar Brothers Group 
351  Other BH  Tanna Group 
352  Other BH  Tatia Group 
352  Other BH  Tatia Group 
353  Other BH  Thackersey Group
354  Other BH  Thiagaraja Group 
355  Other BH  Tinna Group 
356  Other BH  Toshniwal Group 
357  Other BH  Trident Group 
358  Other BH  Turner Morrison Group 
359  Other BH  Ucal Fuel Group 




Code Group type Group name
361 Other BH Uniplas India Group
362 Other BH Unipon (H.N. Patel) Group
363 Other BH Unitech Group
364 Other BH United Group
365 Other BH V G P Group
366 Other BH Vadilal Group
367 Other BH Valecha Group
368 Other BH VBC Group
369 Other BH Venkateshwara Hatcheries [Venky] Gro
370 Other BH Weizmann Group
371 Other BH Welspun Group
372 Other BH Winsome Group
373 Other BH Wockhardt Group
374 Other BH WS Industries Group
375 Other BH XLO Group




Appendix 5D:  Sample selection procedure 
Initial Sample of Indian Private Sector group affiliated firms 
Full Sample (Indian Private Sector, BSE quoted and unquoted)1   6548 
Less:  Independent firms  (4506)
Group affiliated firms used to construct group size and diversification variables   2042
Distribution of affiliated firms across business group types: 
Firms affiliated with Top business houses (50 groups) 921 
Firms affiliated with large business houses (98 groups) 458 
Firms affiliated with other business houses (227 groups) 663    
Total firms affiliated with Indian Private business houses (375 groups listed in Appendix 5C)      2042 
 
Narrow Sample    
Indian Private Sector, non-financial, quoted firms with all required data  1412 
Distribution of narrow sample across listing flags2: 
 Flag A       61 
 Flag B1     320 
 Flag B2     992 
 Flag Z      39
     1412
Distribution of narrow sample across group affiliated and independent firms: 
 Independent firms that paid dividends 325 
 Independent firms that did not pay dividends 533
 Total independent firms      858      
 Group-affiliated firms that paid dividends 322  
 Group-affiliated firms that did not paid dividends 232
Total group-affiliated firms      554 
      1412
                                                          
1 There are 2369 unquoted firms and 4179 quoted firms. Of the quoted firms 79 are in the Listing Flag A group, 586 in the B1 group, 
2813 in the B2 group and 701 in the Z group. For listing flags definitions see footnote (2).  
2 The classification of a firm into listing flag groups is decided by the Bombay Stock Exchange.  The listing flag denotes the volatility 
of the stock of the company on the Exchange.  Stock in the A group has carry forward deals and weekly settlements. Those in B1 and 
B2 trade with weekly settlement without carry forward facility. Z is a relatively new category that denotes companies who have not 
complied with and are in breach of provisions of the Listing Agreement. 
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Appendix 5E:  Notes to Tables 
 
(1).  Table 5.2 Panel C:  Variance inflation factors 
 
High degree of multicollinearity can lead to large standard errors and thus imprecise estimates of 
coefficients. Further, small t ratios imply that the true importance of explanatory variables may be 
obscured.  To assess the degree of multicollinearity present in the sample, the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) is defined as:   
VIF (βj) = 1/ (1 – R2 j) 
 Where R2j is the coefficient of determination from a regression of the explanatory variable, X j, 
on a constant and the rest of the explanatory variables.  The VIF represents the ratio of the actual 
variance of the estimated coefficient, βj, to what it would have been in the absence of 
multicollinearity, where R2j is equal to zero.  Hence the higher is the VIF value, the higher the 
degree of multicollinearity.  
 
 
(2). Table 5.4: Panels B and C.  Tests for comparison of two samples 
 
 
Panel B – Assuming that samples have been drawn from a normal population 
 
Test 1:  F-test for the null hypothesis that the samples came from populations with the same 
variances, σ21=σ22=σ2, (or σ21/σ22=1) against the alternative hypothesis of σ21 ≠ σ22. The ratio of 
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two independent χ2 variables, each divided by their degrees of freedom, forms a random variable, 
which follows an F distribution with degrees of freedom associated with each χ2 variable.  
Therefore it can be shown that:  
If        χ12 = (N1-1)S12/σ21
Then  χ12 /(N1-1) = S12/σ21 
And if    χ22 = (N2-1)S22/σ22
Then  χ22 /(N2-1) = S22/σ22 
Therefore if σ21 = σ22
Then   F(n1-1),(n2-1) = [χ12 /(N1-1)]/ [χ22 /(N2-1)] = S12/ S22
Putting the large sample variance in the numerator of the test statistic guarantees that it will not 
fall into the left-hand critical region.  The test statistic therefore needs only be compared with the 
right-hand critical value, and the left-hand one can be ignored. Thus if the F-statistic is greater 
than the critical value associated with an upper-tail area of 2.5%, the null hypothesis of equal 
variances can be rejected at the 5% significant level in favour of the alternative of unequal 
variances.  
 
Test 2: Testing the hypothesis about equality of the means (μ1=μ2 against the alternative μ1≠μ2) 
when σ21 and σ22 (the population variances) are unknown but presumed equal. Under the null 
hypothesis μ1-μ2=0 and the formula for t becomes: 
t(N1+N2-2) = [E(X1)-E(X2)]/ {S2[(N1+N2)/N1N2]} 1/2
Where the pooled sample variance, S2, is an estimate of the common population variance and is 
defined as:  
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S2 = [(N1-1)S12 +(N2-1)S22] / (N1+N2-2) 
For a two-tailed test at the 1% significance level, the null hypothesis is rejected if the absolute 
value of the test statistics is greater than the critical value associated with an upper-tailed area of 
0.5% (= ½ of 1%).   
 
Test 3: Testing the hypothesis about equality of the means (μ1=μ2 against the alternative μ1≠μ2) 
when σ21 and σ22 (the population variances) are unknown and presumed unequal. The standard 
error of the mean difference may be computed as: 
 S2E(X1)-E(X2) = S12/N1 + S22/N2 
Then  t = [E(X1)-E(X2)]/ {S12/N1 + S22/N2 }1/2
If the samples are large the t-statistic may be referred to a table of normal probability because the 
statistic has a distribution approximating the normal. However, if exact sampling theory is to be 
used than the student’s t distribution needs to be consulted. In this case, the degree of freedom is 
obtained by using the nearest integer from the formula: 
d.f. = -2 + [S12/N1 + S22/N2]2 / [(S12/N1)2 (1/(N1 +1)) + (S22/N2)2 (1/(N2 +1))] 
 
Panel C – Non parametric/ distribution free tests 
Median test for two samples: The null hypothesis is that there is no association between group 
affiliation and payout ratios, while the alternative is of some association. The procedure starts by 
classifying all scores as being above or not above the median of the combined samples.  A 
contingency table is then set up where the two columns represent the two samples and the two 
rows represent observation above or not above the median.  The significance of the table is 
assessed by computing the χ2: 
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χ2df = Σ (O-E)2/E 
where O is the observed value in each cell and E is the expected value of each cell and is given by 
its row total times its column total divided by n, the number of total observations. The degree of 
freedom, df, is calculated as: 
df = (r-1)(c-1) 
where r is the number of rows (2), and c is the number of columns(2). The calculated χ2 statistic 
must be greater than the critical value associated with the upper tail area selected (e.g. 1%) to 
reject the null hypothesis that the row variable is unrelated to the column variable.   
 
The Mann-Whitney U test: The null hypothesis is that the two independent samples of group 
and non-group affiliated firms come from the same underlying population distribution.  In order 
to calculate the U test the two samples are combined and ranked from the smallest to the largest.  
If two or more values are identical (i.e. there are tie scores) the rank assigned to each of the ties is 
the mean of the ranks that would be otherwise assigned. The sum of the ranks for each sample is 
calculated and denoted by R1 (for the smaller size sample which is the group-affiliated sample) 
and R2 (for the larger size sample which is the non-group affiliated sample). A significant 
difference between the rank sums, R1 and R2, implies a significant difference between the 
samples and a rejection of the null hypothesis. To test the difference between the rank sums, the 
following statistics is used: 
U = N1N2 + [N1 (N1+1)]/2 – R1 
The statistic U is the rank sum for the smaller sample of group-affiliated firms, (1).  It represents 
the total number of times that sample (1) values precede sample (2) values when all sample 
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values are arranged in increasing order of size. The sampling distribution of U is symmetrical and 
has a mean and variance given by the formulas:  
μu = N1N2/2  and   σ2u = N1N2(N1+N2+1)/12 
If the sample sizes are at least equal to 8, then the distribution of U is nearly normal, so:  
Zu = Standardised U =  (U-μu)/σu  
is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1.  For a two-sided test the Z statistic would be 
significant if its absolute value is greater than the critical value associated with an upper-tail area 
of half α where α is the level of significance. (i.e. a critical value of 2.576 is associated with an 




(3). Table 5.5: Computing marginal effects for the Probit model 
The marginal effect in the Probit model can be expressed as: 
dF(β’X)/dX = [dF(β’X)/d(β’X)] β = f(β’X) β 
where f(β’X)  is the density function that corresponds to the cumulative distribution F(β’X).  
Thus the probability derivatives, f(β’X) β, will vary with the value of X, and for interpretation 
purposes the marginal effects are given by their means.   In other words the density function, 
f(β’X), is evaluated at every observation and the sample average is then used to compute the 
marginal effects.  As the mean density function, [the average of f(β’X)] is a constant it is termed 
the scale factor.  
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Appendix 5F:  List of Industry codes 
 Industry/ product lines Code Dummies for chapter 5 Dummies for chapter 6 
 Food & Beverages 1  I1 
1 Food products 1.1 INDS1  
2 Beverages & tobacco 1.2 INDS2  
 Textiles 2  I2 
3 Cotton textiles 2.1 INDS3  
4 Synthetic textiles 2.2 INDS4  
5 Other textiles 2.3 INDS5  
 Chemicals 3  I3 
6 Chemicals & plastics 3.1 INDS6  
7 Petroleum products 3.2 INDS7  
8 Tyres & tubes 3.3 INDS8  
9 Rubber & rubber products 3.4 INDS9  
 Non-Metallic Mineral Products 4  I4 
10 Cement 4.1 INDS10  
11 Other non-metallic mineral products 4.2 INDS11  
 Metals & Metal Products 5  I5 
12 Ferrous metals 5.1 INDS12  
13 Non-ferrous metals 5.2 INDS13  
 Machinery 6  I6 
14 Non-electrical machinery 6.1 INDS14  
15 Electrical machinery 6.2 INDS15  
16 Electronics 6.3 INDS16  
 Transport Equipment 7  I7 
17 Automobile 7.1 INDS17  
18 Automobile ancillaries 7.2 INDS18  
 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 8  I8 
19 Paper & paper products 8.1 INDS19  
20 Leather products 8.2 INDS20  
21 Miscellaneous products 8.3 INDS21  
 Diversified Manufacturing 9  I9 
22 Diversified 9.1 INDS22  
 Mining 10  I10 
23 Coal & lignite 10.1 INDS23  
24 Crude oil & natural gas 10.2 INDS24  
25 Minerals 10.3 INDS25  
 Electricity 11  I11 
26 Electricity generation 11.1 INDS26  
27 Electricity distribution 11.2 INDS27  
 Financial Services 12   
28 Banking services 12.1 INDS28  
29 Financial institutions 12.2 INDS29  
30 Non-banking financial companies 12.3 INDS30  
31 Housing finance services 12.4 INDS31  
32 Investment services 12.5 INDS32  
33 Other financial services 12.6 INDS33  
 Non-financial Services 13   
34 Hotels & tourism 13.1 INDS34  
35 Recreational services 13.2 INDS35  
36 Health services 13.3 INDS36  
37 Construction & offshore drilling 13.4 INDS37  
38 Trading 13.5 INDS38  
39 Transport services 13.6 INDS39  
40 Communication services 13.7 INDS40  
41 Miscellaneous services 13.8 INDS41  
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CHAPTER 6: BUSINESS GROUPS AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE - 
EVIDENCE ON INDIAN FIRMS 
 
6.1  Introduction 
Singular among the common distinct features of the business environment in most 
emerging markets in general, and India in particular, is that companies tend to naturally 
structure themselves into business-groups.  This structure has been hypothesised to serve 
various functions in these markets.   
First, the business group can create reputation for quality that is common to all 
group members and which relates to goods, services and practice.  Second, through group 
reputation, skill, or the ability to distort policy, the group structure provides access to 
scare resources such as capital, expertise, foreign technology or other knowledge.  Third, 
not only does the group structure provide access to external markets, but it can also 
replace poorly functioning external markets such as capital or labour markets by creating 
internal equivalents.  For example groups can create in-house training centres or in-house 
lending facilities.  Fourth, preferential access to scare resources, internally created 
markets as well as funds from existing operations, give groups an edge in seizing 
investment opportunities in new and existing lines of businesses1.  
                                                          
1 The fourth benefit of the group structure, namely the ability of the group to enter new lines of business, 
implies that groups should become diversified, which, in turn, lead to further two benefits to group 
affiliation.  First, group diversification can be a valuable form of portfolio diversification where financial 
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The benefits mentioned above, and in particular the first three benefits, imply that 
group-affiliated firms should be relatively less dependent on formal capital markets.  In 
this context, the capital structure decision of these firms is likely to display different 
sensitivities to firm factors compared with independent firms.  Furthermore, group-wide 
factors, such as the capital needs of other firms in the group, or investment opportunities 
that arise in lines outside the firm’s current involvement, are also likely to play a role in 
determining the capital structure of group-affiliated firms.  Based on these observations, 
this chapter seeks to understand the impact of group affiliation on the capital structure 
decisions of firms that operate in an emerging market, namely India.   
In a similar approach to existing studies, also here the choice of variables to 
explain the leverage decision is based on the literature on information asymmetries, 
agency conflicts and the trade off theory.  For example, the pecking order hypothesis is 
inspired by the prevalence of information asymmetry and predicts that firms prefer 
internal over external finance.   This implies that profitable firms should resort to debt 
financing less often compared with unprofitable firms.  Thus like in many previous 
models of capital structure, also here profitability is included as an explanatory variable 
that proxy for pecking order theory and which is therefore expected to enter with a 
negative sign. However, profitability may enhance the use of debt financing because it is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
markets do not provide opportunities for diversification. Second, through vertical integration the group can 
overcome problems that arise from bilateral or statutory monopolies.  (Bilateral monopoly means that there 
is only one buyer as well as only one seller in the market, while statutory monopoly exists when the entry 
of competitors is forbidden by law.)  
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a valuable signal to lenders regarding the security of their lending.  This should lead to 
cheaper access to debt and as per the trade off theory to a positive relationship between 
debt and profitability.  These contradicting predictions regarding the nature of the 
relationship between debt and profitability illustrate how a given variable, in this case 
profitability, can distinguish between competing theories.   
However, not all proxies display such a desirable characteristic.  In fact, often the 
sign on a given explanatory variable is consistent with more than one theory.  For 
instance, and continuing with the profitability example, agency theory like the pecking 
order also supports a negative relationship between profitability and debt.  Accordingly, 
managers prefer to use internal profits to finance investments rather than debt, because 
the former gives them greater discretion while the latter exposes them to lenders’ 
scrutiny.  Thus in common to most previous work, also here the empirical approach is 
lacking in some ways.  Still, the approach in this chapter seeks to contribute to existing 
literature in three ways that are similar to the innovations suggested in the previous 
chapter.  
First, just as empirical work on dividend policy in the context of business groups 
is rare, so is work that examines the impact of business groups on the capital structure 
decision.  Thus this chapter seeks to innovate by synthesising the theory on business 
groups with the orthodox corporate finance theories of capital structure.  Second, the 
chapter adds empirical evidence to the capital structure literature.  In particular evidence 
is added to the literature on the pecking order, agency conflicts, and the trade off theories 
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in the context of an emerging market. This may be a valuable contribution because most 
empirical studies of these issues are from developed markets, and because market 
imperfections, that underlie these theories, are often more severe in emerging markets.  
Third, the study contributes to the business group literature in emerging markets by 
looking at business groups in India.   Understanding the important role that business 
groups play in India as in many other emerging markets is important, particularly given 
the changes that these markets are undergoing.  
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 6.2 reviews some of the relevant 
literature on both capital structure and business groups.  Based on the literature review, 
the impact of group-affiliation on the capital structure decision is discussed in Section 
6.3, and the models to be estimated and tested are presented.  Section 6.4 describes the 
sample, while empirical procedures and results are presented in Section 6.5.  Section 6.6 
concludes.    
 
6.2  Selective review of the literature 
A selective review of studies on business groups was undertaken in Chapter 5, and is 
therefore not repeated here.  Instead, Table 6.1 summarises the business group studies 
that were mentioned in that chapter, and some additional studies that are referred to in 
this chapter2. 
                                                          
2 Refer to Section 5.2.2 
 381
Table 6.1 Key findings and conclusions from previous theoretical and empirical studies on business groups 
 
Study Idea Data  Methodology Findings Comments 
Chang and 
Cohi (1988) 
The impact of business groups’ 
ability to utilise economies of scale 
and scope through diversification,  on 









Firms that are affiliated with the top Korean business groups that 
are integrated both horizontally and vertically show superior 
economic performance.  This is because such group structure 




5A Note (4) 
Chang and 
Hong (2000) 
The impact of group-wide resource 
sharing and internal business 









? Firms benefit from group affiliation through internal sharing 
of intangible and financial resources 
? Firms in business groups cross-subsidise each other through 
internal business transactions such as debt guarantee, equity 









The joint effect of group affiliation 
and firm-level diversification on 
firm’s value 







? In less developed economies, group-affiliation is used to 
complement firm-level diversification in the creation of 
internal markets to enhance performance 
? Group affiliated firms are more likely than independent firms 









The trade off between group visibility 
in controlling conflicts in large 
business groups and between the 
complexity of these groups, which 
can limit the ability of group 








Group membership can affect the cost of issuing new capital: 
The complex nature of horizontal keiretsu groups outweigh their 
high visibility. As a result, potential for agency conflicts between 
firms affiliated with these business groups, and outside investors is 









The contribution of keiretsu 
membership to reduction in 
information asymmetries and agency 
conflicts  








Keiretsu-membership reduces information asymmetries and agency 
conflicts.  Therefore Keiretsu-member firms experience smaller 
stock price reaction to dividend omissions and initiations, and their 








Reaction of business groups to 
competitive shocks can be used to 





Case study of 2 
large business 
houses 
Following the competitive shock caused by the 1991 reforms, 
Indian groups engaged in restructuring that is consistent with the 




Define business groups and speculate 
on their role in economic 
development 
 Theoretical Identify 6 dimensions along which business groups vary.  Including 
axes of solidarity, ownership relations, authority structure, moral 




Comparing the validity of four 
alternative theories that seek to 
explain the economic rationale for the 
emergence of business groups 
Top 10 groups 






Theories that focus on market imperfections, authority structure, or 
state autonomy, do not accurately explain the importance of 
business groups across emerging markets and over time.  However, 




5A Note (3) 
Source:  Compiled by author from a selective review of the literature 
Table 6.1 (concluded) Key findings and conclusions from previous theoretical and empirical studies on business groups 
 
 




The diminishing value of business 
groups in substituting for poorly 
functioning institutions due to the 




Theoretical Put forward a number of practical approaches to how business 
groups in emerging markets should restructure as response to 




Review the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the welfare 
consequences of being affiliated with 
a business group 
Japan and 
emerging 







? Evidence of welfare-enhancing impact of business groups that 
is due to the role of groups in substituting for missing 
institutions. 
? Evidence of welfare-reducing impact of business groups that 





Evaluate the performance of firms 
affiliated with diversified business 







Accounting and stock market measures of firm performance 
initially decline with group affiliation but start to increase once 








The benefits from group affiliation. 
Distinguishing between benefits that 
relate to group diversification and 




Year by year 





Market developments reduces the value-creating potential of 
business groups although the process is slow:  
? Affiliation with a diversified group is beneficial once group 
diversification exceeds a threshold level. But this threshold 
increases with time. 
? There are also benefits to group-affiliation that are not related 









Assess the effects of group affiliation 







? Group affiliation has a profound effect on profitability 
? Profits rates of firms that are affiliated with the same group 
are more similar compared with outside firms. 
? No support for either market failure theory of groups or the 




6A Note (6) 
Leff (1976) The role of the business group in less 
developed countries  
Less developed 
countries 
Theoretical The group structure has evolved in less developed countries to 
mitigate distortion in capital, products and labour markets 
 




Thus Table 6.1 summarises important findings from studies on business groups, 
and saves duplicating the discussion of Chapter 5.  Likewise a selective review of capital 
structure studies was undertaken in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4, as summarised in Table 4.1, 
and it is thus also not repeated here.  Rather, this section is devoted to a review of a 
selection of recent studies that provide possible link between the capital structure 
decision and business group-affiliation.  Specifically, the discussion is organised under 
three factors that have been suggested as determinants of capital structure on one hand, 
and of the behaviour and characteristics of business groups on the other.  These factors 
include asset structure, agency conflicts and cultural-based control considerations, each 
of which is now reviewed.       
 
6.2.1  Asset structure 
The market failure theory of business groups as proposed by Leff (1976) and discussed in 
some detail in Section 5.2.2 of Chapter 5, suggests that business groups engage in 
pooling resources and sharing assets among themselves.  If this is indeed the case, then 
the asset structure of group affiliated firms may be important in determining the 
performance of other member firms and of the group as a whole. Chang and Hong (2000) 
note that intangible assets such as R&D, advertising, and good reputation lend themselves 
particularly well to group sharing because their value does not depreciate with increased 
use.  This means that the group total level of these assets should impact the performance 
and opportunities of individual members.  For example, the higher the reputation of other 
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firms in the group, the more easily the firm can access finance.  But the same argument 
also applies to other assets, such as the amount of liquid net assets of other firms in the 
group.  In general such sharing implies dependency across members of a group, which 
Chang and Hong (2000) suggest may be evident, for instance, form the typical complex 
structure of debt guarantees within groups.  This complex structure means that the 
bankruptcy of one member firm increases the bankruptcy risk of other member firms.  
Based on this argument, Chang and Hong (2000) assess how the sharing and 
transferring of resources within Korean business groups impact the performance of 
member firms.  They find that both firm-level and group-level resources are important 
determinants of firm performance.  Furthermore, evidence is also presented to show that 
group-affiliated firms transfer assets amongst themselves for the purpose of cross 
subsidisation.  In particular the study illustrates that debt guarantees, equity investments 
and internal trade, tend to be used to support poorly performing affiliates at the expense 
of profitable members.  The study concludes that the asset structure of the firm is 
important to the group as a whole as value is created through the sharing of financial and 
intangible resources such as technology, advertising and reputation.  It is further 
concluded that groups tend to pool assets for the purpose of achieving group-wide goals, 
often at a cost to individual members3. 
                                                          
3 Cross substitution among members of business groups implies the existence of agency conflicts.  This is 
dealt with in the next section, while details of the Chang and Hong (2000) study are given in Appendix 6A, 
Note (1).  
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While Chang and Hong (2000) stress the importance of intangible and financial 
assets of group affiliated firms to the performance of other group members, the relevance 
of the firm’s asset structure to its capital structure has also received much attention.  The 
relationship between asset structure and the capital structure of the firm begins with the 
premise that in the case of liquidation, intangible assets are not expected to have high 
salvage value.  Therefore an increase in the fraction of such assets reduces the expected 
payoff to claim holders in the event of bankruptcy.  Further, the probability of bankruptcy 
increases with the amount of debt in the capital structure, so when assets are intangible 
the trade off theory predicts that equity financing should be preferred to debt.  Vilasuso 
and Minkler (2001) propose that the same argument holds when asset structure is defined 
in terms of the specificity of assets.  Thus they measure asset structure in terms of 
specificity rather than intangibility, and test for the importance of asset structure to the 
capital structure decision in the context of US firms.  
Particularly, Vilasuso and Minkler (2001) argue that a project that requires highly 
specific assets will initially be financed by equity.  However, as the debt to equity ratio 
decreases, the agency cost of debt falls while the agency cost of equity rises.  These 
agency cost effects become increasingly more important, until debt finance becomes the 
preferred form of financing.   A crucial point in Vilasuso and Minkler (2001) is that when 
assets are highly specialised, it takes longer for agency cost considerations to dominate.  
Thus while minimisation of total agency costs ensures that in the long term firms will 
move towards their optimal financing mix, for those with highly specific assets this 
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optimal mix contains more equity.  The findings from the empirical procedure are 
consistent with the study’s propositions.  In particular, the sign on the estimated 
coefficient on the degree of asset specificity indicates that equity levels increase with 
asset specificity4.   
Thus asset structure appears to enter the capital structure decision with 
intangibility or specificity of assets increasing the present value of the costs of financial 
distress, and are therefore expected to be associated with less debt.  Alternatively, if the 
use of intangible assets is more difficult to monitor then this should also lead to a 
negative relationship between asset intangibility and debt.  Furthermore, based on Chang 
and Hong (2000) it could be argued that this negative relationship between asset 
intangibility and debt should be particularly strong in the case of group affiliated firms.  
Indeed it was noted that intangible assets lend themselves to sharing thus firms with, for 
instance, high R&D expenditure, are likely to build closer relationship with other group 
members.  Particularly other members in the group are likely to become dependent on the 
knowledge generated by the firm, which invest highly in R&D.   This implies that the 
consequences of failure by the high R&D spending firm will extend beyond the firm 
itself, and such firms should be particularly careful to avoid risk and should display less 
debt in their capital structure.  
                                                          
4 Vilasuso and Minkler (2001) also present evidence to support the idea that balancing agency costs leads 
the capital structure of the firm to converge to its optimal level. The impact of agency costs on the capital 
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Both, Vilasuso and Minkler (2001) for the capital structure discussion and Chang 
and Hong (2000) for the business group discussion, present evidence to support the 
relevance of asset structure.  However, as noted in footnotes (3) and (4), both studies also 
point to the importance of agency conflicts to the capital structure decision and to 
business groups’ operation. It is thus this issue which is discussed next. 
 
6.2.2  Agency costs 
Dewenter, Novaes and Pettway (2001) stress the potential for conflicts of interest that 
business groups create.  Conflicts of interest include internal conflicts among member 
firms as well as conflicts between member firms and outside investors.  The study 
focuses on the latter and in particular on conflicts between firms and investors, when the 
group decides to float one of its members5.  It is proposed that the extent to which 
opportunistic behaviour by managers of group-affiliated firms, is more or less severe than 
in the case of independent firms, is a trade off between group visibility and complexity.  
This is explained as follows.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
structure decision is dealt with in the next section, while details of the empirical procedures in Vilasuso and 
Minkler (2001) are given in Appendix 6A, Note (2).  
5 Dewenter, Novaes and Pettway (2001) note that a potential conflict of interest surrounding initial public 
offers (IPOs) is related to market timing.   This refers to the tendency by managers to take advantage of 
temporary mis-pricing in the market in order to get a particularly high price for the IPO shares.  Indeed, the 
study focuses on IPOs because of the established link between the level of initial returns in IPOs and the 
degree of uncertainty about the value of the issuing firm.  In particular the higher the uncertainty about the 
issuing firm, the greater the potential loss to uninformed participants, thus the higher their expected return. 
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Managers tend to avoid acting opportunistically because sooner or later this 
behaviour is detected and firms are penalised.  However, opportunistic behaviour can 
only be controlled in this way if the market indeed detects it.  Thus the impact of business 
groups on agency behaviour boils down to how group-affiliation influences the ability of 
the market to detect opportunistic behaviour.    On the one hand there is the argument that 
because information about large groups and their member firms is widely available, this 
increases the ability of the market to detect and control agency behaviour.   Thus 
visibility reduces agency costs of firms affiliated with large business groups.  On the 
other hand the typically complex structure of groups makes it difficult for the market to 
infer opportunistic behaviour even when visibility is high.  Thus complexity of large 
business groups makes agency costs in affiliated firms more severe.  
Testing data on Japanese firms, Dewenter, Novaes and Pettway (2001) conclude 
that affiliation with one of the largest keiretsu industrial grouping increases asymmetric 
problems, uncertainty, and the opportunity for agency behaviour by management.  In 
particular due to greater complexity, group membership increases the cost of capital, and 
the magnitude of the impact depends on the level of information asymmetries that are 
built into the market structure6.    
                                                          
6 In relation to information asymmetries, Dewenter, Novaes and Pettway (2001) note that the impact of 
group affiliation is larger when shares are sold with fixed prices compared with when they are set by an 
auction.  This is consistent with the idea that market structure is important for market efficiency and that 
because the auction system reveals more information to investors, it reduces uncertainty.   Details of the 
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Similar to Dewenter, Novaes and Pettway (2001), the study by Gul (1999) also 
focuses on the Japanese keiretsu.  However, in contrast to the former, the conclusions are 
that group membership reduces agency conflicts.  Furthermore, Gul (1999) makes the 
link between group-affiliation and capital structure.  In particular, it is shown that 
keiretsu-affiliated firms are likely to have more debt in their capital structure.  The reason 
given for this is that conflicts between debt and equity holders in these firms are less 
severe because the main bank around which the group centres is also likely to be the main 
shareholder7.   However, although this explanation may be applicable to the Japanese 
case it may not necessarily apply to business groups in other countries where the group is 
not formed around a main bank.   For instance, one of the features that distinguish the 
Indian business houses from the Japanese keiretsu is the absence, in the case of the 
former, of a main bank. An alternative link between business groups and the capital 
structure decision in the case of countries such as India may be cultural factors.  This is 
the subject in the next section.  
 
6.2.3 Culture and control considerations 
The relevance of culture to the capital structure decision is the subject of Gleason, 
Mathur, and Mathur (2000).  The study draws from the organisational behaviour theory 
                                                                                                                                                                             
empirical procedures and results in Dewenter, Novaes and Pettway (2001) are presented in Appendix 6A, 
Note (3). 
7 Details of the empirical procedures and results in Gul (1999) are presented in Appendix 6A, Note (4). 
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proposed by Hofstede (1984) and suggests that the capital structure decision may be 
influenced by culture.  Hofstede (1984) suggests that business organisation is influenced 
by cultural characteristics such as power distance, masculinity, individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance. Gleason, Mathur, and Mathur (2000) find that some of these 
characteristics influence the amount of debt in a firm’s capital structure.8  But cultural 
factors have also been suggested as a plausible alternative to economic oriented 
explanations to the prevalence of business groups in developing countries.   Thus, the link 
between capital structure and business group affiliation may be explained in term of 
agency theory as in Gul (1999), or alternatively by cultural factors.  
Cultural factors to explain the importance of business groups have been suggested 
by a number of researches, often due to failure of economic rationales to explain this 
phenomenon.  An example is Khanna and Rivkin (2001) who study the association 
between group-affiliation and firm’s profitability in fourteen emerging markets.  It is 
found that in most markets group-affiliated firms tend to be more profitable compared 
                                                          
8 Based on survey results collected from IBM subsidiaries in 40 countries, Hofstede (1984) identifies four 
dimensions of culture: power distance, masculinity, individualism and uncertainty avoidance. Power 
distance is defined as relating to the degree of inequality in society, where a culture with small power 
distance is more concerned with equality and less with authoritative manner.  Masculinity is explained as 
the extent to which a culture can be characterised by traits such as competitiveness and assertiveness, while 
individualism describes the degree to which the society is individualistic or collectivist.  Finally uncertainty 
avoidance describes attitude towards uncertainty.   Gleason, Mathur, and Mathur (2000) test whether debt 
levels are determined by cultural differences including power distance, masculinity and uncertainty 
avoidance.  Their results are given in Note (5) of Appendix 6A.  
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with non-affiliated firms.  Further, it is concluded that due to member firms sharing the 
cost and benefits of being affiliated with a particular group, the profit rates within groups 
are more similar than profit rates between groups.  The authors, however, find it difficult 
to explain these results in terms of either groups as responses to capital market 
imperfections or groups as rent-seeking devices.  Particularly, if groups alleviate market 
imperfections and substitute for missing institutions, than there should be a direct 
association between the positive effects of business groups and the level of imperfections 
in the capital market.  Similarly, if groups fulfil the role of rent seeking devices than they 
should enable member firms to obtain favours from the political system and a strong 
association should be observed between group effects and the level of corruption and 
distortions in the economy.   
Thus in the final part of their paper, Khanna and Rivkin (2001) investigate the 
correlation between the importance of group-affiliation and proxies for market conditions 
in the countries studied.   However, the correlation between the importance of groups and 
the conditions in the markets studied do not support the notion that group effects are 
related to market inefficiencies in a way that is consistent with various economic 
explanations.  In particular the study fails to find support for either the market failure or 
rent seeking predictions. The authors suggest that this may be due to variation across 
countries in the way business groups are defined, or is indicative of the weakness of 
economic factors in explaining the group phenomenon.  It is thus suggested that perhaps 
cultural and sociological factors can better explain the business group phenomenon.  This 
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view corresponds to the social structure theory on business groups, which is tested in 
Guillen (2000).  9
 Guillen (2000) notes that consistent with social structure theory, high distance 
power cultures, whose social order is based on inheritance rules, lend themselves 
particularly well to the business group structure.  This may explain the prevalence of the 
family controlled groups in less developed countries, which Hofstede (1984) notes are 
typically authoritarian10. Furthermore, the patrimonial social structure in these markets 
implies that maintaining family control is seen as vital.   Indeed, Khanna and Palepu 
(1999) note that family controlled business groups in many developing countries have 
traditionally focused on growth rather than profitability.  (It is also noted that this practice 
has often been driven and encouraged by government intervention policies aimed at 
creating jobs.)  However, because debt allows family control to be maintained, group-
affiliated firms have preferred to finance growth by external debt rather than by external 
equity.11 
                                                          
9 Empirical procedures and results for the study by Khanna and Rivkin (2001) are given in Appendix 6A, 
Note (6).  
10 In particular, Hofstede (1984, page 216) chooses to describe the implicit model for the Indian 
organisation as the family.  
11 It may, however, be appropriate to mention that the results in Guillen (2000) do not support the social 
structure view.  Specifically, the hypothesis that the higher the power distance in a society, the greater the 
importance of business groups is rejected by the empirical investigation.  Details of this study are given in 
Appendix 5A, Note (3). 
 393
To conclude, cultural-driven control considerations may be particularly important 
to business groups leading to preference for debt over external equity.  Other factors that 
have been suggested to differentiate the capital structure decision of group-affiliated 
firms from that of non-affiliated firms include agency costs, and asset sharing.  
Specifically, the business group structure may result in more or less agency conflicts or 
extra sensitivity to trade off considerations and to the risk of default due to intra-group 
dependency.  The next stage is to build a model that captures these differences.  
 
6.3 The model 
The empirical model is a cross-sectional regression of leverage on variables that are 
predicted to be important in explaining the capital structure decision.  In the first stage the 
explanatory variables include only characteristics at the firm level.  The idea is to assess 
whether a single model is good at explaining the capital structure decision of both group-
affiliated and non-affiliated firms.  Alternatively debt ratios of group-affiliated and non-
affiliated firms may differ because capital structure determinants of these two categories 
of firms are either not the same or do not behave the same.  If this is the case, it is 
expected that the null hypothesis of stable coefficients in a pooled model should be 
rejected.    
In the second stage of the multivariate analysis, explanatory variables at the 
group-level as well as interaction terms between firm-level variables and group affiliation 
dummies are added to the model.  The idea is to assess whether the capital structure 
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decision of group-affiliated firms may be explained in terms of the various business 
group theories.  Starting with the model that includes firm-level characteristics only, 
these two models are outlined below.  
 
6.3.1 The multivariate model at the firm level  
The firm level explanatory variables are drawn from the capital structure literature, and in 
the spirit Booth Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), attempt to 
incorporate variables representing the trade off, agency, and pecking order theories.   The 
general model is of the following form. 
(6.1) 
LEVERAGEi  = α + β1 (NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD)i + β2 (LIQUIDITY)i +  β3 
(INTANGIBILITY)i  + β4 (FIRM SIZE)i + β5 (AGE)i + β6 (STOCK ILLIQUIDITY)i + β7 
(GROWTH)i + β8 (PROFITABILITY)i  + Σ(j =1 to 11) γj (INDUSTRYj)i   + εI              
 
Where LEVERAGE is the debt ratio, measured as total debt to quasi market value of total 
assets (LEV2).  Other measures of leverage were also experimented with as will be noted 
in the empirical sections.  Definitions for LEV2 and for the alternative measures of 
leverage are given in Panel A of Table 6.2.  Definition and prediction for each of the 
RHS variables are explained below, while detailed definitions for all variables are given 
in Panel B of Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2: Variable definitions 
 
Panel A: Debt measures 
 
Variable name Variable definition Correlation with group 
affiliation 
LEV1 Total liabilities / Quasi market value of total assets (+) 
LEV2 Total debt / Quasi market value of total assets (+) 
LEV3 Total debt / Quasi market value of net assets (+) 
LEV4 Total debt / Quasi market value of capital (+) 
L_DEBT Long-term debt / Quasi market value of capital (+) 
S_DEBT Short-term debt / Quasi market value of capital (-) 
B_DEBT Bank loans / Quasi market value of capital (-) 
GOV Loans from government / Total borrowings (+) 
FOREIGN Direct foreign borrowings / Total borrowings (+) 
INTERNAL Loans from group companies / Loans from corporate bodies Not applicable 
Total liabilities = preference capital + total borrowings + current liabilities & provisions;  
Total debt = preference capital + total borrowings;  
Short term debt = short term bank borrowings + commercial paper + current portion of long term debt;  
Long term debt = preference capital + total borrowings – short term debt;  
Quasi market value of total assets = book value of total assets – equity capital – reserves + market capitalisation;  
Quasi market value of net assets = total assets – current liabilities;  
Quasi market value of capital =preference capital + total borrowings + market capitalisation 
 
Panel B: Definition and predicted signs of the firm-level explanatory variables 
 
Trade-off theory: benefits of debt  
NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD = Log (depreciation) (-) 
Trade-off theory: financial distress costs  
LIQUIDITY = Current assets / Current liabilities  (+) 
INTANGIBILITY = (R&D plus advertising) / Sales (-) 
FIRM SIZE  = Log (sales) (+) 
Agency theory  
AGE = Log (firm age since incorporation)  (+/-) 
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY = 1- (No. of days stock traded on BSE / Total no. of trading days) (+) 
GROWTH = Market to Book ratio (-) 
Pecking order  
PROFITABILITY =  Profit before tax / Book value of total assets (-) 
Industry dummies  
Ij = A set of 11 industry dummies. Ij is set to 1 if the firm is affiliated with industry j.  (?) 
 
Panel C: Definition and predicted signs of the group-level explanatory variables 
 
GROUP PROFITABILITY = Σj≠i (profitability)j Wj.                      [Wj = Total assetsj / Σj≠i (Total assets)j]   (-/+) 
GROUP LIQUIDITY = Σj≠i (liquidity)j Wj.               [Wj = Current liabilitiesj / Σj≠i (Current liabilities) j] (+) 
GROUP DEBT  = Σj≠i (Debt / Equity)j Wj.                                              [Wj = Equityj / Σj≠i (Equity) j] (-) 
GROUP DIVERSITY = Logarithm of number of industries represented in the group. (-/+) 
GROUP SIZE = Logarithm of total sales of all firms in the group. (-/+) 
Group dummies    
GP = Equal to 1 if the firm is group-affiliated and 0 otherwise (+) 
HD = Equal to 1 if the firm is affiliated with a highly diversified group with over 11 product lines (+) 
The subscript j relates to all the firms in the group excluding the firm of interest, firm i;  The debt to equity ratio is measured as the ratio of long term debt 
plus preference capital to the market value of equity at the year-end;  GP and HD are defined more specifically in Appendix 5F of Chapter 5. 
The first variable on the RHS of Equation (6.1), namely NON-DEBT TAX 
SHIELD, is included as a proxy for the trade off theory, and in particular as an inverse 
proxy for the benefit of debt in shielding income from tax liability.  This may be 
compared with Booth Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), who use a 
direct measure of the tax advantage of debt, namely the average tax rate.  It is measured 
as the log of depreciation and is expected to enter the model with a negative coefficient, 
because depreciation is a substitute for interest payments in shielding profits from tax 
liabilities.  However, the impact of depreciation as a tax shield may differ for group-
affiliated firms. The reason is that these firms may be able to utilise alternative non-debt 
tax shields that are not available to non-affiliated firms. For instance, profitable firms that 
are group-affiliated may shield their profits from tax liabilities by engaging in intra-group 
trading, as suggested in Chang and Hong (2000), thus transferring profits to less 
profitable members that are not in a tax paying position.   
The next three explanatory variables, namely LIQUIDITY, INTANGIBILITY, 
and SIZE are also included as proxies for the trade off theory.  However, unlike tax 
shield, which represents the benefits of debt, these variables measure financial distress 
costs, the present value of which increases with debt.  First is LIQUIDITY, which is 
defined as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities.  It stands for an inverse measure 
for the present value of the cost of financial distress instead of the business risk measure 
in Booth Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001).  Thus LIQUIDITY is 
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expected to enter the model with a positive coefficient because the ability to meet 
obligations increases the firm’s debt capacity.   
The second proxy for financial distress costs is INTANGIBILITY, which is 
defined as the ratio of R&D plus advertising expenditure to sales.  It is expected to enter 
with a negative coefficient, because intangible assets are expected to have less value in 
the case of liquidation.  An alternative measure of tangibility would be the ratio of fixed 
to total assets as in Booth Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001).  However, 
because the non-debt tax shield is measured in terms of depreciation, using fixed assets as 
measure of the asset structure could have introduced multicollinearity to the model.   
The third proxy for financial distress costs is SIZE, which measure the size of the 
firm. SIZE is measured as the log of sales as in Booth Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2001).  It is expected to have a positive impact on debt because the risk of 
bankruptcy is lower for large firms due to diversification.12   
Thus NON DEBT TAX SHIELD, LIQUIDITY and SIZE are proxies for the trade 
off theory and represent financial distress costs.  However, due to intra-group 
dependency, the capital structure decision of group-affiliated firms may respond 
differently to these factors compared with non-affiliated firms.  Intra-group dependency 
may be due, for instance, to internal trading at transfer pricing or debt guarantee structure 
                                                          
12 However, association between firm size and diversification may be less applicable in the Indian context 
because Indian firms are typically focused (Khanna and Palepu, 2000).  Thus size may play a less important 
role in reducing financial distress costs.  
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within the group, both of which imply that failure of one group member may cause a 
chain reaction within the group. Thus the general state of the group is expected to impact 
the financial distress costs faced by each member firm.  An affiliated firm whose other 
group-members are in good (poor) financial position may be less (more) sensitive to 
factors such as its own liquidity, size, or asset structure.    
The next three explanatory variables, namely, AGE, STOCK ILLIQUIDITY, and 
GROWTH, are included as proxies for agency theory.  The first two variables are not 
included in Booth Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), while the latter is 
included.  AGE is the log of the age of the firm since incorporation, representing firm 
reputation.  It is expected to enter the model with a positive coefficient because 
reputation is an asset that managers may not be willing to destroy by behaving as 
predicted by the agency theory of debt.   However, like debt holders, equity holders are 
also exposed to agency behaviour by managers.  This implies a negative association 
between age and debt ratio, because mature and reputable firms should face lower cost of 
equity capital.  In light of this ambiguity, STOCK ILLIQUIDITY and GROWTH are also 
included to measure more directly the agency cost of equity and the agency cost of debt 
respectively.   
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY is included to represent agency cost of equity and is 
defined as one minus the ratio of the number of days the firm’s equity traded on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange to the total number of trading days in the period.  STOCK 
ILLIQUIDITY is expected to enter the model with a positive estimated coefficient.  This 
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is because highly traded stock is taken to indicate confidence on the part of investors that 
the firm is relatively free of agency costs of equity and hence can support more equity.    
GROWTH is included to represent agency cost of debt and is defined as the price 
to book ratio. Growth gives managers greater opportunities to engage in risk shifting and 
thus GROWTH is expected to enter with a negative coefficient.  Furthermore, consistent 
with under investment agency cost of debt, highly levered firms tend to pass up profitable 
investments thus growing firms prefer equity to debt.   
Thus AGE represent agency cost in general while STOCK ILLIQUIDITY is a 
proxy for agency cost of equity and GROWTH is a proxy for agency cost of debt.  
However, group visibility and complexity may respectively reduce or increase agency 
conflicts within groups as suggested in Dewenter, Novaes and Pettway (2001).  Therefore 
the net impact of group affiliation on agency conflicts is likely to be large in either 
direction.  This means that the three agency costs proxies, namely AGE, STOCK 
ILLIQUIDITY, and GROWTH, may be substantially less or more important in 
determining the capital structure decisions of group-affiliated firms. 
The next firm level explanatory variable is the return on assets, 
PROFITABILITY, which is included as a proxy for pecking order theory, similar to 
Booth Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001).  It is defined as the ratio of 
profit before tax to the total book value of assets, and is expected to enter the model with 
a negative coefficient.  This is because profitable firms can rely on internal funds, which 
are higher up the preference order.  If, however, groups can create internal markets than 
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the debt ratios of group-affiliated firms should display less sensitivity to pecking order 
considerations13.   In contrast it could be argued that groups are particularly sensitive to 
external exposure due to agency behaviour and because the agendas of the controlling 
entity are not always that of maximising shareholder wealth.  Instead the controlling 
entity may, for instance, pursue the objective of supporting other member firms or 
providing jobs to family members.  In that case internal finance should be relatively more 
important to group-affiliated compared with non-affiliated firms.  In any event 
profitability, like the other variables of Equation (6.1) is expected to be unstable across 
independent and group affiliated firms.   
Finally, INDUSTRY is a set of 11 industry dummies, which measure the change 
in the constant due to affiliation with industry j.  More specifically the dummy variable 
measures the difference of industry j from the non-financial services.   The list of industry 
dummies is given in Appendix 5F of Chapter 5.  
 
6.3.2 The multivariate model incorporating group level variables and interaction terms 
The interaction terms between group affiliation and firm level characteristics are included 
to measure the change attributed to group-affiliation. The group level explanatory 
                                                          
13 Group affiliation may reduce pecking order related dependency of a firm on its profitability as a source 
of finance by creating internal capital markets.  This can take the form of paying dividends when there are 
cross shareholding within the group or by passing profits within the group by other means such as transfer 
pricing or advancing loans at favourable terms. 
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variables are chosen to represent the various business group theories and are based in 
particular on Chang and Hong (2000).  The model is specified as follows: 
(6.2) 
LEVERAGEi  = α1 + α2 GPi + α3 HDi + β1 (NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD)i + β2 
(LIQUIDITY)i +  β3 (INTANGIBILITY)i  + β4 (FIRM SIZE)i + β5 (AGE)i + β6 (STOCK 
ILLIQUIDITY)i + β7 (GROWTH)i + β8 (PROFITABILITY)i + δ1 (NON-DEBT TAX 
SHIELDi) GPi + δ2 (LIQUIDITYi) GPi + δ3 (INTANGIBILITYi) GPi + δ4 (FIRM SIZEi) 
GPi + δ5 (AGEi) GPi + δ6 (STOCK ILLIQUIDITYi) GPi + δ7 (GROWTHi) GPi + δ8 
(PROFITABILITYi) GPi  + Ω1 (NON-DEBT TAX SHIELDi) HDi + Ω2 (LIQUIDITYi) HDi 
+ Ω3 (INTANGIBILITYi) HDi + Ω4 (FIRM SIZEi) HDi + Ω5 (AGEi) HDi + Ω6 (STOCK 
ILLIQUIDITYi) HDi + Ω7 (GROWTHi) HDi + Ω8 (PROFITABILITYi) HDi + ψ1 (GROUP 
PROFITABILITY)i + ψ2 (GROUP LIQUIDITY)i + ψ3 (GROUP DEBT)i + ψ4 (GROUP 
DIVERSITY)i + ψ5 (GROUP SIZE)I + Σ(j = 1 to 11)γj (INDUSTRYj)i   + εi    
 
Where LEVERAGE, the RHS variables with β coefficients and INDUSTRY are as 
defined for Equation (6.1) and summarised in Panels A and B of Table 6.2.  Definition 
and prediction for the rest of the RHS variables are explained below and summarised in 
Panel C of Table 6.2.  
GP and HD are group-affiliation dummies that are included to measure the change 
in the constant when the firm is affiliated with a business group and their inclusion is in 
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the spirit of the study by Khanna and Palepu (2000a).  GP is set to one if the firm is a 
member of a business group and zero otherwise.  HD is set to one if the firm is affiliated 
with a group that is diversified over more than 11 product lines and zero otherwise.  Thus 
HD measures the extra change in the constant in additional to the change reflected in GP, 
if the firm is affiliated with a highly diversified group. GP and HD are predicted to enter 
the model with positive estimated coefficients. This prediction is based on control 
considerations, due to which external debt is preferred to external equity and which are 
expected to be particularly important for group-affiliated firms. Further, a positive impact 
of GP and HD on the constant is also consistent with the market failure and political 
economy theories of business groups. Accordingly, group affiliation increases access to 
external funds through the sharing of group-wide reputation and policy distortions.  Thus 
group-affiliated firms have better access to external funds, and debt is preferred to equity 
because of control and pecking order considerations14.   
The two set of interaction terms with the coefficients donated by δ and Ω are 
included to measure the change in the slopes of the firm level characteristics (as 
represented by β) when the firm is group-affiliated. The δ coefficients measure the 
change in the slopes of the firm level characteristics (β) when the firm is group-affiliated.  
The Ω coefficients measure the extra change in β, in addition to the change measured by 
                                                          
14 However, to the extent that groups (particularly diversified groups) add complexity in the Dewenter, 
Novaes and Pettway (2001) sense, agency costs of debt should be higher for group-affiliated firms. This 
implies negative coefficients on the group dummy variables, GP and HD.   
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δ, when the firm is affiliated with a highly diversified group.  If group affiliation impacts 
the sensitivity of the leverage decision to firm factors, than δ and Ω should be 
significantly different from zero.   
The set of variables, which are preceded by ψ as coefficients are the group-level 
explanatory variables.  These variables measure various characteristics of the group with 
which a firm is affiliated and are set to zero for non-affiliated firms. They are included to 
test how group-wide reputation influences the ability of the firm to access external debt.  
Consistent with Chang and Hong (2000) the idea is that a firm can access external debt 
more easily and at lower cost if it is associated with a reputable group.  This is due to 
complex structure of debt guarantees within groups, which means that the bankruptcy of 
one member firm may result in a series of bankruptcies across the group.   
GROUP PROFITABILITY, GROUP LIQUIDITY, and GROUP DEBT are 
selected and measured in line with the approach in Chang and Hong (2000).  Particularly 
these variables are based on the weighted averages for the relevant values of other firms 
in the group for which the required data is available.  GROUP PROFITABILITY is 
measured as the weighted average of the returns on assets of other firms in the group 
where the weighting series is total assets.  GROUP LIQUIDITY is measured as the 
weighted average of the current ratios of other firms in the group, where the weighting 
series is current liabilities.  GROUP DEBT is measured as the weighted average of the 
long-term debt to equity ratios of other firms in the group where the weighting series is 
the equity base.   
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GROUP PROFITABILITY and GROUP LIQUIDITY are expected to be 
positively related to firm debt, because profitable and liquid groups should enhance the 
reputation and debt capacity of member firms.  In contrast, GROUP DEBT is predicted to 
have a negative impact on firm debt because the higher the debt levels of other firms in 
the group the lower the debt capacity of the firm.  It could also, however be argued that 
firms that are affiliated with profitable groups need to rely less on external finance due to 
internal transfers.  Hence theoretically GROUP PROFITABILITY like GROUP DEBT 
may enter the model with a negative coefficient.  
GROUP DIVERSITY is measured as the log of the number of industries 
represented in the group with which the firm is affiliated.  Group diversification is 
assumed to reduce the probability of bankruptcy and thus the present value of the costs of 
financial distress. Therefore, if group affiliation is important, and the group has created 
reputation for establishing internal markets and for support for member firms, than 
GROUP DIVERSITY should enter the model with a positive estimated coefficient.  In 
contrast it could be argued that diversified groups typically have complex structure, 
which makes management behaviour more difficult to monitor.  This suggests more 
opportunities for risk shifting and under investment, which should have a negative impact 
on access to debt.  Thus the association between GROUP DIVERSITY and firm debt 
could be either positive or negative15. 
                                                          
15 GROUP DIVERSITY is closely related to the HD dummy and to the extent that HD captures group 
diversity, GROUP DIVERSITY may appear insignificant.  
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Finally, GROUP SIZE is measured as the log of total sales of all the firms in the 
group.  Consistent with Dewenter, Novaes and Pettway (2001) a large group implies high 
visibility, which ensures that information about the group activities is widely available 
thus reducing the opportunities for managers to engage in risk shifting, under investment, 
or other agency behaviour.  If group-affiliation is important and visibility reduces the 
agency costs of debt than GROUP SIZE should enter the model with significant and 
positive estimated coefficient.  However, if the impact of visibility on reducing the 
agency costs of equity is stronger than its impact on reducing the agency costs of debt, 
than GROUP SIZE should enter the model with a negative coefficient.  Furthermore, if 
complexity increases with size than the positive impact of visibility on reducing agency 
costs can be offset by the adverse effect of complexity.  This may lead to GROUP SIZE 
appearing unimportant in determining the debt level of the affiliated firm, or its impact 
may turn out small in magnitude.  
 
6.4 Data and measurement  
This section begins with a brief description of the corporate financial environment 
underlying the capital structure decisions of the population from which the sample is 
extracted, namely India.  This is followed by description of the sample and finally with a 
description of various debt measures and prediction of how these should vary across 
group-affiliated and non-affiliated firms.  
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6.4.1  Corporate capital structure in India and sources of external funds for investment 
Prior to the economic reforms the capital structure of Indian firms was mainly imposed 
upon managers through state control and regulations, and thus the capital structure choice 
and the puzzle that surrounds it, were irrelevant for that economy.  However since 1991 
the freedom of firms to select their capital mix has gradually increased, and with it the 
importance of the question, of how firms in India decide on their capital structure.  
Ganesh-Kumar, Sen and Vaidya (2001) note that external sources are the most 
important sources of funds for firms in India.  For their sample of 714 firms, about 70 
percent of funds during each of the years 1993 to 1998 are reported to come from 
external sources.  This is consistent with the findings in Singh (1995) but inconsistent 
with pecking order and with the practices of firms in developed countries. Ganesh-
Kumar, Sen and Vaidya (2001) suggest that the reliance on external sources may be due 
to underdeveloped infrastructure.  In particular this may force firms to make large 
investments in plant and machinery for which internal funds are insufficient.    
Thus Indian firms rely heavily on external finance to fund their operations, and 
these funds come from principally three sources including banks, non-bank financial 
institutions and capital markets.   The first of these three sources, namely the banking 
sector, is the main provider of short-term working capital.  Banks in India are 
characterised by having widely spread branches, which may be traced back to the late 
1960s when social objectives led the authorities to encourage banks to expand into rural 
areas. Another important feature of the Indian banking sector is that following 
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nationalisation of banks in 1969 and 1980, and in spite of the reforms-led relaxation of 
entry restrictions of new private banks, the banking sector is still principally in public 
ownership.  Thus, as noted in Joshi and Little (1997), the wide spread of bank branches 
has facilitated adequate resource mobilisation although government intervention led to 
inefficient resource allocation.  
However, while prior to 1991 banks were operating under interest rate controls, 
directed credit programmes to priority sectors, and mandatory reserve requirements, 
substantial changes have taken place since then.  Specifically by 1994, most regulations 
on interest rates were removed, reserve requirements eased, and public sector banks were 
allowed to use the capital markets to issue new capital.  Thus since 1991 India has gone 
some way towards increasing the efficiency of the banking sector.  
The second source of external funds to Indian firms, are non-bank financial 
institutions, of which the development financial institutions are the traditional source of 
long-term borrowings.   Indeed development finance institutions were set up with the aim 
of providing long-term and medium-term finance for investment and for this purpose 
were provided with subsidised credit.  Similar to banks, the operations of the 
development financial institutions were highly controlled including the direction of credit 
at predetermined rates to firms that obtained licenses.  However, as in the case of banks, 
the financial liberalisation introduced substantial changes to the environment in which the 
development finance institutions operate.  These included interest rate deregulation, 
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abolition of licenses and reduction in government subsidies, which have forced these 
institutions to compete for funds in the capital markets. 
The third source of external funds to Indian firms is the capital market. Stock 
markets in India are relatively liquid when compared with other developing countries16.  
However, before the financial reforms, equity issues were heavily regulated by the Office 
of the Controller of Capital including restrictions on the quantity, pricing and timing of 
new issues.  Likewise the pricing of corporate debentures were subject to interest rates 
ceilings.  In 1991 interest rates restrictions were lifted and a year later the Office of the 
Controller of Capital was abolished.  Further, the National Stock Exchange was set up to 
compete with the Bombay Stock Exchange. Other reforms included increasing the supply 
of finance by allowing foreign institutional investors to enter the Indian capital markets 
as well as allowing Indian companies to raise funds directly from offshore markets.   As 
consequences, Ganesh-Kumar, Sen and Vaidya (2001) show that between 1993 and 1995 
the share of capital markets as a source of funds has increased to between 30 and 40 
percent of total sources of funds.17
                                                          
16 Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1995) compare three stock market development indicators across thirty 
developed and developing countries for the period 1980 to 1991.  Liquidity is measured in terms of the 
turnover ratio which is defined as the ratio of total value of shares traded during the period to market 
capitalisation.   Indeed, the turnover ratio reported for India, at a value of 59 percent, is higher than most of 
the developing and developed countries in the sample.  The turnover ratio for 1999 is even higher at 84.4 
percent as reported by the emerging stock markets factbook, 2000.  
17 Ganesh-Kumar, Sen and Vaidya (2001) also show, however, that this trend did not last and between 1996 
and 1998 the use share of capital market as a source of funds has dropped to between 15 and 20 percent.  
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Thus by the year 2000, which is the period investigated here, it can be assumed 
that the selected sample of Indian firms are generally free to select how much external 
finance to raise and in what form.  A description of this sample of Indian firms is the 
subject of the next section.  
 
6.4.2 Data 
The data are retrieved from PROWESS database provided by the Centre for Monitoring 
the Indian Economy (CMIE) and updated to 22 March 2001.   The initial data set 
includes the universe of all quoted and unquoted Indian Private Sector firms available on 
PROWESS, totalling 6,548 firms, and comprising 4,506 independent firms and 2,042 
group affiliated firms.  The 2,042 group-affiliated firms are associated with 375 business 
houses as listed in Appendix 5C, and comprise the sample used to construct the group 
level variables18.  
The period studied is the year ending March 2000 which may be criticised as 
unrepresentative and arbitrary.  However, as noted in Section 5.4.1 of Chapter 5, group 
affiliation, which is at the centre of this study, is available on PROWESS only as a data 
variable at a given point in time.  The use of one year is thus rationalised by the wish to 
                                                          
18 For further information on the characteristics of the initial sample and the distribution of group-affiliated 
firms across various types of groups, refer to the top part of Appendix 5D.  
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avoid making the assumption that group affiliation is stable over time.19   Furthermore, 
Green, Murinde and Suppakitjarak (2001) who study the financial structure of Indian 
firms in the period 1991 to 1996, observe significant year-to-year changes, particularly 
for quoted companies.  To the extent that such variations are assumed to continue into the 
latter part of the 1990s this should weaken the argument for using averages.  The 
selection process involved dropping some firms as follows.   
Firms, which were dropped, include unlisted firms, financial firms, firms without 
the required raw data, and firms with a year ending date other than March 2000. This 
procedure resulted in a sample of 1,811 firms, which is the basis for the comparison 
analysis of the next section.  The sample includes 1,146 independent firms and 665 
group-affiliated firms of which 314 firms are affiliated with groups classified as 
diversified.  Of the 314 firms that are affiliated with diversified groups a total of 131 
firms are affiliated with highly diversified groups.20  In the process of constructing the 
variables further observations were dropped leading to samples of 1,472 and 1,384 for the 
models specified in (6.1) and (6.2), respectively.  Table 6.2 gives variable definitions 
while Table 6.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample.  
 
                                                          
19 For rationale for choosing March as the year ending date and for the reason for focusing on a single year, 
refer to footnote 21 of Chapter 5.  
20 The group dummies GP and HD are based on a count of the number of product lines represented in the 
group.  A total of 41 product lines are identified and these are listed in Appendix 5F of Chapter 5, while 
derivation of GP and HD is given in Appendix 5B of the same chapter.  
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Table 6.3. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
1,472 Non-financial BSE listed firms in the Indian Private Sector with year end March 2000 
 






















LEV2 (Debt/Assets) 0.419 0.235 1        
NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD  0.404 1.766 0.270 1       
LIQUIDITY  (CA/CL)    5.762 16.726 -0.143 -0.128 1      
INTANGIBILITY   0.008 0.022 -0.179 0.038 0.015 1     
FIRM SIZE   3.807 1.745 0.145 0.840 -0.102 0.075 1    
AGE        2.983 0.633 -0.008 0.329 -0.104 0.099 0.377 1   
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY   0.407 0.357 0.049 -0.575 -0.001 -0.129 -0.547 -0.131 1  
GROWTH (P/B)     1.508 8.332 -0.186 0.096 0.033 0.062 0.099 -0.001 -0.085 1 
PROFITABILITY     0.032 0.093 -0.396 0.017 0.124 0.110 0.151 0.023 -0.210 0.181 
Variables are defined in Table 6.2 
 
PANEL B: Firm level variables obtained from auxiliary regressions and group-level variables 
 
Firm level variables obtained from auxiliary regressions
(Number of Observations: 1472) 
Group-level variables  








PROFITABILITY LIQUIDITY DEBT DIVERSITY SIZE 
Mean 
 
-0.006 -0.010 0.002 0.011 3.079 0.895 1.775 7.369 
Standard 
deviation 
0.891 0.893 0.579 0.082 1.651 2.720 0.902 1.689 
The three variables listed on the right hand side of the table are the residuals obtained from the auxiliary regressions. These are the regressions of NON-
DEBT TAX SHIELD, FIRM SIZE and AGE, on a constant and the rest of the firm level explanatory variables  
All variables are defined in Table 6.2.  
 
As is evident from Panel A of Table 6.3 some of the firm level explanatory 
variables are correlated in a way that may cause multicollinearity problems.  The 
principle culprits include NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD, FIRM SIZE and AGE.  For 
instance the correlation between NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD and STOCK ILLIQUIDITY 
is –0.58 and between NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD and FIRM SIZE it is 0.84.  SIZE has a 
correlation coefficient of –0.55 with STOCK ILLIQUIDITY while its correlation with 
AGE is 0.38.  Similarly, AGE has a correlation coefficient of 0.33 with NON-DEBT 
TAX SHIELD.  
To overcome possible multicollinearity problems the three variables suspected of 
causing difficulties are replaced by their residuals from auxiliary regressions.  
Specifically NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD is regressed on a constant and the rest of the 
firm level explanatory variables.  The series of residuals obtained, RESIDUAL TAX 
SHIELD, provides an alternative measure to the NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD.  Similar 
procedures resulted in alternative measures for FIRM SIZE (namely, RESIDUAL SIZE) 
and AGE (namely RESIDUAL AGE).   Panel B of Table 6.3 presents the descriptive 
statistics for these alternative variables, as well as the descriptive statistics for the five 
group level explanatory variables that are included in Equation (6.2).   
 
6.4.3 Debt measurements and comparison of group-affiliated and non-affiliated firms 
One of the main implications that arise from the conclusions in a number of studies 
reviewed above is that the capital structure of group-affiliated firms could be different to 
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that of non-affiliated firms.  For example, Gul (1999) and Dewenter, Novaes and Pettway 
(2001) note that group-affiliation can impact agency conflicts, which is an important 
determinant of the capital structure decision.  Similarly, Khanna and Palepu (1999) argue 
that control considerations within groups have often led to the capital structure of group-
affiliated firms to be incompatible with their asset structures. Thus as an initial testing 
method and before carrying out the multivariate analysis, a simple comparison of debt 
ratios across group affiliation categories is conducted.  
The bivariate analysis compares nine measures of borrowing ratios across group-
affiliated and non-affiliated firms as well as across firms that are affiliated with groups at 
various levels of diversification. These include four alternative measures of leverage, 
long-term and short-term debt measures, as well as measures of bank borrowings, loans 
from government and foreign borrowings.   In addition a comparison of intra-group loans 
are compared across firms affiliated with groups at various levels of diversification.  
Definition and prediction for each of these debt ratios are summarised in Panel A of 
Table 6.2, while the rationale for this prediction is detailed below.  
The first four debt-ratios to be compared across group-affiliated and non-affiliated 
firms are alternative stock measures, based on market value of equity, as suggested in 
Rajan and Zingales (1995).   These include the ratios of total liabilities to total assets 
(LEV1), total debt to total assets (LEV2), total debt to net assets (LEV3), and total debt 
to capital (LEV4).  The prediction is that group-affiliated firms are more highly levered 
compared with non-affiliated firms. This prediction is based on control considerations as 
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argued in Khanna and Palepu (1999) and on the group visibility argument put forward in 
Dewenter, Novaes and Pettway (2001).   Alternatively, in the spirit of Dewenter, Novaes 
and Pettway (2001), it could be argued that due to group complexity, detecting 
opportunistic behaviour by group-affiliated firms is difficult. Thus group complexity 
reduces the ability of lenders to monitor the firm and as a result debt levels in group-
affiliated firms should be lower compared with non-affiliated firms.    
The fifth and sixth debt measures to be compared across group-affiliated and non-
affiliated firms are the constitute parts of the forth leverage measure, namely total debt to 
capital (LEV4).  Specifically, the ratio of total debt to capital is split into long-term debt 
(L_DEBT) and short-term debt (S_DEBT) measures.  The prediction is that group-
affiliated firms tend to use more long-term debt compared with non-affiliated firms, but 
that the latter tend to use relatively more short-term debt.  Group-affiliated firms can save 
on issuing costs by using long-term debt and reducing the issuance frequency.  In contrast 
for non-affiliated firms the issuance costs saved by using long-term debt tend not to offset 
the additional insolvency risk premiums that is due to low visibility and information 
problems.  Thus finding that long-term (short-term) debt is statistically higher (lower) for 
group-affiliated firms compared with non-affiliated firms indicates that group affiliation 
adds to the creditworthiness of the firm and gives it better access to finance.  
The seventh debt measure is bank borrowing to capital (B_DEBT), where bank 
borrowings is the total of loans sourced from banks.  Similar to the argument that non-
group affiliated firms should rely more on short-term debt, it is also predicted that these 
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firms use relatively more bank loans.  Indeed, it has been mentioned in Section 6.4.1 that 
Indian firms have traditionally relied on banks for short-term borrowings.  Furthermore, 
group-affiliated firms have greater access to capital markets due to greater visibility, 
reduced information problems and the sharing of group-wide reputation.  Thus B_DEBT 
is expected to be significantly lower for group-affiliated firms compared with non-
affiliated firms.  
The eighth debt measure to be compared across group-affiliated firms and non-
affiliated firms is the ratio of loans from government to total borrowings (GOV).  Loans 
from government include loans received from central government, state government, and 
state government owned development institutions21. Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) 
suggest that groups may be able to create favourable distortions in the allocation of 
capital from the state financial system.  Consistent with this argument, the prediction is 
that loans from government will constitute a greater fraction of total debt of group-
affiliated firms compared with non-affiliated firms.   
The ninth debt measure is the ratio of foreign borrowings to total debt 
(FOREIGN), where foreign borrowing is the amount raised directly from foreign 
institutions.  The prediction is that group visibility gives affiliated firms relatively better 
access to foreign borrowings.  Hence the amount of foreign loans in the total amount of 
borrowings of group-affiliated firms should be higher compared with non-affiliated firms.    
                                                          
21 A loan such as sales tax deferred credit is treated as loans form government.  
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Another debt measure that is unique to group-affiliated firms is the ratio of loans 
from group companies to total loans from corporate bodies (INTERNAL).  The 
prediction is that intra-group loans should constitute a major part of total loans sourced 
from companies for the following reasons.  Consistent with the market failure theory, 
business groups typically pool funds from member firms, and reallocate these funds in 
order of priority.  This internal capital market is a substitute for inefficient external 
capital markets, and it allows for the re-negotiation of debt in cases of financial distress.   
Further, Chang and Hong (2000) find evidence of cross subsidisation within groups, 
which may include firms selling capital to other member firms at below market prices.  
 
 
6.5 Estimation and testing results 
 
6.5.1 Results of the comparative analysis 
The results from the comparison analysis are given in Table 6.4, which is split into 10 
panels for each of the debt ratios as defined in Panel A of Table 6.2.  The information 
given in Table 6.4 includes the number of observations, variance, mean and median for 
the full sample of all non-financial, BSE listed firms with year ending March 2000.  The 
sample is also split into non-affiliated and group-affiliated firms, and the group-affiliated 
sample is further sub divided into diversified and highly diversified groups.   
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Table 6.4  Comparative analysis of debt ratios across group and non-group affiliated firms 
Non-financial BSE listed firms in the Indian Private Sector with y/e March 2000 
 
1.  LEV1 = TOTAL LIABILITIES / TOTAL ASSETS 







(> 4 product lines) 
Highly diversified  
(>11 product lines)
No. observations 1811 1146 665  314  131  
Variance 0.067 0.072 0.054  0.053  0.063  
 F Statistic (equality of variances)   1.329 0.000 1.352 0.001 1.133 0.184 
Mean 0.698 0.671 0.746  0.730  0.676  
 NORMAL  Statistic (unequal variances)   6.238 0.000 3.863 0.000 0.215 0.830 
 T Statistic (equal variances)   6.008 0.000 3.546 0.000 0.205 0.838 
Median 0.784 0.760 0.826  0.812  0.776  
Median test [CHI SQR (1)]   27.394 0.000 10.135 0.001 0.373 0.542 
Mann-Whitney test   -6.114 0.000 -3.257 0.001 0.135 0.893 
 
2.  LEV2 = TOTAL DEBT / TOTAL ASSETS 







(> 4 product lines) 
Highly diversified  
(>11 product lines)
No. observations 1811 1146 665  314  131  
Variance 0.056 0.058 0.051  0.048  0.047  
 F Statistic (equality of variances)   1.140 0.030 1.208 0.021 1.230 0.067 
Mean 0.434 0.414 0.466  0.449  0.416  
 NORMAL  Statistic (unequal variances)   4.625 0.000 2.404 0.016 0.066 0.948 
 T Statistic (equal variances)   4.545 0.000 2.279 0.023 0.060 0.952 
Median 0.458 0.425 0.488  0.478  0.458  
Median test [CHI SQR (1)]   18.139 0.000 4.875 0.027 1.174 0.279 
Mann-Whitney test   -4.353 0.000 -2.162 0.031 -0.010 0.992 
 
3.  LEV3 = TOTAL DEBT / NET ASSETS 







(> 4 product lines) 
Highly diversified  
(>11 product lines)
No. observations 1811 1146 665  314  131  
Variance 0.088 0.091 0.079  0.077  0.081  
 F Statistic (equality of variances)   1.159 0.017 1.181 0.036 1.128 0.193 
Mean 0.584 0.555 0.635  0.613  0.559  
 NORMAL  Statistic (unequal variances)   5.674 0.000 3.241 0.001 0.172 0.863 
 T Statistic (equal variances)   5.564 0.000 3.091 0.002 0.164 0.870 
Median 0.661 0.627 0.705  0.693  0.638  
Median test [CHI SQR (1)]   17.318 0.000 5.200 0.023 0.069 0.792 
Mann-Whitney test   -5.537 0.000 -2.883 0.004 0.057 0.955 
 








(> 4 product lines) 
Highly diversified  
(>11 product lines)
No. observations 1811 1146 665  314  131  
Variance 0.089 0.093 0.078  0.077  0.082  
 F Statistic (equality of variances)   1.183 0.008 1.201 0.024 1.134 0.182 
Mean 0.602 0.570 0.658  0.637  0.581  
 NORMAL  Statistic (unequal variances)   6.207 0.000 3.676 0.000 0.401 0.689 
 T Statistic (equal variances)   6.070 0.000 3.490 0.001 0.381 0.703 
Median 0.693 0.651 0.747  0.730  0.666  
Median test [CHI SQR (1)]   26.383 0.000 10.600 0.001 0.009 0.926 
Mann-Whitney test   -6.131 0.000 -3.314 0.001 -0.108 0.914 
? Debt measures are defined in Table 6.2 
? Test statistics give the difference from the non-affiliated category 
? Figures in italic are the probabilities attached to the test statistics 




5.  L_DEBT = (LONG TERM DEBT+PREF CAP) / CAPITAL 







(> 4 product lines) 
Highly diversified  
(>11 product lines)
No. observations 1811 1146 665  314  131  
Variance 0.065 0.062 0.064  0.063  0.063  
 F Statistic (equality of variances)   0.972 0.662 0.983 0.581 0.980 0.576 
Mean 0.347 0.309 0.412  0.400  0.364  
 NORMAL  Statistic (unequal variances)   8.396 0.000 5.692 0.000 2.376 0.017 
 T Statistic (equal variances)   8.428 0.000 5.719 0.000 2.396 0.017 
Median 0.338 0.272 0.428  0.409  0.374  
Median test [CHI SQR (1)]   57.363 0.000 28.596 0.000 5.769 0.016 




6.  S_DEBT = SHORT TERM DEBT / CAPITAL 







(> 4 product lines) 
Highly diversified  
(>11 product lines)
No. observations 1811 1146 665  314  131  
Variance 0.045 0.048 0.040  0.040  0.038  
 F Statistic (equality of variances)   1.204 0.004 1.179 0.038 1.265 0.044 
Mean 0.256 0.261 0.246  0.237  0.217  
 NORMAL  Statistic (unequal variances)   -1.514 0.130 -1.863 0.062 -2.445 0.014 
 T Statistic (equal variances)   -1.478 0.140 -1.778 0.076 -2.228 0.026 
Median 0.225 0.233 0.216  0.200  0.186  
Median test [CHI SQR (1)]   2.230 0.135 5.813 0.016 8.120 0.004 




7.  B_DEBT = BANK LOANS / CAPITAL 







(> 4 product lines) 
Highly diversified  
(>11 product lines)
No. observations 1811 1146 665  314  131  
Variance 0.048 0.053 0.038  0.033  0.032  
 F Statistic (equality of variances)   1.374 0.000 1.577 0.000 1.636 0.000 
Mean 0.281 0.294 0.260  0.236  0.220  
 NORMAL  Statistic (unequal variances)   -3.289 0.001 -4.685 0.000 -4.278 0.000 
 T Statistic (equal variances)   -3.154 0.002 -4.121 0.000 -3.522 0.000 
Median 0.252 0.267 0.233  0.210  0.198  
Median test [CHI SQR (1)]   7.093 0.008 9.858 0.002 8.478 0.004 




? Debt measures are defined in Table 6.2 
? Test statistics give the difference from the non-affiliated category 
? Figures in italic are the probabilities attached to the test statistics 





8.  GOV = GOVERNMENT LOANS / TOTAL BORROWINGS 







(> 4 product lines) 
Highly diversified  
(>11 product lines)
No. observations 2060 1362 698  321  130  
Variance 0.015 0.013 0.018  0.024  0.029  
 F Statistic (equality of variances)   1.352 0.000 1.813 0.000 2.217 0.000 
Mean 0.038 0.034 0.045  0.054  0.065  
 NORMAL  Statistic (unequal variances)   1.879 0.060 2.251 0.024 2.026 0.043 
 T Statistic (equal variances)   1.973 0.049 2.697 0.007 2.800 0.005 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Median test [CHI SQR (1)]   70.912 0.000 58.825 0.000 50.819 0.000 




9.  FOREIGN = FOREIGN LOANS / TOTAL BORROWINGS 







(> 4 product lines) 
Highly diversified  
(>11 product lines)
No. observations 2060 1362 698  321  130  
Variance 0.005 0.002 0.010  0.015  0.018  
 F Statistic (equality of variances)   5.791 0.000 8.619 0.000 9.950 0.000 
Mean 0.010 0.004 0.021  0.031  0.032  
 NORMAL  Statistic (unequal variances)   4.190 0.000 3.756 0.000 2.388 0.017 
 T Statistic (equal variances)   5.281 0.000 6.424 0.000 5.427 0.000 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Median test [CHI SQR (1)]   55.102 0.000 64.172 0.000 44.557 0.000 










(> 4 product lines) 
Highly diversified  
(>11 product lines)
No. observations 255 130 125  41  
Variance 0.108 0.097 0.120  0.159  
 F Statistic (equality of variances)   1.235 0.118 1.645 0.020 
Mean 0.127 0.108 0.148  0.201  
 NORMAL  Statistic (unequal variances)   0.968 0.333 1.367 0.172 
 T Statistic (equal variances)   0.970 0.333 1.555 0.122 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  
Median test [CHI SQR (1)]   2.991 0.084 6.441 0.011 




? Debt measures are defined in Table 6.2 
? Test statistics give the difference from the non-affiliated category apart from debt measure 10 (INTERNAL) 
? In the case of INTERNAL the test statistics give the difference from the non-diversified group category 
? Figures in italic are the probabilities attached to the test statistics 
? For description of the tests refer to Note (2) of Appendix 5E, Chapter 5 
The petition in Table 6.4 of the group-affiliated sample according to the level of 
group diversification is based on Khanna and Palepu (2000a).  Particularly, firms in the 
sub sample of diversified groups include firms that are affiliated with groups with more 
than four product lines.  The firms in the sub sample of highly diversified groups include 
firms that are affiliated with groups with more than eleven product lines.22   Further, to 
facilitate the discussion of how group-affiliation impact the capital structure decision, a 
number of tests for the difference between the various group-affiliated samples and the 
non-affiliated sample are presented in Table 6.4.   It is to this discussion that attention is 
now turned23.  
The four total debt measures of Table 6.4 (LEV1-LEV4), show results that are 
consistent with Booth Aivazian Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) and with their 
conclusions that Indian companies tend to be highly geared.  Indeed, the mean total 
liabilities measure (LEV1) for the full sample is reported in Table 6.4 at 69 percent. This 
                                                          
22 Firms in the diversified groups category are those for which the dummy variable GP is set to 1.  
Similarly, firms in the highly diversified groups category are those for which the dummy variable HD is set 
to 1.  For description of GP and HD see Appendix 5B of Chapter 5.  
23 The tests include both parametric and non-parametric tests and are similar to those undertaken in Chapter 
5, as explained in Note (2) of Appendix 5E.   The following discussion is based on the general uniformity 
of the results from the various tests.  In particular the tests of the difference in means as well as the non-
parametric tests, namely the median and Mann-Whitney tests, give similar results across all debt measures.  
However, it should be noted that the Mann-Whitney test is a test based on ranking of the observations in 
order of size, and in the case of short-term debt, bank loans, government loans, foreign borrowings and 
intra-group loans, the number of ties is very high.  Specifically, the number of observations of zero ratios is 
high and this may have implications for the validity of the Mann-Whitney test for these debt measures. 
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is close to the 0.67 percent recorded by Booth Aivazian Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2001) for the period 1980 to 1990.  Likewise, excluding current liabilities and 
provisions, the total debt to total assets (LEV2) is reported in Table 6.4 to have a mean of 
43 percent for the full sample of firms.  This is similar to the approximately 35 percent 
reported in Booth Aivazian Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001).  This high reliance 
on debt could be a tradition that dates back to the pre-reforms period when interest rates 
ceilings, and issue price controls on equity, were imposed by the government24.  
Furthermore, the four total debt measures (LEV1-LEV4) are shown in Table 6.4 
to be significantly higher for group-affiliated firms compared with non-affiliated firms.   
Specifically, the means are significantly higher at the 1 percent significant levels, for the 
sample of group-affiliated firms compared with the sample of non-affiliated firms.  
However, although the mean debt ratios are always higher compared with the sample of 
non-affiliated firms, this difference becomes smaller with the level of group 
diversification.  In fact, for the sample of firms affiliated with highly diversified groups, 
the difference in the mean debt ratios from that for the non-affiliated firms is no longer 
statistically significant.  Similar results are also evident for the median debt ratios.  
                                                          
24 As noted in Section 6.4.1, until 1992, when it was abolished, the Controller of Capital Issues (an agency 
of the Department of Company Affairs) regulated access to the equity markets.  Also since 1992, reforms in 
interest rates policy have allowed institutions to increasingly determine the structure of their interest rates.  
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The long-term debt ratios (L_DEBT) follow a pattern similar to that of the total 
debt measures (LEV1-LEV4).  Both the mean and the median are statistically higher for 
the sample of group-affiliated firms compared with the sample of non-affiliated firms, but 
the difference becomes smaller with the level of group-diversification.  However, unlike 
the results for the total debt measures, for the long-term debt the difference remains 
significant at the 1 percent significant level, even for the sample of firms affiliated with 
highly diversified groups.   
Short term debt (S_DEBT) and bank debt (B_DEBT) are reported in Table 6.4 to 
be essentially the same with means of 26 and 28 percent respectively for the full sample.  
This ties in with the observation in Ganesh-Kumar, Sen and Vaidya (2001) that 
commercial banks in India are the dominant providers of short-term credit, while non-
bank financial institutions are the dominant providers of long-term credit.  Furthermore, 
similar to the results discussed so far, the results for the short-term debt (S_DEBT) and 
bank debt (B_DEBT) also point to a systematic difference between the capital mix of 
group-affiliated and non-affiliated firms.  However, in contrast to the results for the total 
debt and long-term debt measures, the mean and median short-term debt and bank loan 
ratios are lower for group-affiliated firms compared with non-affiliated firms.  These 
differences become stronger with the level of group diversification.  For the short-term 
debt ratio the difference is not statistically significant for the category of all groups but it 
is significant for the category of highly diversified groups.  For the bank debt ratio, the 
difference between group-affiliated and non-affiliated firms is always highly significant.  
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The ratios for the government loans (GOV) and foreign borrowings (FOREIGN), 
like the general results discussed above are consistent with the predictions outlined above 
and summarised in Table 1.  In particular the mean government and foreign debt ratios 
are higher for group-affiliated firms compared with non-affiliated firms.  The difference 
becomes stronger with the level of group diversification, and is always statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level or higher.     
For the internal debt ratio (INTERNAL), the mean for the full sample is around 
13 percent of total corporate loans.   This relatively low value for intra-group borrowings 
is consistent with the results in Green, Murinde and Suppakitjarak (2001) and with their 
observation that the link between firms in Indian groups is not through direct financial 
relationship.  The mean of INTERNAL increases with the level of group diversification 
but the difference between the sample of firms affiliated with non-diversified groups and 
firms affiliated with diversified or highly diversified groups is not significant.25
                                                          
25 The medians for government, foreign and intra-group debt ratios are consistently zero regardless of 
group-affiliation status.  In spite of this the median tests are consistent with the results for the parametric 
tests of the mean.  The reason for this is that the median test compares the fraction of observations at or 
below the median in each category.  A significant test statistics indicates that these fractions are different 
across the categories.  For instance, in the case of government loans, the fractions of observations at or 
below the overall median (observations at or below the median / total observations) are as follow.  79% for 
the sample of non-affiliated firms, 61% for the sample of group-affiliated firms, 58% for the sample of 
firms affiliated with diversified groups, and 51% for firms affiliated with highly diversified groups.  
Similarly for the foreign borrowing ratio the fraction of observations at or below the overall median are 
98%, 91%, 89% and 88% for non-groups, all groups, diversified groups and highly diversified groups 
respectively.  For the intra-group loan measure, the fraction of observations at or below zero are 89% for 
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6.5.2 Results from the multivariate analysis 
As noted in Section 6.3, the empirical procedure includes two stages, both using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS).  The approach is the general to specific where the general models 
are as specified in Equation (6.1) and Equation (6.2) for the firm level and group level 
stages respectively.  The dependent variable in all the regressions reported in the body of 
the text is the ratio of total debt to the quasi market value of total assets (LEV2), as 
defined in Panel A of Table 6.2.   However, the regressions were also run on the other 
three leverage measures (LEV1, LEV3, and LEV4) and on the ratio of long-term debt to 
capital (L_DEBT), as defined in Panel A of Table 6.2.  These additional regressions gave 
results similar to those for the LEV2 regressions, although the diagnostic tests appear to 
consistently favour the LEV2 models26.   
Furthermore, each equation is also run by replacing some of the firm level 
explanatory variables with the residuals obtained from auxiliary regressions, the 
descriptive statistics of which, are presented in Panel B of Table 6.3.  This procedure is 
designed to mitigate the impact of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables as 
discussed in Section 6.4.2.  Specifically, the three variables NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD, 
FIRM SIZE, and AGE, are replaced by the residuals obtained by regressing each of these 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the non-diversified sample, 82% for the diversified groups sample and 73% for the highly diversified 
groups sample.  These results suggest a positive association between group-affiliation and group level 
diversification and between the use of government, foreign and internal loans.  
26 The additional regressions for the model of Equation (6.1) are presented in Appendix 6B, while those for 
the model of Equation (6.2) are given in Appendix 6C.  
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variables in turn on a constant and the remaining seven firm level explanatory variables.  
The results obtained are similar to those from the original regressions and are reported 
along side the original regressions.  
 
6.5.2.1  Results from the multivariate analysis at the firm-level  
The general model is defined in Equation (6.1) where the explanatory variables include 
only characteristics of the firm.  The hypothesis to be tested is that group-affiliated firms 
behave fundamentally different from non-affiliated firms in taking capital structure 
decisions.  The specified model of Equation (6.1) is applied to the pooled sample and 
then separately to the sub samples of non-affiliated and group-affiliated firms, followed 
by a Chow test for stability.  The results are presented in Table 6.5 for both the original 
variables (Panel A) and when some of these are replaced by their residuals (Panel B).   
In studying Table 6.5, it is important to note that the testing down procedure was 
carried out with the aim of optimising the model fitted to the pooled sample of all firms.  
Indeed, the Wald tests reported at the bottom of both Panel A and Panel B of Table 6.5 do 
not reject the null hypothesis that jointly the coefficients dropped from the general 
models are unimportant.  This testing down approach is aimed to avoid biasing the results 
towards one or another categories of firms.  Nonetheless, some bias towards a good fit for 
the sub sample of non-affiliated firms may be still present because over 60 percent of the 
firms in the pooled sample are non-affiliated firms.   
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Table 6.5   Ordinary Least Squares regressions of LEV2 (Debt /Assets) on firm-level characteristics. 
1,472 non-financial BSE listed firms in the Indian Private Sector with y/e March 2000. 
 
Panel A: Original explanatory variables 
 







Regression 1 2 3 4 
Mean of dep. var. 0.419 0.419 0.402 0.448 
Std. dev. of dep.  0.235 0.235 0.238 0.226 
Sum of squared residuals 52.758 52.944 34.178 16.682 
Variance of residuals 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.030 
Std. error of regression 0.191 0.190 0.195 0.175 
R-squared 0.348 0.346 0.338 0.417 
Adj R-squared 0.340 0.341 0.329 0.404 
LM het. Test 6.831 [0.009] 5.017 [0.025] 1.392 [0.238] 2.914 [0.088] 
Jarque-Bera test 0.876 [0.645] 0.482 [0.786] 6.686 [0.035] 6.687 [0.035] 
Ramsey's RESET2 0.284 [0.594] 0.762 [0.383] 0.030 [0.863] 13.170 [0.000] 
F (zero slopes) 40.874 [0.000] 64.371 [0.000] 38.231 [0.000] 32.593 [0.000] 
Schwarz B.I.C. -288.279 -311.209 -159.153 -148.077 
Log likelihood 361.223 358.622 203.454 189.208 
Number observations  1472 1472 912 560 
Variable Coeff t-stat. Prob Coeff. t-stat. Prob Coeff. t-stat. Prob Coeff. t-stat. Prob 
C         0.468 12.793 0.000 0.454 15.714 0.000 0.444 11.628 0.000 0.500 11.894 0.000 
NON-DEBT TAX  0.055 8.481 0.000 0.051 12.507 0.000 0.068 11.372 0.000 0.030 5.211 0.000 
LIQUIDITY  -0.001 -2.063 0.039 -0.001 -2.035 0.042 -0.001 -2.017 0.044 0.002 0.813 0.417 
INTANGIBILITY   -1.128 -4.323 0.000 -1.153 -4.414 0.000 -0.855 -2.722 0.007 -1.509 -2.947 0.003 
FIRM SIZE   -0.007 -1.116 0.264          
AGE        -0.031 -3.423 0.001 -0.033 -3.749 0.000 -0.034 -2.700 0.007 -0.031 -2.621 0.009 
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY   0.086 4.410 0.000 0.091 4.638 0.000 0.123 5.116 0.000 0.045 1.291 0.197 
GROWTH    -0.003 -1.879 0.060 -0.004 -1.914 0.056 -0.007 -4.335 0.000 -0.002 -0.777 0.437 
PROFITABILITY     -0.739 -6.807 0.000 -0.759 -7.204 0.000 -0.553 -4.363 0.000 -1.133 -5.304 0.000 
I1 (food & beverages)     0.093 3.918 0.000 0.084 4.194 0.000 0.102 4.060 0.000 0.030 0.944 0.346 
I2 (Textiles) 0.149 6.849 0.000 0.142 8.317 0.000 0.121 5.375 0.000 0.162 6.403 0.000 
I3 (Chemicals)         0.071 3.861 0.000 0.065 5.032 0.000 0.067 3.953 0.000 0.051 2.652 0.008 
I4 (Mineral products)        0.027 1.040 0.298          
I5 (Metals)         0.062 2.748 0.006 0.052 2.919 0.004 0.050 2.059 0.040 0.037 1.402 0.162 
I6 (Machinery)         -0.004 -0.210 0.834          
I7 (transport equipment)    0.019 0.714 0.476          
I8 (Misc. manufacturing)   0.074 2.756 0.006 0.069 2.941 0.003 0.061 2.015 0.044 0.079 2.327 0.020 
I9 (Diver. Manufacturing) 0.034 0.708 0.479          
I10 (Mining)        0.039 0.555 0.579          
I11 (Electricity)        -0.051 -0.685 0.494          
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2).  
The dependent variable is defined in Panel A of Table 6.2.   
The explanatory variables are defined in Panel B of Table 6.2 
 
WALD TEST  - TESTING SEVERAL COEFFICIENTS JOINTLY [Equation (1) versus Equation (2)]:  
F(7 1453)  Test Statistic: 0.735  Upper tail area: 0.642 
 
CHOW TEST FOR STABILITY [Equation (2) Versus Equations (3) and (4) separately]:  
F(12 1448) Test Statistic: 4.945 Upper tail area: 0.000 
Panel B: Residuals from auxiliary regressions replace the explanatory variables: NON-DEBT TAX 
SHIELD, FIRM SIZE and AGE. 
 








Regression 5 6 7 8 
Mean of dep. Var. 0.419 0.419 0.402 0.448 
Std. Dev. Of dep. Var. 0.235 0.235 0.238 0.226 
Sum of squared residuals 52.758 52.896 34.220 16.586 
Variance of residuals 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.030 
Std. Error of regression 0.191 0.190 0.195 0.174 
R-squared 0.348 0.347 0.337 0.420 
Adjusted R-squared 0.340 0.341 0.328 0.408 
LM het. Test 6.831 [0.009] 6.272 [0.012] 0.938 [0.333] 2.574 [0.109] 
Jarque-Bera test 0.876 [0.645] 1.012 [0.603] 7.188 [0.027] 7.729 [0.021] 
Ramsey’s RESET2 0.284 [0.594] 0.410 [0.522] 0.000 [0.992] 11.275 [0.001] 
F (zero slopes) 40.874 [0.000] 64.540 [0.000] 38.095 [0.000] 33.046 [0.000] 
Schwarz B.I.C. -288.279 -311.878 -158.603 -149.693 
Log likelihood 361.223 359.291 202.904 190.825 
Number observations 1472 1472 912 560 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Prob Coeff. t-stat. Prob Coeff. t-stat. Prob Coeff. t-stat. Prob 
C         0.436 23.714 0.000 0.443 39.066 0.000 0.457 25.915 0.000 0.455 26.734 0.000 
RESIDUAL TAX SHLD 0.114 11.481 0.000 0.116 12.512 0.000 0.154 11.356 0.000 0.071 5.264 0.000 
LIQUIDITY     -0.001 -3.540 0.000 -0.001 -3.598 0.000 -0.001 -4.188 0.000 0.002 0.594 0.553 
INTANGIBILITY   -1.322 -5.087 0.000 -1.337 -5.157 0.000 -1.095 -3.444 0.001 -1.567 -3.132 0.002 
RESIDUAL FIRM SIZE 0.078 7.726 0.000 0.080 8.681 0.000 0.117 9.126 0.000 0.035 2.141 0.033 
RESIDUAL AGE 0.001 0.119 0.905          
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY   -0.051 -3.317 0.001 -0.052 -3.361 0.001 -0.068 -3.237 0.001 -0.043 -1.509 0.132 
GROWTH      -0.003 -1.472 0.141 -0.003 -1.497 0.135 -0.006 -3.663 0.000 -0.002 -0.613 0.540 
PROFITABILITY     -0.855 -8.222 0.000 -0.860 -8.307 0.000 -0.687 -5.445 0.000 -1.197 -5.817 0.000 
I1 (food & beverages)     0.093 3.918 0.000 0.086 4.369 0.000 0.101 4.071 0.000 0.039 1.224 0.221 
I2 (Textiles) 0.149 6.849 0.000 0.142 8.391 0.000 0.121 5.406 0.000 0.165 6.492 0.000 
I3 (Chemicals)         0.071 3.861 0.000 0.065 5.083 0.000 0.065 3.878 0.000 0.052 2.777 0.006 
I4 (Mineral products)        0.027 1.040 0.298          
I5 (Metals)         0.062 2.748 0.006 0.055 3.089 0.002 0.051 2.128 0.034 0.040 1.538 0.125 
I6 (Machinery)         -0.004 -0.210 0.834          
I7 (transport equipment)    0.019 0.714 0.476          
I8 (Misc. manufacturing)   0.074 2.756 0.006 0.068 2.902 0.004 0.060 1.985 0.047 0.074 2.106 0.036 
I9 (Diver. Manufacturing) 0.034 0.708 0.479          
I10 (Mining)        0.039 0.555 0.579          
I11 (Electricity)        -0.051 -0.685 0.494          
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2).  
The dependent variable is defined in Panel A of Table 6.2.   
The explanatory variables are defined in Panel B of Table 6.2, excluding the following three: RESIDUAL TAX SHIELD, RESIDUAL 
FIRM SIZE, and RESIDUAL AGE. These are obtained from regressing respectively NON DEBT TAX SHIELD, FIRM SIZE and 
AGE on a constant and the rest of the non-dummy explanatory variables.  The residuals from these regressions then replace the 
original variables.  
 
WALD TEST - TESTING SEVERAL COEFFICIENTS JOINTLY [Equation (5) versus Equation (6)]:  
F(7 1453)  Test Statistic: 0.546 Upper tail area: 0.800 
 
CHOW TEST FOR STABILITY [Equation (6) versus Equations (7) and (8) separately]:  
F(12 1448) Test Statistic: 4.966 Upper tail area: 0.000 
However, bearing the above-mentioned bias, the idea of the first stage of the 
empirical procedure is to assess the stability of the coefficients across group-affiliated 
and non-affiliated firms.  If a structural break is found to be present, than the next stage is 
to design a model that takes these differences into account.  Indeed, the results of Table 
6.5 indicate that there is a structural break in fitting the capital structure model to the 
pooled sample of group-affiliated and non-affiliated firms.  
In particular the results from Chow tests of both Panel A and Panel B of Table 6.5 
reject the null hypothesis of stability.  These results persist when other leverage measures 
replace LEV2 (the total debt to total capital measure) as reported in Appendix 6B.  
Rejection of stability is consistent with the hypothesis put forward in Section 6.3.  
Explicitly, the sensitivity of the leverage decision to firm factors seems different for 
group-affiliated firms compared to non-affiliated firms.  It thus appears more appropriate 
to discuss the results for the separate models, rather than for the model fitted to the full 
sample.  This is done below.  
  The fit of the specified model of Equation (6.1) to the sample of non group-
affiliated firms appears good.  This is reflected by the results of Regression (3) for the 
original variables and by the results for Regression (7) where some of the original 
variables are replaced by their residuals.  Particularly, both Regression (3) of Panel A and 
Regression (7) of Panel B of Table 6.5 easily pass the LM heteroskedasticity test at the 
10 percent significance level.  Indeed, the probability values attached to the Chi-squared 
test statistics are 0.24 and 0.33 for Regression (3) and Regression (7), respectively.  Thus 
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it is difficult to reject the null of homoskedasticity.   Further, the Jarque-Bera tests for 
normality of the disturbances can not be rejected at the 1 percent significance level, and 
the RESET2 tests for no omitted second power terms also pass with very high 
probabilities.    
Evidence of good fit, of the specified model of Equation (6.1) to the sample of 
group-affiliated firms is weaker as can be seen from Table 6.5.  This is reflected in the 
results for Regression (4) for the original variables and in the results for Regression (8) 
where some of the variables are replaced by their residuals.  In particular, although the 
Jarque-Bera tests for normality give similar results to those for the non group-affiliated 
sample, the LM heteroskedasticity tests give weaker results.  Indeed the probability 
values attached to the Chi-squared test statistics are 0.09 and 0.11 for Regressions (4) and 
(8), respectively.   Thus the null of homoskedasticity is easier to reject compared with the 
results for the non group-affiliated sample.  Further, the RESET2 test for no omitted 
second power terms is strongly rejected for the sample of group-affiliated firms as is 
shown in Regression (4) and Regression (8) of Table 6.5.   
Table 6.5 also indicates that the estimated coefficients for both the non-affiliated 
and group-affiliated samples generally enter the model with the predicted signs. 
Furthermore, as expected there appear to be differences in the magnitudes of the 
coefficients of the two categories of firms.   
NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD as measured by the log of depreciation is important 
for the capital structure decision of both non-affiliated and group affiliated firms.  
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However, in contrast to the prediction of Table 6.2, it enters the models with positively 
signed coefficients, which may be due to depreciation reflecting tangibility of assets. In 
both Panel A and Panel B of Table 6.5, however, the magnitude of the coefficients for the 
sample of group-affiliated firms is about half that of non-affiliated firms. This indicates 
that the capital structure decision of group-affiliated firms tend to be less sensitive to this 
variable compared with non-affiliated firms.  
The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients on the LIQUIDITY variables are 
relatively small for both non-affiliated and group-affiliated firms.  In the case of the 
group-affiliated sample this variable enters with the expected positive coefficient which 
is, however, insignificant.  In the case of the non-affiliated firms LIQUIDITY enters with 
negatively signed estimated coefficients, which is contradictory to expectations.  These 
differences between group-affiliated and non-affiliated firms serve to emphasis the 
difference between these two categories of firms. Thus LIQUIDITY, which is an inverse 
proxy for financial distress, tend to have a small positive effect on the leverage decision 
of group-affiliated firms but near enough no effect in the case of non-affiliated firms. 
Asset structure appears important for both non-affiliated and group-affiliated 
firms.  In particular the INTANGIBILITY is always highly significant and enters the 
specified models of both group and non-group firms with negatively signed estimated 
coefficients as predicted.  Group-affiliated firms appear more sensitive to asset 
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structure27. In Panel A of Table 6.5, the estimated coefficients on INTANGIBILITY are 
–0.9 and –1.5 for the non-affiliated and group-affiliated samples respectively.  Similar 
results are also presented in Panel B of the same table.  
Larger firms can support more debt as evidence from the positive and significant 
estimated coefficients on RESIDUAL FIRM SIZE as shown in Panel B of Table 6.5.  
FIRM SIZE drops out of the specified model of Panel A of Table 6.5, but this may be due 
to multicollinearity problems that are controlled for in Panel B.  Similar to the results for 
NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD and INTANGIBILITY there appears to be a substantial 
difference between non-affiliated and group-affiliated firms. In particular in Panel B of 
Table 6.5, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on RESIDUAL FIRM SIZE is 0.12 
for non-affiliated firms but only 0.04 for group-affiliated.  This suggests that while firm 
size, is important for the leverage decision of non-affiliated firms it has much weaker 
impact in the case of group-affiliated firms. This is consistent with the market failure 
theory of business groups, where affiliated firms share group-wide reputation for stability 
and thus rely less on factors at the firm level.    
No definite prediction regarding the sign of the coefficient on AGE is specified in 
Table 6.2.  However, AGE enters Panel A of Table 6.5 with negative coefficients, which 
is in line with agency cost of equity considerations and the notion that due to greater 
reputation, mature firms tend to have more equity in their capital mix.  Further, the 
                                                          
27 But note the opposite conclusions arrived at from the results of the non-debt tax shield proxy whose 
negative sign indicates it may reflect asset tangibility.       
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coefficients on AGE, in Panel A, for both non-affiliated and group-affiliated firms are of 
similar magnitudes.   Thus the results do not point to a difference in the impact of AGE 
on the capital structure decision of group and non-group firms.  This variable however 
drops out of the models of Panel B of Table 6.5 where the problem of multicollinearity is 
addressed.  
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY, is expected to enter the model with positive estimated 
coefficients because highly traded equity is taken as a sign of confidence on the part of 
investors that the firm is free from agency costs of equity. This variable does not appear 
to play an important role in the capital structure decisions of group-affiliated firms.  
Indeed, it enters both Regression (4) and Regression (8) of Table 6.5 with very high 
probability values of being insignificantly different from zero.  There is also not much 
that can be said about how this variable influences the capital structure decisions of non-
affiliated firms. Particularly, although in Regression (3) of Table 6.5 it enters with the 
predicted positive sign, this sign is reversed in Regression (7).  
GROWTH is included to measure the agency cost of debt and it appears to 
confirm to expectations. It enters the regressions for the non-affiliated firms with 
negative and significant estimated coefficients but is insignificant for group-affiliated 
firms.  One caveat, however, with regards the importance of this variable, is the relatively 
small magnitudes of its coefficients. 
Finally firm’s profitability as reflected by the variable PROFITABILITY is 
shown to be important to both group and non-group firms with a stronger impact in the 
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case of the former.  This is consistent with pecking order considerations and with agency 
theory where managers of profitable firms prefer to use internal funds to avoid the 
constraints imposed by external debt.  It is also in line with Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) and the suggestion that internal sources are particularly 
important to group-affiliated firms, perhaps due to these firms guarding their secrecy 
more jealousy compared with non-affiliated firms.  
There are important conclusions to be drawn from the empirical results from both 
the comparison analysis and the multivariate analysis described in this section.  
Particularly it may be concluded that debt levels and their determinants behave 
systematically different in the case of group-affiliated firms compared with non-affiliated 
firms.   The next section reports the results from the empirical approach that attempts to 
account for these differences.  
 
 
6.5.2.2   Results for the multivariate analysis incorporating group-level variables and 
interaction terms 
 
In the second stage explanatory variables at the group level are added to the model as 
specified in Equation (6.2).  Group-affiliation dummy variables and interaction terms are 
also added in order to allow the constant and the slopes of the firm level characteristics to 
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differ when the firm is group-affiliated.  Moreover, the conclusions from the comparison 
analysis are that there tend to be some differences in the debt ratios within the group-
affiliated category.  Particularly it has been shown that debt ratios tend to change as the 
group with which a firm is affiliated becomes more diversified.  These findings justify 
the inclusion in Equation (6.2) of the dummy variable, HD, for firms affiliated with 
highly diversified groups.  These conclusions further justify the inclusion of interaction 
terms that measure the extra change in the firm level characteristics’ slopes when the firm 
is affiliated with a highly diversified group.   
The results from the group level analysis are reported in Table 6.6 and are 
discussed in more detail below.   As before, Panel A of the table gives the general and 
specific regressions that are based on Equation (6.2).  Similarly, Panel B is a variant of 
Equation (6.2) where some of the explanatory variables suspected of causing 
multicollinearity are replaced by the residuals from auxiliary regressions.   These include 
NON DEBT TAX SHIELD, FIRM SIZE, and AGE. 
As emerges from Table 6.6, the general results from the multivariate analysis at 
the group level, indicate that group-affiliated firms display different sensitivities to the 
determinants of capital structure.  Further, it is shown that there is merit to the idea that 
the capital structure decision of group-affiliated firms may be explained in terms of the 
various business group theories.  In particular it is appears that control considerations, 
sharing of group-wide resources and group complexity influence the leverage decisions 
of group-affiliated firms.  
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Table 6.6 Ordinary Least Squares regressions of LEV2 on firm and group characteristics. 
1,384 non-financial BSE listed firms in the Indian Private Sector with y/e March 2000 (of which 472 are group-affiliated). 
 
Panel A: Original explanatory variables 
 GENERAL MODEL SPECIFIC MODEL 
Mean of dep. var.  0.419 0.419 
Std. dev. of dep. var. 0.235 0.235 
Sum of squared residuals 46.872 47.335 
Variance of residuals 0.035 0.035 
Std. error of regression 0.187 0.187 
R-squared 0.387 0.381 
Adjusted R-squared 0.368 0.370 
LM het. test  1.937 [0.164] 2.047 [0.152] 
Jarque-Bera test 2.018 [0.365] 3.016 [0.221] 
Ramsey's RESET2 3.746 [0.053] 3.466 [0.063] 
F (zero slopes) 20.139 [0.000] 34.812 [0.000] 
Schwarz B.I.C. -223.328 -281.610 
Log likelihood 378.832 372.019 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Prob Coeff. t-stat. Prob 
C       0.445 9.971 0.000 0.448 15.003 0.000 
GP  0.203 2.006 0.045 0.177 3.192 0.001 
HD      0.129 0.966 0.334 0.056 1.892 0.059 
NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD 0.065 8.028 0.000 0.068 11.900 0.000 
LIQUIDITY (CA/CL)    -0.001 -1.996 0.046 -0.001 -2.027 0.043 
INTANGIBILITY  -0.839 -2.715 0.007 -0.893 -3.486 0.001 
FIRM SIZE 0.003 0.434 0.664    
AGE      -0.036 -2.830 0.005 -0.033 -3.574 0.000 
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY 0.119 5.088 0.000 0.122 5.167 0.000 
GROWTH (P/B)   -0.006 -4.255 0.000 -0.008 -4.650 0.000 
PROFITABILITY   -0.557 -4.188 0.000 -0.535 -4.288 0.000 
(NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD) x GP  -0.020 -1.208 0.227 -0.033 -4.058 0.000 
LIQUIDITY x GP  0.006 2.012 0.044 0.005 1.824 0.068 
INTANGIBILITY x GP    0.008 0.013 0.990 -0.095 -2.241 0.025 
(FIRM SIZE) x GP  -0.012 -0.679 0.497    
AGE x GP   0.003 0.159 0.874    
(STOCK ILLIQUIDITY) x GP  -0.101 -2.094 0.036    
GROWTH x GP     -0.007 -0.585 0.558    
PROFITABILITY x GP  -0.340 -1.156 0.248 -0.397 -1.461 0.144 
(NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD) x HD  0.007 0.252 0.801    
LIQUIDITY x HD  -0.002 -0.352 0.725    
INTANGIBILITY x HD    -2.131 -2.212 0.027 -2.072 -2.902 0.004 
(FIRM SIZE) x HD  -0.025 -0.778 0.437    
AGE x HD   0.013 0.395 0.693    
(STOCK ILLIQUIDITY) x HD  -0.022 -0.281 0.779    
GROWTH x HD     0.013 1.002 0.317 0.006 1.331 0.183 
PROFITABILITY x HD  -0.552 -1.677 0.094 -0.509 -1.663 0.096 
GROUP PROFITABILITY   -0.230 -1.885 0.060 -0.199 -1.945 0.052 
GROUP LIQUIDITY  0.005 0.511 0.610    
GROUP DEBT   -0.007 -2.115 0.035 -0.007 -2.255 0.024 
GROUP DIVERSITY  0.012 0.699 0.484    
GROUP SIZE   -0.022 -2.226 0.026 -0.018 -2.420 0.016 
I1 (food & beverages)     0.081 3.311 0.001 0.081 3.924 0.000 
I2 (Textiles) 0.127 5.677 0.000 0.129 7.411 0.000 
I3 (Chemicals)         0.055 2.904 0.004 0.057 4.317 0.000 
I4 (Mineral products)         0.006 0.221 0.825    
I5 (Metals)         0.037 1.603 0.109 0.038 2.028 0.043 
I6 (Machinery)         -0.015 -0.763 0.446    
I7 (transport equipment)         0.019 0.665 0.506    
I8 (Misc. manufacturing)         0.064 2.306 0.021 0.067 2.727 0.006 
I9 (Diver. Manufacturing)         0.021 0.379 0.705    
I10 (Mining)        0.051 0.581 0.561    
I11 (Electricity)        0.007 0.104 0.917    
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2);  All variables are defined in Table 6.2 
 
WALD TEST-For several coefficients jointly: F(18 1342)  Test Statistic: 0.738 Upper tail area: 0.774 
Panel B: residuals replace some of the explanatory variables 
 
 GENERAL MODEL SPECIFIC MODEL 
Mean of dep. var.  0.419 0.419 
Std. dev. of dep. var. 0.235 0.235 
Sum of squared residuals 46.872 47.540 
Variance of residuals 0.035 0.035 
Std. error of regression 0.187 0.187 
R-squared 0.387 0.378 
Adjusted R-squared 0.368 0.368 
LM het. test  1.937 [0.164] 2.984 [0.084] 
Jarque-Bera test 2.018 [0.365] 1.995 [0.369] 
Ramsey's RESET2 3.746 [0.053] 0.599 [0.439] 
F (zero slopes) 20.139 [0.000] 35.940 [0.000] 
Schwarz B.I.C. -223.328 -282.234 
Log likelihood 378.832 369.027 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Prob Coeff. t-stat. Prob 
C       0.456 21.022 0.000 0.463 31.359 0.000 
GP  0.130 1.927 0.054 0.128 2.458 0.014 
HD      0.062 1.213 0.225 0.067 2.231 0.026 
RESIDUAL TAX SHIELD 0.163 9.425 0.000 0.153 11.799 0.000 
LIQUIDITY (CA/CL)    -0.001 -4.050 0.000 -0.001 -4.017 0.000 
INTANGIBILITY  -1.032 -3.250 0.001 -1.098 -4.251 0.000 
RESIDUAL FIRM SIZE 0.138 5.577 0.000 0.117 9.504 0.000 
RESIDUAL AGE      0.020 1.056 0.291    
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY -0.064 -2.936 0.003 -0.074 -4.336 0.000 
GROWTH (P/B)   -0.005 -3.567 0.000 -0.006 -3.889 0.000 
PROFITABILITY   -0.669 -5.254 0.000 -0.755 -7.185 0.000 
(RESIDUAL TAX SHIELD) x GP  -0.084 -2.886 0.004 -0.071 -3.769 0.000 
LIQUIDITY x GP  0.006 2.123 0.034 0.004 1.565 0.118 
INTANGIBILITY  x GP    -0.026 -0.041 0.967    
(RESIDUAL FIRM SIZE) x GP  -0.096 -2.247 0.025 -0.075 -3.601 0.000 
(RESIDUAL AGE) x GP   -0.033 -1.060 0.289    
(STOCK ILLIQUIDITY) x GP  -0.025 -0.572 0.567    
GROWTH x GP     -0.008 -0.629 0.530    
PROFITABILITY x GP  -0.332 -1.201 0.230    
(RESIDUAL TAX SHIELD) x HD  -0.028 -0.726 0.468    
LIQUIDITY x HD  -0.002 -0.333 0.739    
INTANGIBILITY  x HD    -2.127 -2.293 0.022 -2.053 -2.845 0.005 
(RESIDUAL FIRM SIZE) x HD  -0.049 -0.834 0.404    
(RESIDUAL AGE) x HD   -0.004 -0.097 0.923    
(STOCK ILLIQUIDITY) x HD  0.017 0.258 0.797    
GROWTH x HD     0.013 0.988 0.323 0.006 1.247 0.213 
PROFITABILITY x HD  -0.588 -1.800 0.072 -0.763 -3.323 0.001 
GROUP PROFITABILITY   -0.230 -1.885 0.060 -0.240 -2.346 0.019 
GROUP LIQUIDITY  0.005 0.511 0.610    
GROUP DEBT   -0.007 -2.115 0.035 -0.007 -2.234 0.026 
GROUP DIVERSITY  0.012 0.699 0.484    
GROUP SIZE   -0.022 -2.226 0.026 -0.020 -2.657 0.008 
I1 (food & beverages)     0.081 3.311 0.001 0.082 4.053 0.000 
I2 (Textiles) 0.127 5.677 0.000 0.131 7.526 0.000 
I3 (Chemicals)         0.055 2.904 0.004 0.056 4.269 0.000 
I4 (Mineral products)         0.006 0.221 0.825    
I5 (Metals)         0.037 1.603 0.109 0.042 2.259 0.024 
I6 (Machinery)         -0.015 -0.763 0.446    
I7 (transport equipment)         0.019 0.665 0.506    
I8 (Misc. manufacturing)         0.064 2.306 0.021 0.067 2.741 0.006 
I9 (Diver. Manufacturing)         0.021 0.379 0.705    
I10 (Mining)        0.051 0.581 0.561    
I11 (Electricity)        0.007 0.104 0.917    
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2); All variables are defined in Table 6.2, apart from RESIDUAL TAX 
SHIELD, RESIDUAL FIRM SIZE and RESDIUAL AGE that are defined in the notes to Panel B of Table 6.3. 
 
WALD TEST-For several coefficients jointly: F(19 1342)  Test Statistic: 1.008 Upper tail area: 0.448 
 
The group dummy, GP, and the highly diversified group dummy, HD, enter the 
model of both Panel A and Panel B of Table 6.6 with significant and positive estimated 
coefficients.  This implies that group-affiliated firms tend to use more debt, and is 
consistent with the results of the comparison analysis.  The positive coefficient on GP is 
also in line with the cultural-based/social structure theory, which implies that due to 
control considerations group-affiliated firms should prefer debt to external equity.  The 
additional positive effect for firms affiliated with highly diversified groups, is consistent 
with Khanna and Palepu (2000a) and with the prediction of Table 6.2 but not with the 
results of the comparison analysis.   
In general, excluding AGE and STOCK ILLIQUIDITY the slopes on the other six 
firm level explanatory variables are shown in Table 6.6 to change when the firm is group-
affiliated.  The interpretation of AGE, and STOCK ILLIQUIDITY, however, is 
ambiguous because both these variables display inconsistency when Panel A and Panel B 
of Table 6.6 are compared. The results for the eight firm level explanatory variables are 
basically the same as the results obtained for Equation (6.1) as reported in Table 6.5.  The 
discussion here, therefore, focuses only on new information that emerges from running 
the extended model of Equation (6.2).  
INTANGIBILITY as reflected by the ratio of R&D and advertising expenditure to 
sales has the predicted negative effect in the case of non-affiliated firms.  This effect is 
stronger for group-affiliated firms and much stronger when the firm is affiliated with a 
highly diversified group.  To the extent that R&D and advertising represent intangibility 
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of assets and hence distress costs, this extra sensitivity implies that firms affiliated with 
highly diversified groups face higher risk of failure.  This could be rationalised in two 
ways.  First, as the diversified groups are also likely to be larger, this higher risk may 
reflect size-related inefficiencies that are associated with the business group structure.  
Such inefficiencies could relate, for instance, to cumbersome control structure or to cross 
subsidisation as in Chang and Hong (2000).  Second, in the spirit of Chang and Hong 
(2000) it may be argued that group-affiliated firms with high R&D expenditure tend to 
share their knowledge with other group members.  This means that the consequences of 
their failure can be critical not only to the firm itself but also to other firms in the group.  
Diversified groups are likely to be large which means more firms depend on the high 
R&D firm and the consequences of it failing are particularly severe.  To reduce risk, 
these firms tend to reduce their dependency on debt.  
Alternatively, to the extent that R&D and advertising represent growth 
opportunities, the extra sensitivity may suggest that firms affiliated with highly 
diversified groups face greater agency costs of debt.  This may be due to the typical 
complex structure of highly diversified groups, which makes agency behaviour difficult 
to detect.  Thus the debt levels of firms affiliated with highly diversified groups are 
particularly sensitive to factors that increase the opportunities for wealth expropriation 
from debt holders such as risk shifting. 
 PROFITABILITY has a negative impact on the leverage decision of non-
affiliated firms. This negative impact seems to increase with group-affiliation and is 
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particularly strong for firms affiliated with highly diversified groups.  As previously 
suggested, this is consistent with pecking order considerations, with agency behaviour, 
and with the notion that internal sources are particularly important to group-affiliated 
firms, perhaps due to secrecy factors. 
Turning to the group-level variables out of the five proxies included, two show to 
be unimportant.  Specifically both GROUP LIQUIDITY and GROUP DIVERSITY drop 
out of the specified models of not only of Table 6.6, but also of the specified models of 
the other debt measures as given in Appendix 6C.  It should, however be noted that group 
diversity may still be important to the capital structure decision of firms, in spite of 
dropping out.  Indeed, the reason that this variable drops out may simply be due to the 
fact that the effect of this variable is reflected in the group diversification dummy, HD, 
which is found to be positive and significant and which also enters with a few interaction 
terms.  
In contrast to GROUP LIQUIDITY and GROUP DIVERSITY, the three group-
level variables that are shown in Table 6.6 to be important include GROUP 
PROFITABILITY, GROUP DEBT and GROUP SIZE.  GROUP PROFITABILITY 
enters the regressions of Panels A and B with negative coefficients, which is inconsistent 
with the idea that firms share group-wide reputation that gives them better access to debt.  
The negative sign on GROUP PROFITABILITY, however, may be explained in terms of 
group internal capital market.  Thus the group channel profits to where it is needed to 
avoid member firms having to resort to external finance.  Hence firms affiliated with 
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profitable firms tend to have lower debt ratios. This is consistent with pecking order 
considerations, with agency behaviour, and with the market failure theory of groups.   
GROUP DEBT enters the models of Table 6.6 with negative but small 
coefficients.  The negative association between the ability of the affiliated firm to 
obtained debt finance and the group-wide debt level is consistent with expectations and 
with the notion of internal dependency within the group.   Intra-group trading, sharing of 
resources and loan guarantee links mean that a default by one firm may cause a chain 
reaction within the group.  Therefore the financial risk to which other firms in the group 
are exposed, impact the leverage decision of an affiliated firm. It could further be argued 
that in order to create group-wide reputation, the group imposes debt levels on member 
firms that are designed to move the group towards its group-wide optimal capital 
structure.  
Finally, GROUP SIZE has a small but important and negative impact on the debt 
ratios of the affiliated firm.  In the spirit of Dewenter, Novaes and Pettway (2001) it is 
assumed that group size, due to high visibility reduces agency behaviour.  The negative 
sign on the GROUP SIZE coefficient implies that the impact of visibility on reducing the 
agency costs of equity is stronger than its impact on reducing the agency costs of debt.  
Table 6.7 summarises the key empirical findings, and is divided into two panels.  
Panel A summarises the key findings from the comparison analysis as discussed in 
Section 6.5.1, while Panel B is devoted to the findings from the multivariate analysis of 
Section 6.5.2.  These key findings are discussed in the concluding section below.   
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Table 6.7 Summary of Empirical Findings 
 













Due to control 
considerations and 
access to debt via 
group visibility 
? Mean/median higher for group-affiliated firms compared 
with non-affiliated firms. 
? The difference becomes weaker with the level of group 
diversification. 
? The difference between the mean/median of firms affiliated 
with highly diversified groups is not significantly higher 
from the category of non-affiliated firms.  
Long term debt 
(+) 
 
Short term debt 
(-) 
 
Savings on issuing 
costs by using long-
term debt and 
reducing the 
issuance frequency 
create preference for 
long-term debt.  
 
For non-affiliated 
firms the issuance 
costs saved do not 
offset the additional 
insolvency risk that 
is associated with 
long-term debt thus 
creating preference 
for short-term debt. 
Long term debt 
? Mean/median higher for group-affiliated firms compared 
with non-affiliated firms. 
? The difference becomes weaker with the level of group 
diversification. 
? The difference between the mean/median of firms affiliated 
with highly diversified groups is still significantly higher 
compared with the category of non-affiliated firms.   
Short term debt 
? Mean/median lower for group-affiliated firms compared with 
non-affiliated firms. 
? The difference becomes stronger with the level of group 
diversification. 
? While the difference between all group-affiliated and non-
affiliated firms is insignificant, the difference between firms 
affiliated with highly diversified groups and non-affiliated 
firms is significant. 
Bank debt  
(-) 
 
Greater access to 
capital markets by 
group-affiliated 
firms  
? Mean/median lower for group-affiliated firms compared with 
non-affiliated firms. 
? The difference becomes stronger with the level of group 
diversification. 
? The difference between group-affiliated and non-affiliated 




Greater access to 
policy makers by 
group-affiliated 
firms  
? Group-affiliated firms tend to rely more on government loans 
compared with non-affiliated firms.  
? The difference becomes stronger with the level of group 
diversification but is always significant. 
Foreign debt  
(+) 
 
Greater access to 
foreign markets via 
group’ visibility and 
reputation 
? Group-affiliated firms tend to rely more on loans from 
foreign institutions compared with non-affiliated firms.  
? The difference becomes stronger with the level of group 





markets thus they 
rely heavily on 
internal loans 
? The mean loans from group firms, as a fraction of total 
corporate loans is about 12 percent. 
? The mean increases with the level of group diversity but the 
difference between diversified and non-diversified groups is 
never significant 
Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
 
Variable and  Predicted sign and 
Rationale for 
prediction 
Predicted impact of group affiliation Summary results 
Constant  (+) – Due to control considerations. 
Also as affiliation increases access to 
external funds via sharing of group-
wide reputation and policy distortions 
(+) - Group affiliation has a 
positive impact on the constant, 
which increases when the group 
is highly diversified.  
NON DEBT TAX 
SHIELD 
(-) – The availability 
of alternative tax 
shields reduces the 
value of the debt tax 
shield 
(Reduced effect) – The tax benefits of 
debt should not play an important role 
for group firms due to alternative 
shields such as internal transfer of 
profits.  
(+) – Opposite to expectations. 
Also group firms are only about 
half as sensitive compared with 
independent firms.  
FIRM SIZE (+) – Large firms 
tend to be diversified, 
which reduces 
distress costs 
(Reduced effect) – It is the group size 
and diversification levels that 
determine the present value of 
financial distress costs 
(+) – Positive impact in the case 
of non-affiliated firms but 
almost no effect in the case of 
group-affiliated firms. 
GROWTH (-) – Growth 
increases the 
opportunities for 
managers to engage 
in risk shifting. 
(Ambiguous) – Agency conflicts 
within groups are complicated and 
determined by visibility, complexity, 
and conflicts between firms and 
controlling entity. 
(-) – Evidence of negative 
impact for non-affiliated firms 
but appears unimportant in the 
case of group-affiliated firms. 




(Reduced effect) – It is the group size 
and diversification that determine the 
present value of financial distress costs 
(-) – Relatively small effect 
with no difference between 
group and non-group firms.  
STOCK 
ILLIQUIDITY 
(+) – Indicates agency 
cost of equity. Highly 
traded stock means 
less agency behaviour 
by managers. 
(Ambiguous) – Agency conflicts 
within groups are complicated and 
determined by visibility, complexity, 
and conflicts between member firms 
and the controlling entity.  
(+/-) – Sign reversals once 
multicollinearity is accounted 
for. No difference between 
group and non-group firms 
LIQUIDITY (+) – Reduces the 
present value of 
financial distress 
costs 
(Reduced or increased effect) – 
Sensitivity of the firm’s leverage 
decision partly depends on the general 
financial position of the group   
(+) – Positive effect (albeit 
small) in the case of group-
affiliated firms but almost no 
effect for independent firms. 
INTANGIBILITY (-) – Increases the 
present value of 
financial distress 
costs 
(Reduced or increased effect) – 
Sensitivity of the firm’s leverage 
decision partly depends on the general 
financial position of the group 
(-) – Negative effect, which 
becomes stronger with the level 
of group diversification.  
PROFITABILITY (-) – Due to pecking 
order and agency 
considerations  
(Increased effect) – Preference for 
secrecy increases the effects of pecking 
order and agency considerations. 
(-) – Negative impact increases 
with group affiliation and 
further for diversified groups 
GROUP  
PROFITABILITY 
 (+) – Profitability creates reputations. 
(-) – Group internal capital markets 
(-) – Negative and significant 
impact 
GROUP DEBT  (-) – Increases financial distress costs 
due to debt guarantee links. Also due 
to group-wide optimal capital structure 
(-) – Negative and significant 
impact but relatively small 
coefficient 
GROUP SIZE  (+/-) – Increases group visibility and 
can have impact on agency costs of 
both equity and debt.   
(-) – Negative and significant 




 (+) – reduces financial distress costs 
(-) – increases group complexity 




 (+) – Profitability creates reputations. 
(-) – Group internal capital markets 





6.6 Summary and concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we initially provide a brief review of two strands of the corporate finance 
literature.  The first strand relates to the firm’s capital structure decisions, with emphasis 
on pecking order, agency and the trade off theories.  The second strand of the literature 
relates to business groups and theories regarding their role, especially in the context of 
emerging markets.  The chapter integrates these two strands, particularly with reference 
to three factors that are expected to influence both capital structure decisions and the 
behaviour of groups.   These include distress costs, as reflected by asset structure, agency 
costs, and control considerations.  This synthesis is then used to compare the debt levels 
of group-affiliated and non-affiliated firms and to generate some plausible models that 
explain the capital structure decisions of these two categories of firms.  
The comparison analysis utilises a sample of 1811 Indian Private Sector, non-
financial firms with a year ending of March 2000, of which 1146 are non-affiliated firms 
and 665 are group-affiliated firms.  In particular ten debt measures are compared across 
these two categories of firms further splitting the group-affiliated firms into 314 firms 
affiliated with diversified groups and 131 firms affiliated with highly diversified groups.  
Indeed significant differences are found between the debt levels of group and non-group 
firms as well as between firms that are affiliated with groups at various levels of 
diversification.  These results are further reinforced by the conclusions from the 
multivariate analysis, which involves the estimation of two models.  The first model 
includes explanatory variables at the firm-level only and is tested on a sample of 1472 
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Indian firms, of which 912 are independent and 560 are group-affiliated.   The second 
model expands the first by adding group-level explanatory variables as well as interaction 
terms between group affiliation dummies and firm-level variables.  This is tested on a 
sample of 1384 Indian firms, of which 912 are independent firms and 472 are group-
affiliated.  Table 6.7 summarises the main conclusions from the empirical procedures.  
In general, the findings of the study confirm that group-affiliated firms are 
significantly different from their independent counterparts, in the context of their capital 
structure decisions.  For example, the results show that the mean as well as median 
leverage of group-affiliated firms is higher than the counterpart measures for non-
affiliated firms.  This result is consistent with the findings relating to long-term debt, 
government debt and foreign debt, which all show higher mean and median measures for 
group-affiliated firms compared with independent firms.  In contrast, the mean and 
median of short-term debt and bank debt are found to be lower for group-affiliated firms 
compared with independent firms.  Peculiarly, there is no evidence to suggest that group-
affiliated firms rely mainly on sister firms as a source of corporate debt. 
In terms of the main determinants of capital structure, a number of interesting 
findings were uncovered.  First the alternative tax shield, as measured in terms of 
depreciation, is found to have a positive rather than the expected negative effect on the 
level of debt.  This, however, is the only variable whose sign is opposite to expectations 
and it could be due to the fact that depreciation is a proxy for the tangibility of assets.  It 
is also found that group affiliation reduces the effect of this variable on capital structure 
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decisions. Second, it is found that firm size, and growth prospects, do not matter for the 
capital structure of group-affiliated firms, whereas these are critical factors for the debt 
level decisions of independent firms with a positive and negative impact respectively.  
Third, it appears that there are no differences between group and non-group firms in 
terms of the impact of age and stock illiquidity on capital structure decisions.  Fourth, 
liquidity, asset structure, and profitability appear to have stronger impact on the capital 
structure decisions of group-affiliated firms compared with non-affiliated firms. Indeed, 
liquidity has a positive (albeit small) effect in the case of group-affiliated firms while 
almost no effect on the capital structure decision of independent firms.  Similarly 
intangibility of assets and profitability appear to have a negative impact on the leverage 
decisions of firms and this impact becomes stronger with group-affiliation and stronger 
still for firms affiliated with highly diversified groups.  
Finally it is shown that consistent with the market failure theory of business 
groups, group-affiliated firms appear to share tangible and intangible assets so that group-
wide factors enter the capital structure decisions of these firms.  In particular, group 
profitability, group debt, and group size have significant negative impact on the leverage 
of affiliated firms.   Furthermore, although group liquidity is not shown to be important, 
there is some evidence to show that group diversification increases the debt capacity of 
the affiliated firm.  
Clearly more research into the workings of business groups is required.  It is 
noted, however, that this task can be difficult because the Indian Business House as well 
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as most business groups world-wide, are typically an informal organisation without a 
legal base.  Thus it may be difficult to obtain data such as accounts at the group level.  
Indeed, in this chapter group-level variables had to be estimated using information from 
member firms for which data were available, ignoring those member firms for which no 
data was available. Undoubtedly, this is one weakness of the empirical approach in this 
chapter.  Another weakness of this as well as the previous chapter is the concentration on 
a single year, which as explained is due to lack of historic group-affiliation information.  
Thus the second idea for possible future research is to incorporate time series into the 
business group analysis.  
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Appendix 6A:  Notes on the empirical procedures of previous studies 
 
 
(1). Chang and Hong (2000)  
The study uses 12,019 observations on 1,248 listed and unlisted Korean firms associated with 317 
business groups and spanning the period 1985 to 1996.   The idea is to assess how group-
affiliation influences member firms’ performance, and the model is of the form:  
Performance = f(firm-level resources, group-level resources, intra-group financial & trade 
transactions) 
Using Panel data technique with fixed time and industry effects and Weighted Least Squares 
methodology the conclusions are that group-affiliated firms benefit from intra-group sharing of 
intangible and financial resources.  Specifically, a positive and significant relationship is recorded 
between the performance of the firm, and the level of advertising, R&D and liquidity of other 
firms in the group.  Further, there is evidence that Intra-group transactions, such as debt 
guarantee, equity investment, and trade transactions, are extensively used by member firms.  It is 
shown that exchanging debt guarantees and equity investments have an inverse affect on the 
profitability of the providing firm, but a positive affect on the profitability of the receiving firm.  
The study also records a positive (negative) association between internal sales and the 
profitability of the selling (buying) firm, suggesting that profitable firms buy from unprofitable 
firms in the group at higher than market prices.  It is proposed that this practice may be designed 
to achieve cross-subsidisation or tax avoidance.   Regression results are given below, where 11 
year dummies, 45 industry dummies, and 451 industry-year interaction terms are included but not 
reported.  Standard errors are given in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
448 
1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. The dependent variable, profitability is measured as: 




Period 1:  
1985-1988 










2.  R&D = R&D expenditure / total sales 0.40  
(0.32) 
0.22 (0.10)** 
3.  Liquidity = R&D expenditure / total sales 1.10 (0.17)*** 0.48 (0.12)*** 
4.  Leverage = Long term debt / equity -0.18 (0.02)*** -0.09 (0.01)*** 
5.  Firm size = Logarithm of assets in thousands 
won 
0.30 (0.12)** -0.29 (0.09)*** 
The higher the firm level of 
intangible & cash resources, 
the more profitable it is.  
(Variables 1 and 2 stand for 
intangible assets, 3 stands for 
cash availability, 4 is and 
inverse proxy of  cash 
availability, 5 is a control 
variable) 
Group-level resources (of other firms in the group) 
6.  Group advertising ( where sales is the 
weighting series) 
0.21 (0.07)*** 0.18 (0.05)*** 
7.  Group R&D (where sales is the  weighting 
series) 
0.83 (0.41)** 0.35 (0.13)*** 
8.  Group liquidity (where current liability is the 
weighting series) 
1.09 (0.24)*** -0.21  
(0.18) 
9.  Group leverage (where equity is the  
weighting series) 
-0.06 (0.03)** -0.09 (0.02)*** 
10.  Unrelated diversification based on 





11.  Related diversification (based on 
distribution of sales across industries) 
1.84 (0.45)*** 0.37  
(0.29) 
12.  Group size (Log of total assets of all firms in 
group) 
-0.73 (0.13)*** -0.07  
(0.09) 
? The higher the levels of 
intangibles of other firms in 
the same business group 
(Variables 6 and 7), the more 
profitable the firm.  
? The higher the liquidity of 
other firms in the same group 
(Variable 8 and the inverse 
of variable 9), the more 
profitable the firm.  
Internal transactions   
13.  Supply of debt guarantee to group members 
/ equity of providing firm 
-0.16 (0.08)** -0.18 (0.05)*** 
14.  Debt guarantee received from group 




15.  Equity investment in affiliates / equity base 




16.  Equity investment from affiliates / equity 




17.  Sales to affiliates / total sales of the firm 0.66  
(0.54) 
1.10 (0.35)*** 










Number observations 2901 4923 
Total adjusted R2 0.20 0.14 
? The negative sign on 
variable 18, and the positive 
sign on variable 17 indicate 
either cross-subsidisation 
(buying firms in the group 
support unprofitable affiliates 
by paying high prices) or tax 
avoidance through passing of 
profits.   
? Cross-subsidisation has 
strong effects in slump 
periods (period 3) but weak 
effects in boom periods 
(period 1).  
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(2).  Vilasuso and Minkler (2001)  
The authors set out to test the idea that there is an optimal debt to equity ratio, which minimises 
the sum of agency costs given the degree of asset specificity.  A distinction is made between 
agency costs of debt and agency costs of equity, which have opposite effects on the attractiveness 
of debt financing.  They formulate a dynamic adjustment process where the actual change in each 
period towards the optimal debt to equity ratio is some fraction of the optimal change.  The 
optimal debt to equity ratio, in turn, is inversely determined by the degree of asset specificity, 
because when assets are highly specific the expected payment to debt holders in the event of 
liquidation is low.  
Using US firms listed in the Compustant database with at least three years of annual data 
in the period 1987-1997, provides the unbalanced Panel dataset, to which a non-linear least 
squares methodology is applied. Particularly the sample consists of 28 publicly held firms in the 
transportation equipment sector including aircraft, defence, and space vehicles and components, 
and 37 firms in the printing and publishing industry.  
The dependent variable is the debt to equity ratio, and the asset structure proxy is 
measured by two alternative ways.  For the sample of firms in the transportation equipment 
sector, asset structure is measured as the ratio of sales to government to total sales. The idea is 
that assets dedicated to government procurement are highly specific. For the sample of firms in 
the printing and publishing sector, asset structure is measured as the ratio of advertising 
expenditure to total assets. The idea is that these costs can not be recovered and should therefore 
present high degree of asset specificity. 
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The regression results show the sign on the estimated coefficient of the degree of asset 
specificity to be negative as expected, implying that equity levels increase with asset specificity.  
It is further shown that due to agency costs the capital structure of the firm converges to an 
optimal level.  Convergence is evident from the fact that the null hypothesis, that the absolute 
value of the estimated partial adjustment coefficient is less than 1, can not be rejected at 
conventional significance levels.  
 
(3).  Dewenter, Novaes and Pettway (2001)  
The study uses data on 159 initial public offers by independent and group-affiliated private firms 
that subsequently listed the Tokyo Stock Exchange in the period 1981-1994.  The aim is to 
investigate agency theory in the context of business groups, and in particular the implications of 
the trade off between group visibility and group complexity to agency costs. The model is of the 
following form: 
Opportunity for agency behaviour by group-affiliated firms = f(increasing function of structure 
complexity, decreasing function of visibility of member firms) 
Results from Ordinary Least Squares regressions provide evidence to support the domination of 
group complexity over visibility.  The immediate IPO return is measured as the percentage 
change from the offer price to the closing price on the first day of trading following an IPO.  This 
is shown to be significantly larger when the firm is affiliated with one of the largest keiretsu 
compared to when it is independent.   The results hold after controlling for changes in the pricing 
regimes of IPOs, and for visibility and complexity at the firm level.  The implications are that 
despite the high visibility of keiretsu members, their complex structure gives rise to agency 
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problems that are difficult to control.  It is noted that the impact of group affiliation is larger when 
shares are sold with fixed prices compared with when they are set by an auction. This is 
consistent with the idea that market structure is important for market efficiency and that because 
the auction system reveals more information to investors, it reduces uncertainty.   
 
 (4).  Gul (1999) 
The idea is to use Japanese data to provide further evidence on the theory that capital structure 
and dividend policy decisions are influenced by growth opportunities in a way that is consistent 
with agency cost explanations. For this purpose both a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis 
and a time-series analysis with a one-year lag for the dependent variable are utilised. The sample 
includes over 1000 firm-year observations on listed Japanese firms with year ending date of 31 
March and with no missing values for the period 1988 to 1992.  The regressions alternatively 
include and exclude data for the year 1990 due to a crash experienced in that year by the Japanese 
market. 
The dependent variable is measured alternatively as the book debt to equity ratio and as 
the market debt to equity ratio.  To measure the asset structure as represented by growth 
opportunities the study uses a growth measure that takes into account three measures. In 
particular, the growth measure is the common factor obtained when each of three growth 
measures is regressed on the other two.  These three measures include the ratio of market value of 
assets to book value of assets, the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity and the 
earnings to price ratio.   
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Controlling for firm size, profitability, regulation and business-group affiliation, the 
study finds significant negative relationship between growth opportunities and debt financing.  
Furthermore, Keiretsu firms are found to be associated with higher debt, which is explained by 
the fact that the keiretsu’s main bank is normally also a main shareholder in these firms.  
Specifically, it is proposed that conflicts between shareholder and debt-holders are less severe in 
Keiretu-affiliated firms because the main bank is also the main shareholder. 
 
 (5). Gleason, Mathur, and Mathur (2000)  
The study utilises 1994 data on 198 retailers from the following 14 European countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.   It is proposed that culture influences the choice of capital 
structure and that capital structure and cultural factors influence the performance of firms.  To test 
these propositions the countries are classified into four cultural clusters, defined in terms of 
power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance.  Indeed, the results from regressions of 
debt levels on the cultural clusters show that the capital structure of retailers varies by culture.  
However, the results from regressions of various measures of performance on cultural clusters 
and capital structure show that cultural influence on performance is insignificant.  For the capital 
structure model, the results are as follows:  
Total debt/ Total assets = 33.48*** - 9.44 C1 ** - 15.29 C2 *** - 11.20 C3 *** 
 
Where *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. F-value is 
7.11***, and Adjusted R2 is 0.0851.   C1, C2 and C3 are dummy variables representing 
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membership in that cluster and are included to test for differences in the mean capital structure 
against the mean of cluster 4.  The clusters are defined as follows: 
Cluster 1 – Strong uncertainty avoidance, feminine, and large power distance.  (Belgium, France, 
Portugal, and Spain.) 
Cluster 2 – Weak uncertainty avoidance, masculine, and small power distance. (Ireland, and UK.) 
Cluster 3 – Strong uncertainty avoidance, masculine, and small power distance. (Austria, 
Germany, Italy, and Switzerland.) 
Cluster 4 – Weak uncertainty avoidance, feminine, and small power distance. (Denmark, Finland, 
Netherlands, and Sweden.) 
 
 (6). Khanna and Rivkin (2001)  
The study utilises 1990s data on non-financial publicly traded firms from 14 emerging markets, 
each with between 10531 to 86 group-affiliated and non-affiliated firms. These include 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey.  The idea is to investigate how affiliation with a 
business group affects performance.  The first hypothesis is that group-affiliated firms are more 
profitable compared with independent firms.  The second hypothesis is that the profitability levels 
of firms within the same business group are more similar compared with the profitability of firms 
that do not belong to the same group.  The model basic is of the following form:  
Profitability = f(time effect, industry effect, group effect, firm effect) 
Strong support is documented for the hypothesis that group-affiliated firms enjoy higher profits in 
India, Indonesia and Taiwan, while the reverse is true for Argentina.   Further, in 10 out of the 14 
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countries, differences in profitability rates tend to be smaller for firms from the same group 
compared with firms that do not belong to the same group.  Thus it appears that within groups, 
firms tend to share both costs and benefits.    In the final part of their paper, Khanna and Rivkin 
(2001) investigate the correlation between group importance and proxies for market conditions.  
They expect group-affiliation to be most valuable, where capital markets are the least developed.  
Instead, however, they find group effect to be more valuable the more developed the capital 
market.  No evidence is found to support an association between the importance of business 




Appendix 6B:  Firm-level regressions of Model (6.1), with alternative debt measures  
 
Table 6B.1: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of LEV1 (Total liabilities / Quasi market value of total assets) on firm-level 
characteristics.  1,472/1479 non-financial BSE listed firms in the Indian Private Sector with y/e March 2000. 
 








Regression 1 2 3 4 
Mean of dep. var. 0.681 0.680 0.657 0.716 
Std. dev. of dep.  0.258 0.259 0.269 0.236 
Sum of squared residuals 62.391 75.162 46.947 23.595 
Variance of residuals 0.043 0.051 0.052 0.043 
Std. error of regression 0.207 0.226 0.228 0.207 
R-squared 0.363 0.240 0.292 0.248 
Adj R-squared 0.355 0.235 0.285 0.235 
LM het. Test 59.560 [.000] 32.870  [.000] 51.796  [.000] 34.241   [.000] 
Jarque-Bera test 96.774 [.000] 107.549  [.000] 39.985  [.000] 90.249   [.000] 
Ramsey's RESET2 73.528 [.000] 162.495  [.000] 90.134  [.000] 43.808   [.000] 
F (zero slopes) 43.528 [.000] 51.467  [.000] 41.501  [.000] 20.183   [.000] 
Schwarz B.I.C. -164.842 -68.213 -27.435 -61.796 
Log likelihood 237.786 104.708 61.541 93.453 
Number observations  1472 1479 917 562 
Variable Coeff t-stat. Prob Coeff t-stat. Prob Coeff t-stat. Prob Coeff t-stat. Prob 
C         0.480 11.181 [.000] 0.483 12.994 [.000] 0.424 8.877 [.000] 0.730 13.204 [.000] 
NON-DEBT TAX  -0.005 -0.646 [.519]          
LIQUIDITY  -0.003 -2.743 [.006] -0.003 -3.048 [.002] -0.003 -2.995 [.003] -0.016 -3.545 [.000] 
INTANGIBILITY   -1.413 -3.617 [.000] -1.662 -3.933 [.000] -1.304 -2.415 [.016] -1.933 -2.744 [.006] 
FIRM SIZE   0.036 4.662 [.000] 0.029 5.497 [.000] 0.048 6.706 [.000] -0.002 -0.235 [.814] 
AGE        0.025 2.601 [.009] 0.023 2.221 [.027] 0.018 1.268 [.205] 0.013 0.855 [.393] 
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY   0.096 4.495 [.000] 0.130 6.183 [.000] 0.159 6.282 [.000] 0.081 2.108 [.035] 
GROWTH    -0.006 -1.928 [.054] -0.007 -1.994 [.046] -0.011 -3.868 [.000] -0.005 -1.196 [.232] 
PROFITABILITY     -1.022 -8.714 [.000]          
I1 (food & beverages)     0.027 1.098 [.272]          
I2 (Textiles) 0.070 3.063 [.002] 0.081 5.002 [.000] 0.062 2.999 [.003] 0.128 5.068 [.000] 
I3 (Chemicals)         0.029 1.356 [.175]          
I4 (Mineral products)        0.013 0.460 [.646]          
I5 (Metals)         0.062 2.606 [.009] 0.068 3.474 [.001] 0.042 1.641 [.101] 0.086 2.822 [.005] 
I6 (Machinery)         -0.031 -1.302 [.193] -0.048 -2.493 [.013] -0.073 -2.912 [.004] -0.011 -0.405 [.685] 
I7 (transport equipment)    0.021 0.714 [.475]          
I8 (Misc. manufacturing)   0.006 0.180 [.857]          
I9 (Diver. Manufacturing) 0.016 0.383 [.702]          
I10 (Mining)        -0.040 -0.605 [.545]          
I11 (Electricity)        -0.034 -0.448 [.654]          
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2); The dependent variable is defined in Panel A of Table 6.2; The 
explanatory variables are defined in Panel B of Table 6.2 
 
WALD TEST  - TESTING SEVERAL COEFFICIENTS JOINTLY [Equation (1) versus Equation (2)]:  
F(7 1453)  Test Statistic: 17.496   Upper tail area: 0.000 
CHOW TEST FOR STABILITY [Equation (2) Versus Equations (3) and (4) separately]:  
F(9 1461) Test Statistic: 10.633 Upper tail area: 0.000 
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Table 6B.2: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of LEV3 (Total debt / Quasi market value of net assets) on firm-level 
characteristics.  1,472 non-financial BSE listed firms in the Indian Private Sector with y/e March 2000. 
 







Regression 1 2 3 4 
Mean of dep. var. 0.560 0.560 0.536 0.598 
Std. dev. of dep.  0.292 0.292 0.299 0.278 
Sum of squared residuals 78.614 78.844 50.972 23.871 
Variance of residuals 0.054 0.054 0.057 0.044 
Std. error of regression 0.233 0.232 0.238 0.209 
R-squared 0.374 0.373 0.372 0.447 
Adj R-squared 0.366 0.367 0.364 0.435 
LM het. Test 0.344 [.557] 0.386  [.534] 0.617   [.432] 1.240   [.266] 
Jarque-Bera test 17.991 [.000] 18.457   [.000] 4.002   [.135] 38.810   [.000] 
Ramsey's RESET2 11.238 [.001] 11.129  [.001] 3.261   [.071] 10.259    [.001] 
F (zero slopes) 45.749 [.000] 72.219  [.000] 44.415   [.000] 36.866  [.000] 
Schwarz B.I.C. 5.269 -18.114 23.107 -47.743 
Log likelihood 67.675 65.528 21.194 88.875 
Number observations  1472 1472 912 560 
Variable Coeff t-stat. Prob Coeff t-stat. Prob Coeff t-stat. Prob Coeff t-stat. Prob 
C         0.487 10.760 [.000] 0.443 14.296 [.000] 0.396 10.688 [.000] 0.581 10.570 [.000] 
NON-DEBT TAX  0.034 4.074 [.000] 0.033 4.057 [.000] 0.053 5.073 [.000] 0.008 0.667 [.505] 
LIQUIDITY  -0.002 -2.344 [.019] -0.002 -2.337 [.020] -0.001 -2.244 [.025] -0.008 -2.323 [.021] 
INTANGIBILITY   -1.403 -3.475 [.001] -1.438 -3.574 [.000] -0.982 -1.777 [.076] -1.918 -3.329 [.001] 
FIRM SIZE   0.021 2.559 [.011] 0.019 2.409 [.016] 0.027 2.750 [.006] 0.010 0.778 [.437] 
AGE        -0.016 -1.502 [.133]          
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY   0.128 5.290 [.000] 0.125 5.231 [.000] 0.165 5.611 [.000] 0.073 1.754 [.080] 
GROWTH    -0.004 -1.837 [.066] -0.004 -1.911 [.056] -0.007 -3.640 [.000] -0.003 -0.785 [.433] 
PROFITABILITY     -1.241 -8.591 [.000] -1.241 -8.644 [.000] -1.031 -5.843 [.000] -1.573 -5.529 [.000] 
I1 (food & beverages)     0.073 2.597 [.009] 0.077 3.312 [.001] 0.104 3.715 [.000] 0.005 0.116 [.908] 
I2 (Textiles) 0.119 4.656 [.000] 0.125 6.549 [.000] 0.106 4.099 [.000] 0.151 5.670 [.000] 
I3 (Chemicals)         0.063 2.750 [.006] 0.068 4.286 [.000] 0.070 3.314 [.001] 0.054 2.346 [.019] 
I4 (Mineral products)        0.009 0.277 [.782]          
I5 (Metals)         0.091 3.272 [.001] 0.094 4.289 [.000] 0.081 2.765 [.006] 0.083 2.442 [.015] 
I6 (Machinery)         -0.013 -0.514 [.607]          
I7 (transport equipment)    0.014 0.425 [.671]          
I8 (Misc. manufacturing)   0.054 1.641 [.101] 0.057 2.011 [.045] 0.055 1.499 [.134] 0.049 1.183 [.237] 
I9 (Diver. Manufacturing) 0.009 0.161 [.872]          
I10 (Mining)        -0.018 -0.230 [.818]          
I11 (Electricity)        -0.060 -0.690 [.490]          
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2); The dependent variable is defined in Panel A of Table 6.2; The 
explanatory variables are defined in Panel B of Table 6.2 
 
WALD TEST  - TESTING SEVERAL COEFFICIENTS JOINTLY [Equation (1) versus Equation (2)]:  
F(7 1453) Test Statistic: 0.607    Upper tail area: 0.751 
CHOW TEST FOR STABILITY [Equation (2) Versus Equations (3) and (4) separately]:  




Table 6B.3:  Ordinary Least Squares regressions of LEV4 (Total debt / Quasi market value of capital) on firm-level 
characteristics.  1,472 non-financial BSE listed firms in the Indian Private Sector with y/e March 2000. 
 







Regression 1 2 3 4 
Mean of dep. var. 0.580 0.580 0.554 0.622 
Std. dev. of dep.  0.295 0.295 0.301 0.279 
Sum of squared residuals 81.490 81.749 52.686 24.730 
Variance of residuals 0.056 0.056 0.059 0.045 
Std. error of regression 0.237 0.237 0.242 0.212 
R-squared 0.362 0.360 0.364 0.430 
Adj R-squared 0.354 0.355 0.356 0.419 
LM het. Test 5.587   [.018] 5.644 [.018] 5.709 [.017] 3.146 [.076] 
Jarque-Bera test 24.476 [.000] 24.619 [.000] 8.278 [.016] 49.428 [.000] 
Ramsey's RESET2 12.593 [.000] 12.931 [.000] 4.808 [.029] 8.520 [.004] 
F (zero slopes) 43.406 [.000] 74.729 [.000] 46.730 [.000] 37.588 [.000] 
Schwarz B.I.C. 31.711 4.868 34.778 -41.007 
Log likelihood 41.233 38.899 6.116 78.975 
Number observations  1472 1472 912 560 
Variable Coeff t-stat. Prob Coeff t-stat. Prob Coeff t-stat. Prob Coeff t-stat. Prob 
C         0.468 10.169 [.000] 0.457 14.647 [.000] 0.408 10.978 [.000] 0.598 10.723 [.000] 
NON-DEBT TAX  0.030 3.588 [.000] 0.030 3.609 [.000] 0.051 4.906 [.000] 0.002 0.146 [.884] 
LIQUIDITY  -0.002 -2.378 [.018] -0.002 -2.431 [.015] -0.002 -2.348 [.019] -0.008 -2.110 [.035] 
INTANGIBILITY   -1.442 -3.515 [.000] -1.447 -3.554 [.000] -0.999 -1.807 [.071] -1.918 -3.114 [.002] 
FIRM SIZE   0.024 2.902 [.004] 0.023 2.914 [.004] 0.031 3.130 [.002] 0.015 1.108 [.268] 
AGE        -0.004 -0.401 [.688]          
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY   0.127 5.173 [.000] 0.128 5.258 [.000] 0.171 5.752 [.000] 0.073 1.728 [.085] 
GROWTH    -0.005 -1.860 [.063] -0.005 -1.912 [.056] -0.008 -3.690 [.000] -0.003 -0.783 [.434] 
PROFITABILITY     -1.225 -8.724 [.000] -1.225 -8.787 [.000] -1.008 -5.952 [.000] -1.570 -5.640 [.000] 
I1 (food & beverages)     0.066 2.289 [.022] 0.066 2.837 [.005] 0.094 3.403 [.001] -0.011 -0.272 [.786] 
I2 (Textiles) 0.111 4.266 [.000] 0.111 5.933 [.000] 0.091 3.570 [.000] 0.141 5.434 [.000] 
I3 (Chemicals)         0.057 2.413 [.016] 0.057 3.601 [.000] 0.059 2.795 [.005] 0.045 1.942 [.053] 
I4 (Mineral products)        0.001 0.040 [.968]          
I5 (Metals)         0.082 2.913 [.004] 0.082 3.762 [.000] 0.068 2.338 [.020] 0.073 2.194 [.029] 
I6 (Machinery)         -0.017 -0.647 [.518]          
I7 (transport equipment)    0.018 0.524 [.601]          
I8 (Misc. manufacturing)   0.043 1.266 [.206]          
I9 (Diver. Manufacturing) -0.003 -0.060 [.952]          
I10 (Mining)        -0.019 -0.236 [.814]          
I11 (Electricity)        -0.057 -0.623 [.533]          
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2); The dependent variable is defined in Panel A of Table 6.2; The 
explanatory variables are defined in Panel B of Table 6.2 
 
WALD TEST  - TESTING SEVERAL COEFFICIENTS JOINTLY [Equation (1) versus Equation (2)]:  
F(8 1453) Test Statistic: 0.577 Upper tail area: 0.798 
CHOW TEST FOR STABILITY [Equation (2) Versus Equations (3) and (4) separately]:  
F(11 1450) Test Statistic: 7.378 Upper tail area: 0.000 
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Table 6B.4: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of LONG TERM DEBT  (Long term debt including preference capital/ Quasi 
market value of capital) on firm-level characteristics.  1,472 non-financial BSE listed firms in the Indian Private Sector with 
y/e March 2000. 
 








Regression 1 2 3 4 
Mean of dep. var. 0.332 0.332 0.296 0.389 
Std. dev. of dep.  0.245 0.245 0.241 0.241 
Sum of squared residuals 62.278 62.672 37.446 23.105 
Variance of residuals 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.042 
Std. error of regression 0.207 0.207 0.204 0.205 
R-squared 0.293 0.289 0.289 0.287 
Adj R-squared 0.284 0.283 0.281 0.273 
LM het. Test 28.471  [.000] 26.543   [.000] 9.484  [.002] 19.659 
Jarque-Bera test 14.735   [.001] 17.399   [.000] 45.912  [.000] 29.777 
Ramsey's RESET2 5.865   [.016] 5.462   [.020] 3.156  [.076] 3.243 
F (zero slopes) 31.701  [.000] 53.878   [.000] 33.322  [.000] 20.097 
Schwarz B.I.C. -166.174 -190.711 -120.925 -60.036 
Log likelihood 239.118 234.477 161.819 98.004 
Number observations  1472 1472 912 560 
Variable Coeff t-stat. Prob Coeff t-stat. Prob Coeff t-stat. Prob Coeff t-stat. Prob 
C         0.541 13.607 [.000] 0.508 14.542 [.000] 0.513 12.034 [.000] 0.613 8.764 [.000] 
NON-DEBT TAX  0.083 11.459 [.000] 0.082 11.376 [.000] 0.090 10.249 [.000] 0.059 4.203 [.000] 
LIQUIDITY  -0.001 -2.008 [.045] -0.001 -2.005 [.045] -0.001 -1.762 [.078] -0.004 -1.109 [.268] 
INTANGIBILITY   -0.761 -3.342 [.001] -0.743 -3.296 [.001] -0.416 -1.449 [.148] -1.176 -3.388 [.001] 
FIRM SIZE   -0.030 -4.146 [.000] -0.030 -4.094 [.000] -0.030 -3.465 [.001] -0.029 -1.928 [.054] 
AGE        -0.029 -3.150 [.002] -0.028 -3.061 [.002] -0.040 -3.307 [.001] -0.037 -2.528 [.012] 
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY   0.104 4.736 [.000] 0.104 4.975 [.000] 0.131 5.412 [.000] 0.089 2.144 [.033] 
GROWTH    -0.003 -1.896 [.058] -0.003 -1.907 [.057] -0.004 -3.344 [.001] -0.002 -0.798 [.425] 
PROFITABILITY     -0.654 -6.289 [.000] -0.658 -6.294 [.000] -0.526 -4.129 [.000] -0.809 -4.208 [.000] 
I1 (food & beverages)     -0.069 -2.731 [.006] -0.041 -2.208 [.027] -0.018 -0.793 [.428] -0.092 -2.856 [.004] 
I2 (Textiles) -0.036 -1.522 [.128]          
I3 (Chemicals)         -0.038 -1.797 [.073]          
I4 (Mineral products)        -0.073 -2.561 [.011] -0.045 -1.965 [.050] -0.106 -3.415 [.001] 0.004 0.136 [.892] 
I5 (Metals)         -0.017 -0.649 [.517]          
I6 (Machinery)         -0.103 -4.687 [.000] -0.076 -5.215 [.000] -0.089 -4.982 [.000] -0.069 -2.944 [.003] 
I7 (transport equipment)    -0.065 -2.153 [.031]          
I8 (Misc. manufacturing)   -0.015 -0.511 [.609]          
I9 (Diver. Manufacturing) -0.017 -0.374 [.709]          
I10 (Mining)        -0.081 -1.052 [.293]          
I11 (Electricity)        0.025 0.271 [.786]          
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2); The dependent variable is defined in Panel A of Table 6.2; The 
explanatory variables are defined in Panel B of Table 6.2 
 
WALD TEST  - TESTING SEVERAL COEFFICIENTS JOINTLY [Equation (1) versus Equation (2)]:  
F(8 1453)  Test Statistic: 1.149 Upper tail area: 0.327 
CHOW TEST FOR STABILITY [Equation (2) Versus Equations (3) and (4) separately]:  
F(11 1450) Test Statistic: 4.618 Upper tail area: 0.000 
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Appendix 6C:  The expanded Model (6.2), with alternative debt measures  
 
Table 6C.1: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of LEV1 (Total liabilities / Quasi market value of total assets) on firm and 
group characteristics.  1,384 non-financial BSE listed firms in the Indian Private Sector with y/e March 2000 (of which 472 are 
group-affiliated). 
 
 GENERAL MODEL SPECIFIC MODEL 
Mean of dep. var.  0.679 0.679 
Std. dev. of dep. var. 0.259 0.259 
Sum of squared residuals 53.577 54.439 
Variance of residuals 0.040 0.040 
Std. error of regression 0.200 0.200 
R-squared 0.422 0.413 
Adjusted R-squared 0.404 0.403 
LM het. test  84.963 [.000] 61.065 [.000] 
Jarque-Bera test 67.115 [.000] 87.550 [.000] 
Ramsey's RESET2 70.802 [.000] 45.295 [.000] 
F (zero slopes) 23.305 [.000] 43.461 [.000] 
Schwarz B.I.C. -130.801 -192.090 
Log likelihood 286.305 275.266 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Prob Coeff. t-stat. Prob 
C       0.451 8.892 [.000] 0.457 10.981 [.000] 
GP  0.337 3.419 [.001] 0.284 4.311 [.000] 
HD      -0.020 -0.144 [.886]    
NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD 0.012 1.238 [.216] 0.011 1.201 [.230] 
LIQUIDITY (CA/CL)    -0.002 -2.715 [.007] -0.002 -2.718 [.007] 
INTANGIBILITY  -1.046 -2.067 [.039] -1.095 -2.841 [.005] 
FIRM SIZE 0.046 4.980 [.000] 0.048 5.264 [.000] 
AGE      0.019 1.448 [.148] 0.018 1.880 [.060] 
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY 0.141 5.470 [.000] 0.137 5.435 [.000] 
GROWTH (P/B)   -0.009 -3.567 [.000] -0.010 -4.207 [.000] 
PROFITABILITY   -0.833 -6.134 [.000] -0.875 -7.755 [.000] 
(NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD) x GP  -0.030 -1.980 [.048] -0.028 -2.177 [.030] 
LIQUIDITY x GP  -0.003 -0.845 [.398] -0.006 -1.881 [.060] 
INTANGIBILITY x GP    -0.022 -0.026 [.979]    
(FIRM SIZE) x GP  -0.022 -1.251 [.211] -0.031 -2.274 [.023] 
AGE x GP   -0.012 -0.543 [.587]    
(STOCK ILLIQUIDITY) x GP  -0.108 -2.176 [.030] -0.105 -2.548 [.011] 
GROWTH x GP     -0.010 -0.548 [.584]    
PROFITABILITY x GP  -0.166 -0.603 [.547]    
(NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD) x HD  -0.005 -0.207 [.836]    
LIQUIDITY x HD  -0.004 -0.701 [.483]    
INTANGIBILITY x HD    -2.607 -2.139 [.033] -1.732 -2.323 [.020] 
(FIRM SIZE) x HD  -0.005 -0.188 [.851]    
AGE x HD   0.019 0.606 [.545]    
(STOCK ILLIQUIDITY) x HD  -0.027 -0.363 [.717]    
GROWTH x HD     0.016 0.816 [.415]    
PROFITABILITY x HD  -0.615 -1.969 [.049] -0.698 -3.330 [.001] 
GROUP PROFITABILITY   -0.276 -2.179 [.029] -0.389 -3.181 [.002] 
GROUP LIQUIDITY  -0.008 -1.049 [.294]    
GROUP DEBT   -0.010 -2.415 [.016] -0.009 -3.196 [.001] 
GROUP DIVERSITY  0.020 1.174 [.240]    
GROUP SIZE   -0.014 -1.465 [.143] -0.006 -1.077 [.282] 
I1 (food & beverages)     0.017 0.703 [.482]    
I2 (Textiles) 0.044 1.879 [.060] 0.043 2.660 [.008] 
I3 (Chemicals)         0.010 0.476 [.634]    
I4 (Mineral products)         -0.016 -0.548 [.584]    
I5 (Metals)         0.032 1.342 [.180] 0.032 1.859 [.063] 
I6 (Machinery)         -0.051 -2.135 [.033] -0.049 -2.861 [.004] 
I7 (transport equipment)         0.004 0.139 [.889]    
I8 (Misc. manufacturing)         -0.005 -0.166 [.868]    
I9 (Diver. Manufacturing)         0.050 1.261 [.208] 0.052 1.620 [.105] 
I10 (Mining)        -0.027 -0.337 [.736]    
I11 (Electricity)        0.036 0.465 [.642]    
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2);  All variables are defined in Table 6.2 
 
WALD TEST-For several coefficients jointly: F(20 1342)  Test Statistic: 1.079  Upper tail area: 0.365 
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Table 6C.2:  Ordinary Least Squares regressions of LEV3 (Total debt / Quasi market value of net assets) on firm and group 




 GENERAL MODEL SPECIFIC MODEL 
Mean of dep. var.  0.559 0.559 
Std. dev. of dep. var. 0.293 0.293 
Sum of squared residuals 68.724 69.729 
Variance of residuals 0.051 0.051 
Std. error of regression 0.226 0.226 
R-squared 0.420 0.411 
Adjusted R-squared 0.401 0.401 
LM het. test  3.493 [.062] 0.721 [.396] 
Jarque-Bera test 14.779 [.001] 18.982 [.000] 
Ramsey's RESET2 11.622 [.001] 3.979 [.046] 
F (zero slopes) 23.089 [.000] 41.291 [.000] 
Schwarz B.I.C. 41.494 -17.173 
Log likelihood 114.010 103.965 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Prob Coeff. t-stat. Prob 
C       0.468 8.298 [.000] 0.479 11.379 [.000] 
GP  0.342 2.938 [.003] 0.251 3.896 [.000] 
HD      0.021 0.141 [.888]    
NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD 0.053 5.080 [.000] 0.056 6.012 [.000] 
LIQUIDITY (CA/CL)    -0.001 -2.252 [.024] -0.001 -2.268 [.023] 
INTANGIBILITY  -0.960 -1.760 [.079] -1.061 -2.586 [.010] 
FIRM SIZE 0.030 3.046 [.002] 0.025 3.135 [.002] 
AGE      -0.023 -1.438 [.151] -0.023 -1.976 [.048] 
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY 0.167 5.751 [.000] 0.162 5.766 [.000] 
GROWTH (P/B)   -0.008 -3.612 [.000] -0.008 -4.232 [.000] 
PROFITABILITY   -1.029 -5.849 [.000] -1.095 -7.469 [.000] 
(NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD) x GP  -0.041 -2.171 [.030] -0.052 -5.060 [.000] 
LIQUIDITY x GP  -0.002 -0.586 [.558] -0.004 -1.329 [.184] 
INTANGIBILITY x GP    -0.139 -0.178 [.858]    
(FIRM SIZE) x GP  -0.008 -0.392 [.695]    
AGE x GP   -0.012 -0.492 [.623]    
(STOCK ILLIQUIDITY) x GP  -0.091 -1.544 [.123] -0.088 -1.885 [.060] 
GROWTH x GP     -0.009 -0.522 [.602]    
PROFITABILITY x GP  -0.275 -0.735 [.462]    
(NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD) x HD  -0.003 -0.109 [.913]    
LIQUIDITY x HD  -0.002 -0.277 [.782]    
INTANGIBILITY x HD    -2.470 -2.286 [.022] -1.730 -2.255 [.024] 
(FIRM SIZE) x HD  -0.022 -0.699 [.485]    
AGE x HD   0.046 1.301 [.193] 0.018 1.864 [.062] 
(STOCK ILLIQUIDITY) x HD  -0.090 -1.018 [.309]    
GROWTH x HD     0.014 0.751 [.453]    
PROFITABILITY x HD  -0.737 -1.866 [.062] -0.848 -3.251 [.001] 
GROUP PROFITABILITY   -0.246 -1.661 [.097] -0.329 -2.324 [.020] 
GROUP LIQUIDITY  -0.003 -0.331 [.741]    
GROUP DEBT   -0.010 -1.959 [.050] -0.009 -2.100 [.036] 
GROUP DIVERSITY  0.019 0.970 [.332]    
GROUP SIZE   -0.027 -2.298 [.022] -0.021 -2.338 [.020] 
I1 (food & beverages)     0.063 2.176 [.030] 0.072 3.065 [.002] 
I2 (Textiles) 0.092 3.509 [.000] 0.108 5.403 [.000] 
I3 (Chemicals)         0.044 1.848 [.065] 0.057 3.479 [.001] 
I4 (Mineral products)         -0.022 -0.687 [.492]    
I5 (Metals)         0.058 2.034 [.042] 0.076 3.323 [.001] 
I6 (Machinery)         -0.033 -1.281 [.200]    
I7 (transport equipment)         0.000 0.005 [.996]    
I8 (Misc. manufacturing)         0.040 1.188 [.235] 0.055 1.884 [.060] 
I9 (Diver. Manufacturing)         0.025 0.400 [.689]    
I10 (Mining)        0.000 -0.003 [.998]    
I11 (Electricity)        0.019 0.231 [.818]    
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2);  All variables are defined in Table 6.2 
 




Table 6C.3: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of LEV4  (Total debt / Quasi market value of capital) on firm and group 
characteristics.  1,384 non-financial BSE listed firms in the Indian Private Sector with y/e March 2000 (of which 472 are 
group-affiliated). 
 
 GENERAL MODEL SPECIFIC MODEL 
Mean of dep. var.  0.578 0.578 
Std. dev. of dep. var. 0.295 0.295 
Sum of squared residuals 70.860 72.723 
Variance of residuals 0.053 0.053 
Std. error of regression 0.230 0.231 
R-squared 0.412 0.396 
Adjusted R-squared 0.393 0.388 
LM het. test  11.956  [.001] 3.605   [.058] 
Jarque-Bera test 21.392   [.000] 26.989  [.000] 
Ramsey's RESET2 13.494   [.000] 4.244   [.040] 
F (zero slopes) 22.329   [.000] 49.731  [.000] 
Schwarz B.I.C. 62.673 -6.160 
Log likelihood 92.831 74.871 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Prob Coeff. t-stat. Prob 
C       0.457 8.046 [.000] 0.460 14.313 [.000] 
GP  0.309 2.615 [.009]    
HD      0.055 0.364 [.716]    
NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD 0.051 4.882 [.000] 0.051 5.511 [.000] 
LIQUIDITY (CA/CL)    -0.002 -2.295 [.022] -0.002 -2.325 [.020] 
INTANGIBILITY  -0.992 -1.818 [.069] -1.102 -2.730 [.006] 
FIRM SIZE 0.033 3.325 [.001] 0.027 3.407 [.001] 
AGE      -0.014 -0.894 [.371]    
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY 0.171 5.837 [.000] 0.132 5.419 [.000] 
GROWTH (P/B)   -0.008 -3.625 [.000] -0.009 -4.168 [.000] 
PROFITABILITY   -1.004 -5.938 [.000] -1.097 -7.759 [.000] 
(NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD) x GP  -0.047 -2.497 [.013] -0.050 -5.488 [.000] 
LIQUIDITY x GP  -0.001 -0.343 [.732]    
INTANGIBILITY x GP    -0.198 -0.235 [.814]    
(FIRM SIZE) x GP  -0.006 -0.288 [.774]    
AGE x GP   -0.003 -0.130 [.897]    
(STOCK ILLIQUIDITY) x GP  -0.105 -1.756 [.079]    
GROWTH x GP     -0.010 -0.540 [.589]    
PROFITABILITY x GP  -0.295 -0.825 [.409]    
(NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD) x HD  0.002 0.075 [.940]    
LIQUIDITY x HD  -0.003 -0.390 [.697]    
INTANGIBILITY x HD    -2.628 -2.272 [.023] -2.138 -2.687 [.007] 
(FIRM SIZE) x HD  -0.026 -0.828 [.408]    
AGE x HD   0.037 1.023 [.307]    
(STOCK ILLIQUIDITY) x HD  -0.080 -0.883 [.377]    
GROWTH x HD     0.015 0.775 [.439]    
PROFITABILITY x HD  -0.716 -1.872 [.061] -0.934 -3.753 [.000] 
GROUP PROFITABILITY   -0.299 -1.987 [.047] -0.485 -3.513 [.000] 
GROUP LIQUIDITY  -0.003 -0.309 [.758]    
GROUP DEBT   -0.010 -1.903 [.057] -0.011 -2.985 [.003] 
GROUP DIVERSITY  0.021 1.042 [.298]    
GROUP SIZE   -0.026 -2.175 [.030] 0.008 3.210 [.001] 
I1 (food & beverages)     0.055 1.887 [.059] 0.054 2.242 [.025] 
I2 (Textiles) 0.082 3.062 [.002] 0.086 4.255 [.000] 
I3 (Chemicals)         0.036 1.481 [.139] 0.042 2.418 [.016] 
I4 (Mineral products)         -0.030 -0.918 [.359]    
I5 (Metals)         0.048 1.663 [.097] 0.050 2.156 [.031] 
I6 (Machinery)         -0.037 -1.433 [.152] -0.035 -1.732 [.084] 
I7 (transport equipment)         0.005 0.148 [.882]    
I8 (Misc. manufacturing)         0.030 0.853 [.394]    
I9 (Diver. Manufacturing)         0.018 0.285 [.776]    
I10 (Mining)        -0.001 -0.009 [.992]    
I11 (Electricity)        0.024 0.275 [.783]    
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2);  All variables are defined in Table 6.2 
 
WALD TEST-For several coefficients jointly: F(24 1342) Test Statistic: 1.470 Upper tail area: 0.067 
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Table 6C.4: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of LONG TERM DEBT (Long term debt including preference capital/ Quasi 
market value of capital) on firm and group characteristics.  1,384 non-financial BSE listed firms in the Indian Private Sector 
with y/e March 2000 (of which 472 are group-affiliated). 
 
 GENERAL MODEL SPECIFIC MODEL 
Mean of dep. var.  0.329 0.329 
Std. dev. of dep. var. 0.245 0.245 
Sum of squared residuals 55.684 56.741 
Variance of residuals 0.042 0.042 
Std. error of regression 0.204 0.204 
R-squared 0.327 0.314 
Adjusted R-squared 0.305 0.304 
LM het. test  12.610  [.000] 22.888  [.000] 
Jarque-Bera test 17.764   [.000] 21.777  [.000] 
Ramsey's RESET2 11.020   [.001] 4.001  [.046] 
F (zero slopes) 15.483   [.000] 31.162  [.000] 
Schwarz B.I.C. -104.108 -170.654 
Log likelihood 259.612 246.598 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Prob Coeff. t-stat. Prob 
C       0.540 11.622 [.000] 0.555 14.738 [.000] 
GP  0.183 1.535 [.125] 0.091 5.601 [.000] 
HD      0.047 0.269 [.788]    
NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD 0.093 10.580 [.000] 0.090 11.276 [.000] 
LIQUIDITY (CA/CL)    -0.001 -1.810 [.071] -0.001 -1.906 [.057] 
INTANGIBILITY  -0.432 -1.510 [.131] -0.547 -2.383 [.017] 
FIRM SIZE -0.030 -3.365 [.001] -0.031 -3.973 [.000] 
AGE      -0.039 -3.250 [.001] -0.042 -4.360 [.000] 
STOCK ILLIQUIDITY 0.136 5.427 [.000] 0.108 4.796 [.000] 
GROWTH (P/B)   -0.004 -3.559 [.000] -0.005 -4.008 [.000] 
PROFITABILITY   -0.533 -4.142 [.000] -0.573 -5.564 [.000] 
(NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD) x GP  -0.036 -1.830 [.067] -0.023 -3.011 [.003] 
LIQUIDITY x GP  0.001 0.342 [.732]    
INTANGIBILITY x GP    -0.318 -0.709 [.478]    
(FIRM SIZE) x GP  0.011 0.511 [.609]    
AGE x GP   -0.026 -1.110 [.267]    
(STOCK ILLIQUIDITY) x GP  -0.053 -1.059 [.290]    
GROWTH x GP     -0.008 -0.660 [.510]    
PROFITABILITY x GP  -0.162 -0.651 [.515]    
(NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD) x HD  0.020 0.588 [.556]    
LIQUIDITY x HD  -0.013 -2.006 [.045] -0.009 -2.280 [.023] 
INTANGIBILITY x HD    -2.261 -2.422 [.016] -1.531 -2.077 [.038] 
(FIRM SIZE) x HD  -0.049 -1.356 [.175]    
AGE x HD   0.064 1.566 [.118]    
(STOCK ILLIQUIDITY) x HD  -0.194 -1.439 [.150]    
GROWTH x HD     0.012 0.913 [.361]    
PROFITABILITY x HD  0.023 0.045 [.964]    
GROUP PROFITABILITY   -0.285 -1.781 [.075] -0.320 -2.295 [.022] 
GROUP LIQUIDITY  -0.001 -0.166 [.868]    
GROUP DEBT   -0.009 -2.174 [.030] -0.009 -3.180 [.002] 
GROUP DIVERSITY  0.023 1.116 [.265]    
GROUP SIZE   -0.007 -0.569 [.569]    
I1 (food & beverages)     -0.067 -2.539 [.011] -0.058 -2.728 [.006] 
I2 (Textiles) -0.048 -1.979 [.048] -0.034 -1.814 [.070] 
I3 (Chemicals)         -0.046 -2.093 [.037] -0.035 -2.159 [.031] 
I4 (Mineral products)         -0.085 -2.897 [.004] -0.071 -2.946 [.003] 
I5 (Metals)         -0.031 -1.143 [.253]    
I6 (Machinery)         -0.114 -4.999 [.000] -0.099 -5.771 [.000] 
I7 (transport equipment)         -0.070 -2.178 [.030] -0.065 -2.389 [.017] 
I8 (Misc. manufacturing)         -0.011 -0.372 [.710]    
I9 (Diver. Manufacturing)         -0.013 -0.260 [.795]    
I10 (Mining)        -0.065 -0.693 [.488]    
I11 (Electricity)        0.071 0.828 [.408]    
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent (HCTYPE=2);  All variables are defined in Table 6.2 
 
WALD TEST-For several coefficients jointly: F(22 1342)Test Statistic: 1.158  Upper tail area: 0.277 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
7.1  The aim 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to summarise the key findings of the study and to 
offer some possible research ideas for future work.  The first task is thus to briefly restate 
the purpose and approach of each chapter, emphasising the main results and conclusions.  
This will be followed by the concluding section, which highlights some promising 
research ideas as were mentioned at chapters’ ends.  
 
7.2  Key findings 
After a brief introduction, the study turns, in Chapter 2, to a survey on the dividend 
puzzle.  Particularly, Chapter 2 begins by introducing the main theoretical and empirical 
work on the question of how dividend policy affects firm value.  The leading theories of 
dividend include the transaction cost theory, the tax hypothesis, the bird in the hand 
argument, and signalling and agency theories.  Discussed in length is the Lintner’s (1956) 
survey on the dividend decision process of US managers, as this is a point of reference 
for many subsequent studies, particularly those that focus on the signalling role of 
dividends.  It is noted that the empirical literature has recorded systematic variations in 
dividend behaviour across firms, countries and time, as well as in the type of dividend 
paid.  Such variation can be expected in imperfect markets that are distorted by taxes, 
464 
transaction costs, information asymmetries and agency conflicts.  The chapter ends with 
an inconclusive verdict on the dividend puzzle.  In particular it is stated that despite of 
four decades of theoretical debate, and after very many attempts to empirically validate 
the various theories, the pile of evidence collected is not conclusive on the determinants 
of dividend policy.   Indeed, nor does it fully clarify the impact of dividend policy on 
firm value.   
Following Chapter 2, the remaining four chapters are empirical in nature.  In 
Chapter 3 a specific agency model of dividends is applied to Indian data extracted from 
the PROWESS database, by way of cross sectional Weighted Least Squares 
methodology.  The data span the five years’ period from 1994 to 1998 and the sample 
includes 910 Private Sector firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange.  The chapter 
innovates on similar studies by introducing second power and interaction terms, as well 
as a number of new explanatory variables such as government and foreign holdings.  The 
reported results are consistent with the idea that Private Sector firms in India set their 
target payout ratios so as to minimise the sum of agency costs and the costs associated 
with raising external finance.  In particular insider ownership and debt levels, being 
alternative measures for controlling conflicts between managers and shareholders, are 
shown to have a negative impact on the payout ratio.  Similarly, risk and growth tend to 
have a negative impact on the payout ratio because these variables increase dependency 
on external finance and the associated transaction costs.  In contrast, ownership 
dispersion increases the free rider problem while foreign ownership reduces the ability to 
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monitor managers.  Hence these two variables tend to positively impact the payout ratio.  
Furthermore, unlike most studies, firm size appears to reduce the payout ratio, while the 
impact of institutional ownership is not persistent.  Finally the study shows that the 
percentage of shares held by central and state governments is an important determinant of 
the firm’s target payout ratio.  In particular it is shown that government holdings tends to 
reduce the payout ratio and it is suggested that this is due to the implications of such 
holdings on agency costs. 
While Chapter 3 as well as the other empirical chapters in this study, are Indian 
based, Chapter 4 is unique in that it is African based.  Specifically Chapter 4 utilises the 
most comprehensive database on non-financial listed companies in Mauritius, in order to 
empirically study the determinants of capital structure of these firms.  The theory of 
capital structure is critically reviewed and used to develop a theoretical model, which 
predicts the main determinants of the level of debt in the capital structure.  The model is 
then empirically estimated and tested on a sample of 24 firms first as a cross-section on 
each year from 1992 to 1999, and second as a panel over the period 1992 – 2000.  It is 
illustrated that the factors previously found to be important in determining the capital 
structures of firms in other countries, have similar influence on the capital structures of 
Mauritian firms.  First, age is found to have a negative impact on leverage, and this is 
consistent with the notion that mature firms have greater access to the capital market, 
which in Mauritius is dominated by equity as opposed to debentures.  Second, 
profitability and risk provide weak evidence of having negative impact on debt capacity, 
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which is consistent with pecking order and trade off considerations respectively.  Third 
size provides strong evidence of having a positive impact on debt, which may be due to 
control considerations.   Specifically, firms achieve larger size through debt financing 
because dilution of control is an important factor for the predominantly family owned 
groups that characterise the Mauritian business environment.  Indeed, this control-based 
rationale for the positive impact of size on leverage can also explain the positive sign 
recorded for the growth variable.  Fourth, and last, the non-debt tax shield and the asset 
tangibility variables are shown to enter with positive and negative signs respectively, 
which contradicts the trade off based predictions.  However, it is noted that this could be 
due to the improper selection of proxies, which may also explain the perverse sign on the 
proxy for the industry-imposed level of credit given to debtors.  In summary, the findings 
support the notion that the trade off, pecking order, and agency theories, as well as 
control considerations have an important role in explaining the capital structure decision.  
The last two empirical chapters investigate the Indian Business House structure.  
Business groups are an important feature of many developed and developing markets but 
relatively little attention has been paid to them in the theoretical and empirical literature. 
Chapter 5 synthesises the transaction cost theory of dividend policy with the market 
failure and political economy theories of business groups in emerging markets. While the 
former theory suggests that dividend policy is inversely related to dependency on external 
finance, the latter theories imply that dividend policies of group-affiliated firms are 
mainly determined by group considerations.  The sample consists of 1412 non-financial 
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firms with data related to the year 2000.   Particularly the sample comprises 858 
independent firms and 554 group-affiliated firms, and is refined from the universe of all 
quoted Indian Private Sector firms available on the PROWESS database.   However, in 
order to measure business groups’ size and diversification levels, the sample is not 
restricted to firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange.  Indeed, for that purpose a 
second sample of 2042 group-affiliated firms is drawn from the PROWESS total 
population of 6548 quoted and unquoted Indian Private Sector firms.  The first stage of 
the empirical procedure includes some preliminary tests to determine whether the 
dividend policies of group-affiliated firms are substantially different from that of 
independent firms.  The second stage of the empirical procedure includes application of 
Maximum Likelihood binary and limited dependent variable econometric techniques to 
the data.  The aim is to disentangle the determinants of dividend policy of group-
affiliated versus independent firms.  In general, the results suggest that while the decision 
to pay dividend is sensitive to transaction cost considerations regardless of group-
affiliation, the payout level of group-affiliated firms is less sensitive to transaction cost 
considerations compared with the case of independent firms. 
Chapter 6 is the final empirical chapter and is similar to chapter 5 in that it 
synthesises two strands of the corporate finance literature. The two strands include the 
literature on business groups and the literature on the determinants of capital structure. 
This synthesis is then used to explain variation in the debt levels of group-affiliated and 
non-affiliated firms and to generate some plausible models that explain the capital 
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structure decisions of these two categories of firms.  The empirical procedures utilise a 
sample of 1811 Indian Private Sector, non-financial firms, which is extracted from the 
PROWESS database.  The firms in the sample have a year ending of March 2000, and 
comprise 1146 non group-affiliated firms and 665 firms that are affiliated with Indian 
Business Houses.  It is shown by way of comparison analysis that significant differences 
exist between the debt levels of group and non-group firms as well as between firms that 
are affiliated with groups at various levels of diversification.  These results are further 
reinforced by the conclusions from an Ordinary Least Squares multivariate analysis, 
which involves the estimation of two models on slightly smaller samples.   The main 
results from the multivariate analysis can be summarised in five points as follows.  First 
the alternative tax shield proxy is the only variable whose sign is found to be opposite to 
expectations.  Second, it is found that firm size and growth are unimportant for the capital 
structure decisions of group-affiliated firms, while they are critical for the leverage 
decisions of independent firms.  Third, no major differences are recorded between group 
and non-group firms in terms of the impact of age and stock illiquidity on capital 
structure decisions.  Fourth, liquidity, asset structure, and profitability appear to have 
stronger impact on the capital structure decisions of group-affiliated firms compared with 
non-affiliated firms.  Fifth, it is shown that consistent with the market failure theory of 
business groups, group-affiliated firms appear to share tangible and intangible assets so 
that group-wide factors enter the capital structure decisions of these firms.  
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The conclusions from Chapter 6, as well as those from the rest of the chapters, are 
only valid to the extent that the sample selection procedures produce a representative 
sample of the population on which the conclusions are drawn.  Further the validity of the 
results and conclusions are subject to the quality and accuracy of the data and of the 
empirical procedures.  These results and conclusions should be rebuffed or reinforced by 
future research, suggestions for which are summarised in the next section.  
 
7.3 Promising research ideas 
Chapters 2 to 6 end with ideas for future research and the main suggestions from each are 
briefly repeated here, starting with Chapter 2.   In that chapter a problem is identified 
which surfaces again in later chapters and concerns the difficulty in distinguishing 
between competing theories.   A possible solution for this is offered at the end of Chapter 
2.  Specifically it is suggested that future research should exploit institutional differences 
across countries to understand better the factors that influence corporate financial 
decisions.  Furthermore, based on La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(2000), it is noted that cross-country comparisons can also assist in establishing fine 
distinctions between various under-themes within major theories.  
 In Chapter 3 a call was made for a system of equations that allows the dividend 
decision, the capital structure decision, and ownership structure patterns to be 
simultaneously determined. It was also suggested to replace cross sectional data that is 
averaged over time with panel data and a panel procedure that allows for time effects.  
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Although obtaining data from emerging markets with adequate time series for this 
purpose can be problematic such a procedure should permit trends over time to be 
observed.  
Another promising research idea, which is noted at the end of Chapter 4, is to 
investigate capital structure decisions of unlisted as opposed to quoted companies.  In the 
context of emerging markets where non-quoted firms constitute a large fraction of 
companies, understanding how this sector undertake financial decisions should prove 
valuable.  Further, as in many emerging markets (albeit not in India) the size of samples 
that includes only quoted companies are likely to be small and not necessarily to reflect 
the economy as a whole.  Thus expanding the sample by including non-quoted firms 
should be beneficial for empirical inferences.  
Chapter 5 advances two promising future research ideas relating to business 
groups.  First it is noted that business groups may be changing in response to major 
changes that many emerging markets are going through.  Thus studying the 
responsiveness of business groups to changing environments should give a clue as to the 
reason for their emergence, the efficiency of this corporate structure and to their future 
fate.  Second, it is noted that although the results from the empirical investigations show 
that the dividend decisions of group-affiliated firms are less sensitive to transaction costs 
considerations, the issue of what determines the dividend policies of these firms was not 
addressed. Thus another promising research idea is to model the dividend policy 
decisions of group-affiliated firms.   
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It should be noted, however, that obtaining data at the group level for the purpose 
of investigation, or even simply identifying the group with which a firm is associated 
could prove to be a difficult task in many markets.  Granovetter (1995) terms this the 
invisible problem of business groups, which may be due, for instance to the fact that the 
business group organisation typically does not have a legal structure.  In India, for 
instance there is no legal requirements for groups to provide group-accounts, and in Chile 
due to pyramiding, Granovetter (1995) notes that it can be extremely difficult to identify 
the family controlling the group.  Chapter 6 notes these problems but nonetheless 
concludes that further research into the workings of business groups and how this 
organisational structure impacts corporate financial decisions, is clearly required.  
Chapter 6 further identifies the weakness of using data on a single year and proposes that 
subject to data availability, this short fall should also be addressed by future studies.  
  In sum, there are plenty of interesting avenues which future research into the 
financing decisions of firms in general and in emerging markets in particular, could and 
no doubt will take.  Thus the final word on the subject is yet to be known.   
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